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Abstract
Maintaining accessibility to and understanding of digital information over time is a complex
challenge that often requires contributions and interventions from a variety of individuals
and organizations. The processes of preservation planning and evaluation are fundamentally
implicit and share similar complexity. Both demand comprehensive knowledge and under-
standing of every aspect of to-be-preserved content and the contexts within which preserva-
tion is undertaken. Consequently, means are required for the identification, documentation
and association of those properties of data, representation and management mechanisms that
in combination lend value, facilitate interaction and influence the preservation process. These
properties may be almost limitless in terms of diversity, but are integral to the establishment
of classes of risk exposure, and the planning and deployment of appropriate preservation
strategies.
We explore several research objectives within the course of this thesis. Our main objective
is the conception of an ontology for risk management of digital collections. Incorporated
within this are our aims to survey the contexts within which preservation has been under-
taken successfully, the development of an appropriate methodology for risk management,
the evaluation of existing preservation evaluation approaches and metrics, the structuring
of best practice knowledge and lastly the demonstration of a range of tools that utilise our
findings.
We describe a mixed methodology that uses interview and survey, extensive content analysis,
practical case study and iterative software and ontology development. We build on a robust
foundation, the development of the Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assess-
ment.
We summarise the extent of the challenge facing the digital preservation community (and
by extension users and creators of digital materials from many disciplines and operational
contexts) and present the case for a comprehensive and extensible knowledge base of best
practice. These challenges are manifested in the scale of data growth, the increasing com-
plexity and the increasing onus on communities with no formal training to offer assurances
of data management and sustainability. These collectively imply a challenge that demands
an intuitive and adaptable means of evaluating digital preservation efforts. The need for
individuals and organisations to validate the legitimacy of their own efforts is particularly
prioritised.
We introduce our approach, based on risk management. Risk is an expression of the like-
lihood of a negative outcome, and an expression of the impact of such an occurrence. We
describe how risk management may be considered synonymous with preservation activity, a
persistent effort to negate the dangers posed to information availability, usability and sustain-
ability. Risk can be characterised according to associated goals, activities, responsibilities
and policies in terms of both their manifestation and mitigation. They have the capacity to
be deconstructed into their atomic units and responsibility for their resolution delegated ap-
propriately. We continue to describe how the manifestation of risks typically spans an entire
organisational environment, and as the focus of our analysis risk safeguards against omis-
sions that may occur when pursuing functional, departmental or role-based assessment. We
discuss the importance of relating risk-factors, through the risks themselves or associated
system elements. To do so will yield the preservation best-practice knowledge base that is
conspicuously lacking within the international digital preservation community.
We present as research outcomes an encapsulation of preservation practice (and explicitly
defined best practice) as a series of case studies, in turn distilled into atomic, related infor-
mation elements. We conduct our analyses in the formal evaluation of memory institutions
in the UK, US and continental Europe. Furthermore we showcase a series of applications
that use the fruits of this research as their intellectual foundation. Finally we document our
results in a range of technical reports and conference and journal articles.
We present evidence of preservation approaches and infrastructures from a series of case
studies conducted in a range of international preservation environments. We then aggregate
this into a linked data structure entitled PORRO, an ontology relating preservation repos-
itory, object and risk characteristics, intended to support preservation decision making and
evaluation. The methodology leading to this ontology is outlined, and lessons are exposed by
revisiting legacy studies and exposing the resource and associated applications to evaluation
by the digital preservation community.
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Introduction
1.1 Research Problem and Motivation
Managing and maintaining the accessibility and utility of digital materials is a pressing chal-
lenge in today’s data driven world. Irrespective of whether one speaks of digital preservation,
curation or data management, each task implies a similar set of responsibilities, and a focus
on facilitating both contemporaneous information use and safeguarding opportunities for
continued consumption many years into the future. Within this thesis we use a number of
terms broadly interchangeably, favouring their most demanding definitions, encapsulating
sustainability as a critical benchmark.
In 2011 the International Data Corporation presented estimates suggesting that the Digi-
tal Universe, the full extent of digital content collections throughout the world, would that
year exceed 1.8 million petabytes, a reported 62 per cent increase from the previous year
[Gantz and Reinsel, 2011]. Further estimates hinted at an expected 44-fold increase to 35
million petabytes by 2020. These difficult-to-comprehend figures can be lent some physi-
cality; the 2010 figure would be roughly equivalent to a stack of DVD’s that stretched to the
moon and back. The 2020 projections would take that DVD stack half way to Mars. The
scale and rapidity of growth associated with our digital information pose several problems,
including concerns over information security, power dependency and the costs of data man-
agement. However, there is no corresponding growth forecast for custodians of this data;
despite the dramatic increase in the scale, the number of IT staff is expected to expand only
around 1.5 times by 2020. The purpose of the IDC report was principally to illustrate the
challenges of information discovery, but it also throws into sharp relief the challenges as-
sociated with maintaining access to such large and rapidly expanding datasets. Dedicated
and professional expertise is diminishing, meaning that creators and users of data are in-
creasingly responsible for ensuring their longevity. However, these communities appear to
lack curatorial capacity, demonstrated clearly in the results of surveys conducted within this
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research and described in sections to follow. Digital preservation and curation are active
and not passive processes. Benign neglect of digital materials will seldom result in usable,
accessible content in years to come as technology, law and culture change.
Given the scale of data growth we are seeing it is impossible to rely solely upon the propor-
tionately diminishing numbers of trained data managers and digital archivists to safeguard
the body of digital heritage. Instead we observe a culture now where the numbers of those
with digital custodial responsibility has increased more or less in line with the changing
data landscape. Rarely however is such responsibility wilfully embraced - it is more often
foisted onto those with no professional interest - or particular competency - in such matters.
Increasing numbers of institutions are being required to grasp the challenge of maintain-
ing accessible and available data. In the UK, policies such as those issued in 2012 by the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Data Centre and in 2015 by the Economic and Social
Research Council require universities and research organisations to establish their own pro-
cesses and infrastructure to safeguard and ensure the continued availability of data generated
as part of funded research. Despite the continued existence of dedicated, expert preservation
and curation environments provided by funders such as the Natural Environment Research
Council (NERC), science research has been characterised by its increasing data demands.
Data curation and management have become necessary and explicit parts of interrogating
and manipulating datasets in the new big data context, even in a contemporary sense as the
speed of collection threatens to outpace that of data analysis. Research data management is
to some extent becoming accepted as a core competency of the scientific process. Even those
disciplinary areas that one may intuitively expect to have less onerous data requirements are
embracing data as a key ingredient in the pursuit of research. Humanities institutions face
complex challenges with issues such as copyright introducing challenges to the digitisation
and distribution of textual materials [Stobo et al., 2013]. Custodial organisations such as the
Arts and Humanities Data are long gone [Open Objects Blog, 2008], with institutions them-
selves expected to be responsible for maintaining the data their research generates. Social
scientists (both qualitative and quantitative) have similarly expanding data and data man-
agement requirements. Chapter two details our survey and interview series conducted at
the London School of Economics in 2012 which illustrate attitudes, competencies and ex-
pectations of a range of social science scholars (comprising several disciplines and levels
of seniority) associated with managing and sharing data. Their opinions of existing support
provisions and possible policy directions are illustrative of the current demands.
There are few resources available that provide the new data custodian with the definitive and
relevant information they require to help them understand these issues. Among the most no-
table are international standards such as the Reference Model for an Open Archival Informa-
tion System (OAIS) [ISO 14721, 2012] and Audit and Certification Criteria for Trustworthy
Digital Repositories [ISO 16363, 2012] but their form is such that in many cases under-
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standing their practical applicability can be challenging. Likewise, these standards appear to
assume homogeneity across preserving organisations that in reality can differ dramatically
in terms of legislative context, scale, funding and content coverage.
Other efforts have sought to model digital preservation systems in a variety of ways, includ-
ing high level reference models [Candela et al., 2008, Antunes et al., 2011], enterprise archi-
tecture components [Becker et al., 2011] and data dictionaries [Library of Congress, 2008].
More generic materials are also relevant, including international standards on topics like in-
formation security [ISO 27001, 2005] and legal admissibility of evidence [BS 10008, 2008]
as well as general organisational framework architectures [Zachman, 1987]. Few effectively
bridge the gap between academic theory and practical applicability.
A challenge for those with custodial responsibility has been to distil the tremendous body
of literature that exists into a coherent set of requirements that can inform their develop-
ments and facilitate their validation [Sinclair et al., 2009, Waller et al., 2006]. That reposi-
tories have such potential for variety increases the difficulties associated with presenting a
coherent resource with minimal redundancy. Therefore a fit-for-purpose approach is one that
is adaptable to the changing circumstances evident across the repository landscape and over
time.
A Risk Based Approach
Understanding how to preserve implies an understanding of how to assess our efforts. In the
course of this and earlier research, we have developed the concept of risk as a critical compo-
nent in the determination of preservation capacity and in the validation of preservation solu-
tions [McHugh et al., 2007, Ahmed et al., 2007, Barateiro et al., 2012, Lawrence et al., 2000,
Moore et al., 2005]. We define risk as an expression of the likelihood and impact of an event
with the potential to influence the achievement of objectives, the success of actions or the
sustainability of resources [McHugh et al., 2007]. We favour a view of risk whereby active
preservation planning and infrastructural development can be considered synonymous with
risk management. The identification and successful management of risk pre-empts the loss
of information. In a contemporary sense, definitively demonstrating success or failure is
impossible, given that digital preservation is so temporally dependent. For those with the
responsibility to preserve, a registry of managed risks offers the next best thing. Risks (a
negative element) can be conceptually paired with units of value which are effectively their
converse. These units of value amount to individual preservation goals. Our thesis assumes
that the mitigation of a specific risk is equivalent to the accomplishment of a corresponding
preservation goal. Risk appetite, and risk management capacity are measures of preservation
success.
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The approach fits well because digital information is at risk, irrespective of whether it is be-
ing actively used, modified or manipulated. Technological, organisational, social, legal and
financial issues all act individually and conspiratorially to limit access to and interpretability
of our collective digital memory. Even where data remain static the contextual factors that
facilitate or inhibit their usability and availability continue to change. High dependencies on
digitally encoded data in commercial, personal and scientific contexts demand approaches
and methods to safeguard their availability over time.
Despite an increasingly intensified research agenda focused on overcoming the issue of dig-
ital obsolescence, our understanding of information vulnerabilities and of causal links be-
tween environmental or object-specific properties and information loss remains rudimentary.
While individual facets, such as format characteristics [Abrams and Seaman, 2003] or leg-
islative responsibilities [Oltmans, 2003] are in isolation well understood, a holistic and con-
tinuous understanding is missing. The digital preservation community is large and varied,
and a common knowledge base profoundly absent. Even within single environments there
is complexity in terms of organization, technology and priorities. A macro understanding
of the relationships that exist both within and between preservation environments permits
greater overall understanding of risk and of the implications of particular preservation in-
teractions. Given the burden of expectation that now falls on ill-equipped data creators and
users as often as on a proportionally diminishing community of data custodians, a linked,
coherent picture of digital information custodial best practice becomes critically important;
this is the role of this thesis.
Research Questions
Given this context, we define several research questions to inform our efforts. Firstly, can we
develop an effective online tool to support the development and evaluation of preservation
efforts? Secondly, can we collect data illustrative of real world processes and supporting
infrastructures for preservation? Next, can we analyse that data, to make sense of it and
draw a correspondence with risk exposure and resolution? Can we take these data and our
experience of their collection to reflect on the suitability and value of existing preservation
evaluation metrics? Can we develop from the data a structured knowledge base capable of
interrogation and integration with a wider range of applications? Finally, can we develop
novel tools that effectively validate its usefulness?
1.2 Research Objectives
In pursuit of the resolution of these research questions we present a series of corresponding
objectives. Collectively, they may be summarised as the conception of a comprehensive on-
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tology for risk management of digital collections. The principal problems associated with
the current data landscape are its vast, unconnected knowledge base and a set of core guide-
lines that remain opaque and difficult to understand in practical terms by even experienced
preservation practitioners [Ockerbloom, 2008]. We seek to deliver mechanisms by which
this knowledge can be rigorously validated, structured and ultimately applied.
To satisfy our first research question we will develop an associated methodology, charac-
terised as an interactive online tool, for undertaking risk management within such contexts.
That is, we aim to streamline and systematise the process of infrastructural assessment and
to make the practical more elegantly interlaced with the theoretical. Its accomplishment
presupposes and encapsulates a process for organisational analysis and evaluation.
Using this methodology, we will address our second research question, surveying a range
of repository services within which data is created, used and preserved. We will do this via
primary onsite research and by analysing self-evaluation responses contributed via the online
tools we have developed. We will target a selection of organisations that exhibit diversity
in terms including but not limited to geographic location, legal jurisdiction, disciplinary
association, collection type, budgetary model and scale.
With respect to our third research question we will establish by analysing these surveys a
definitive understanding of best practice for preservation, and of issues that limit productiv-
ity, introduce additional resource costs or threaten the availability and accessibility of our
valuable digital heritage.
Our fourth research question concerns existing approaches; we will evaluate several existing
methodologies and criteria for undertaking preservation assessment. Among the most no-
table are a range of international formalised and de facto standards for preservation certifica-
tion. This thesis will explore their qualities, most significantly their breadth of applicability
and perceived utility. We remain conscious throughout that any new developments are most
likely to enjoy success if compatible with and complementary to the strengths of existing
provisions.
To meet the challenges of our fifth research question we will structure and present best prac-
tice knowledge in a suitable taxonomical and ontological format. Again its success will be
dependent not only on the extent to which the knowledge contained within is exhaustive
and definitive, but in terms of its usability and value. Associated with this will be a re-
lational model designed to express the circumstances within which preservation activities,
investments or regulatory requirements intersect with associated risk. Its success implies the
ability to traverse bi-directionally - to be able to identify best practice approaches to resolve
known risks, and to identify what risks may threaten a preservation context that employs
particular tools, strategies or policies.
Our approach with respect to our final research question will be to develop, showcase and
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
evaluate a selection of practical tools that use this structured knowledge, evaluating their per-
formance in individual production environments and research contexts. These will facilitate
preservation management and data curation for both generic and specialist users. The latter
group includes 3D model curators and research data management professionals.
We will present a view of preservation that is largely bottom-up, taking its inspiration from
findings of a series of investigations undertaken in an international selection of preservation
contexts. Acknowledging existing work that has been done (notably in the area of preserva-
tion repository certification) we do not present our findings in isolation, but seek to illustrate
their relatable qualities. We align conceptual elements to existing criteria within the Trust-
worthy Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Checklist (TRAC) [CRL/RLG, 2007]
in order to illustrate their usefulness in expansion and validation of this and similar top-down
resources.
1.3 Methodology
We adopted a mixed method approach in pursuit of our outcomes. Survey and detailed
analysis work at participating institutions provided our starting point, involving extensive
questionnaire and interview techniques, observed and stated behaviour. Detailed analyses
were undertaken of organisational and technical documentation to build institutional per-
spectives that provided a basis for discussion and additional interrogation during on-site ac-
tivities. We also took the opportunity to evaluate responses submitted to the online DRAMB-
ORA Interactive self-evaluation tool that we developed during the course of this research.
DRAMBORA is the Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assessment, which with
colleagues we conceived to address shortcomings in existing audit methodologies. Its in-
teractive self-evaluation tool was developed to lend usability and connectivity to those or-
ganisations using it to direct their self-assessment work. Over one hundred full evaluations
have been conducted using that platform by an internationally diverse range of information
custodians.
A methodology to perform risk management was continuously shaped in the course of these
activities and by reflecting on comparisons with other complementary standards. Litera-
ture reviews of existing standards and their evidential foundations were developed. Liaison
with the individuals participating in pilot assessments and the wider community provided a
means to ensure that the best practice we sought to document remained representative. We
employed available audit standards such as TRAC [CRL/RLG, 2007] to inform the assess-
ments. We were able to critically appraise not only the institutions being audited, but also the
metrics upon which these audits were based. Those who were the focus of our assessments
were typically quick to identify any shortcomings of the benchmarks we sought to measure
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them against.
Taxonomy and ontology development are inevitably iterative processes. Field and desk re-
search yielded high level classifications of preservation elements, the building blocks of the
preservation process. Goals, Activities, Resources, Policies and Rights became increasingly
expressive means to understand the connectivity between parts of the preservation system.
Our analyses were coded to isolate discrete examples of each and an interactive tool was
developed using semantic markup software to formalise relationships between individual
abstract instances. This was iteratively developed, with reference to existing practice data
and top-down resources such as the various international standards that steer preservation ef-
forts. A suite of tools was built to facilitate the construction of a relational ontology structure
and this in turn provided the basis for a selection of applications that use the data.
Evaluation of the resource was undertaken with consideration of a further range of institu-
tional audits, both our own and administered elsewhere, in order to understand the compre-
hensiveness of the ontology’s coverage and its applicability. The ontology and its associated
applications were also evaluated against a further program of institutional assessment, with
the results revealing their value and perceived value from a range of participating stakehold-
ers.
1.4 Research Outcomes
The principle contributions of this thesis are manifold. The first is an encapsulation of digital
preservation practice and best practice presented as a series of case studies of exhaustive
analyses of a range of preservation services. These relate to work undertaken in a series of
UK, European and US funded projects and correspond to data preserving organisations that
vary in terms of jurisdiction, content types, scale and maturity.
Developed iteratively based on our increasing understanding of best practice for planning
and evaluating preservation activities, the DRAMBORA Interactive online application com-
prises a major outcome of this research. Developed to reflect the emerging DRAMBORA
methodology for infrastructural self assessment this resource has achieved impact across a
worldwide context. It has been used to support professional activities and also as part of
University curricula in well over one hundred international settings. In addition to providing
a fertile source of data for the ontology development that followed it continues several years
after its release to be relied upon by information professionals in the course of their own
efforts.
The outcomes of preservation audits and the user contributions to DRAMBORA Interactive
provide much of the basis for our final major contribution, a novel ontology for summarising
and presenting digital preservation infrastructure information in an integrated and interlinked
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form. The Preserved Object and Repository Risks Ontology (PORRO) presents a linked
model comprising goals, resources, activities, policies and rights and responsibilities within a
preservation system, each explicitly mapped to corresponding risks in order to make explicit
causality and opportunities for amelioration.
A further major outcome has been the development of a selection of applications that use
the ontology and are indicative of anticipated use cases. This includes the PORRO Browser,
Collaborative Assessment of Research Data Infrastructure and Objectives (CARDIO) (a data
management capacity management tool) and a specialist preservation component supporting
long term availability of three dimensional models and associated metadata developed as part
of the 3D-Coform System.
Our results are documented in a range of technical reports and conference and journal ar-
ticles [McHugh et al., 2007, McHugh et al., 2008, McHugh, 2011, McHugh, 2012]. These
illustrate the development of DRAMBORA throughout the pilot assessments, emphasising its
shortcomings and document the subsequent development of PORRO as a means to inform
self assessment, providing a low barrier to entry while facilitating, if not enforcing appropri-
ate rigour.
1.5 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 explores approaches to preservation infrastructure management, describing current
approaches to planning and evaluating digital preservation approaches and infrastructures. It
summarises existing tools, metrics and standards for supporting these activities and describes
the relationships between approaches aimed specifically at digital preservation management
and more generic information management. This chapter also introduces DRAMBORA and
its sister resource DRAMBORA Interactive, respectively developed alongside and as a major
part of this thesis. The latter online manifestation of the core methodology extends the func-
tionality of DRAMBORA and enables the capture of user contributions as well as facilitating a
greater dialogue between a best practice knowledge base and the self assessment process. In
collaboration with colleagues at University of Glasgow, the National Archives of the Nether-
lands and the Estonian Business Archives we conceived DRAMBORA as a counterpoint to
the top-heaviness and inflexibility of the existing preservation assessment standards. Our
efforts to realise it as an online tool have greatly facilitated its usability and visibility.
Chapter 3 comprises our analysis of digital preservation approaches and presents a represen-
tative range of preservation experiences from a varied selection of organisations. Its purpose
is to illustrate the body of evidence upon which the preservation ontology is based. The
accounts within are themselves expected to be of considerable value; seldom do custodial
organisations offer comprehensive insights into all aspects of their operations, from policy
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and staffing to technological and financial arrangements. This chapter includes a suite of
such accounts from a range of preservation organisations that exhibit diverse characteristics.
In Chapter 4 we introduce the Preserved Object and Repository Risks Ontology, a classifi-
cation approach for preservation and an ontology of factors that inform preservation success
and risk exposure. This is a core outcome of the research and represents a distillation of the
best practice described above to a human and machine readable knowledge base.
Evaluation follows in Chapter 5, including a summary of some traditional difficulties asso-
ciated with evaluating digital preservation contributions, and a description of the process of
engagement with digital preservation expert sources and documented best practice resources
in exploring the merits of this research. Our evaluation reveals not only the value of the re-
search outcomes but positions them within an existing context for preservation development
and evaluation.
Finally our concluding Chapter describes the broad lessons learned within the research and
recommends a new model for evaluation of digital preservation research and outcomes. We
consider the extent to which we have been successful in meeting our stated research objec-
tives - we reflect too on the possibilities for further work using the outcomes of this research,
and more philosophically on the future opportunities for supporting preservation and data
management.
The thesis’ Appendices include full assessment reports from each of the described pilot au-
dits, those activities that ultimately informed the ontology’s population. They also include a
full structure of the ontology introduced in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 2
Approaches to Preservation
Infrastructure Management
2.1 Introduction
Our research is motivated and propelled by lessons learned in the course of preservation
validation research, and by visible opportunities to optimise the supporting methodologies.
A common blueprint can support both the establishment and evaluation of a given sys-
tem. Preservation planning approaches such as Plato [Becker et al., 2007, Becker et al.,
2008, Becker et al., Becker and Rauber, 2011, Strodl et al., 2007] enable the systemati-
sation of preservation systems development, to which concepts of risk and risk manage-
ment have become increasingly integral. From risks associated with physical media in-
tegrity [Stanescu, 2004] to file format stability [Lawrence et al., 2000], preservation inter-
actions are often considered to be part of an ongoing process of risk management. Our own
contribution, the Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assessment (DRAMB-
ORA) [McHugh et al., 2007, Ross et al., 2008, McHugh et al., 2008, Innocenti et al., 2008a,
Innocenti et al., 2008b] and DRAMBORA Interactive have been similarly pivotal in the in-
troduction of methodological structure to organisational risk awareness.
We developed DRAMBORA based on a realisation that risk is a compelling factor in the se-
lection of preservation approaches. Risks are considered in terms of their impact on valued
outcomes. The strength of a given plan is determined by the extent to which it avoids or mit-
igates those pitfalls that prejudice the accomplishment of a desired objective. Preservation
is fundamentally about safeguarding against possible negative outcomes: about maintaining
things the way they are amid external influences that would seek to disrupt. It is a means by
which one can quantify and systematically address whichever threats arise. The most valu-
able outcome will be the one that best limits risk exposure and vice versa. Risk management
requires a consciousness of the value of digital materials, an awareness of the implications
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of employing particular preservation strategies, and an understanding of one’s own priorities
and tolerances (risk appetite). Core tools used in preservation planning such as the objective
tree focus upon technical and infrastructural factors that influence access to information con-
tent (a combination of representation mechanisms and supporting infrastructure), the merits
of proposed preservation tools or interventions and the properties of those data that one pur-
ports to preserve. Neither preservation planning nor validation has been supported by tools
to adequately express or explore sophisticated information interrelationships. Nevertheless,
the preservation community has exploited knowledge management approaches elsewhere.
Before considering the landscape of preservation management tools, we turn our attention
to the justification for their existence. We seek to demonstrate the problems facing not only
large scale organisations with preservation as their core remit, but also those individuals
relying on digital content (and by implication its sustainability) but lack dedicated support.
2.2 Challenges of Preservation Management
In order to quantify to some extent the extent of challenge facing the digital preservation
community we undertook a large scale survey and series of interviews at the London School
of Economics and Political Science in 2012. LSE was a willing host, and one that ap-
proached us prompted by increasing stakeholder expectations surrounding data curation and
preservation. Theirs was a disciplinary context where attitudes to and reliance upon data
varied across its core disciplines. In that sense it was considered to be a useful setting to bet-
ter understand current and emerging expectations and challenges facing organisations with
respect to short and long term information curation. Our goal was to understand attitudes,
challenges and responsibilities associated with the management and preservation of digital
resources, specifically those used within research. Functions of preservation planning and
assessment cannot be assumed a level of significance or importance. The establishment and
roll out of certification services for repositories may be prioritised by custodial organisations
and their stakeholders. However, we propose that the availability of flexible support and
best practice insight is more compelling to data managers and information curators. Our
view, informed directly by our experiences evaluating repositories, is that the process of be-
ing questioned and asked to justify an approach is of greater value than a certification. Our
research indicates too that almost all data users are expected to perform at least part of a
custodial role.
In collaboration with colleagues at LSE’s Library, Research Office and IT Service we issued
to all LSE academic staff an electronic questionnaire that queried attitudes to research data
management within the institution. One hundred and eleven LSE staff responded - they com-
prised a range of disciplines and roles. Each respondent was asked whether they would be
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prepared to be interviewed to discuss these issues further. A cohort of sixteen scholars agreed
to do so and met with us to provide their views on research data and on the infrastructures that
were available and/or required to support its management. They comprised a range of lev-
els and disciplines, from early career researchers to senior Professors. In disciplinary terms
LSE is rather homogeneous in comparison with many Higher Education institutions but our
sample included most of the social sciences, including researchers using both qualitative and
quantitative methods.
Our results revealed the complexity associated with data management, and the increasing re-
sponsibilities of those creating and administering digital information. A consistent message
was that associated infrastructures and institutional and personal competencies were rarely
commensurate with the scale of and increasing dependence upon digital information.
Responses indicated a general trend in data size per respondent of somewhere between 1Gb
and 1Tb of data, tending towards the lower end in most cases. To answer this question
respondents had been instructed to calculate their data footprint using operating system level
file management software (e.g. Windows Explorer) (see Figure 2.1 for details of data size by
respondent).
Figure 2.1: LSE Case Study: Data Size By Respondent
The proportion of datasets that respondents considered to require preservation (illustrated in
Figure 2.2) offered an indication of the perceived value of their collections. More than half
of the respondents suggested that at least 80 per cent of their collection should be preserved.
Those with larger data collections typically demanded their complete preservation (see Fig-
ure 2.3 for details of proportions of data requiring preservation by data size), perhaps indicat-
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Figure 2.2: LSE Case Study: Proportion of Datasets Requiring Preservation
ing a greater awareness of their data’s value, or simply highlighting those disciplines which
were more data-driven.
Figure 2.3: LSE Case Study: Proportion of Datasets Requiring Preservation By Data Size
Figure 2.4 illustrates total data retention requirements for each respondent. The fact that the
most popular answer was “indefinitely” indicates an emphatic appetite in favour of long term
data preservation; when allied with a consensus in favour of keeping most or all data the need
for appropriate custodial provisions and expertise are clear.
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Figure 2.4: LSE Case Study: Perceived Data Retention Requirements
Illustrated by Figure 2.5, respondents were also invited to consider how long they would wish
data to be retained beyond the end of its current period of use, for each of four potential user
communities. The groups were a) the respondent him/herself, b) other researchers within the
same institution, c) external researchers operating in the same field and d) external researches
in other fields. The results indicated that preservation was seen as primarily a personal
priority - many respondents argued that a retention period of 1 to 5 years would be sufficient
to meet the needs of colleagues or external stakeholders. The number of ‘not sure’ responses
is perhaps indicative of a lack of clarity of the responsibilities funded researchers have to
maintain their data over time. Being expected to manage one’s data does not equate to an
understanding of the associated responsibilities.
Respondents were also asked to consider where responsibility lay for preserving access to
their data (see Figure 2.6). The results appear to place responsibility emphatically upon re-
searchers. Continuing a theme, individuals appeared to be embracing responsibility for their
data’s continued management and availability, but evidence of capacity and required compe-
tencies was very limited. We suggest that the response spoke more to the lack of supporting
infrastructure than any widespread desire to take on the responsibility for managing data.
Given the significant demands for retention scale and term, the extent of the challenge, and
the need for supporting infrastructure, is clear.
When asked whether they would be interested in the establishment of a research data cat-
alogue service or infrastructure a majority were either very or somewhat interested (Figure
2.7).
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Figure 2.5: LSE Case Study: Perceived Data Retention Requirements By Group
Figure 2.6: LSE Case Study: Perceived Preservation Responsibility
In terms of total data we recorded a potential range across the respondents as follows:
Min Total Data (TB): 16.69
Max Total Data (TB): 166.87
The variation is accounted for by the difference between higher end options in the question-
naire (e.g., the sole respondent claiming to have between 10 and 100TB skews the results and
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Figure 2.7: LSE Case Study: Interest in Institutional Data Catalogue
automatically introduces a 90Tb ambiguity in the results). Given the factor of ten that distin-
guishes the top and bottom end of each selectable range the variation will always maintain
that 10x relationship. Extrapolating these figures to the entire School research community
further exacerbates this fuzziness, but a crude sense of minimum and maximum contempo-
rary data requirements remains compelling.
Four respondents were unsure of their data usage and depending on their circumstances
this could potentially further skew results (they were omitted from this analysis). With 107
respondents left this suggests a personal data footprint at LSE between approximately 150
GB and 1.5TB.
The issue is complicated when one considers the scale of the preservation challenge, achieved
by combining those questionnaire responses corresponding to data scale and proportion re-
quiring preservation. This gives a matrix of four values corresponding to the values in
low/high parts of each selected range. Again, the most useful statement we can make is
of overall minimum and maximum preservation data requirements, which are as follows:
Min Total Preserved Data (TB): 12.37
Max Total Preserved Data (TB): 151.25
We can conclude that although our estimates of data storage requirements are not exact,
they are likely to correspond closely to preservation storage requirements. Excluding those
unsure about the scale of their data, 6 respondents were unsure of their preservation require-
ments. One claimed to have between 1 and 10 Tb of data so their data may be significant.
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Those unsure were again left out of this analysis. The suggestion is that most data requires
preservation, although there is greater variety of requirements from those with less data, a
fact largely obscured by the requirements of the large data holders.
Figure 2.8: LSE Case Study: Preservation Requirements Against Data Size
Figure 2.8 illustrates the proportion of data requiring preservation (horizontal axis) and the
scale of data. One thing it appears to illustrate (highlighted by the red line) is a relationship
between larger data scale and higher retention requirements. Those with smaller datasets
vary much more in terms of preservation requirements. Conversely, those with a great deal
of data typically appear to favour the preservation of all or at least a greater proportion of
that data.
Sixteen interviews with members of the survey cohort offered an opportunity to explore in
more detail researchers’ attitudes to data and its management and preservation. Participants
favoured a broad definition of data, comprising both qualitative and quantitative materials
(unsurprising given the hybrid nature of the cohort). Common examples of the former in-
cluded transcribed, coded interview data, with the latter including spatial and tabulated data
sets made available by public agencies. Disciplinary origins of the data were similarly di-
verse, including medicine, finance, government and law (the institutional setting limited the
role of STEM subjects). Data perceived as valuable ranged from open, freely accessible sets
to those with significant commercial value or implicit sensitivities. Data were overwhelm-
ingly considered to be digital. Those interviewed with analogue materials of value typically
planned to digitise them, again illustrating the increasing demands of even those disciplines
traditionally associated with non-digital research methods and resources.
When researchers were asked how they decided which data to retain, the overwhelming
majority indicated an intention to keep everything, prompted by difficulties associated with
predicting future value, the largely non-reproducible nature of data such as interviews and
a general perception that storage costs are comparatively cheap, making viable a keep-all
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approach. Less consensus was demonstrated in attitudes to sharing curated data, with dis-
ciplinary norms persuasive. Those with quantitative data appeared to embrace sharing most
readily. Some feared losing the opportunity to themselves exploit datasets - others had philo-
sophical and scholarly views in favour of sharing. General confusion regarding responsibil-
ities to share (such as conditions of funding), appropriate schedules for doing so and the
status of derived outputs (e.g. from commercial datasets) was evident throughout the sam-
ple. Communities with no explicit sharing culture (or a determination to avoid sharing) were
more likely to see materials isolated and threatened.
Even in comparatively non technical disciplines the systems used to create, process, man-
age and disseminate data were wide ranging. Applications in use included the mainstream
Microsoft Office suite as well more specialist applications such as Stata and MATLAB. Data
management planning processes and associated tools were largely unknown. Even those
aware of data management planning responsibility typically approached the issue as one of
compliance, and devoted little time beyond satisfying bare bones requirements, mainly those
originating from funders. Others demonstrated behaviours that were evidently risky. One
respondent described transporting sensitive interview data that if disclosed would be “awful,
absolutely awful” throughout a politically unstable country on a laptop hard disk. Capacity
concerns around core storage and backup infrastructure were described, with several re-
spondents storing data on personal hard drives backed up using commercial synchronisation
services such as Dropbox. Few were aware of standards for research data management, or
over the longer term, preservation. However when introduced to the concept of a data man-
agement plan most agreed that it could be useful. It was felt that storage, if not more active
data management could reasonably be centralised.
The principal challenge for research data management cited by respondents was limited time.
Data documentation was seen as a less worthwhile activity than traditional academic activi-
ties such as publishing (“Had I followed [data documentation best practice] instead of hav-
ing published 100 articles, probably I would have published 30”). This was exacerbated by
a perceived lack of recognition or career advancement for publishing data, irrespective of
its subsequent usage. Others highlighted the mismatch between short funding cycles and
the long term challenge of data preservation. Nevertheless, there was widespread acknowl-
edgement of the importance of data management. Several respondents approached the issue
pragmatically, concluding that data takes too long to create to allow it to be lost (in many
cases it cannot even be recreated). Others’ perspectives were informed by pressure from
academic peers to release data to validate conclusions; by funder expectations with respect
to data quality and availability and by the role of data as a currency/commodity in enhancing
career development. Some more altruistic justifications focused on opportunities to elimi-
nate community redundancy, or on fundamental academic principles such as validation and
replication. A small cross section of respondents continued to argue that there was little in-
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centive to curate data any more than is strictly necessary to raise one’s academic profile and
to satisfy funders.
The issue of infrastructure is central to this thesis and among the respondents several per-
spectives were described regarding those services and resources relied upon for managing
research data. Centralised network drives and backups were identified as critical by many,
others citing the importance of centrally managed data acquisition and licensing, ePrints
repositories (for papers and publications) and liaison staff to connect academics with ap-
propriate support. Others remained sceptical about existing central provisions, claiming no
interaction with the centre on data. The issue of trust appeared critical, with concerns raised
over storage and high performance computing capacity. Respondents described their con-
cerns surrounding instances of illegal or inappropriate uses of licensed data. Notable gaps
in the institutional provisions included data inventory management systems; brokering ser-
vices to facilitate licensing of data from third parties; acquisition and license management
resources and levels of central storage space and high performance computing capacity that
reflected the institutional need. Data management and liaison staff were also identified as
valued potential additions to the provisions. Given the sensitivities associated with accessing
many external data sets (e.g. current UK census data), data holders demanded the introduc-
tion at local institution level of appropriate secure access environments. Opportunities for
training on data management, related central services on offer and archival appraisal were
widely welcomed. This reflected a general confusion about where to go to seek help for
things like commercialisation of research data, acquisition of new content, the applicability
of Freedom of Information legislation, existing datasets and opportunities to preserve data.
Respondents suggested that an appropriate research data management policy should pro-
vide base-level standards of what is expected, and offer concrete guidelines with practical
applicability. It should be funder-independent but still inform the preparation of research
proposals. It should encourage good practice through recommendations, but not constrain
(the more it looks like compliance the more it was thought likely to be ignored). It should en-
courage principles of sharing and appropriate consideration of what should be kept. Finally,
it should be succinct and limit unnecessary complexity (“[not] a ten page document that no
one reads”). One respondent summarised, suggesting that academics’ two main priorities,
to have autonomy, and to share, should be prioritised most highly. More than anything else,
there was almost universal insistence that any recommendations or requirements should be
accompanied by a commensurate commitment of support and an appropriate institutional
provision.
This survey provides compelling evidence of the challenges associated with maintaining
institutional infrastructures for data management and preservation. Accounts such as these
illustrate that those expected to demonstrate conformity to data curation best practice (by, for
example, research funders) are often ill equipped to sustain the scale and complexity of data
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within their custody. Better means for promoting preservation and research data management
approaches and evidence, flexible to meet the expectations of a range of stakeholders are
clearly required. End users and infrastructural administrators and service providers have
expectations and responsibilities with respect to data. It is critical is that these be aligned
to best practice. Currently, this is typically propagated through less accessible resources
(such as international standards) and is limited to the institutional competencies of expensive,
dedicated curatorial organisations.
In contrast with this work, which was partly focused on the individual responsibilities and
expectations of researchers, the full audit assessments that follow in Chapter 3 and inform
many of the outcomes of this thesis primarily took place in dedicated, curatorial organisa-
tions. These are the very types of organisation whose responsibilities for data preservation
we expect to be increasingly inherited by smaller organisational units, individual researchers
and non-specialists. Our goal is to establish a record of best practice and therefore it is natu-
ral that we look first to those with demonstrable preservation expertise. However, it is critical
that the risks we characterise, and the responses we present as optimal are relevant irrespec-
tive of where they arise or how they are utilised. In evaluating the outcomes of this research
we explore this very issue. The ontology presented in Chapter 4 was deployed within the
context of the Digital Curation Centre’s Collaborative Assessment of Research Data Infras-
tructures and Objectives tool [DCC, 2011]. We demonstrated the value of ontology elements
and properties to a user base approaching questions of curation capacity and risk exposure
from specific and individual professional and personal perspectives. A CARDIO assessment
at LSE revealed concerns associated with unclear data ownership and responsibilities for
preservation, structuring of data for long term curation (e.g. metadata and format choices),
implications of relevant regulations and legislation (including intellectual property law) for
data management, and adequacy of training. These concerns were evident across a selection
of users and respondents that included researchers and those providing research, informa-
tion and IT services in the institution. As illustrated in the accounts presented in Chapter 3
they resonate very closely with the challenges identified, and often successfully resolved, in
dedicated preservation environments.
2.3 Preservation Planning
2.3.1 Approaches and Standards
Preservation planning describes the systematic approach to the challenges posed by objects
or environments to continued information availability, accessibility and usability. Plato
[Becker et al., 2007, Becker et al., 2008, Becker et al., Becker and Rauber, 2011, Strodl
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et al., 2007] is a de facto preservation planning approach with high knowledge demands. It
requires consciousness of the value of digital materials, an awareness of the implications of
employing particular preservation strategies, and an understanding of one’s own priorities
and tolerances for achieving success. A favoured means of informing the process is the cre-
ation of objective trees, used to express strategic and operational priorities in a hierarchy.
The goal is the formation of a rationale or justification in favour of a particular approach,
wholly based on the environment within which risk arises and has impact.
Preservation planning is particularly constrained by perceptions, expectations and priorities
of individuals. The procedure implies the input of diverse constituencies, each of which may
have differing preservation priorities. A case study at ArsElectronica [Becker et al., 2007]
included collaborative workshops with curators, art historians, computer scientists, preser-
vation specialists and management; each role could be reasonably associated with a myriad
of policy and procedural responsibilities.
If we wish to understand the wider impact of individual choices, and the nature of relation-
ships between discrete objectives, the existing approaches are limited. For example, within
an electronic publishing context we may wish to ensure on one hand the preservation of
sufficiently high resolution images to enable legible representation of a smallest meaningful
element. On the other we may wish to enforce file size limits to best support scalability. In
such circumstances the incompatibility or tension is self-evident, but the example is illus-
trative of the implications that relationships between system or information facets may have
in terms of decision making. In other cases the link between priorities may be less explicit,
and as a consequence less well understood. One might for instance prioritise support for em-
bedded metadata in image formats. However, a format satisfying this requirement may have
poor tool support and as a consequence staff may become dissatisfied and seek shortcuts in
their coding of metadata. Competencies for using related metadata tools such as relational
databases may deteriorate. Formalised understanding of such wider potential consequences
and associations would not only assist the interpretation of experimental results, but also the
conception of more informed objective trees.
Risk often emerges at the intersection between information or system facets. For preservation
systems, typical origins of risk include combinations of discrete processes; conflicting prop-
erties of preserved or operational resources; characteristics and capacity of actors contribut-
ing to preservation; and the nature of the context surrounding preservation, including but not
limited to legal, geographical, financial, technological, cultural and historical issues. Under-
standing risk exposure is further complicated by the fact that risks both influence and follow
as consequences of other risks. The existence of a risk can generate others, and can influence
risk severity in a dynamic fashion. This concept continues to risk management, whereby the
implementation of particular approaches may affect risk exposure elsewhere. For example,
if software access systems are upgraded to newer versions in response to emerging security
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vulnerabilities there may be an exacerbated likelihood of legacy content being no longer fully
supported. A common incompatibility is expenditure; if money is invested in the process of
risk resolution there is greater likelihood of resource shortfalls in other areas.
It is in the expression of such relationships that existing approaches such as Plato appear to
fall somewhat short. Risks do not arise in isolation, and likewise cannot be evaluated without
consideration of cause and effect. Effective risk management and preservation planning both
demand understanding of the implications of decisions. Within an information environment
this demand can only be satisfied with an expressive documentation model.
More recent work developing ideas and lessons from the Planets preservation planning
approach and Plato is ongoing within the EU Framework Programme 7 funded Scalable
Preservation Environments (SCAPE) project [SCAPE, 2014, King et al., 2012]. A taxon-
omy of representative decision criteria and influence factors has been compiled, based on
an extensive evaluation of a number of case studies [Becker and Rauber, 2011]. These are
in turn mapped to models to support decision making in software quality, format assess-
ment and object properties. It is an attempt to establish a definitive, common framework for
decision factors for preservation planning. Properties are established for a preservation out-
come, in terms of an object (in a broadly conceptual, or semantic sense), its corresponding
format (its structural representation) and any contextual outcomes, such as costs incurred.
Likewise, properties of the preservation action are recorded, encapsulating runtime (e.g.,
performance, memory use), static (non-runtime considerations such as licensing costs) and
judgement (not objectively determinable) aspects. Researchers used the SQuaRE quality
model [ISO 25010, 2011] as the basis for software quality evaluation. In their adoption of
this model acknowledgement is made of “business” factors which are relevant in an organisa-
tional decision making context and although not integral to this model have to be considered
alongside intrinsic aspects of preservation actions.
The conception of objective trees need not be limited to object-centric characteristics; one
should also factor into preservation planning those factors considered more passive, such as
repository characteristics or other contextual factors. Similarly we may wish to consider in
wider terms the meaning of preservation action and intervention. All too often the role of
infrastructural or procedural facets can be diminished in favour of evaluating mainly those
object-related implications of employing a certain migration or emulation strategies. First
and foremost we must develop means of understanding wider implications of particular ap-
proaches. This only becomes meaningful when we begin to acknowledge the inevitable rela-
tionship between “coal face” preservation interventions and wider business decision making.
Every decision, interaction or investment within a preservation context, irrespective of the
extent to which it appears detached from the surface of a magnetic tape or hard disk platter
may have implications for the preservation of content.
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Preservation planning and evaluation both benefit from encapsulating this wider view, and
leveraging wider preservation insight. Our ability to relate and understand the implications of
those relationships demands more sophisticated information modelling approaches. The ex-
pression of an appropriate ontology presupposes an understanding of the fundamental knowl-
edge requirements associated with each process. The outcomes of the SCAPE project pro-
vide the digital preservation community with a useful resource for cataloguing object-centric
properties and influence factors but there remains a disconnect in terms of more infrastruc-
tural issues. We present an approach that could be considered a companion piece to SCAPE’s
decision criteria.
2.4 Preservation Audit and Certification
2.4.1 Approaches and Standards
In 1996 the Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information declared in its seminal Preserv-
ing Digital Information that “a critical component of digital archiving infrastructure is the
existence of a sufficient number of trusted organizations capable of storing, migrating, and
providing access to digital collections” [Waters and Garrett, 1996]. In 2002, in response to
this clarion call, the US Research Libraries Group (RLG) and Online Computer Library
Center (OCLC) issued a joint report entitled Trusted Digital Repositories: Attributes and
Responsibilities [RLG/OCLC, 2002]. This document outlined a set of requirements for the
establishment of reliable custodial organisations for digital information. Among a range of
attributes including organisational, financial, policy and technology considerations the re-
port’s authors recommended the development of framework and process to support the certi-
fication of repositories to demonstrate and display their competencies to the many stakehold-
ers reliant on assurances of capacity and capability. This concluded work begun four years
earlier at the Archival Workshop on Ingest, Identification and Certification Standards (AWI-
ICS) [Steinhart et al., 2009] which had proposed a combination of individual, programme,
process and data level assessment to satisfy an overall certification requirement.
The workshop explicitly referenced existing resources available to facilitate such assess-
ment, including international standards on quality assurance [ISO 9000, 2005], professional
programme accreditation models such as those used by the Society of American Archivists
[Society of American Archivists, 2009] and individual competencies examinations. A pre-
liminary checklist was developed at the workshop to serve as a foundation for the develop-
ment of new resources.
Meanwhile, the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems’ (CCSDS) 2002 Reference
Model for an Open Archival Information System (OAIS) was given the status of interna-
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tional standard [ISO 14721, 2012]. It too called for the definition of accreditation and certi-
fication processes to establish a concept of compliance with its recommendations as part of a
roadmap for follow-on standards. In 2012 the standard was revised with an explicit reference
included to an emergent certification standard published in 2011 as CCSDS Recommendation
for Space Data System Practices: Audit and Certification of Trustworthy Digital Reposito-
ries [ISO 16363, 2012].
This latter standard was several years in development. Shortly after the publication of Trusted
Digital Repositories: Attributes and Responsibilities, an international working group was
established by the Research Libraries Groups (RLG) [OCLC, 2012] and the US National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) [NARA, 2012] with its purpose the defini-
tion of criteria for trusted repository audit and certification. The group comprised experts
from domains including space data, archive and library science and data curation, including
this author. Initially published as a draft for public comment, the criteria were eventually
released as the Trustworthy Repository Audit and Certification (TRAC): Criteria and Check-
list, with the Center for Research Libraries (CRL) [CRL, 2012b] assuming responsibility for
its continued development. As part of the Certifying Digital Archives project [CRL, 2012a],
we partnered with CRL to undertake a series of further pilot audits in a range of US and
European settings, with this author a member of the auditing team. Our final release com-
prised eighty four individual criteria that should be demonstrable by those organisations
seeking trustworthy status, divided into three sections covering organisational, object man-
agement and technical infrastructure respectively. This would then provide the basis for the
development of an ISO standard, with several experts transitioning from the RLG/NARA
group to the CCSDS led Mission Operations and Information Management Area Digital
Repository Audit and Certification working group (MOIMS-RAC) [CCSDS, 2012], chaired
by David Giaretta of the UK Space Agency and Science and Technology Facilities Council
[STFC, 2012].
Much of the criticism of TRAC in its various forms derived from its rather monolithic and
prescriptive nature. We conceived the document by conference call. The expertise of the
individual authors could not be questioned, and a limited consultation period enabled practi-
tioners to have their say, but the criteria were firmly top-down in their origin, and presented
by and large as a one-size-fits-all solution. Having joined the group quite late on in the
development of TRAC, our first contributions were reactive; we reflected on its content in
a response to the TRAC team’s consultation on behalf of the Digital Curation Centre. Our
focus was on the ubiquity and variety of digital content and its resistance to simple char-
acterisation. Digital preservation is associated with a diversity of challenges that vary ac-
cording to content characteristics (for example, scale; complexity; associated rights issues),
organisational qualities (such as budget; legal jurisdiction; and level autonomy) and strategic
priorities (perhaps most notably the extent to which particular preservation functions, such
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as ingest, access or management are important). Associated demands and responsibilities
are similarly variable, and organisations are generally most interested in ensuring that their
funder, end user or depositor expectations are given greatest consideration. Conforming to
the demands of a one-size-fits-all set of criteria that at times may be considered arbitrary is
understandably less important than meeting stakeholder needs.
We also reflected on the lack of clarity associated with identifying what exactly it means to
conform with TRAC’s criteria. This point was partially responded to in subsequent releases,
including the ISO standard, with the inclusion of limited references and example evidence.
Nevertheless, a disconnect continues to exist between the criteria themselves and a relatable,
practical implementation.
Other similar efforts have followed the release of TRAC, reflecting demands for lower cost or
less onerous criteria, and for jurisdiction-specific provisions. The former is best realised by
the Data Seal of Approval (DSA) [Harmsen and de Leeuw, 2010], developed in the Nether-
lands by the Dutch Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) [DANS, 2012]. It
comprises a set of requirements and a quasi-certification that can be issued following appli-
cation via a self-assessment process. The DSA Board assumed management responsibility
for the requirements and for issuing the Seal of Approval in 2009. Unlike TRAC and ISO
16363 which are detailed in comparison, the DSA comprises just sixteen broadly expressed
guidelines. They cover similar issues, but describe required commitments of data produc-
ers and data consumers, in addition to the archive itself. This is a welcome development
that reflects the reality that successful preservation is dependent not just on the efforts of a
nominated custodial organisation, but on actors throughout the information lifecycle. Never-
theless, for practical purposes it is the archive that is considered the “primary implementer”
of the guidelines, and should assume responsibility for verifying and demonstrating evidence
of the other actors’ commitment and capacity. A focus on certification makes this position
inevitable - someone or something must be the primary subject of scrutiny and the repository
is an obvious choice.
We question the extent to which the DSA guidelines are self evidently meaningful. Exam-
ples such as “the data repository applies documented processes and procedures for manag-
ing data storage” are typical in terms of their generality. The process of application requires
repositories to complete a self assessment questionnaire which is then peer reviewed by a
DSA general assembly member, who verifies that conformity with the guidelines has been
demonstrated. Detailed information on the processes and requirements for joining the DSA
community, general assembly and board is available from the DSA website. To assist the
applicant, limited additional guidance is available, which explicitly aligns the DANS criteria
with TRAC and other guidelines. In addition, DSA references the Foundations of Modern
Language Resource Archives [Wittenburg et al., 2006] and Stewardship of Digital Research
Data: A Framework of Principles and Guidelines [Research Information Network, 2008].
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There remains doubt as to what might be considered to be a practical expression of confor-
mity. The pursuit and award of the DSA is mainly prompted by repositories seeking a valida-
tion or acknowledgement of their competencies. Although end users and other stakeholders
may feel reassured by the Data Seal of Approval emblazoned on a conforming repository’s
website, in reality it is difficult for them to comprehend what this really means. Although
self assessment responses are reproduced on the DSA site the reviewer responses are a sim-
ple binary Accept or Reject (only awarded certifications are presented on the site, although
it is unclear if any have been withheld) and of the eight DSAs already awarded between
March 2011 and September 2012 there is very limited use made of the reviewers’ additional
comments field (which might provide an opportunity for further clarification) [DSA, 2012].
Nonetheless, there does appear to be a robust organisational framework in place for DSA
which appears to elicit trust; only those who have already been through the DSA process
may contribute to its continued development.
In terms of jurisdiction-specific resources, softening the problems associated with a single-fit
approach, the German standard [DIN 31644, 2012] published by the nestor Working Group
for Trusted Repositories Certification [Nestor, 2012] (established as part of the Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research) is a notable example. It was published in its second version
in November 2009 and is structurally similar to TRAC (comprising sections covering organi-
sational framework, object management and infrastructure and security). The release of this
standard was prompted by a wish to reflect specific financial and legal requirements within a
German context. As authors of DRAMBORA and TRAC we collaborated with the authors to
define a shared set of ten core requirements for trustworthy repositories, as a means to help
ensure the resources’ collective coherence [McHugh et al., 2008].
Continuing this spirit of cooperation, in 2010 a memorandum of understanding to create
a European Framework for Audit and Certification of Digital Repositories was signed be-
tween David Giaretta (chair of the CCSDS/ISO Repository Audit and Certification Working
Group), Henk Harmsen (chair of the Data Seal of Approval Board) and Christian Keitel
(chair of the DIN Trustworthy Archives - Certification Working Group) [APARSEN, 2012b,
Giaretta and Lambert, 2012]. This sought to galvanise collaboration in the establishment
of an integrated framework for auditing and certifying digital repositories. It described
three levels of certification and, by association, trustworthiness. Basic certification would
be conferred upon those repositories awarded a Data Seal of Approval. Extended certifi-
cation would follow for those who in addition to obtaining a DSA complete a full, peer
reviewed and publicly accessible self assessment based on ISO 16363 or DIN 31644. Fi-
nally, formal certification would be available to those who both obtain a DSA and complete
a full external audit and certification based on either of the other standards. The signatories
agreed to ensure overlap between their efforts, to undertake common promotion, to encour-
age repositories towards higher end certifications and to carry out related test cases in 2010.
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The European Commission supported the memorandum of understanding as part of a se-
ries of “EC sponsored initiatives on the audit and certification of trusted digital repositories”
[Giaretta et al., 2010].
Further European investment in this issue is evident in the work of the APARSEN project
[APARSEN, 2012a, Giaretta and Lambert, 2012] , which builds on the Alliance for Perma-
nent Access membership organisation and is funded by the EU’s Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme [European Commission, ]. Its goal is the establishment of a virtual research centre
for digital preservation in Europe. This explicitly incorporates work on common terminology
and standards. Similarly, its membership and leadership includes pivotal individuals in the
development of assessment approaches and resources. At the 2011 Alliance for Permanent
Access Conference a new organisation was launched called the Primary Trustworthy Repos-
itory Authorisation Body (PTAB) [Giaretta et al., 2011]. This comprises a number of experts
who have contributed to the development of audit and certification resources and standards
and positions itself as “the anchor for the provision of ISO audit and certification of digital
repositories and plays a major role in training and accrediting auditors”. In July 2012 the
Alliance for Permanent Access reported an ongoing discussion between PTAB and the ISO
Committee for Conformity Assessment (CASCO) and the International Accreditation Forum
(IAF) over their roles in the processes of audit and certification [APA, 2012]. Until this was
concluded and its outcomes reflected in a standard for auditor guidance [ISO 16919, 2011],
no formal certification can take place.
That the PTAB group appear to have self-appointed themselves as overseers of the inter-
national repository audit domain may raise eyebrows, but it has attempted to counter asso-
ciated criticism by explaining that “to bootstrap the process an initial body of auditors is
defined based, as we believe is reasonable, on the membership of the body which wrote
the metrics document”[APA, 2011]. Its constitution appears to extend beyond that how-
ever, with assumed responsibilities for accrediting training courses, undertaking initial au-
dits and accrediting those national authorization bodies which will in turn accredit audi-
tors within individual countries and allow for the creation of an international network of
competent bodies. To date, a series of test audits have been completed - three European
repositories (UK Data Archive [UKDA, 2012], French Centre Informatique National de
l’Enseignement Supe´rieur [CINES, 2012] and the Dutch Data Archiving and Networked Ser-
vices [DANS, 2012]) received EU funding via APARSEN to take part, and three US based
repositories (the National Space Science Data Center [NSSDC, 2012], the Socioeconomic
Data and Applications Center [SEDAC, 2012] and the Kentucky Department for Libraries
and Archives [KDLA, 2012]) each contributed their time freely to do so. The German Na-
tional Library (DNB) [DNB, 2012] also participated in a pilot assessment in this period based
on the DIN standard. These were intended to support the establishment of the European
framework (as described in the memorandum of understanding described above), identify
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metrics which could not be easily or intuitively understood by participating archives and ver-
ify that individual auditors shared a common understanding of the evidential and compliance
requirements. The exercises also assisted in the definition of auditing processes which are
yet to be formally disclosed (an auditors’ spreadsheet, based on the ISO standard is available
from the PTAB website [PTAB, 2012b]).
The range of checklists now is considerable, but the steps taken at the European Framework
level appear designed to mitigate possible confusion - coherence between them, and also
with other relevant standards, is critical. Examples include standards relating to archival
information systems [ISO 14721, 2012] and records management [ISO 15489-1, 2001, ISO
15489-2, 2001]. The ISO and DIN standards are expected to provide an intellectual foun-
dation for repository certification, to represent the standard expected of our preserving insti-
tutions. However, despite some promises of procedural guidance, seemingly omitted from
scope are many of the practical issues associated with performing an evaluation and de-
termining conformity. A companion standard to ISO 16363 has been released to describe
characteristics of certifying organisations [ISO 16919, 2011] and refers to a number of other
relevant standards including those covering Quality Management Systems [ISO 9000, 2005]
and Conformity Assessment [ISO 17000, 2004, ISO 17021, 2012]. Neither these nor any
of the criteria catalogues address the process of assessment explicitly. Furthermore, it is
clear that the prioritisation of certification (over audit) is a reflection of the fact that funders’
interests are usurping those of other relevant stakeholders. End users and depositors have
compelling reasons to demand trustworthiness from the custodial organisations they deal
with, but are less inclined to pay for such assurances. Funders appear willing to secure their
investment by only financing those institutions with demonstrable capacity. However, assess-
ment is not characterised as just pass or fail (although such would appear more aligned to
these stakeholders’ expectations). The PTAB website’s Frequently Asked Questions page in-
cludes the question “is the certification a simple yes/no?”, countered with the response “no,
the ISO audit and certification process is designed to be one of continuous improvement.
Therefore the certification, assuming the repository meets at least minimum levels, identi-
fies areas which need improvement” [PTAB, 2012a]. The document continues to describe
possible award levels that while not strictly binary (exemplary; very good; good or fair) are
more indicative of a less fluid type of evaluation, again in keeping with the expectations of
primarily external stakeholders. Nevertheless, it is clear that the group is trying to appeal
to repositories by distancing themselves from a clinical yes/no assessment. This reflects a
tacit acknowledgement that preservation is too complex and diverse to allow a single set of
criteria to be the basis of evaluation in every context or to support distillation to a single pass
or fail judgement. There are grey areas in preservation - one must be able to tailor or weight
expectations to suit organisational priorities. Skills and infrastructure requirements for the
preservation of digitised, out of copyright texts are notably different from those associated
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with the preservation of clinical trials datasets for example. Furthermore, PTAB relies upon
the trust of the whole digital preservation community, a sizeable proportion of which are
running their own repository services; their alienation would be a problem for the viability
of PTAB’s mandate.
Nevertheless, there is notable focus on the views of external stakeholders; emphasis on the
role of best practice criteria in informing external evaluation appears to disregard their value
in the management or establishment of preservation repository services. To date, few, if any,
certifications have been awarded (excluding the small number of Data Seal of Approvals
issued). Conversely, many accounts (both formally documented and anecdotal) are available
to suggest that repositories are using such tools not as evaluation benchmarks, but to inform
the establishment and administration of repository services: to support their risk assessment
activities [Antunes et al., 2011, Lyrasis, 2011]. There are few practically-oriented resources
for informing such activities. The digital preservation community has a tremendous body of
knowledge but it is typically dispersed and spans domains such as computing science and
archival and information science. This is not to mention the range of individual disciplines
with specialist data that poses uniquely challenging characteristics. More so than OAIS,
TRAC and ISO 16363 provide organisational and structural blueprints that are far more likely
to be referenced and checked off by practitioners interested in ensuring the completeness and
appropriateness of their activities than an external auditor.
Reflecting these more commonplace use cases, we developed the Digital Repository Au-
dit Method Based on Risk Assessment (DRAMBORA) within the UK JISC funded Digital
Curation Centre [DCC, 2012] and EU Framework Programme Six funded DigitalPreserva-
tionEurope [DPE, 2012], initially as a methodological accompaniment to the TRAC criteria.
Its development was prefaced by a series of pilot repository audits which used the (then
draft) checklist and sought to establish complementary information gathering approaches
[Ross and McHugh, 2006b]. Our activity was also intended to highlight issues associated
with the checklist in terms of coverage, interpretability and applicability in a range of organ-
isational, jurisdictional and technological contexts. These pilot assessments are described
in more detail in Chapter 3, in terms of the lessons learned that informed the develop-
ment of our ontology of preservation practice. They predated the ISO 16363 audits by
several years but share many of the same anticipated outcomes. Our list of participating
repositories was diverse, and included national libraries and archives, smaller scale cultural
heritage digital collections, eScience data repositories and distributed research collections.
The cohort spanned continental boundaries and demonstrated a range of business models
[Ross and McHugh, 2006a].
We conceived DRAMBORA as a means to support self assessment of repository services. Its
core risk-based approach reflected the fundamental doubt that is at the core of preservation;
until time has passed there are few guarantees about the appropriateness of any preservation
2.4. Preservation Audit and Certification 31
intervention. Some will argue in favour of benign neglect, with future forensic technologies
likely to enable the recovery of valuable content. Others will suggest that explicit and active
management and documentation of resources is a requirement in order to ensure authenticity
and integrity are adequately maintained over time. In reality, preservation is about managing
risk appetite - those with responsibility to do so welcome both guidance and validation to
support and underscore their efforts. Given the increasing prioritisation of formal certifi-
cation approaches and infrastructures DRAMBORA was also a response to a growing need
for those with custodial responsibilities to obtain reassurances about their ability to meet
relevant expectations. It was envisaged as a means for organisations to establish a system-
atic self-awareness that would be a necessary precursor to inviting external auditors to pass
judgement as part of a more formal certification process. DRAMBORA uses risk as a metric;
its principle conceit is that digital preservation is a risk management activity, and that ca-
pacity and capability to effectively manage risk can be considered synonymous with digital
preservation success. At its core is a systematic approach. It requires users to document a
repository context in terms of responsibilities, objectives, activities and assets, and then to
align these with corresponding risks. Appropriate management responses can be defined,
and characterised in subsequent iterations of the process. Unlike existing (and subsequently
released) evaluation instruments, DRAMBORA is intended to be used in a bottom-up fash-
ion, with the specific preservation priorities of the evaluating institution representing the core
benchmark for success.
Subsequently, we developed DRAMBORA Interactive as a freely accessible online version
of the resource to facilitate the evaluation process and to enable the capture of representative
responses to the core questions 1. At the time of writing 834 repositories have been registered
within the system by users. Disregarding spam, exploratory and teaching related2 registra-
tions (and adopting a conservative metric) approximately 123 repositories have been fully
and formally evaluated using the tool. This figure was derived by analysing the progress
of audits in each case and excluding any that had not completed the classification of risks,
objectives, activities and mandate. The sample of 123 repositories offers a compelling and
varied selection; it includes repositories from 21 countries (see Figure 2.9 which displays the
country association of repositories registered in DRAMBORA) including the United States
(79 repositories), the United Kingdom (15 repositories), the Czech Republic (5 repositories),
Germany (3 repositories) and Australia, Canada and the Netherlands (2 repositories each).
Institution types (displayed in the chart within Figure 2.10) include Universities (51 reposi-
tories), Archives (28 repositories), Libraries (14 repositories) and Museums (9 repositories).
DRAMBORA is by no means immune to the criticisms of ambiguity and inapplicability that
1DRAMBORA Interactive is available from http://www.repositoryaudit.eu
2Several Universities including University of Glasgow, Simmons College, the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and University of Illinois have used DRAMBORA within their teaching activities
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Figure 2.9: DRAMBORA Registered Repositories By Country
Figure 2.10: DRAMBORA Registered Repositories By Type
TRAC and ISO 16363 face. During and following its iterative development, we conducted
a number of pilot audits at an international range of institutions (see Chapters 3 and 5). In
the course of these we gained experience of real world preservation practice that was unique,
at the very least in terms of its variety. Despite their largely successful outcomes, a caveat
often accompanied the otherwise positive feedback received from participants. Without the
expert contributions of external auditors, it was argued, the process would have been less
successful. Individuals were constrained by the limits of their own knowledge - systema-
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tising the process of assessment was useful, but it was widely felt that the process of risk
management demanded the input of those with experience of comparable activity. This con-
cern was addressed to a limited extent with the inclusion (in the published and subsequent
interactive online versions of DRAMBORA) of around one hundred example risks and mit-
igation strategies. These were developed by reference to the audit experiences, as well as
the TRAC instrument that we had used as their basis (at least initially). We reflected the
latter’s structure within the list of risks, incorporating those associated with organisation,
technology and preservation workflow respectively. In several cases they were the inverse
of good practice promoted within TRAC, or the results of extrapolating failure within that
framework to a practical outcome. In other cases they were the expression of shortcomings
we had identified in our audit work. Risks were defined with a name and description, but in
reasonably generic terms to limit the extent to which they were prescriptive. Each risk was
accompanied by details of its typical organisational spacing (e.g. physical environment or
personnel, management and administration) and role ownership (e.g. management or techni-
cal) and prompts to assist in determining its relevance. The latter were intended to encourage
self-assessors to reflect on the extent of their risk exposure. For instance, a risk entitled ‘staff
suffer deterioration of skills’ included prompts such as ‘are skills refreshment opportunities
available to staff?’. Example manifestations were also included to illustrate the types of
circumstances within which risks may arise, or their practical effects. Finally, in order to
introduce a positive dimension each risk was accompanied by a set of possible mitigation
measures, that included both strategies for risk avoidance and treatment in the event of its
occurrence.
We acknowledged that this remedy was not wholly satisfying, and even though we aimed
to limit the extent to which these were prescriptive and prominently labelled them as being
not exhaustive that it implicitly contrasted with the bottom-up philosophy of the DRAMB-
ORA approach. There followed further demand for prescriptive guidance from end users
struggling to define organisational objectives, activities or responsibilities. Again, in order
to assist such definition, but contrary to DRAMBORA’s philosophy, we used similar methods
to provide a series of examples that end users could refer to in establishing their own organi-
sational picture. These were classified in DRAMBORA according to ten “functional classes”
which were available to structure responses and facilitate internal communication for self as-
sessment participants, echoing ten common core requirements for repository trustworthiness
collectively agreed by the DCC, DPE, nestor and CRL (the corresponding organisations for
DRAMBORA, and the then-nascent DIN and ISO standards) in 2007 [McHugh et al., 2008].
DRAMBORA’s implementation of these requirements (as functional classes) was as follows:
Mandate and Commitment to Digital Object Maintenance Functions and characteristics
that correspond to the commitment of the repository or the institution within which it is
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based to the maintenance of digital objects, or describe its responsibilities with respect
to this.
Organisational Fitness Functions and characteristics corresponding to the repository’s or-
ganisational viability, sustainability and value, mainly incorporating issues of resource
availability, including human resources.
Legal and Regulatory Legitimacy Functions and characteristics corresponding to legisla-
tive, regulatory or common law rights and responsibilities of the repository.
Efficient and Effective Policies Functions and characteristics corresponding to the reposi-
tory’s policy infrastructure that facilitates its activities and the completion of its objec-
tives.
Adequate Technical Infrastructure Functions and characteristics corresponding to the tech-
nical and security provisions maintained by the repository to facilitate its activities and
assist the achievement of its objectives.
Acquisition and Ingest Functions and characteristics corresponding to the repository’s ne-
gotiation, submission, receipt and ingestion of data from creators and suppliers.
Preservation of Digital Object Integrity, Authenticity and Usability Functions and char-
acteristics corresponding to maintenance of object integrity, authenticity and usability.
Metadata Management and Audit Trails Functions and characteristics corresponding to
the documentation recorded by the repository to describe digital objects and processes
to which they are subjected.
Dissemination Functions and characteristics corresponding to the repository’s distribution
of stored content and end user access provisions.
Preservation Planning and Action Functions and characteristics corresponding to the cu-
ration and preservation of digital materials within the repository [McHugh et al., 2007].
To be wholly successful, a resource would perform a surrogate facilitator role, with a flex-
ibility that would provide further detail where appropriate or prompt greater examination
on issues that might be only partially understood by self assessors. However, each of these
efforts (including DRAMBORA) is constrained by a reliance on prescriptive, inflexible cri-
teria that may not reflect the objectives or characteristics of a given preservation context.
These should be adaptable to permit the evaluation of contexts ranging from, say, a national
repository or a single academic maintaining their research data.
In fact, DRAMBORA’s reasonably widespread use across a range of disciplines and organi-
sational types has yielded a range of data that provides evidence of priorities and approaches
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for preservation, related to associated risks. As described in the Chapter 4, we use this and
other assessment data to conceive our own knowledge-base of best practice for administering
a preservation system.
2.5 Generic Information Security
A range of generic information standards contribute to best practice awareness in digi-
tal preservation. Digital preservation can be considered a superset of a range of organi-
sational and technological end goals (as described in the ontology chapter that follows).
Critical standards that are consistently referenced include those on information security
[ISO 27001, 2005, ISO 21827, 2008, BS 7799, 2006], legal admissibility of electronic ev-
idence [BS 10008, 2008], quality management systems [ISO 9000, 2005] and risk manage-
ment [ISO 31000, 2009].
These can be considered alongside more community oriented (although not explicitly digi-
tal preservation related) standards such as those associated with archiving and retrieval of
digital technical product documentation [BS 9300-003, 2012], performance measures for
libraries [ISO 28118, 2009] and records management of information and documentation
[ISO 15489-1, 2001, ISO 15489-2, 2001].
With specific applicability to measures for auditing and certifying digital repositories we look
to more generic standards on conformity assessment [ISO 17000, 2004, ISO 17021, 2012]
which have informed the bespoke digital preservation standards in place [ISO 16363, 2012,
ISO 16919, 2011].
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Chapter 3
Digital Preservation Approaches
Analysis
3.1 Time Proven Perspectives
“Our yesterdays follow us; they constitute our life, and they give character and
force and meaning to our present deeds.”
Joseph Parker
As a discipline, digital preservation has wrestled with a number of issues as a consequence of
its explicit temporal dimension. Among the most fundamental relate to validation and evalu-
ation of approaches. The standards and criteria referenced in the previous chapter purport to
present a definitive account of how preservation should be undertaken, but with the passing
of time an essential factor in the determination of the success of any preservation interven-
tion, the pursuit of compelling approaches or standards (and their subsequent expression as
‘best’) has at times been more art than science.
The studies that comprise this chapter and form the basis for the ontology described in Chap-
ter 4 took place between 2008 and 2014. Each institutional analysis is illustrative of good
and bad practice. Each is presented not only in terms of the circumstances during the as-
sessment but also in terms of future improvements and expectations. Little has substantively
changed in terms of preservation best practice in this time. New tools and content types have
emerged but their impact in terms of fundamental functional approaches has been limited.
This analysis, and any optimal approach to digital preservation disregards the transitory and
focuses instead on permanence; architecturally, organisationally and in terms of content. We
embrace the tools of the day but as vehicles for implementing more fundamental ideas. We
have the opportunity to look back at some circumstances that appeared optimal and ques-
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tion whether time has disproved or validated such assessments. We also have the chance to
re-evaluate identified risks based on the outcomes that have followed.
3.2 Preservation Case Studies
3.2.1 Introduction
In order to better understand the issues associated with preservation best practice we analyse
our preservation profiling activities and evaluate the extent to which our findings exhibit con-
tinued, contemporary validity. We undertook a series of repository evaluations in 2008 and
2009 (within the parameters of the Digital Curation Centre [DCC, 2012] and DigitalPreser-
vationEurope [DPE, 2012] projects). As well as providing the participating organisations
with an objective and expert insight into the effectiveness of their operations, we sought to
explore means for performing evaluation and for verifying the global applicability of met-
rics, criteria and methodologies already conceived. The cohort of participating institutions
represented a diverse subset of curatorial contexts, each contrasting in scale, scope, fund-
ing basis, means of deposit, user community and in terms of the nature and origins of their
digital holdings. We remain grateful for the welcome and unrestricted accessibility each of-
fered. This was in several cases conditional on us providing assurances of anonymity; this is
indicated by the accounts that are presented generically.
The selection of these repositories was based mainly on their availability and willingness to
expose their collections and processes to scrutiny. Professional relationships with a num-
ber of repository administrators led to discussions about the viability of performing audits.
Those that ultimately took part were the ones that agreed and committed staff resource to
undertaking the process. There were clear benefits presented to incentivise participation,
both in terms of enhancing operational performance and providing an opportunity to engage
directly in the development of the evaluation standards.
3.2.2 Approach
Metric and Method
Our initial audits used a draft version of the RLG/NARA check-list (subsequently formalised
as the Trustworthy Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Check-list [CRL/RLG,
2007]) as a best practice benchmark. Reflecting their interest in the international audit and
certification developments, four of the five organisational assessments repository adminis-
trators were already familiar with the document, and with the work that helped shape it, such
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as the Reference Model for an Open Archival Information System [ISO 14721, 2012]. The
final repository was less well versed in the surrounding intellectual framework, and this had
undoubted implications, explored in more detail below. An ancillary goal of our audits was
to determine the legitimacy of the check-list’s metrics, their applicability in a range of cir-
cumstances, and their usability both as self-assessment criteria and as a tool to structure and
support third part repository audit.
Around a month prior to each visit we issued a local repository contact with instructions to
package and distribute a selection of documentation that would support the assessment. This
included a range of literature corresponding to policy in several areas, financial information,
and content and system documentation.
A two day schedule was established for each onsite visit, comprising interviews and discus-
sions with a range of appropriate nominated individuals. This would typically commence
with an opening meeting and tour of the facilities, followed by reviews of organisational
characteristics (including staffing, finances, designated community, policies and contracts);
ingest procedures and archival storage; preservation planning and strategies; information and
access management and finally the technological infrastructure comprising the repository. A
worked example would be designed and discussed which was an opportunity to witness or
simulate the journey of objects within repository. The visit was concluded with an opportu-
nity for any final questions and a concluding presentation.
Each of the review sessions was linked to corresponding sections of the draft checklist, our
adopted means to try to ensure comprehensiveness of coverage and consistency in the se-
ries of evaluations. Nevertheless, the conversation was typically wide ranging and not con-
strained by specific TRAC criteria.
Evidence Requirements
Establishing a representative picture of digital preservation best practice demanded method-
ological coherence and a sound evidential platform. Three principle questions characterised
the evaluation across each participating institution:
1. What was documented?
2. What did staff members or other stakeholders believe, think or know happened to
facilitate preservation?
3. What actually happened?
The extent to which initial evidence (i.e. that received and analysed prior to the on-site au-
dit activities) was comprehensive, significantly influenced the ease with which subsequent
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on-site analysis, comparison and corroboration took place. In most cases evidence was pre-
sented as documentation and this was generally useful in establishing an institutional picture.
In contrast with personal testimonial it provided an objective foundation to support further
inquiry.
In each of the assessments, documents were made freely available from the host institu-
tion, ensuring that it was straightforward to identify what was documented. Primary tes-
timony was a useful means of corroborating that written policies, procedures and practices
were well understood and representative, providing evidence that staff and stakeholders were
aware of the extent of functionality and services offered by the repository, and illustrating a
level of intrinsic transparency. The identification of a critical mass of stakeholders or staff
whose views, beliefs or understanding differed markedly from that which was documented
carried significant evidential impact. Lesser degrees of dissent motivated further interviews,
or, where feasible, a conclusive practical demonstration was sought. Testimony unsupported
by documentation was persuasive only to the extent to which it was corroborated by other
means, whether by interview with alternative staff or stakeholders or through first hand ob-
servation. Observation of practice, while likely to carry the greatest evidential impact was
suited to only those issues that related to a demonstrable procedure.
Witnessing the repository function in a particular way was representative of its capacity to
do so, but not that such behaviour was firmly embedded within the fabric of the repository’s
infrastructure. Interviews and observation evidence offered a transitory view of the world;
the development of a compelling account of preservation practice demanded policies, skills,
techniques and functionality that were sustainable, assured and persistent. Documentation
was our favoured means of establishing this.
Formal primary documentation included not just paper records, but also online content (such
as web pages or wikis) and object or repository metadata. Documentation was typically illus-
trative of the satisfaction of capacity or commitment-style requirements. Other requirements
demanding the existence of particularly policies could be demonstrated with a physical doc-
ument. Metrics within documentation were illustrative of resource requirements such as
appropriate staffing numbers. Service levels and contingency measures were also revealed
in documentation.
Unsupported testimony that lacked corroboration, documentation or visible procedure was
of limited value, although was used as a basis for further investigation. Subsequent inves-
tigation would either elevate this testimony or result in its rejection. The exception was
when evaluating organisational commitment. While generally identified at repository level,
commitment or appetite could also be determined within the will of individuals, particularly
repository management. These softer aspects could rarely be conclusively demonstrated in
this way, but such testimony was nevertheless to some degree compelling. In the event of
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contradiction by any other evidence type, unsubstantiated stakeholder testimony could in
most cases be immediately discarded.
The extent to which testimony was substantiated was important in determining its eviden-
tial impact. If several interviewees described a common world view it implied a degree of
credibility. Any agreed deviation from documented evidence tended to undermine that doc-
umentation and required it to be disregarded. This was also indicative of a poorly integrated
documented policy.
Among the most useful secondary documentation was the content of reports from prior audits
or certification that had already been awarded (or withheld). In such circumstances that value
was largely dependent upon the aspect of the repository that had undergone assessment, and
the trustworthiness of the associated procedure or awarding organisation.
Where institutional representatives stage-managed the demonstration of systems or processes
the value was to some extent limited. Known issues could be avoided, and non representa-
tive strengths (for example, extraordinarily extensive metadata records for particular objects)
presented as typical. However, it was considered unlikely that hosts could conceal significant
system shortcomings during an in-depth demonstration, and the results were therefore quite
compelling. In terms of their evidential weight, these usurp both testimony and documenta-
tion as representative of what actually happens.
Our own personal system interactions were preferable. Evidence collected this way was gen-
erally conclusive, more so than both testimony and documentation. Documentation would
only carry greater weight in the event of temporary system problems error status documen-
tation could limit the inferences that auditors could reasonably make in these circumstances.
These evidential prioritisations were complemented by criteria established by the US Center
for Research Libraries [CRL, 2007] which detailed informal ratings as follows:
5. Compliant with all metrics fully and consistently, and able to provide complete, up-to-date
documentation of all systems and procedures and certifications of system security.
4. Compliant with all metrics, and able to provide complete, up-to-date documentation, but
with minor inconsistencies in areas that are not likely to lead to systemic or pervasive
defects.
3. Compliant with all critical metrics, and able to provide complete, up-to-date documenta-
tion of major systems and procedures, but with minor inconsistencies in areas that are
not likely to lead to systemic or pervasive defects.
2. Compliant with all critical metrics, with a minimum of inconsistencies in areas that might
lead to minor defects of a systemic or pervasive nature; documentation is complete and
updated on a periodic basis.
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1. Compliant with all critical metrics, with a minimum of inconsistencies or deficiencies in
areas that might lead to minor defects of a systemic or pervasive nature.
Evidence retrieval at times faced difficulties. The most obvious was the reluctance of repos-
itory staff to fully cooperate with the process, and their consequent resistance to the release
of documentation, disclosure of information in interviews or provision of auditor access to
systems, whether due to reasons of sensitivity or otherwise. Those that ultimately partici-
pated were required to confer upon auditors discretion to request any documentation relevant
to the assessment - for those the incentives of improvement and the opportunity to contribute
(and help shape) the development of community standards for evaluation were sufficiently
compelling. Non disclosure of the specific practical aspects of each audit was an unfortunate
commitment required by several participants (although this did not affect the shaping of the
outcomes).
Other barriers were less easily overcome however, particularly when the context for such
work was an international one. Documentation was typically written in native languages,
which represented a significant barrier. Similarly the role of auditor demands considerably
diverse skills and knowledge: in most instances, given the breadth of coverage these au-
dits demand, from the point of view of any single auditor, some aspects of documentation,
whether technical, financial, legal or archival could prove difficult to interpret.
3.2.3 The National Library Repository
Background
The e-Depot repository at the Dutch Koninklijke Bibliotheek documented in the first case
study had a formal relationship with two internationally established Dutch publishers which
was integral to the establishment of its e-journal preservation storage resource. Success-
ful negotiations with Elsevier and Kluwer concluded in 1996, and subsequent collaborating
publishers include Oxford University Press, Taylor and Francis, Sage, and Springer. At the
end of 2005 the repository accommodated around 3,500 e-journal titles, comprising some 5
million articles and totalling around 6.3 Tb.
Prior to the assessment the repository staff were encouraged to complete a self assessment
based upon the draft audit criteria and complete separate financial and technologically-
focused questionnaires. Further documentation and comments regarding the audit questions
were also submitted. The fact that several responses were not in the English language was
illustrative of one of the challenge of undertaking international audits.
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Methodological Notes
Despite the large volume of documentation that was made available to us during the on-
site process, the most influential evidence was solicited via themed interviews, structured
to broadly correspond with the sections of the RLG/NARA audit check-list, and involving
a selection of relevant staff. The majority of the conclusions from this audit were drawn
from a combination of written self-assessment (mainly corresponding to the RLG/NARA
check-list and completed and submitted to our on-site activities), and the series of staff inter-
views. Only the self-assessment documents and a further short document describing some
criticism of the RLG/NARA check-list were available to auditors prior to their arrival on-
site. Interview questions were primarily designed to address points of uncertainty within the
check-list responses, and the specific criticisms of the metric that had been presented. The
general process throughout each session was to question only those responses that appeared
to demonstrate non-compliance with the check-list’s prescribed metric or that questioned the
value of those metrics. Significantly less time was spent questioning those responses that
suggested best practice had already been implemented. Finally, notwithstanding the insights
afforded during a short tour of the archive, the audit offered no opportunities for staff to
demonstrate the operation of the system or for auditors to see or question the specifics of ac-
tual physical processes. In that respect then, no primary evidence about the hands-on digital
object management undertaken within the archive was available.
Documentation was made available on arrival at the repository, and appeared both extensive
and persuasive. However, as it was subject to little formal analysis, and was rarely respon-
sible for the provocation of questions during interview sessions one must be cautious of
overstating the role it played during the audit. Within the concluding presentation auditors
were congratulatory about the level of documentation that the archive had accumulated and
made available. However, one might assert that, from a formal, analytical perspective, its
legitimacy was granted based on little more than its quantity. A trustworthy repository will
have extensive documentation, but it is not necessarily true to say that any repository with
extensive documentation is trustworthy.
The role of the check-list itself was limited. A more effective strategy would combine the
different kinds of evidence available (interviews, documentation and observation of practice)
to evaluate the satisfaction of the requirements of individual sections, with individual metrics
providing opportunities for more specific analysis. The audit of the e-Depot dwelt mainly
on the pursuit of evidence to explore points of ambiguity or organisational failings perceived
only from the initial self-assessment. In this sense, the approach was reactive, and even then
mainly to points of failure - compliance was frequently determined on the basis of little more
self-affirmation, whereas this ought to have been admissible as just one of several kinds of
evidence that confirmed the pedigree of the repository. The self-assessment documents un-
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doubtedly represent a valuable starting point for the audit process. However, rather than treat
them definitively, the on-site process may have benefited more from being an exercise in
determining their legitimacy, employing interview, document analysis, observation and ex-
perimental techniques to establish a sense of the extent to which each metric’s requirements
are satisfied.
3.2.4 The National Archive’s Data Centre
Background
The National Archive’s Data Centre preserved and provided online access to archived digital
datasets and documents from UK central government departments. Data stored remained
in the legal custody of the National Archives, but were managed by the Data Centre, who
provided preservation and dissemination services. The datasets accessioned varied tremen-
dously. Many were decommissioned databases that had been superseded. In other circum-
stances they were snapshots of running servers still in production use. Similarly, the types of
data, their size and their subject matter exhibited considerable diversity.
Limited access was offered to the Data Centre’s staff intranet and wiki and a range of addi-
tional materials were supplied prior to and during the visit. These included several procedural
manuals, organisation charts, staff job descriptions, a selection of data transfer documents,
the Data Centre contract’s service level agreement and a copy of the service’s Business Con-
tinuity Plan. In addition, several Data Centre staff contributed to the completion of a self-
assessment against the RLG-NARA criteria and these responses provided a useful basis for
subsequent enquiry. Additional recourse was made to the Data Centre and service websites,
which provided further insights in some areas.
Methodological Notes
The preservation service provided at the Data Centre was undertaken as a contractual obli-
gation under agreement with a national archive, and as a consequence the documentation
available within the organisation was perhaps second to none, at least within the context
of this pilot process. Perhaps the greatest lesson learned in this exercise focused less on
the specifics of the available audit tools or methodology than on the preparatory work that
repositories might undertake to facilitate a successful assessment. As a prerequisite and con-
sequence of its contractual relationship, the outcome of a competitive tender process, the
Data Centre maintained a tremendous body of documentation relating to almost every part
of repository operations. Within an impressive catalogue of policy and procedure manu-
als, issues such as digital object acquisition, digital preservation, information security, staff
3.2. Preservation Case Studies 45
training, legal responsibilities, policy review and access were each explained in considerable
detail, enabling an auditor to quickly gain a comprehensive picture of the repository, which
could be immediately compared with the criteria implicit within the audit check-list. Simi-
larly, the repository had willingly undertaken a challenging process of certification under the
ISO 9000 series of standards, relating to quality assurance across every aspect of the organ-
isation. It was also already subject to detailed inspection by its primary client to determine
the suitability of its physical infrastructures.
The check-list self assessment document returned by the Data Centre was of particular value
since unlike every other received during this programme, it was completed by a broad range
of staff representing every level and repository function. This provided an opportunity to
confirm that repository policies had absorbed into the consciousness of all staff, and not just
a single overseer. Discussions with staff indicated a broad and in-depth awareness of policy
and procedure in every area and an organisational cohesion consistent with documentation,
enabling auditors to more easily take demonstrations of repository functionality at face value
with less need to adopt a more adversarial investigative approach. By embedding a culture
of assessment, improvement and transparency firmly within the repository, the demands of
inviting external auditors to perform further assessment were minimised. In the Data Centre,
these characteristics were implicit as a management objective, and to the fore to facilitate the
effective running of the repository. An increase in the organisation’s ‘auditability’ appears
to be a resultant side effect. The goal of auditors is to identify good management practice;
the goal of repository staff is to manage their repository effectively. Both are consistent with
a requirement for a formally documented and internally expressed self awareness.
3.2.5 The UK Research Council Data Centre
Background
The UK Research Council Data Centre in the third case study provided electronic archiving
facilities for a range of data producers, perhaps most notably the research projects funded by
the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) but also significant international mete-
orological organisations such as the UK Met Office and the European Centre for Medium-
range Weather Forecasts. Since 1985 it had grown to represent the NERC’s primary and
sole data centre for data originating from atmospheric research, and consisted of over sixty
terabytes of data in a variety of formats.
Complete access was afforded to the Data Centre’s staff intranet and wiki which incorporated
a comprehensive Operations Manual and associated documents (including a prototype risk
register) and a range of additional materials were supplied prior to the visit. These included
the Natural Environment Research Council [NERC, 2012] Data Policy Handbook, with as-
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sociated guidance notes and example data policies; an organisational chart with job descrip-
tions; an example data protocol document, the service level agreement that documented the
datacentre’s mandate, scope, deliverables and funding period; excerpts from presentations
depicting lines of management within the Data Centre and associated NERC reports. In ad-
dition, the centre’s Curation Manager completed a short self-assessment exercise based on
an earlier draft copy of the RLG-NARA check-list and this was utilised as a foundation for
significant parts of the subsequent investigation. Additional recourse was made to the Data
Centre website which provided further insights in a range of areas.
Methodological Notes
The audit of the UK Research Council Data Centre was facilitated with the availability
of substantial and varied documentation, interview subjects that were both responsive and
forthcoming and an organisationally enthusiastic attitude to the demonstration of practical
processes undertaken during the archive’s normal operation. Near comprehensive documen-
tation was supplied to auditors prior to the visit (including a self assessment based on the
RLG/NARA check-list), offering an opportunity to establish considerable foundational un-
derstanding of the organisation, its contextual spacing, the nature of its business and its
digital holdings, its technological infrastructure and the services and functionality it is com-
mitted to providing. In isolation, this falls far short of representing conclusive proof of the
trustworthiness of the repository (although its very existence provides a persuasive indicator
of managerial effectiveness). As a starting point however, the documentation, which in-
cluded extensive details about the archive’s systems and procedures, technical architecture,
staffing, funding, depositor relationships (including legal relationships) and risks represented
an essential starting point. Equipped with an initial world view, we could spend our limited
time on-site seeking confirmation; staff interviews would provide compelling insights into
whether the documentation was representative of real day-to-day practice and observation
of the completion of tasks, interactions with the system and management process would
prove even more conclusive. The check-list structure informed the organisation of interview
sessions. However, with the extensive evidence already submitted and considered, inter-
views had some adversarial characteristics. The exercise became akin to cross examination,
where truths within the documentation were corroborated, gaps were gradually filled in and
concerns confronted. Every interview room had facilities to access the archive’s computer
system, which facilitated both the demonstration of any concepts or processes that arose
as well as the recovery of any additional electronic documentary evidence, which could be
checked whenever referenced in conversation.
As the audit continued, the evidence-based focus gradually narrowed; our initial goal to
accumulate a broad understanding of the archive evolved into increasingly granular level
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of inquiry, culminating in the determination of whether selected individual criteria from
within the RLG/NARA check-list had been satisfied. In that respect the check-list provided
a pivotal structural support: its broad scope determined the parameters of both initial general
investigation and its individual metrics the focus of more specific subsequent assessment.
3.2.6 The US State Digital Archive
Background
The US State Digital Archive was established to provide long term preservation archival
services for digital materials originating from any of Florida’s state University libraries. In
2002 a three year public grant prompted the archive’s development. Preservation functional-
ity was prioritised ahead of access features, and consequently the organisation operated as a
principally “dark archive”. Its commitment was that all files deposited by agreement with its
affiliates remained available, unaltered and readable from media, with preservation achieved
using the best format migration tools available. Its technological foundation was a set of
scripts and programs, which at the time of the evaluation was due to be released under an
Open Source license.
Extensive documentation was provided in advance of the assessment, comprising job de-
scriptions, organisational charts, service level agreements and a completed self assessment
check-list. Policy documentation was mostly available from a comprehensive policy guide
document. Technical information contained in a corresponding document describing the be-
spoke archive software system. Financial information was made available to auditors on
site.
Methodological Notes
The US State Digital Archive was the final repository to be subject to assessment in the ini-
tial Digital Curation Centre pilot programme; the adopted methodology was therefore quite
mature by this stage. Like many of the audited organisations, the US State Digital Archive
submitted a self assessment document based on the RLG/NARA check-list in anticipation of
the audit visit, and this proved again to be a useful source of insights. By this stage of the
programme it was clear that the self-completed check-list was of greatest value when read af-
ter more neutral documentation; responses amounted in some respects to a dialogue between
the repository and the auditor. Accompanying the self assessment document was a variety of
additional documents, which included organisational information, policy information, soft-
ware specifications, and example deposit agreements. The audit began not with the arrival on
site, but upon receipt of this documentation, with a thorough analysis providing numerous
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insights into the repository infrastructure that would be subsequently explored. Two days
of on-site activities provided an opportunity for discussions and demonstrations of system
functionality and work-flow, and these highlighted a number of implicit concerns. The au-
ditors and audit methodology were by this point sufficiently well established that although
interviews were still structured according to the broad categories of criteria within the check-
list, it was much less necessary to labour over every specific criterion. A more fluid process
evolved; although checks for completeness were made by reference to the check-list at the
conclusion of each session, interviews were mainly structured by the evidence provided by
the repository. The value of a more bottom-up process of evaluation was increasingly evi-
dent.
The team based at the US State Digital Archive appeared in a number of cases to be broadly
conscious of their organisational shortcomings but the audit exercise enabled their system-
atic encapsulation and expression, and allowed them to be more effectively addressed. We
acknowledged during this assessment the value of experience accrued during the previous pi-
lots. In isolation, the RLG/NARA check-list criteria offer a useful structure around which to
base assessment, and a number of clues about the shape that repository activities might best
assume. However, the specific details of how repositories should conform to these criteria
were not really expressed within the check-list. Certification is ultimately about comparison,
using objective metrics, and with peer organisations. For this to work there is an implicit
requirement that tools and methods must support comparability. By exposing ourselves to
a range of environments that purport to satisfy the check-list’s criteria, we are equipped to
determine optimal means of check-list conformity. An additional level of granularity can be
expressed, whereby metric conformity or non-conformity is no longer an atomic considera-
tion. Instead, we can determine the extent to which specific practical approaches are capable
of satisfying individual criteria, and introduce a notional understanding of what this means in
terms of a more universal understanding of conformity. For example, exposed to just a single
repository, we may see evidence of provisions whereby staff may request practical training
during an annual skills review session, that appear to satisfy metric A2.3 of TRAC (“Repos-
itory has an active professional development program in place that provides staff with skills
and expertise development opportunities.”). This may however appear less than satisfactory
when we visit a second repository that offers, in addition to an annual skills review session, a
system requiring each staff member’s line manager to monitor performance levels to suggest
appropriate training. The latter approach ensures that any training opportunities that staff
members may themselves be unaware of remain available, and is therefore preferable. But
without the exposure to a range of implementations that aspire to conformity, it remains dif-
ficult for auditors to determine where improvement might plausibly be sought. It might be
said that the role of a consultant is to distil broad and varied knowledge, accumulated with
considerable experience over a significant period, into advice or services for a client that
3.2. Preservation Case Studies 49
lacks the resources to themselves gather that experience. Our role was broadly identical; in
order to understand the practical realities of check-list compliance, one must be exposed to a
wide variety of implementations. An aspiration to conform is just half of a picture that must
also include a practical capacity to conform.
This suggests that the success of the audit is completely dependant upon the availability
of sufficiently expert auditors. It is they who must interpret audit criteria and determine
what it means in practice to conform. Any opportunities to objectify the process, and con-
vey this knowledge to those within the repository profession should of course be explored.
Accomplished auditors are equipped through their experiences to ask telling questions of
repositories, which might be understood as Key Lines of Enquiry. There is a danger that
unless expressed as at least a semi-formal framework within which evidence can be gathered
and assessed, the audit process may appear to be unduly based on feel, and dependent on the
perceptions of specific auditors, which limits opportunities for comparison. With the priori-
tisation of self-assessment, each repository manager requires access to a body of knowledge
that can be an effective surrogate for such experience.
3.2.7 The Cultural Heritage Archive
Background
The Cultural Heritage Archive based at a UK University was an electronic annex to an older
physical archive, which itself consisted of several hundred thousand examples of notes, pho-
tographs, negatives, drawings, books, catalogues and gem impressions. Three databases
represented the bulk of the electronic content. Much of the the archive’s electronic content
acquisition was proactive, with staff encouraged to actively pursue newly available catalogue
information and photographs for accession.
Little documentary evidence was available to facilitate this final assessment, a point which
is returned to a number of times during the case study, but in advance the archive supplied a
user manual for the bespoke database system that acts as a technological foundation for the
archive, and the Technical Appendix from an AHRC project grant application detailing some
aspects of project management, a commitment to preservation and the text from the now
defunct Arts and Humanities Data Service deposit waiver application, which entitled the
archive to maintain and preserve its own collections. Without this waiver agreement AHRC
funded projects were required to deposit collections with the central management resource.
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Methodological Notes
The audit of the Cultural Heritage Digital Archive was undertaken with little documentation
available throughout the process. A small selection was gathered prior to the on-site activ-
ities, mainly encompassing descriptions of system procedures and functionality and some
documentation describing the archive’s practical commitment to preservation. What distin-
guished this audit most significantly from the others described in this paper was the manner
in which the RLG/NARA check-list was employed. In each of the other examples archive
staff had familiarised themselves with the document’s metrics and provided, in advance, a
series of self-penned responses. In the case of the Cultural Heritage Digital Archive, the
archive was only comprehensively exposed to the check-list during the on-site activities.
In the absence of sufficient alternative documentation, the discussion with staff closely re-
flected the check-list’s structure; in that respect the on-site activities resembled a measured,
facilitated self-assessment exercise. A useful consequence was that auditors were afforded
an insight into the check-list’s applicability, relevance and usefulness within an archive that
had little prior knowledge its metrics. Efforts to obtain practical insights into the repository
operations were made - each interview was conducted with a computer workstation nearby,
ensuring that the physical processes of ingest, archival storage, data management and ac-
cess could be demonstrated. Typically, the information gathering process began with the
check-list requirements. Posed as questions, one or more of the individual metrics would
encourage discussion from appropriate individuals, which included management, technical
support individuals and object management specialists. In the absence of comprehensive
documentation little recourse was available to printed matter, and instead auditors would fre-
quently request that further illustration be provided by way of practical example within the
Archive’s digital object management system.
The absence of extensive written documentation, particularly prior to the on-site activities,
hampered our efforts to obtain a comprehensive and definitive assessment of the Cultural
Heritage Digital Archive. One might argue that it was the lack of opportunity for repository
staff to familiarise themselves with the check-list’s terminology that proved most problem-
atic. But what was clearer was that the check-list could not define, legislate or reflect a new
form of best practice; rather its role is limited to reflecting and encapsulating broadly ac-
cepted truths. An effective sequence for evidence gathering began to emerge - the check-list
provided an initial focus for repositories, but as auditors, our primary starting point had to be
documentation. The absence of documentation from the Cultural Heritage Digital Archive
was symptomatic of the same organisational shortcomings that meant a large proportion of
check-list metrics appeared unfamiliar and onerous.
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3.3 Findings
This section presents a distilled perspective of preservation practice within the organisations
that we audited, with excerpts from each corresponding case study included to illustrate and
provide evidence of practice. Structurally, the overview reflects our audit check-list which
provided the intellectual foundation. Each broad section of analysis concludes with a table
summarising a relationship between core audit issues (essentially derived from the available
check-list literature) and one or more (most commonly several) associated and incorporated
goals. This is illustrative of the first phase of transposition of audit findings to a structured
information network. From these goals we continue to deconstruct the preservation activity
(in the following chapter).
Organisational Infrastructure
This section includes coverage of those organisational aspects necessary to operate the preser-
vation or data management service. Typical considerations include mandate and institutional
commitment; organisational viability and sustainability; legal and regulatory legitimacy and
policy infrastructure efficiency and effectiveness.
We observed a range of organisational infrastructures throughout the sample set. They in-
cluded individual services positioned within a single institutional setting, commercial com-
panies operating under public sector contract, centralised, US state funded services with sev-
eral University clients and repositories supported primarily with short term research funding.
Mission and Mandate
Mission and mandate were typically defined at a very high level within a mission statement or
similar succinct message of organisational commitment. Exemplary practice was identified
in the US State Digital Archive which outlined eight key responsibilities. These described
the major constituent parts of activities, and their relationships with their depositors. These
were to implement bit-level or full preservation of submitted content (determined according
to preservation agreement); to restrict those who were authorised to deposit or sanction the
withdrawal or dissemination of content; to provide detailed ingest and error-related feedback
for every submitted package; to preserve ‘original’ files as submitted, maintaining integrity,
viability and authenticity; to employ appropriate preservation strategies to persistently main-
tain a usable version of each file for which full preservation was sought; to provide dissem-
ination information packages (DIPS) on request; to provide appropriate reports to affiliates
for management purposes; and to ultimately achieve and maintain certification as a trusted
digital repository, when the infrastructure to support this becomes available.
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The Archive’s mission statement was “to provide a cost-effective, long-term preservation
repository for digital materials in support of teaching and learning, scholarship, and re-
search”. This was endorsed by a Data Centre board, lending the commitment a weight of
legitimacy.
Perhaps as a consequence of its contractual basis, the National Archive’s Data Centre
lacked a true mission statement that was sufficiently succinct and widely distributed. In-
stead, its contract (and corresponding legislation) made explicit business aims. This re-
mained inaccessible to wider stakeholders and therefore was of limited widespread value.
The Data Centre website’s ‘About’ page contained an expression of mandate and objectives,
but failed to explicitly define the legislative relationships that justified its existence. Further
background was freely accessible from the web pages within data transfer overview doc-
umentation, which described in more detail the applicability of legislation, the obligations
arising from it and the particular data that the Data Centre was responsible for preserving.
It was thought preferable to have this information presented in a more prominent location,
encapsulated within a succinct and clearly defined mission statement. The Data Centre’s
parent service did have its own mission statement (“the service aims to be the preferred
provider of information, communication and learning technology service across the public
sector”) but, while far from incompatible with the Data Centre’s commitment to long term
data management and access provision, was hardly synonymous.
Organisational, Governance and Policy Best Practice
The UK Research Council Data Centre provided useful evidence of organisational and
governance best practice. There, a steering committee was responsible for advising on
programme development, and ensuring the implementation of associated data management
plans. A data management sub group, including representation from the Data Centre (or
other appropriate data centre(s)) was convened to support a coordinator in these activities.
The steering committee was responsible for ensuring that data management was carried out
effectively (by providing adequate support and resources during the programme); an ap-
propriate data management plan was created; a realistic proportion of the overall programme
budget was devoted to support data management; and all holders of programme awards com-
plied with the data management policy of the programme, as outlined in the data management
plan, (although some scepticism was expressed in terms of enforceability). Circumstances
had arisen where funded researchers had failed to deposit content, or had provided incom-
plete datasets. The Data Centre was not involved in the grant process, and therefore could
not compel deposit where it would be worthwhile. It was suggested that the Data Centre
would have benefited from access to a more detailed online register of grant awards, to sup-
port their pursuit of worthwhile data. In practical terms, discussions suggested that the Data
Centre was simply not offered a great deal of data; however, it was also suggested that this
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situation was changing, and therefore it was imperative that the Data Centre was equipped to
cope with a consequent upsurge of deposits.
Organisationally, the Data Centre existed within a research institution setting under a service
level agreement that described core services, infrastructural developments, and support for
other data centres operating on behalf of a common research funder.
Less clarity in organisation was evident in the Cultural Heritage Archive, where quali-
ties of individuals were often indistinguishable from the service as a whole. Individuals’
dedication, self-motivation and wide ranging contacts had offered a degree of operational
security to the Archive during its lifetime but there was a notable risk that the departure of
key individuals could threaten the organisation’s ongoing viability. Partly this was an or-
ganisational concern - at the time of the assessment the post of Principal Archivist existed
(and was therefore centrally funded by the accommodating University) only for as long as
the existing postholder remained in place.
Succession and Service Continuity
The US State Digital Archive identified the need to engage with other organisations to meet
the range of challenges that prejudiced the integrity of its digital assets. Building relation-
ships was expected to enable the conception of succession or escrow arrangements, further
remote storage of backed up materials, and ultimately, assuming the emergence of their
adopted technology platform as a widely used tool, collaboration in systems development
and format description.
Two ‘options’ existed in the event of the Archive’s cessation of operations, as described in
the Archive’s Policy Guide. The first was to simply return content to the appropriate de-
positor, in the form of a Dissemination Information Package (DIP). This was practically
viable, although one may question whether returning content was a compelling succession
arrangement. In addition, the success of this approach presupposed that the Archive’s op-
erations would be maintained for a period that was sufficient to permit a comprehensive
dissemination. The second option, which was at the time only planned and not practically
implementable, was to send content to an alternative preservation repository in a DIP ex-
change format (the precise format of which was yet to be conceived). While in principle
much closer to a true succession plan, the practical barriers of no format and no repository
greatly impeded its viability. However, discussions were already ongoing with a partner
library on the opposite US coast with whom research monies were being sought to collabo-
ratively define an appropriate exchange format. It was hoped that this joint endeavour might
be extended to represent a reciprocity agreement capable of facilitating succession and the
remote accommodation of content.
In addition, given the anticipated public release of the platform software, it was quite feasi-
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ble to suggest that if widely adopted, the barriers to information exchange across common
systems would be reduced, and that many of the practical or technical difficulties associ-
ated with succession planning would be similarly mitigated. Nonetheless, it was acknowl-
edged that several of the barriers associated with succession planning and feasibility are not
technical, and instead are based in inter-organisational, political and legal concerns. It was
suggested that the Archive continues to pursue a formally expressed collaboration to seek
formal assurances for succession and service continuity, and to define means for effective
inter-organisational digital object exchange. Although it was suggested that funding was
reasonably assured for the foreseeable future there was no evidence of a legal or regulatory
compulsion upon the state to continue to support the Archive. It was suggested that if such
assurances could not be obtained then this should be considered and documented within an
overall risk mitigation strategy.
Succession arrangements at the Cultural Heritage Archive were identified as being vague
if not non-existant. A perception existed that should the Archive fail, the University which
provided the operational context for the Archive would assume custodial responsibility for
the archival holdings and ensure their continued and ongoing availability, such was the extent
to which their value was recognised. However notwithstanding this confident attitude, there
were apparently no formal assurances that this would be the case.
At the e-Depot the issue of software escrow was subjected to some scrutiny during our au-
dit, and also emerged as an area of some concern. The repository’s technical infrastructure
was essentially a proprietary system, consisting of both off-the-shelf and bespoke software
developed by IBM. No escrow agreements were in place, which might leave the Library in a
dangerous position in the event of the withdrawal of the Tivoli software suite or the discon-
tinuation of its support. Dismissing such concerns, staff explained that the issue was given
significant consideration, but that IBM were deemed the only adequate supplier given their
technological requirements. They perceived the likelihood of vendor collapse as extremely
minimal, and irrespective of this, since the data and system software were separable, such an
eventuality could be survived until appropriate alternative software became available. Addi-
tionally, it was argued that since a number of large global banks used and rely upon the same
IBM software, there was sufficient international weight to ensure that IBM would continue
to maintain the software in its current, or similar form.
Repository Staffing
The US State Archive’s biggest staffing priority was to make new appointments, with the
most high priority being a manager for the Archive, who could engage with affiliates and plan
and direct the future administrative and operational direction of the Archive. The Archive’s
primary goal within the near future was to increase affiliate numbers and the quantity and
quality of content within it and to enhance its reputation.
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The UK Research Council Data Centre exhibited sufficient number of staff, and evidence
suggested that the organisation had a broad understanding of the implications in terms of
workload and personnel requirements of a move towards a more ‘OAIS compliant’ infras-
tructure. However, the organisation would have benefited from committing extra resources
towards preservation and archival roles, with its existing staff primarily consisting of subject
experts. Archival lifecycle activities such as ingest, data and metadata management could
have been assigned explicit ownership by individuals or roles within the Centre. Further-
more, legal advice should have been at least solicited given the doubt that to some extent
surrounded agreements with depositors and content creators. These recommendations were
primarily focussed on enhancing the repository’s scalability.
Training was available for staff, although it was presented in a fairly ad hoc fashion, based
mainly on staff demand. At the time of our audit, recent training had been offered in script-
ing languages such as Perl and Python whereby several copies of prominent learning texts
were purchased and staff were encouraged to learn as a group. There were however few
mechanisms in place to identify knowledge or skills gaps and therefore staff were expected
to maintain a degree of consciousness of their own shortcomings, which was perhaps unreal-
istic. Better structured training programmes could have been developed and associated with
particular roles within the Centre, in order to ensure the effective development of staff.
Most repositories enjoyed staff stability - the Cultural Heritage Archive had been success-
ful for over twenty-five years with little evidence of service disruption or data loss appeared
to relate, to at least some extent, to the fact that the Archive had enjoyed tremendous staff
stability throughout its period of existence. It was identified in several audits that although
low turnover of staff implied that those employed were both experienced and competent, it
also meant that staff were more expensive, a consideration in terms of financial sustainability.
The National Archive’s Data Centre exhibited an exemplary approach to staffing. The
heads of Application Services and Digital Archives, in association with senior staff, were
responsible for allocating staff resources, and monitoring appeared to be undertaken to de-
tect staffing shortfalls based on the requirements made explicit within the the Data Centre
contract. To this end, there appeared to be adequate staffing provisions at the time of our
audit.
Professional staff development within the service was covered by both in house training poli-
cies and procedures, and by the wider infrastructure provided by the parent university. With
respect to the latter, job appraisal schemes provided opportunities for staff and line man-
agers to jointly mould personal and professional development, to identify their own training
needs and to arrange for them to be formally addressed. A training budget existed for the
Digital Archiving Department and given the involvement of the service in a variety of other
training activities there were ample opportunities for specific training. Furthermore, the Data
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Centre’s Inhouse and Training Procedure Manual described fairly comprehensive processes
associated with staff induction, training needs assessment and review and training delivery.
Community Engagement
The UK Research Council Data Centre’s designated community was defined more nar-
rowly than its overall potential user base, a target community comprising around 45 per cent
of total end users. The Centre’s commitment (in terms of preservation) was limited to making
materials usable for its stated group of specialist scientists. Although an internal understand-
ing of the designated community of the Data Centre was demonstrated during discussions
with the Curation Manager, there was no evidence of a centralised, published definition.
Similarly, little evidence was available to suggest that formal mechanisms were in place to
monitor the evolution of this community, although the relationships that were maintained
with depositors, who were in turn likely to be end users, were close, and provided insights
into latest developments. However, of the 8000 or so registered users of the Data Centre web
access system, a small fraction (less than 5 per cent) were responsible for depositing.
There was little to indicate the existence of formal mechanisms to react to accumulated evi-
dence of community evolution. One anticipated an ad hoc approach to dealing with changes
in community expectations.
At the e-Depot, two categories of designated community were identified. The first was pri-
marily publishers, what the Library described as their business to business profile. This was
expected to be extended in the future with the addition of additional cultural and heritage
depositors; the development of formal service level agreements would enable and facilitate
these emerging relationships. The second category of relationship was with end users, de-
scribed as the Library’s business to consumer profile. This relationship was less explicitly
stated, and few formal guarantees were offered to those seeking content as to what was avail-
able and the infrastructure that was available to support its delivery. Nonetheless, Library
users could remotely access catalogue information about publications, access resources on-
site, or access faxed or printed copies of articles in libraries elsewhere as inter-library loans.
In turn the Library was compelled by contract to provide a ‘minimal level of functionality’
which included bibliographic searches, publisher publication listings at the volume and issue
level, listings of issue content, article views, copyright information views article or “smaller
than article components” (e.g., metadata) downloads consistent with the terms of each con-
tract.
Suitability of Policies and Procedures
The National Archive’s Data Centre exhibited great leadership in terms of policy and pro-
cedural formality. A range of policy and procedural documentation was available, which in-
cluded Security Procedures, Transfer Procedures, Site Exchange Procedures, Digital Preser-
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vation Procedures, Paper and Paper Preservation Procedures, Helpdesk Procedures, Inhouse
and Training Procedures, Closed Data Access Procedures, Data Protection Act Procedures,
Finding Aids Procedures, Contingency Planning Procedures and Style Guides. Each set of
procedures was realised in one or more associated documents.
The Data Centre also maintained policies that described in detail necessary steps to intro-
duce, review and retire procedures. All the Data Centre procedures were documented in ap-
propriate manuals, supplemented where necessary by detailed working instructions. These
could be changed in three ways. The first was where the Data Centre Service Manager
had identified the need to revise a procedure manual, and this duty could be delegated to a
member of staff. A draft revision was then presented and discussed in a physical meeting,
by email or in the Data Centre Usenet discussion forum. Amendments were then actioned,
prior to the creation of a final draft, which was then approved by the the Data Centre Service
Manager, and linked to from a central HTML index page. Staff were informed that all prior
versions should be immediately disregarded. Alternatively, any staff member could suggest
changes at any time. Suggested changes were circulated via email or Usenet, comments were
aggregated and a brief report conceived, for discussion at a subsequent meeting. Final revi-
sions, and the replacement of earlier versions were actioned as above, subject to the Service
Manager’s approval. Finally, all procedures manuals were subject to ongoing review, on an
at least annual basis. The introduction of new procedures was conducted on a similar basis.
Once more, these could be prompted by the Service Manager, an independent member of
staff or during a regular procedures review meeting.
The quality assurance and consultation procedures associated with the conception of new
procedures were broadly equivalent to those associated with amending existing procedures.
A new procedure could be justified by the introduction of a new procedure that extended the
range of work; a major change in the way a procedure was undertaken; sufficient numbers of
small changes to an existing procedure to necessitate a wholesale review or its granularisation
into multiple procedures; or, finally, the insistence by a staff member that a new procedure
was otherwise necessary. In most cases of procedural change, the existing manuals would
simply be updated. The benefits of this approach to procedures management were clear. Each
of these three methods for introducing and modifying procedures was intended to ensure that
they remained relevant, representative and comprehensive in their coverage. Procedures were
allowed to both dictate the work undertaken within the Data Centre, and reflect emerging
working practices that may reveal themselves and optimise the repository’s efforts.
Further policy described the mechanism for retiring redundant procedures within the Data
Centre. Again, this could be prompted by any staff member, or in discussions as part of
a procedures review meeting. In the event of a procedure being nominated for retirement,
a staff member was delegated the responsibility for collecting comments to support or op-
pose the motion (or suggest merely revision of the procedure). These were amalgamated
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into a report which provided the basis for subsequent discussion and a final decision by the
the Data Centre Service Manager. Retired procedures were moved to a special section of
the staff intranet, with a note describing the fact that the procedure did once exist and had
been superseded. Details of any procedures manuals that did supersede retired procedures
were also recorded. Procedures could be retired if they were classified as redundant; this
could incorporate situations where working practices had changed to the extent that the pro-
cedure was no longer relevant; staff had suggested that the procedure was no longer relevant;
procedures corresponded to work areas that were no longer active; sufficient smaller-scale
changes necessitated reformulation of policies or the creation of more granular policies; or
where procedures were subsumed within an existing procedures manual.
As well as participating in this pilot assessment, the Data Centre illustrated its enthusiasm
for policy excellence by obtaining ISO 9000 series quality assurance certification.
A less successful approach to policy was evident at the Cultural Heritage Archive. Un-
doubtedly the greatest concern with respect to policies and procedures was the lack of trans-
parency, accountability and documentation that surrounded much of the Archive’s efforts.
Notwithstanding the clear indicators of success in terms of funding consistency, user num-
bers and community reputation, there was little in place to facilitate understanding or sustain-
ability, or to enable a newcomer to continue to build on the preceding efforts. The Archive
adopted a bullish approach to user and legal accountability, where the fact that services were
available free to end users appeared to be the basis for complete limitation of liability. The
primary role embraced by staff appeared to be to add value to the materials, with preser-
vation of lesser concern. This view did not appear to conform to terms of funding which
compelled the Archive to act as custodian and preserver of digital assets arising from funded
activities; indeed the Archive’s own deposit waiver applications offered a commitment to
undertake these activities as an alternative to a funder appointed custodian. Information in-
tegrity measures were defined, but not formally documented, although it seemed that these
were exclusively related to the creation, acquisition and ingest of new content. Once assets
become resident within the database there was little evidence of ongoing integrity checks. No
mechanisms existed to provide on demand measurements of information integrity. Clearly,
policies ought to have been more rigorously conceived, documented and formalised, and
circulated widely among repository staff to ensure widespread understanding.
Contracts, Intellectual Property and Legal
The Cultural Heritage Archive faced a number of potential legal concerns, which to date
had been managed, but, it was considered, may have threatened the ongoing viability of the
Archive. The legal status of much of the material within the database remained unclear.
No formal relationship was maintained with information publishers or producers; instead
the Archive’s principal researchers operated quite independently, acquiring digital materials
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from analogue sources based mainly on their availability. Legal guidance had been sought
in the past with regard to the dissemination of copyright controlled image materials; the
suggestion then was that since the chance of rights holders seeking redress was negligible
the Archive needn’t deviate from its existing practice. The repository administration offered
three main justifications for continuing to distribute copyrighted materials - the lack of charge
levied by the Archive for access to materials; the excellent track record that the Archive had
established as an authoritative source; and the community interests that were being served -
it was argued that in the absence of the Archive there would be no way for these demands to
be met.
The lack of appropriate contracts or deposit agreements, and the legal questions surrounding
data gathering procedures were a concern, and almost certainly represented a risk that could
have been addressed more systematically. The restrictions imposed on usage (content was
free for personal and academic usage; copyright notices; digital watermarks and technology
used to encode copyright holders name to images) would not necessarily satisfy content
creators in the event of legal objections. Reciprocal agreements were sporadically in place,
enabling the Archive to digitise content in exchange for appropriate credit on their web
site. These could have been better formalised in order to limit the risk of liability. Even
in those circumstances where producers or publishers directly interacted with the Archive no
formal written agreements existed. Irrespective of the fact that such legal challenges might
have been overcome by withdrawing content, the impact in terms of wasted staff time could
have been considerable. The Archive described only positive feedback from publishers, who
according to anecdotal evidence regarded the Archive’s use of their materials as beneficial.
Nonetheless, none would agree to waive copyright, and arrangements would have benefited
from being more formally expressed.
The lack of legal controls was also problematic due to its impact on funding requirements,
notably those imposed by the Archive’s primary funder. The Archive was understandably
reluctant to deposit content given the rights issues described above; it was thought that such
behaviour might imply ownership. Instead the Archive was required to commit to preserva-
tion activities which added to their core objectives to present content. However, discussions
suggested that preservation remained a very low priority for the Archive, despite the fact that
continued funding was contingent upon it.
The UK Research Council Data Centre appeared to operate without formal deposit agree-
ments, and where agreements existed there appeared to be a somewhat loose approach
to contractual management. At least one relationship with a strategically important data
provider offered a good example. Data originating from research council-funded research
was subject to more formal terms, and these were outlined within a data policy and associ-
ated programme-specific data protocols and policies. These appeared to be negotiated at a
level beyond the immediate Data Centre management (although appeared to involve at least
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some degree of consultation with the Data Centre).
Further rights-related questions were associated with ambiguities over the Data Centre’s right
to change data, which might be regarded as ‘preservation rights’. The internally held percep-
tion was that the Data Centre probably did not have the rights to change, or even reformat
data. Instead the rights were to share data. In practical terms though, it was argued that
irrespective of the existence of these rights, the Data Centre would not change data be-
cause of the question of trust (the internally held perception being that users did not trust
the Data Centre to alter content), and the comparatively small number of widely acknowl-
edged data formats: both of the principle formats utilised by the Data Centre, NASA AMES
and NetCDF, appeared stable and widely used. Ownership of data was similarly unclear;
NERC was committed mainly to making data public, and therefore questions of ownership
were given considerably less priority. Discussions and analysis of example NERC funding
agreements suggested that NERC was unlikely to own data generated from funded research
since this was not expressly stipulated in the grant award documentation. Notwithstanding
such ambiguity, it was claimed that the Data Centre might not be permitted to make data
public if there was a notable associated revenue stream that might be exploitable. In the case
of NERC data, contracts existed between NERC and the appropriate universities/researchers
providing (and in many cases owning) the data. No direct agreements were formed between
the Data Centre and depositors, with mutual responsibilities mainly encompassed in a data
protocol corresponding to each NERC programme. There were questions about the extent
to which the Data Centre was legally entitled to make preservation management decisions
based on their perceived value of archived data.
Monitoring of intellectual property rights existed in embryonic form in the Operations Man-
ual on the Data Centre wiki, but this fell short of the “comprehensive overview” demanded
by our audit check-list. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that this issue could be taken to
extremes, and ISO 9000 series certification might be regarded as necessary in order to con-
form to the check list. However, within this context, it was felt that to make such demands
of the Centre was not helpful and ultimately unnecessary. Of potentially greater relevance,
conversations revealed that no formal policies or procedures existed relating to requirements
arising from Data Protection and Freedom of Information legislation. The Curation Man-
ager’s view was that neither Act presented any problems or legal incompatibilities with ex-
isting Data Centre practice. With respect to Freedom of Information, his rationale appeared
to be that existing Environmental Information Regulations superseded FoI, encompassing
all of its requirements (and more). However, in order to ensure that everybody at the Data
Centre was aware of legal issues and the appropriate approaches to resolve any associated
concerns, it was suggested that written guidance should be developed. This was especially
true for those members of staff responsible for answering user queries and providing user
support. Legal doubts were apparently quite widespread and the then current non-formalised
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approach, which seemed to be based on continuing until legal challenges arose, was regarded
as unsustainable. Contracting a lawyer to provide advice was recommended. NERC had es-
tablished some precedent with respect to legal issues, when it provided the Data Centre with
legal input for the purposes of drafting a limitation of liability statement, and in addition the
Data Centre’s parent organisation had in house legal expertise available.
A final concern in this area relates to the current system workflow evident within the Data
Centre. Control of access to datasets was built into the access system/interface, with those re-
sponsible for information ingest responsible for determining the appropriate access level for
particular datasets and content. There was therefore perhaps scope for concern when dealing
with atypical access rules. Nevertheless, this was a small concern, as the system demon-
strated sufficient fluidity to suggest that it could be altered to reflect emerging requirements.
Given its partnership-based approach, the legal responsibilities of the US State Digital
Archive itself were considered limited. According to affiliate agreements, liability for in-
tellectual property rights infringements remained with the depositing organisation, and sub-
mitted content would only be accepted after standard agreements had been countersigned.
The affiliate organisation was required to commit to being “responsible for compliance with
all applicable copyright laws and other laws applicable to deposited materials, and that [they
have] the authority to grant to Data Centre non-exclusive rights to copy, display and cre-
ate derivative versions of deposited files.” In the event of legal challenge (which had at the
time of the evaluation not occurred), the Archive’s policy was to disseminate the content to
the owning affiliate and withdraw it from the Archive. If a challenge subsequently faltered
then they would replace the object without charge. The only concern associated with this
approach was that it might be abused with minimal justification. Since the Archive was op-
erating as a dark archive it seemed that either hoax or legitimate challenges were unlikely,
given that it remained impossible for non-affiliate parties to determine the nature of or access
the archived content. Nevertheless, with the onus of proof of legality resting on the affiliate,
this presented a potential risk.
A final point of legal concern related to materials that were associated with the digital ob-
jects, and also stored within the Archive. The Archive’s documented ‘localization’ policy
described a process that occurred when a submitted file contained links to other files (such
as an XML file which references a DTD or Schema). In such cases, the remote, referenced
file was retrieved and added to the archival content (AIP). There were obvious legal con-
cerns, given that affiliates were required to only vouch for the legality of submitted content,
not that of any referenced material. This had been earlier acknowledged, and the system
was modified (albeit without a corresponding change to the Archive policy documentation)
to download only a small format-specific subset of all linked files, most notably DTD and
XML Schema files. The alternative would be that every online document cited within a
PDF dissertation might be harvested and stored with no permission. A remaining doubt was
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whether legal permission was required to store these remaining file types. In all likelihood
this would vary on a file-by-file basis, but it was recommended that Archive staff explore,
with some urgency, the legal implications of storing each of the linked schemas and DTDs
within the digital collections. Liability in such cases may not be assumed to fall upon the
affiliate within the current wording of the library agreement (given that it explicitly covered
just ‘deposited files’). Therefore, if potential legal consequences could be identified these
should be addressed by either refining the text of the standard agreement or conceiving and
documenting an appropriate policy that alleviates the remaining concerns.
Its contractual origins afforded the National Archive’s Data Centre a degree of legal pro-
tection, since the liabilities were expressly indicated within that contract, and many implicit
issues were the parent Archive’s responsibility. Similarly, questions about the the Data Cen-
tre mission being at odds with its parent University were largely moot since the contract
had been endorsed, with the Vice Chancellor countersigning and formally expressing his
satisfaction of the Data Centre’s alignment with the University mission.
At the end of the the Data Centre contract content would be returned to the contracting
National Archive and any remaining local copies destroyed. Either contracting party could
choose to back out of the contract giving a minimum of six months notice; there were direc-
tions to follow in the event of this happening, but specific details would be negotiated at that
time. Generally speaking, conflicting contracts with the commercial sector would be avoided
by the service.
The Data Centre maintained ongoing relationships with both government departments and
data owners (as well as client and contract managers at the parent Archive) to ensure that
its procedures were endorsed where appropriate and that it was ultimately able to fulfil its
mandate. Dataset transfer forms changed hands during the initial stages of transfer, follow-
ing the notification by the parent of data that was to be preserved. Signed by data owners
and departmental records officers these provided the means to issue formal authorisation to
transform source data, detail parts of data sets that must remain closed or be redacted, and
describe conditions for managing transport media. Subsequent receipts issued by the Data
Centre further formalised the agreement that preservation would take place, and confirmed
the instructions issued by owners and departments. An accessioning tracking system moni-
tored and maintained a record of every interaction between parties and interaction with data.
Intellectual property rights were unlikely to concern the Data Centre too much since it was
dealing with public records with an explicitly expressed legislative mandate. Nevertheless,
evidence highlighted a concerning shortfall in policy in the event of an intellectual property
rights challenge. One staff member recounted in a check-list self-response that the Data Cen-
tre had been challenged in the past and had redacted data, in the absence of a suitable policy
saying otherwise. She expressed some (albeit tentative) concerns that perhaps everything
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might be redacted if challenged. This should have been addressed by both the development
of formal documentation describing a policy for this situation and internal awareness raising
to communicate more clearly the legal status of the Data Centre records. It seemed unlikely
that the Data Centre would be conforming to its contractual requirements if it acted unilater-
ally on this occasion, and therefore an expression of parent Archive policy in this area was
probably quite adequate. In fact, in this case the approach went via the parent which over-
saw negotiations prior to making a decision. Further ambiguity surrounded challenges to
non-availability; for example, some materials were classified as too commercially sensitive
to release but may be covered by Freedom of Information legislation. It appeared that there
had been no retrospective assessment of previously closed datasets in light of FOI and this
was something that could have been considered. Such requests remained primarily the re-
sponsibility of the parent National Archive, to whom the request would normally be issued.
Following a representation by the relevant government department, the National Archive
would make a decision as to whether content should be released.
Further legal complications arose as a result of some records within the Data Centre being
exempt from corresponding public record legislation. Furthermore, on some occasions parts
of certain accessions would be subject to intellectual property law. For example, software
user manuals had been submitted in the past as part of a dataset’s accompanying documen-
tation, and this introduced some ambiguities that could have been addressed within a formal
policy document.
Budgeting and Finance
In addition to a large research funder grant, the period of which ended prior to our audit, the
greatest proportion of the US State Digital Archive’s funding originated from centralised,
state channels. Although the budget came via a host institution, there was little to no direct
independent budgetary interaction. Instead, budget plans were subject to review by the board
of eleven State-wide Directors (representing individual affiliate Universities), who would of-
fer their approval, assuming sufficient finances were available. Plans would then pass to the
centralised, State Board of Governors, whereby each University’s Vice-President met and
agreed before final ratification by the council of University Presidents. Budgetary flexibility
was evident, and had been exploited in the past. For instance, when systems were transferred
from a costly mainframe system to cheaper UNIX systems monies were freed up, enabling
the Data Centre to acquire additional human resources. The base budget, allocated annu-
ally, continued automatically, although it was noted that in past periods of recession the Data
Centre budget had been reduced. For instance, in 1991 when the host institution was asked
to reduce 3 per cent of its spending the Data Centre was asked to cut that amount of their
yearly budget, which was collected from the mid-year free balance. This accompanied a
much wider commensurate series of public sector budget cuts within the state. Within the
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model, the Data Centre was capable of maintaining a carry-over fund which was useful to
meet costs that recur on a less than annual basis, such as replacement of expensive technolog-
ical infrastructure equipment. These monies resided in a separate budget, which unlike the
main Data Centre budget could be accessed by the host institution. Such tampering would
be likely to elicit a strong negative reaction from the other state university libraries, and was
therefore considered unlikely. One consequence of the protection afforded to the Data Centre
budget (which further emphasised the value of the carry-over fund) was that no overspend-
ing could take place; budgetary separation meant that the University was unable to cover any
deficits. At the time of the evaluation the Data Centre budget had never been in the nega-
tive; rather their annual spending had consistently yielded spare cash to carry over into the
following financial year. There was also evidence of anticipatory budgeting for subsequent
years, if not within the Archive itself, certainly within the wider Data Centre. For instance,
when a significant proportion of the Data Centre’s library infrastructure moved from dumb
terminals to PCs they were able to project across a five year period the anticipated budgetary
requirements and spending.
There was no charging model in place for the Archive services, but the library agreement
countersigned by each affiliate included a caveat explaining that although no fee was cur-
rently payable, this may be introduced in the future. Discussions suggested that a quota-
based system of billing might be adopted, with a view to both income generation and pro-
voking a more thoughtful and selective approach to archiving from depositors. The adminis-
trative consequences of such a decision were thought likely to be considerable, and this again
provided a clear justification for the appointment of a full time Archive Manager. There were
many benefits associated with introducing a charging model, not least from a sustainability
perspective. Perhaps the most profound was that the introduction of such a system would
immediately reduce some of the concerns that surrounded the scalability of the Archive;
continuing without charge was quite conceivable if the level of content remained roughly
the same. However, an increasingly widespread use of the Archive services would introduce
additional costs across the whole Archive budget. If these could be mitigated by a self-
sustainable, charging-based system then the Archive could be less worried about attracting
additional depositors. Income generation of this type provides a degree of insurance against
possible future funding gaps, which as noted, could not be met by the local host University.
The Data Centre Director suggested in discussion that the primary operational budget was
guaranteed, but given previous funding dips in periods of recession, it was realistic to think
that funding may be less than expected.
There was at the time of the evaluation no formal, distinct budget for the Archive, rather its
allocations were consumed within an overall budget for the Data Centre. This was a situa-
tion that staff were seeking to amend however, and recent efforts had been made to develop
a prototype budget for just the Archive, with the intention to make it increasingly indepen-
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dent from its organisational context. A spreadsheet detailed individual costs associated with
staffing, software and hardware, and the third party hardware hosting services provided by
the host institution’s Computing and Networking Services and a remote third party Data Cen-
tre. These costs amounted to around 550,000 USD of expenditure from a total Data Centre
budget of just under 13m USD. The most significant Archive expenditure was staff salaries;
given the strong suggestion above, it was likely that this would extend beyond the current
384,774 USD following the appointment of a full time manager.
Greater budgetary independence for the Archive appeared appropriate. In order to not only
manage but also actively demonstrate the sustainability of the archival operations it was
useful to isolate expenditure, incomes and assets (or proportions of each) that related to the
Archive. This would in turn facilitate business planning, and the allocation of monies for
contingency. The Archive could also consider maintaining a similar distinction with regard
to the carry forward balance in order to ensure that cash saved in archival operations could
be subsequently channelled back to cover those less frequent costs associated with archival
preservation functionality. Preservation is unpredictable and flexible assets are therefore
extremely valuable, particularly in the absence of a parent organisation capable of providing
support in times of financial strain.
It was suggested that greater physical separation of the Archive might accompany a move
towards greater financial independence. In contrast, this was not recommended, since the
rich skills and other resources evident within the Archive team’s operational context provided
scope for intellectual and resourcing economies of scale that would benefit both the Archive
and its associated services.
In terms of transparency, public law ensured that all organisations funded by the state legis-
lature were bound to full disclosure of financial record keeping, ensuring that transparency
was maintained, and that shortcomings in accounting practice could be immediately identi-
fied and corrected.
On occasions, costs associated with the accessioning of datasets led to the National Archive’s
Data Centre’s resistance to archive. Data had been turned down in the past due to unneces-
sary expense associated with it - a prominent example was a dataset encoded in a proprietary
format associated with an unnamed document management system. Mechanisms were of-
fered by the system’s developers to export these documents to PDF, but the Data Centre was
unwilling to pay the charge. Had the parent contracting Archive insisted, it was acknowl-
edged that the Data Centre would have had to proceed, such were the terms of the contract.
It appeared though that the relationship that existed would make it unlikely for the parent
to insist that transfer should take place where it might significantly undermine the financial
position of the service and the Data Centre.
The service’s turnover associated with digital preservation amounted to approximately 1m
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GBP, about 20 per cent of its overall turnover. The Data Centre contract was negotiated at a
fixed price, which was adequate to meet most costs, although in some circumstances where
the service exceeded expectations there were additional costs that had to be met. History
suggested that increased costs would be met with favourable terms in subsequent contract
renegotiation. The original Data Centre contract was priced too low; the service was losing
money and forced to rely on its own additional funding reserves. A subsequent contract
compensated this loss and acknowledged the increased cost of providing the service.
Risk Management
At the Cultural Heritage Archive, rather than formalising risks in a risk-register or equiv-
alent document, risks were explored and mitigated by planning for broad scenarios. It was
assumed that any threatening technological consequences could be overcome by the tech-
nological expertise available in-house, and that although depletion or cessation of funding
would inhibit the Archive’s growth, it would not be terminal to the continuation of delivery
services. Sustainability in the event of a combination of both funding lapses and techno-
logical barriers were less well addressed. The consequences of key personnel leaving the
Archive were likely to be profound. It was suggested by staff that the Technical Director
role could be assumed by another, and that the Principal Archivist role could be continued,
given the momentum already established. However, there was a serious shortfall in docu-
mentation within the Archive, which could exacerbate the implications of staff loss. The
technological systems were documented from an end user perspective but little documen-
tation was available for prospective developers to inherit and understand the system to the
extent that it could be confidently administered. Similarly, almost every aspect of archival
policies and procedures (although seemingly well established among repository staff, and
reflected at least partially in the system’s imposed workflow) remained undocumented.
Widespread evidence of risk-based strategy was observed, although this seldom manifested
itself as explicit, formal risk management. At the UK Research Council Data Centre it
was revealed that the availability of content originating from one large data producer (which,
it was suggested, the Data Centre relied upon for its very survival) was not guaranteed due
to the non-renewal of an agreement between the producer and the Data Centre. An original
archive and dissemination agreement ended in 1999 and its terms stated then that Data Centre
should destroy all data upon cessation of agreement, which never happened. At the time of
our audit, a new contract was in the midst of being negotiated.
The US State Digital Archive shared a lack of evidence of appropriate risk management
activity. The lack of risk-based strategy resonated throughout much of the organisational,
technological and digital object management infrastructure at the Archive.
Summary
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Table 3.1 summarises the component elements necessary to be successful in these areas.
These were derived by reference to both instances of good practice, and the more limited
efforts observed elsewhere among the cohort. The more important question of what these
goals mean, or rather how they may be practically accomplished, is explored in the following
chapter.
Table 3.1: Organisational Infrastructure
Audit Issue Incorporated Goals
Mission and Mandate - Establish ratification of preservation mission from parent or governing
entity
Organisational, Governance and
Policy Best Practice
- Maintain business planning autonomy
- Establish appropriate business planning
- Establish appropriate coordination and steering platform
- Evaluate and certify activities
- Maintain best practice awareness
Suitability of Policies and
Procedures
- Establish policy-review policy
- Establish policy transparency
Succession and Service Continuity
- Establish appropriate strategies for facilitating succession of organisa-
tion or content
- Establish relationships with succession partners
Repository Staffing
- Establish assurances of staff skills and capacity
- Establish portfolio of internal or external staff training provisions
- Establish appropriate categories of staff (roles and responsibilities)
- Establish budget dedicated to training provision
Community Engagement
- Establish designated community
- Maintain end user dialogue
- Monitor and respond to designated community evolution
Contracts, Intellectual Property and
Legal
- Ensure appropriate contractual management
- Monitor and fulfil intellectual property responsibilities
- Monitor and fulfil freedom of information responsibilities
- Monitor and fulfil other legislative and legal responsibilities
- Make explicit (and optionally transfer) preservation rights
- Establish and maintain terms of deposit
- Establish terms of use
Budgeting and Finances
- Establish appropriate financial accounting infrastructure
- Establish assurances that all costs are and will continue to be covered
- Establish budgetary protection assurances
- Maintain budget carry-over facility
- Maintain comprehensive costings breakdown
- Establish appropriate contingency funding
Risk Management - Maintain risk awareness
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Digital Object Management
Scrutiny of the repository’s digital object management provisions are focused on its core
service of maintaining accessibility to and utility of its digital collections. Intrinsic functions
are largely derived from the broadly accepted functional model presented in the Reference
Model for an Open Archival Information System [ISO 14721, 2012]. They include func-
tions associated with information ingest, physical data management and storage, preserva-
tion planning and dissemination.
Preservation Responsibility
The US State Digital Archive adopted an attitude of shared responsibility for preservation,
between both the Archive and its content owners and depositors. It was perhaps for this
reason that institutions were described not as passive ‘depositors’, but instead as ‘affiliates’,
suggesting a degree of mutual cooperation. To this end, as documented in the Archive Policy
Guide, affiliates were responsible for negotiating an agreement (counter-signed by represen-
tatives of both their institution and the Data Centre), incorporating details of authorised indi-
viduals for deposit, withdrawal and dissemination and details of projects and sub-accounts;
selecting content for archiving and maintaining adequate local descriptive metadata; ensur-
ing legal permissions were obtained and transferred to the Archive (assuming liability for
breach of intellectual property rights occasioned by the deposit); submitting content to the
Archive in the format specified in its Submission Information Package (SIP) specification;
maintaining records of what was archived (including at minimum the entity ID of the SIP
and links to locally stored metadata); verifying the success of the submission process via the
generated error and ingest reports; requesting withdrawals where preservation was no longer
required; and requesting dissemination when access to information was necessary.
Acquisition and Ingest
Robust systems for ingest were identified in several of our audited respositories. The e-
Depot’s workflow was quite typical. Prior to ingest, content tended to originate on installable
CDs, in PDF format via the File Transfer Protocol or on locally received digital tapes. Con-
tent was installed along with the necessary helper applications on a reference workstation;
the ingested content was a disk image snapshot of the reference machine. PDF documents
(which represented the vast majority of received content) were validated via checksums and
batched for processing. Both digital content and associated metadata were ingested, with
bibliographic information standardised and a unique identifier (based on millisecond-level
timestamps) associated with each object. Descriptive and structural metadata were provided
by the publishers.
Every stage of dataset acquisition was recorded within the National Archive’s Data Cen-
tre’s Accession Tracking System (ATS). Its role was to document all events that related to in-
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dividual accessions. These included communications that took place surrounding the dataset
(whether internal or with data owners, government departmental records officers or client or
contract managers at the parent Archive); suspensions on the accessioning process, for in-
stance where the government departments’ inactions result in the stalling of the process; and
the final public release of the dataset. This provided provenance and traceability up to the
point of the dataset’s dissemination. The procedures for transfer were well documented and
described procedures for initiating dataset transfer, appropriate communications that must be
undertaken, physical transfer procedures, checks, documentation and receipts that must be
issued in explicit detail with a suite of corresponding forms.
Formats, Naming and Identification
Various formats were supported for deposit by the range of audited organisations but some
were more flexible than others. Strict requirements on file formats imposed by the UK Re-
search Council Data Centre appeared to have the negative effect of dissuading depositors
from submitting content to the Data Centre. A potential solution would have been to be
more open minded about acceptable ingest formats, but employ people or acquire software
capable of performing appropriate preservation transformations. The Data Centre appeared
to be pushing the responsibility for encoding data in long term formats to the data producers,
although this is unlikely to have been that group’s primary motivation. A lack of funding
was offered as an explanation, although on the other hand, opening up the range of ingest
formats might have been a means to solicit greater funding. A corresponding funder policy
permitted the Data Centre some discretion in deciding whether or not to accept deposited
content. “The sole reason for keeping data”, described the Data Centre Operations Manual,
“is to distribute it for use”. This did not presuppose contemporary use, instead acknowledg-
ing the fact that even long term curation was undertaken with a view to one day using the
information that had been preserved. The two most influential considerations were the us-
ability (format, conditions of use) and usefulness (quality, scale, coverage, gaps, uniqueness)
of data.
The National Archive’s Data Centre meanwhile supported a wide range of media and for-
mats. In terms of physical format, the overwhelming majority of data arrived on CD or some
kind of magnetic tape, with some low volume and non-confidential material also appearing
by email.
Files ingested into the UK Research Council Data Centre shared a common naming con-
vention including details of the instrument, location and date. Both capture instruments and
locations were required to be registered with the the Data Centre to ensure their validity.
Some ambiguity existed over the extent to which an instrument could change and still main-
tain the same identity. For instance, if components were replaced, was an instrument the
same as it was before? Similarly, some confusion appeared to surround the location and time
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information of certain data, such as those mounted on aircraft. Generally speaking, such am-
biguities, as well as processing that had been undertaken on particular data, was documented
within file-specific metadata. At the point of ingest, documents could be associated with
datasets in order to provide format descriptions, details of problems or further information
about particular instruments. This documentation was associated with data in one of various
ways. The first was to include it within a README file located within the relevant data
directory. An alternative approach was to create a file with the reference explicit within its
title, which seemed to be a more robust means of enforcing the association. Finally, staff
explained that some adopted file formats supported the addition of in-line comments.
At the e-Depot a notable shortcoming related to the adopted identifiers in use. Consisting of
a simple UNIX timestamp generated at the moment of ingest this was potentially problematic
if multiple ingest machines were commissioned to operate simultaneously or the procedure
was streamlined to facilitate the ingest of objects at a rate faster than the timestamp’s smallest
unit of time. In the former case a solution would be to add a prefix to distinguish objects
ingested by alternative machines. This would not address the latter concern however, and
the repository’s technical staff agreed that some kind of alternative means of conceiving
identifiers would be preferable to mitigate potential future problems.
Likewise at the US State Digital Archive affiliates were not limited in terms of the file-
names that they could allocate, which could result in unpredictable behaviour should multiple
packages be submitted by a single affiliate with identical names.
At the UK Research Council Data Centre and Cultural Heritage Archive a philosophy
of providing access dominated. Conversely, at the US State Digital Archive, which was
principally a dark archive, curation and preservation were identified as primary responsibil-
ities. Each AIP corresponded to a single intellectual entity (some examples might include
a volume, dissertation or home movie). Some files (perhaps those originating from digi-
tal collections at affiliate institutions) would have a preservation level of none, and in such
cases these files would be excluded from the archived package. The next stage corresponded
to a development decision to limit the duplication of consistently referenced files; a global
directory existed to accommodate any files that may be linked to by several archived ob-
jects. There was actually little evidence of savings in terms of bandwidth or processing -
the remote, referenced file would still be checked in all cases in order to ensure that it re-
mained unchanged from a previously retrieved globally stored example. The storage savings
were likely to be negligible too - for several reasons (including potential legal issues, as dis-
cussed above) only linked schema and DTD files were retrieved, and since these were text
and comparatively small in terms of file-size the benefits appeared minimal. Conversely, the
associated risks were potentially serious. Relying upon a system of shared files meant that
no archived package was independently complete, and if one was acquired in isolation from
the rest of the Archive this may be problematic. Any value obtained from capturing remotely
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referenced content was at best threatened. In order to maintain the link it was necessary to
alter references to point to the global directory, not the remote resource, which could be ar-
gued to be in contrast to the archival goals. It was suggested that the Archive should retire
the global directory approach in favour of independently complete archival packages, despite
the additional resulting storage overhead.
The AIP descriptor was created, corresponding to the original SIP descriptor but with addi-
tional documentation of all files, relationships and events that the object had been subject to
within the Archive. In comparison with the SIP, which was described thoroughly in the pub-
lic SIP specification and associated METS SIP Profile, minimal documentation described the
structure and content of AIPs. A short AIP definition existed within a system overview docu-
ment, and the same document described the process within which SIPs were converted AIPs,
but it was suggested that this should be extended, given that maintaining an understanding
of the AIP was, in the longer term, a higher priority.
The US State Digital Archive processed incoming content with a ‘prep’ module, part of
their technology platform. This ensured the validity of the submitted package, removing
files that were not described within the corresponding manifest. When invalid or non-well
formed SIP descriptors were identified packages were rejected and the process logged. Any
files that existed within the submission package that were not documented in the associated
package descriptor were rejected, although oddly this step was not formally documented.
Understandability Validation
Although not performed periodically, the US State Digital Archive’s technology platform
supported both MD5 and SHA1 message digest algorithms and was capable of recording
both in association with a single object. Mechanisms and policies apparently existed for
resolving a situation where a single archival package demonstrated corruption.
At the system level it was vital that the repository implemented a means for ongoing fixity
checking, either conducted in a random or methodical fashion. Without maintaining assur-
ances about information integrity until the point of dissemination there were implicit risks
that even a well implemented backup strategy might fail to solve, if errors, accidents or
malfeasance were noticed too late, with even backed-up content potentially affected.
Technical approaches to information integrity maintenance and verification should have been
refined. Checksum provisions and other information integrity measurements were insuffi-
cient to create an audit trail for the data and processing in the Archive. Monitoring and
checking schedules were well described but in practice rarely applied.
A validation mechanism at the National Archive’s Data Centre sought to ensure that trans-
formations were true and accurate, and sufficiently representative of the original source
dataset. The identification of inaccuracies or deficiencies in the original data could also
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be found at this stage and brought to the attention of researchers or data users. Two terms,
‘transformation validation’, and ‘content validation’ were internally coined by the Data Cen-
tre to describe the two types. Software was available to perform content validation on various
types of data, validating against metadata descriptors to ensure that content within database
fields corresponded to the documented schema, and if so, that metadata was retained with
the preserved dataset. It was capable of checking for example, that columns that ought to
be dates were dates, and those that ought to be integers were integers. The tool was also
used to automate the creation of data description metadata based on the characteristics of
the data where none previously existed. Measurement checks ensured that content corre-
sponded to that described in transfer forms, accompanying documentation or in any other
referenced publication. This typically compared averages, counts, or other quantitative char-
acteristics of the dataset with this evidential information. Results of each of these checks
were recorded within the dataset’s processing record. Irrespective of how poor the results
of these checks were, the Data Centre had a policy not to change data, even if errors were
obvious and straightforwardly correctable. All such problems and inconsistencies were doc-
umented. Only one exception to this had been documented, and related to corruption prior
to accession by the Data Centre that prevented data processing. The dataset in question had
relied upon fixed-width fields to distinguish individual content fields and the corruption had
misaligned the data, with significant effects, whereby some closed data (i.e. not for general
viewing) had been shifted into open field positions. This was therefore repaired. It would
have been useful to have a more formally expressed policy to document the circumstances
within which such interventions would be permissible. Documentation described an exam-
ple occasion where intervention was legitimate, but it was suggested that the Data Centre
extrapolate this into a more generally applicable policy statement.
Immediately prior to committing a dataset to permanent preservation storage, responsible
staff submitted it for review by a fellow Data Centre staff member. An individual was ap-
pointed with responsibility for data checking, although in the event of his/her non availability
other staff might have been required to provide this final quality assurance input. Typically,
the review comprised checks for consistency between the transformed dataset, the original
source and associated documentation, completeness and accuracy. Documented procedures
supported random checking by senior Data Centre staff, and mechanisms were in place to
involve more than one individual in this final review process (up to the entire Data Cen-
tre team) for datasets identified as presenting particularly challenging problems or layers
of complexity. The Data Centre Checking procedure check-list was completed immediately
prior to the dataset being committed.
Media replacement took place in one of four circumstances. The first was the result of
ongoing activities, with the latter three reactions to atypical circumstances that might arise.
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• A tape has reached its maximum usage count (set at 10,000 mounts) or age (set at 7
years);
• A tape has been damaged due to hardware failure;
• Unanticipated readability problems;
• Other failures or the procurement of information that suggests a tape or batch might
be suspect.
Automated checks within the system monitored usage and tape age - the current values were
subject to review on an occasional basis, and systems staff were granted suitable discretion
to retire tapes prior to them reaching the maximum age or usage if more convenient.
When faced with errors or discrepancies an administrator made a judgement as to whether
it was the media upon which data resided that was to blame. Suspect media was disabled
from interacting with the wider system until this judgement was made. When the media
itself was found to be at fault a procedure existed for media replacement. In the event of
above average media failures administrators were expected to pursue with manufacturers the
possibility that a batch was affected with a common fault. Where hardware was identified
as being at fault, staff would liaise with vendor engineers who would perform appropriate
maintenance and corrections. Consultation would follow to determine whether any media on
a failing hardware drive might have been affected.
Initially, administrators would determine from the system which files were stored on the
tape that was set to be replaced. Each of these files was recalled to online storage, and
verified to ensure their integrity had been maintained. These files were then copied to a new
tape, and the system was instructed to disregard the previous tape. Media retirement was
recorded within the media register, and the media was then erased and destroyed (presumably
according to the guidelines expressed within the Digital Preservation Procedures Manual,
although this was not made explicit).
The Cultural Heritage Archive boasted of no content loss throughout the full extent of its
twenty-five year lifetime, despite a number of system migrations. This was regarded with
some scepticism given a lack of documentation about exactly what was expected to be within
the collection.
A notable shortcoming evident in the US State Digital Archive’s self evaluation was that
there was no process (documented or otherwise) for determining the understandability and
usability of archived content. It was suggested that this could be implemented in the short
term by exploiting the existing communication channels that existed between the Archive
and its designated community. Without implementing a means for verifying ongoing under-
standability the Archive could not confidently claim to be preserving content (other than at
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the bit-stream level). Given the finite breadth of its designated community it was thought
to be quite feasible for the Archive to establish a straightforward method. It was likely that
such increased interaction with affiliates would require an additional administrative commit-
ment; this would represent a further justification for the appointment of a full time Archive
Manager.
Preservation Policy and Service Levels
Preservation approaches varied across our audited organisations. Within the UK Research
Council Data Centre, a distinction was drawn between three classes of data, known as A,
B and C data, which corresponded roughly to the extent to which their preservation was pri-
oritised. The characteristics of each was explained in simple terms by the Curation Manager.
Class A data was that for which the Data Centre was the primary archive, and this amounted
to approximately one third of all data holdings. Class B was that for which although the
Data Centre was not the primary or sole custodian, scepticism existed about the ability of
the primary archive to provide adequate preservation services. Class C data was that which
was adequately preserved elsewhere, but was sufficiently useful to retain. Only class A and
some class B data for which the Data Centre considers itself to be the primary steward was
really relevant when considering issues of preservation. The fundamental differences be-
tween classes were not formally expressed anywhere at the time of this assessment - the
internal classification was a realisation of an appraisal - but had tremendous influence over
the preservation activities to which particular data sets will be subject.
Following ingest, data that arrived into the Data Centre’s archival storage were likely to have
already been subject to some processing. Class A, B and C data were distributed across
several disks; a single directory contained symbolic links that corresponded to each dataset,
and pointed to the physical space where individual data streams were located. All access,
including end user access was via this directory. The server that this directory resided upon
probably represented the most vulnerable point of the system. If compromised this could
limit the extent to which data can be retrieved or its completeness ensured. By maintaining a
single system for archive and delivery, the Centre was limited in terms of the extent to which
system changes could be implemented while maintaining an optimal level of service.
The transition of a SIP into an AIP and subsequently a DIP was not regulated by a formal
policy, nor documented anywhere other than the resulting directory structure on the archival
storage media. The Data Centre only accepted data that it had appraised as suitable for de-
posit. Therefore, SIPs were always transformed into an AIP/DIP. The choice of structure for
archival and dissemination packages was made by the ingest staff, who made their decision
based on how the dataset was most likely to be used. Therefore, the primary criteria for
converting SIPs into AIPs was ease of use. But no strict policy existed, and the decision to
convert a particular dataset in one way or another, was not documented in a separate log,
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audit trail or documentation. It was only visible from the consequent presentation of the data
in the storage system.
No formal criteria were established to determine when preservation responsibility was ac-
cepted by the Data Centre, and neither was the transfer of responsibility acknowledged in
a deposit agreement exchanged with the depositor. In practice, the Data Centre assumed
preservation responsibility from the moment the data had been transferred (uploaded) to the
Data Centre and an e-mail had been received from the depositor containing the script of the
completed transfer. The Data Centre could have benefited from formalising this process,
especially for the class A datasets. In terms of current practice, whereby the Data Centre
generally utilised a single file format for SIP, AIP and DIP, the production of detailed depos-
itor agreements was not regarded as being necessary. However, looking into the future when
the Data Centre may have had to consider AIP or even SIP migration as part of preservation
processing, it would have to be clear about the rights and responsibilities it had with respect
to data.
Since a finite number of AIP ‘types’ were generally accepted (measurement data, model
data, satellite data, Met Office data), the Operations Manual specified an AIP configuration
for each. However, the AIP configurations were not documented in a sufficiently structured
way to permit the automatic verification or validation of an archival package. The AIP defi-
nitions maintained by the Data Centre were largely sufficient to meet long term preservation
requirements, although poorly documented. The choice of file formats for each class of data
stored was more based on data usage criteria than on issues of long-term preservation. In
fact though, they also happened to be suitable for preservation without requiring extensive
processing at short intervals. Although the Data Centre Operations Manual described the
process of constructing archival packages from submission packages, no documentation was
created in practice that enabled one to verify whether the instructions had been followed.
The division of a SIP into constituent AIPs (i.e. files in a directory structure different from
that of the original SIP) was not tracked - no checks were performed to verify whether all
files transferred to the Data Centre were in the stored AIP.
Perhaps more relevant with respect to this point was the appraisal of datasets for classifica-
tion into class A, B and C datasets. The appraisal criteria were reasonable. However, the
class or category assignment did not mean anything for the AIP configuration: irrespective
of whether a dataset was classified as A, B or C, it was kept in the same file format and
supplemented with the same kind of documentation. The only difference was in storage and
back-up practices whereby class C data was supported by fewer safe copies (if any). Assum-
ing that the AIP configuration was sufficient for preserving the class A data it may have been
reasonable to apply it to class B and C data. However, in principle the content with highest
preservation priority should have been accompanied by richer supplementary information,
in greater quantity. Documentation as such was a weak point at the Data Centre, at least
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from the archival point of view. All AIPs of class A should have had their entire custodial
history logged, all processing decisions documented, all usage occasions tracked, and all
changes to documentation audited. This was not done at the time of this assessment. An ex-
ample was offered of the Hierarchical Data Format raw data that arrived from the HIRDLS
instrument aboard the Earth Observing System (EOS) AURA Mission Spacecraft. Given the
nature of the data, which was tied very closely to the spacecraft’s instruments, it was vital
that the semantics of the data were appropriately documented with sufficient representation
and provenance information.
The National Archive’s Data Centre favoured transformation as a primary preservation
strategy. The point of transforming data within the Data Centre was to regularise its form
to facilitate access and usability. Target formats were chosen based upon their amenability
to subsequent conversion as part of ongoing preservation, and their ability to preserve the
content and intellectual ordering of the original dataset. Datasets were organised and doc-
umented to facilitate the representation of their implicit information, and not necessarily to
reflect their form when they arrived. Nevertheless, documentation made it possible to trace
back to see the structure of content upon accession. All steps to transform the data were
recorded, with the procedures demanding that staff were satisfied that not only could they
repeat the process exactly with only the original data, their description of the process and the
metadata that accompanies the dataset, but that a different staff member could do the same.
The initial stages of data transformation required staff to document the source dataset’s struc-
ture, as well as the content and format of each field within. Following their initial assessment,
data specialists were required to formally document their anticipated actions within an ‘Ap-
proach’ document, to be evaluated by other members of the team.
Where content arrived in popular formats such as Microsoft Access .mdb files documentation
was fairly straightforward to automate. In other cases, where more proprietary or bespoke
formats or data structures were employed it could be necessary to use more labour intensive
techniques, such as text analysis of data documentation or alternatively manual keying. In
even more complex cases, it was often necessary to reverse engineer software to retrieve a
description of data structures. It was not clear whether the potential legal implications of
such techniques had been formally explored, but it was suggested that this should be done
and documented with some priority. The end user license agreements of software vary, but a
policy statement encouraging staff to investigate their rights with respect to such procedures
was considered appropriate for inclusion in the Digital Preservation Procedures Manual. If
reverse engineering failed to yield a clear definition then raw data analysis was undertaken,
using tools such as od or the Data Centre’s own flook. Concerns surrounded such procedures
which amounted to little more than (highly educated) guesswork, but given the shortcomings
implicit within the received data, and the pressures placed upon the Data Centre to archive
whatever they were given, this was probably unavoidable from time to time. It appeared
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that communications with departments and data owners were suitably extensive to limit the
likelihood of these circumstances in almost every case. Irrespective of which methods were
employed for documentation, the required elements remained consistent. Characteristics that
were documented for each accessioned dataset included:
• File layouts
• Record Structures
• Field formats (including field widths, repeat counts and relationships between fields
(e.g., whether they were keys or indexes)
• Field descriptions - usually one line descriptions, explaining what a field was for, and
also documenting any ambiguity that might surround the data specialists’s interpreta-
tion
Data were also anonymised at this stage if there had been indications from the transferring
department that this was necessary. The transferring department would indicate in their
initial correspondence how this anonymisation should take place (summarisation of data or
suppression of certain fields). An Anonymisation Procedures Manual contained detailed
descriptions of the process that should be followed.
Following analysis, description and the completion of any required anonymisation, data spe-
cialists decided upon the form within which the dataset would be preserved. It was not
necessary to maintain the original table structure, and it in some cases could be desirable
to normalise if this had not already taken place. Any temporary, or redundant tables could
be discarded, but their prior existence was recorded so that it was possible to maintain an
understanding of the form of the data at the point of its transfer. Any proposed conversion or
disposal was expressed within the ‘Approach’ document detailed above, a discussion group
or in direct conversation with the Service Manager. These modifications were approved by
TNA prior to their execution.
Of some concern were situations where coded values could not be transformed, or indeed
translated, since information (such as lookup tables, or references linking data to existing
lookup tables) had been omitted from the documentation supplied by data owners or depart-
ments. In such cases the Data Centre staff were required to simply deduce the meaning of
these codes.
Within the US State Digital Archive the shape of preservation activities was based on the
agreement between the Archive and a given contracting affiliate. This agreement could de-
scribe preservation expectations as one of full, bit or none. Preservation levels were deter-
mined at the level of individual files at the ingest stage, based on the account (the identity of
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the particular affiliate, or the repository itself), the project code (enabling individual accounts
to allocate alternative preservation levels for the same file format) and file format. Although
sub accounts could also be defined within individual accounts, these were relevant only for
billing and reporting purposes and were irrelevant from a strict preservation perspective. Full
preservation meant that all applicable and available preservation techniques were employed,
including migration, localization and normalisation. Bit preservation meant that files would
be ingested and stored and subject to refreshing and integrity checks, but no further preser-
vation methods would be employed. A preservation status of none was to accommodate
content that arrived within a larger package of submitted content, which for some reason had
not been isolated and removed prior to deposit.
Full preservation services were only practically applicable to a small subsection of all file
formats. These had been identified based on a combination of their preservation viability
and their popularity. For each format (the full range was listed on the Archive information
web page) a background report was prepared detailing a selection of technological char-
acteristics, and documenting additional associated sociological or legal issues (e.g. adop-
tion rate, licensing implications). These were internally ratified by the Archive group as a
whole to determine their completeness of coverage. No additional external registries (such
as representation information registries) were automatically referenced although it was ac-
knowledged that the research activity undertaken to understand each format could involve
consultation with a variety of sources. Following the completion of an initial report a further
document was conceived to detail the action plan that would be undertaken with respect to
the corresponding format. This document represented the most critical aspect of preservation
planning within the Archive. In some respects, the format-centric approach had limitations in
terms of the effectiveness with which one can preserve content, or more specifically, the sig-
nificant properties of individual items. The principal value of an item may relate to any one
of its physical or semantic characteristics. There were implicit risks in adopting a preserva-
tion approach that dwelt on formats and not objects. It was acknowledged that until relatively
recently the Archive had given very little consideration to the subject of significant properties
at all. However an even more granular, affiliate-oriented approach should have been pursued;
indeed, much of the overhead related to the identification of significant properties might have
been allocated to affiliates as an additional responsibility. To date, no affiliate had explicitly
notified the Archive of the properties that ought to be preserved within any deposited content
but it was suggested that once a suitable infrastructure was conceived to accommodate such
varying degrees of preservation, it should be encouraged.
Three main preservation approaches were implemented within the Archive, and reflecting the
overall organisational philosophy these were applied exclusively at ingest. In the case of full
preservation the archived AIP would contain both an original bit-stream or bit-streams (that
is, the originally deposited file or files) as well as the last-best migrated preservable example
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of that file or those files. In some cases the original and last-best preservable example would
be synonymous. Normalization, Migration and Localization were all identified as means
to manage format obsolescence, and based on format transformation. Normalization was
intended to ensure that those files that were in formats that were less than optimal for preser-
vation were created in a more preservation worthy format. For instance, PDF files would be
normalised into a set of page-image TIFF files. Normalized files were not saved, rather the
process itself was recorded as having been successful. Some question marks remained about
the value of this process since the ongoing availability of a successful normalisation method
relies upon the preservation of the corresponding tool or script. Migration was intended to
alleviate the risk of obsolescence by creating a version of at-risk formats that was considered
to be a reasonable successor to that format. This could be an equivalent but higher version
example of the original format (e.g., PDF 1.4 files might be migrated to PDF 1.6) or a dif-
ferent format altogether. This then represented the ‘last-best’ preservation version, replacing
any that might have existed within the AIP before. Localization, as discussed above, was in-
tended to ensure that remotely referenced files were, wherever possible, harvested and stored
locally to ensure the independent completeness of AIPs. For files subject to full preserva-
tion (as specified by affiliates in Appendix A of the Data Centre - Library Agreement), the
appropriate preservation strategy was documented within each format-specific action plan.
For those files formats that had no corresponding action plan the Archive would commit to
bit-level preservation until a suitable preservation strategy was identified. At that time the
affected files would be disseminated and reingested, and during this process the appropriate
preservation steps implemented. Discussions revealed that decisions to research and con-
ceive background and action plans for new formats were prompted by the nature of content
that had been received within the Archive.
Since it took around three months to fully document a format and conceive an appropriate
action plan it was suggested that the Archive should seek to modularise the system code
to encourage the development of format plugins from beyond the Archive’s in-house de-
velopment group. By facilitating and motivating external development the work could be
effectively shared and many more than the eighteen supported file formats (at the time of the
evaluation) could be preserved. In addition, adoption of the Open Source software would
be likely to increase and its status as a stable archiving solution increasingly consolidated.
An action plan review schedule existed in order to identify when format information was
approaching obsolescence, although as a result of intensive development commitments there
had been evidence of failure to undertake some reviews in an appropriately timely fashion.
A wider community of format specialists in a range of institutions would provide a consid-
erably more effective, and ongoing means of policing to ensure that preservation planning
remains both optimal and viable. Of considerable concern was the lack of regular integrity
checking that was undertaken within the Archive, an issue that was described above. It was
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hoped that the commitments made during discussions would be fulfilled, and an appropriate
automated procedure conceived to execute fixity checking on a regular basis.
Preservation policy was limited within the Cultural Heritage Archive. Organisational un-
certainty about the role of the Archive with respect to preservation was evident, and this
ambiguity manifested itself in an approach to digital object management that fell short of
that described in such best-practice benchmarks as OAIS for instance. Preservation plan-
ning was undertaken in an ad hoc fashion. Dealing with preservation issues and considering
pitfalls and potential solutions was not explicitly part of anyones job, nor were there any
(collective) reports written on this to inform decision making. Data management rarely ex-
tended beyond the association of simple web-page information with digital datasets. More
sophisticated data management provisions were required for the Archive to consider itself to
be OAIS compliant.
At the UK Research Council Data Centre a policy for ongoing appraisal was in place but
rarely utilised. The Centre presented documentation describing a dataset review process but
little evidence of implementation. Within the Operations Manual the procedure was de-
scribed as a Retention Process. The process, as documented, was prompted by an automatic
notification that data review was due, with a milestone in the project database conceived to
correspond to each review. When this happened, a responsible individual was required to
evaluate:
• the content of the data’s corresponding catalogue entry (checking that links were work-
ing for example);
• the extent to which corresponding web pages were current, appropriate, informative
and usable;
• the extent to which data was usable, accessible and adequately documented;
• whether any representation information (specifically software) was required to use the
data;
• the effectiveness and security of corresponding ingest mechanisms; and
• the extent to which data was adequately documented, creating and aggregating docu-
mentation where appropriate.
Applying these criteria would result in evaluation marks between 1 (‘Poor’) and 5 (‘Excel-
lent’) corresponding to both data usability and usefulness. Reviewers were then required
to propose subsequent action, which could be to leave the dataset as is, keep the dataset
but implement some changes or remove the dataset from the Archive. The latter seemed to
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imply destruction, with no overt infrastructures in place to support transfer of stewardship
to a more appropriate repository elsewhere. Despite the reasonably robust provisions for
data review, discussions with the Curation Manager revealed that the process had seldom
been undertaken. The number of datasets currently within the Centre, combined with the
time consuming nature of the review process was the most critical factor - simply put, re-
view notifications were arising more quickly than staff could undertake reviews. This was
undoubtedly a problem, and threatened the viability of long term archiving within the Cen-
tre. The Data Centre’s emphasis was very much on ingest, with dissemination enjoying a
comparable, albeit secondary level of prioritisation.
In addition to continuing to preserve content the US State Digital Archive also supported
withdrawal functionality to enable content to be removed. This would take place only upon
the request of an authorised agent of the corresponding depositing affiliate. Although files
belonging to a withdrawn AIP were deleted entirely from storage, the Archive maintained
a record of the object’s ingest and subsequent withdrawal, with the affiliate notified of the
withdrawal via an emailed Withdrawal Report. A common use of withdrawal functionality
was to correct a previously submitted package. In such cases withdrawal would be followed
by a subsequent ingest of the package, with any errors amended. The Archive could unilat-
erally withdraw content if the preservation of specific material was subject to external legal
challenge, in accordance with the policy described above.
The US State Digital Archive operated principally as a dark archive with no end user func-
tion. Despite this, there were examples of descriptive metadata maintained in association
with archived content. The majority of descriptive metadata derived from SIP descriptors
provided by affiliates. Information that would be captured when supplied by affiliates in-
cluded a SIP package identifier (the only mandatory metadata), affiliate-assigned entity iden-
tifier, identifiers of external metadata records, title, serial volume and issue number. File
names were also maintained for each file within the SIP. The Archive would add further in-
ternal identifiers associated with each individual AIP, file and bitstream. All of this metadata
was stored within the Archive management database and within the corresponding AIP.
Limited formats were offered by the National Archive’s Data Centre. Access to the Data
Centre’s archived content was almost exclusively via its website. Until the introduction of
the Freedom of Information Act in 2005 the distinction between closed and open content
was quite clear cut. Confusion followed the legislation’s introduction within the Data Cen-
tre. For instance, the continued applicability of statutory bar (the mechanism that enables
government departments to collect sensitive data with the proviso that it may not be used
for purposes other than its original stated one) was unclear. The Data Centre’s Closed Data
Access Procedures Manual described the procedures, although it was of some concern that
the most current version of this procedures document pre-dated the introduction of FOI leg-
islation.
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Content Dissemination
Within the National Archive’s Data Centre system, DIPs were created dynamically, con-
structed from the corresponding database or flat CSV file to provide an interrogable, web
accessible dataset. Catalogue data was available alongside datasets, encoded within HTML
pages. Individuals very rarely requested their own copy of archived datasets, and instead the
web interface was overwhelmingly the most popular means of accessing the Data Centre’s
content. Nevertheless, if tables were required to be delivered in an incomplete form (either
due to legal restrictions or to conform with a specific sub-set request) this could be be done.
A checksum was created at the point of the DIP’s request, which was intended to ensure that
it was both complete and correct with respect to the request issued. Similarly, the original
SIP bitstream could be requested when it was of value. An example offered during discus-
sions was of certain Geographical Information Systems (GIS) datasets that could not really
be understood when converted from their source form and separated from the application
that created them.
In technical terms, the system that stored the archived materials had no direct contact with
the outside world. The Data Centre web server operated as a client to the archival servers,
with limited, read only access. Therefore if the web server was compromised the extent to
which a malicious individual could damage the archival storage component of the system
was limited.
To facilitate the designated community’s identification and discovery of content, the UK Re-
search Council Data Centre’s website offered just a narrative description of each dataset.
Search and browse functionality complemented this metadata. There was however no ev-
idence of the use of formal description metadata standards for resource discovery such as
ISADG, or EAD. Nevertheless, the requirements of their designated community were prob-
ably met, with descriptive metadata available on the web sufficient to cater for the primary
user group. A separate, but related, project called Claddier (funded by JISC) was develop-
ing further access methods, including better support for data citation. Metadata was both
requested from the depositors and also created by Data Centre staff. The metadata to be in-
cluded in the SIP was stated for depositors, but covered only a description of the data and its
implicit variables. Relationships between metadata and archival packages were maintained
by storing metadata within a separate directory adjacent to the data directories of the cor-
responding data sets. No separate techniques, persistent links or identifiers were employed
to make this association more explicit. Since staff interactions with data sets might feasibly
result in disassociation of this metadata-to-dataset relationship this might be considered as
something of an implicit risk.
As submission, archival and dissemination packages within the Data Centre were generally
synonymous, the need to demonstrate that the DIP (or AIP) creation process was complete
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and correct was perhaps less pressing. Interviews revealed that the last time someone ordered
a dataset to be delivered on transfer media was a long time ago. At the time of the assessment,
DIPs were delivered exclusively online. Since the data was accessed via an online interface,
DIP creation was virtually a one stage process, with archival packages simply delivered via
web or FTP protocols. The onus of ensuring that packages corresponded to requests was
placed upon the user. Subsets of web accessible data were not really supported as such.
Summary
Once more, the infrastructures observed above are summarised in Table 3.2 with broad
check-list areas expanded to encapsulate the range of individual goals that contribute to their
accomplishment.
Table 3.2: Digital Object Management
Audit Issue Incorporated Goals
Preservation Responsibility
- Make explicit (and optionally transfer) preservation responsibility
- Establish data ownership
Acquisition and Ingest
- Authenticate source of ingested packages
- Define ingest package specification
- Document software dependencies
- Establish and exercise ingest policy
- Establish and exercise selection policy
- Initiate stakeholder dialogue
- Maintain depositor dialogue
- Physically acquire content
- Process ingested content
- Select and appraise ingested content
Formats, Naming and Identification
- Establish list of supported formats
- Establish means to track data object through preservation workflow
- Establish naming convention
- Verify ingest package conformity with specification
- Establish means for data identification
- Adopt appropriate preservation formats
- Monitor file format obsolescence
- Maintain archival package referential integrity
Understandability Validation
- Establish criteria for data review
- Establish means for data review
Preservation Policy and Service
Levels
- Classify archival data
- Establish archival package configuration(s)
- Establish criteria for disposal
- Establish means for data disposal
- Establish levels of preservation
- Establish relationship between ingest and archival packages
- Establish transformation procedure from ingest to archival packages
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Audit Issue Incorporated Goals
- Plan for preservation
- Exercise preservation plans
- Select preservation strategies
Metadata and Documentation
- Record appropriate metadata
- Maintain link between data and metadata
- Document archival data
- Record and maintain descriptive metadata
- Record and maintain representation information
Content Dissemination
- Establish conditions for access
- Establish physical and logical provisions for providing access
- Establish relationship between access and archival packages
- Implement access controls
- Implement categories of access
- Manage formation of dissemination package
- Monitor access behaviours
- Monitor unauthorised access
Technologies, Technical Infrastructure and Security
Consideration of these issues is, like the evaluation of organisational factors, not neces-
sary exclusive to data management and preservation. Nevertheless, although satisfying more
generic information security requirements is indicative of technical capacity, the explicit
focus is on the suitability of technical platforms to support preservation and access. This
encapsulates technical sustainability, appropriate provisions to detect and mitigate against
information change and appropriate tools to facilitate practical preservation interactions.
Software and Hardware Inventory
A technical questionnaire completed by respondents from the e-Depot revealed a signif-
icant organisational investment in IBM software, with the Digital Information Archiving
System software at the heart of the repository, providing the breadth of its functionality. Al-
though this relied on additional off-the-shelf IBM products (such as Tivoli Access Manager
for authentication and authorisation and Tivoli Storage Manager for object management and
backup) the system was designed and built specifically for the repository application accord-
ing to the OAIS reference model. IBM was chosen as the supplier following a tender process
on the basis of mainly functional requirements. Questionnaire responses suggested good
practice with measures in place to optimise performance and capacity, mitigate risks to sys-
tem security, and deal with any environmental unpredictability (UPS and climate control).
Some concerns were raised with regards to several technical responses. No off-site backup
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facilities were employed and although the Library had a disaster plan at the institutional
level, there was nothing in place at the repository level, nor was there anything specifically
addressing ICT concerns. This was thought to be of particular concern given the Library’s
low-lying nature, and its propensity for flooding. That backups were stored in facilities two
floors below ground, in the same building in which the repository operated raised some con-
cerns. Repository technical staff explained that moisture sensors were installed within these
backup storage facilities.
The US State Digital Archive’s technical infrastructure was part of an original software
platform developed within the Data Centre. This operated within a Linux environment (the
chosen distribution at the Archive was Red Hat Enterprise version 4). In addition to the
core operating system the software relied upon Sun Java and the MySQL database server.
Archival storage was managed by IBM’s Tivoli software. Both the primary and a redundant
secondary site featured dedicated machines for processing and storage, which were new and
subject to appropriate renewal schedules. At the primary site all but some shared networking
facilities were exclusively deployed for the Archive. Similarly, a tape robot at the redundant
site was leased solely by the Archive.
All the UK Research Council Data Centre’s systems aimed to use community-supported
software and hardware, including open source systems where possible. There was a variety
of bespoke code that was used during various data processing and validation stages but this
was generally written in mainstream scripting languages. Some data that arrived within the
Data Centre was encoded in closed formats and therefore during the ingest and accessioning
stages it becomes necessary to rely on both proprietary software and hardware. Generally
speaking, the choice of system infrastructure raised no substantial risks of itself being ir-
replaceable, irreparable or subject to unanticipated and unavoidable licensing changes that
would prejudice continuity.
At the US State Digital Archive system updates were undertaken based on a needs and risk
based assessment. Numerous security mailing lists were subscribed to in order to determine
potential problems associated with software that may need to be patched. New and update
packages were installed using the Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) and updates made avail-
able via Red Hat’s Update Agent. Upgrading was tested within a controlled environment on
legacy hardware that corresponded closely with the live configuration. This also demon-
strated that the system operated adequately on even old hardware and offered assurances that
its performance and functionality would be optimal on the production system. The Archive
staff met with system administrators on a biweekly basis providing an opportunity to plan
software and hardware maintenance and customisation to suit any emerging user needs.
Backup and Redundancy
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The e-Depot’s most critical shortcoming was the lack of off-site backup facilities, which
was of particular concern due to the local topography. Repository staff assured auditors that
this was currently being addressed, and had been highlighted in prior external investigations
independently commissioned by the Library.
Three principle methods were available for data backup within the UK Research Council
Data Centre. These were to a local tape archive stored within a Data Centre fire safe and via
rsync to separate disk storage and to a bespoke petabyte datastore, maintained at the same
facilities but around five hundred metres away. The UNIX df command revealed around
62 terabytes of content within the archive. Class A data were backed up to local tape on a
mainly ad hoc basis, and to the petabyte store as part of a regular backup job. Smaller Class A
data were also subject to daily backup via rsync. Class B data was subject to similar backup
processes, although it was rarely if ever backed up to local tapes. Little documented backup
policy surrounded Class C data; large data within this category were unlikely to be backed
up at all - smaller datasets may be backed up to the petabyte store for convenience. The Data
Centre had at least one recorded instance of data loss, when a large Class B satellite dataset
was lost following a catastrophic filesystem failure, leading to the loss of everything stored
on the RAID array. Reacquisition of the data was possible, albeit complicated, and its size
was considerable; other data was consequently afforded higher priority, and this particular
dataset was not backed up at Data Centre. It was unclear what explanation was provided
to the depositor and users about the non-availability of this dataset. There were also daily
dumps of Ingres, MySQL and PostgreSQL databases that supported the catalogue, website
and various ancillary systems within the Data Centre. These were stored on tape within a
firesafe, rsynced to another disk and backed up to the petabyte datastore. With respect to
storage, at least two copies of class A datasets were maintained, with at least one copy of
class B. The Data Centre should have therefore had at least 4 copies of each class A dataset.
Documentation was included in the directory structure of an AIP, and was therefore also
backed up. There was one issue identified with respect to the backing up of large datasets;
the physical capacity of storage systems would sometimes limit the extent to which policies
could be adhered to with larger files manually split between storage volumes and partitions.
The petabyte system was a Storatek tape library (produced by Sun Microsystems). The
Data Centre’s own storage system relied upon Cyberview servers configured for RAID 5.
Redundancy was therefore maintained on all disks clusters; however, although a single disk’s
failure could be tolerated, the failure of two or more within a single cluster would result in
loss (albeit in many cases recoverable).
All of the copies of data were maintained in a common geographic area (distributed up to
500 metres). None of the redundant storage provisions could really be classified as off-
site. This was of particular concern given the safety notification that one received upon
entering the site - a sounding bell denoted a firm alarm, whereas a klaxon would sound in
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the event of a nuclear incident! This did not appear on any of the Data Centre risk assessment
documents, and although no doubt capable of destroying much of the local environment, little
had apparently been done to assess the threat or to conceive of contingencies (most obviously
to store redundant copies of data in a more remote location).
Tapes were checked randomly, but not systematically and there seemed to be little evidence
of documentation of test results. Tapes and servers were decommissioned at regular inter-
vals, and it appeared that resource availability was not a premium concern with respect to
the replacement of faulty media or infrastructural hardware. However, although procedures
for replacing a tape were in place, there were no formal mechanisms for identifying faults.
Similarly, although a disaster recovery plan did exist as part of the Data Centre Operations
Manual, it could have been more detailed and ought to have been tested in fire drill proce-
dures and the test results documented.
System Recovery
Backups were performed regularly at the US State Digital Archive, with system software
and the MySQL management database included within the procedure. Three archival copies
of AIPs were maintained at all times. Although some Data Centre software was also accom-
modated at the San Diego Supercomputer Center the Archive’s content was not currently
included. It was agreed that relationships should be continuously pursued with more ge-
ographically diverse organisations in order to conceive and build reciprocal agreements to
mutually accommodate content. Although no complete system recovery tests had been un-
dertaken, Data Centre staff described a number of occasions where individual items had
been recovered. It was noted that system administrator staff claimed to have undertaken
simulations of data destruction and recovery from a redundant site, which were apparently
successful, but this was not documented in a prominent place, and appeared to be an ad hoc
test. Some aspects of this were covered in the Archive’s (at the time unfinished) Continuity of
Operations Plan (COOP), conceived to meet state legislature requirements. This described
the steps to overcome problems associated with disaster, although omitted to describe the
specific steps required to re-establish the service or the location of key documentation.
Fixity and Content Integrity
Fixity information that was collected and stored within the e-Depot, (specifically CRC32
checksums) raised some concerns. Since it was stored within the archival repository along-
side additional technical metadata any system compromises that threatened the integrity of
metadata or objects could in theory also prejudice the integrity of these checksums (which
were principally deployed to determine when and where unauthorised changes have taken
place).
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At the point of ingest the US State Digital Archive system performed fixity checks to en-
sure that each master copy was identical. Since any AIP interactions were actioned by
re-ingesting content these synchronous fixity checks would be undertaken at the point of
dissemination or the execution of new preservation strategies. Staff offered a limited de-
scription of mechanisms and policies embedded in the system software code to resolve fixity
inconsistencies, but as noted this was undocumented. There did not appear to be any explicit
procedures or mechanisms to report bit loss or corruption to repository administration. The
fact that no bit loss had yet been incurred was a weak justification for the absence of such
mechanisms.
Storage media were refreshed annually, with a scheduled job within Tivoli to transfer all
stored content to new tapes. In addition, Tivoli supported a range of functionality to deter-
mine tape deterioration or increased error probability. A healthily paranoid level of adminis-
tration was consistently maintained, and any tapes that prompted concerns would no longer
be written to, and content immediately transferred to an alternative fresh tape.
Information Security Best Practice
The UK Research Council Data Centre maintained fairly stringent physical access re-
quirements around its main petabyte data store, where backup copies of the highest priority
datasets were maintained. Similarly, archival/access storage facilities were subject to phys-
ical security systems. Pass card authentication was enforced within the store facility, and
although visitors could be signed in, they were required to be accompanied by authorised
individuals. More generally, the facility demonstrated security best practice. All employees
were required to display identification badges at all times and visitors were required to liaise
on arrival and departure with gatehouse security staff in order to be issued with a visitor’s
pass.
Exemplary physical security was observed at the US State Digital Archive. Electronic
locks protected the central machine room and each of the core network fibre huts. All doors
opening to public spaces were configured to fail to a secure state. Alarms were immedi-
ately investigated by local staff or referred to campus police. Key fobs and proximity cards
were required for access, with rights granted based on work requirements and staff integra-
tion needs. This meant that most technical staff would have access to the areas in which
the Archive machines were based. PIN codes were required in addition to physical fobs
during non-working hours. A variety of environmental security measures were also imple-
mented, with heat and water detection facilities subject to continuous monitoring. Uninter-
rupted power supply facilities provided power for all computer equipment in the event of
grid failure, and a diesel generator offered a day’s power for all systems before it needs to
be refuelled. The only perceivable shortcoming from a physical perspective were the lack
of hurricane proof windows within the central server room which were in any case due for
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imminent installation.
The Archive’s redundant site was a bespoke secure Data Centre, and therefore physically
optimised to ensure security, accessibility and connectivity. Non-stop security monitor-
ing, video surveillance, air temperature and humidity control and monitoring, and redundant
cooling were all available. Lightning protection, smoke detection and fire suppression and
emergency power were also provided.
A notable concern was the lack of geographical diversity between the two sites (both were
within the same US state), and one might conceive of a disaster (natural or otherwise) that
might render both sites non-operational. The Data Centre Director described an informal
hurricane threat assessment exercise that suggested that the chances of a single hurricane
affecting both sites was very low; however, two hurricanes might occur simultaneously or in
quick succession. The biggest continuity issues were largely organisational and the Archive
had already demonstrated a willingness to collaborate (with a much more physically remote
institution) to address these.
At the US State Digital Archive passwords were rotated every one hundred and eighty days,
and were strictly enforced to include numbers, letters, punctuation, upper and lower case
characters. A single database user permitted insert and delete rights, although these were
applied to all tables (although according to established work flows only the affiliate user
information should have ever been changed by direct human interaction). These rights could
therefore be restricted to limit insert and delete privileges more strictly. Processing scripts
were executable by the five IT staff within the group, and configuration files were editable
only by these individuals. Of more concern was the potential for human error during the
processing of scripts. It was suggested that applications and user interfaces should be refined
to maximise automation, limit manual interactions and render the system less vulnerable to
accidental or malicious misuse.
System security at the UK Research Council Data Centre was less well enforced. Many of
the software scripts utilised by the Data Centre staff were run as a shared user, which imme-
diately let any staff member access the full range of functionality that all of the repository’s
collective scripts offer. If compromised and exploited a responsible individual would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately identify.
The e-Depot was praised for its commitment to evaluating the extent of its achievements,
as well as the areas in which it might improve. The most recent completed assessment was
undertaken by KPMG, which highlighted the lack of off-site backup facilities among its chief
concerns.
More formal risk management was universally poorly undertaken. The US State Digital
Archive lacked a formal risk register although some aspects of risk were covered in the
Archive’s Incident Event Threat Matrix. The Cultural Heritage Archive undertook no for-
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mal, documented disaster planning and although the Archive’s Technical Director suggested
that the availability of backups guaranteed that the worst outcome could be the loss of a
single day’s work this was not systematically demonstrable.
Summary
Table 3.3 illustrates the incorporated goals within each high level sub-category of Technolo-
gies, Technical Infrastructure and Security.
Table 3.3: Technologies, Technical Infrastructure and Security
Audit Issue Incorporated Goals
Software and Hardware Inventory
- Establish appropriate hardware infrastructure
- Establish appropriate software infrastructure
- Establish software upgrade policy
- Establish hardware upgrade policy
Backup and Redundancy
- Backup documentation
- Define policy and procedures for undertaking backups
- Ensure synchronisation of data separated by time or space
- Establish appropriate backup redundancy provisions
- Establish appropriate backup remoteness provisions
- Establish appropriate database (i.e system) backup infrastructure
- Establish appropriate provisions for backup
- Establish suitability of backup infrastructure through testing
Fixity and Content Integrity
- Maintain data integrity
- Validate data integrity
- Continuously validate data integrity
- Establish media refreshment policy
- Validate integrity of backups
System Recovery
- Define disaster recovery policy
- Establish appropriate technical documentation base
- Establish assurances of recoverability of any lost data
- Limit data loss incidence
Information Security Best Practice
- Establish appropriate logical security provisions
- Establish appropriate physical security provisions
- Establish assurances of site stability
- Establish assurances of availability of appropriate technical skills
- Establish information security policy
Audit Conclusions By Organisation
Cultural Heritage Archive Assessed according to the strict terms outlined within our
audit check-list the approach adopted by the Archive raised questions in a number of areas.
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However, given the historical success of the Archive, and the esteem that it clearly enjoyed
among its target communities it was difficult for us to dismiss its efforts according to just
these metrics. The most notable shortcoming was the lack of formal documentation that
characterised much of the business activities of the Archive. There can be little doubt that
its current staff were competent in their positions, and that there was a shared sense of duty,
responsibility and role. Similarly, the life cycle of content that was accessioned, archived
and disseminated seemed well understood. Surrounding procedures were, although not for-
mally communicated anywhere, well known. Without the discussions undertaken during
this assessment there would have been little scope for forming any kind of organisational
assessment. There was concern that a new staff member would face a similar struggle to
understand the organisation’s mechanisms, policies and scope without recourse to a resource
within which they are formally, objectively and unambiguously expressed.
Associated with documentary shortcomings were issues concerning the Archive’s policy in
a number of key areas. Legal questions abounded, and there seemed to be few formal assur-
ances that the Archive had legal authority to maintain much of its digital collections. Where
agreements were in place they were generally informal or bore more similarity to ‘under-
standings’. Relationships with organisations providing content should have been more for-
mally established to provide the Archive with the necessary protection to enable it to continue
its business.
A similar problem followed with respect to the user communities - closely related to inter-
nal documentation and transparency was the external issue of community trust. Based on
its track record the Archive had established a dedicated user base, and although one could
not dismiss the success with which this had been preserved for several years, there was a
danger that without better external expression of their policies and procedures this might be
threatened.
Preservation policy was perhaps even more of a widespread problem. Frequently described
in this case study was an organisational uncertainty about the role of the Archive with re-
spect to preservation, and this ambiguity manifested itself in an approach to digital object
management that fell short of that described in best-practice benchmarks such as OAIS.
A further issue associated with sustainability that was of concern was the extent to which the
staff (most notably the Principal Archivist) were inextricably associated with the Archive.
Given the extent to which the latter’s dedication, self-motivation and wide range of contacts
had offered security and continuity to the Archive, there was a notable risk that her departure
would be difficult to overcome. Partly this was an organisational concern - her position
existed (and was therefore centrally funded) only for as long as she continued to occupy
it. The other factor was less quantifiable, but nonetheless persuasive, and was based on her
unique personality and knowledge. That the Archive had existed so successfully for over
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twenty-five years with little evidence of service disruption or data loss appeared to relate,
to at least some extent, to the fact that the Archive had enjoyed tremendous staff stability
throughout its period of existence. Perhaps true sustainability could only be demonstrated,
and this concern addressed, following a rotation of staff, whereby new individuals were
expected to take over in key roles.
Overall our audit exercise identified a series of shortcomings that for the most part would
probably manifest themselves only during a period of organisational disruption or change,
or in the event of one or more unforeseen contingencies. However, it seemed that little was
in place to mitigate such problems should they arise, and within the organisational model
limited resource seemed available to do so. Many of the problems could be traced back to
a lack of documentation and discussions highlighted concerns about the limited extent to
which policies, procedures and legal relationships were formalised. Policies and work flows
were clearly well-ingrained into the management and archival activities needed to be more
communicable to stakeholders in order to elicit trust.
National Library e-Depot Our overall conclusion from this process was that the Library
Data Centre was operating an efficient and considered repository service that emerged with
credit from its exposure to the RLG-NARA audit check-list. The organisational, financial,
technological and preservation infrastructures that the National Library Data Centre had es-
tablished corresponded closely to those outlined within our audit check-list. In addition, a
number of more broad characteristics of the Data Centre were applauded, and highlighted as
being particularly representative of this overall success. Perhaps the most appealing aspect of
the Data Centre was the proactive attitude that seemed to characterise the whole organisation.
Eschewing the notion of continuing to plan until completely certain of success, the Library
had achieved a great deal by deploying experimental solutions that had through practical
experience been shaped into robust and stable systems providing a realistic and achievable
example to other aspiring repositories. This was facilitated with a strong commitment of
both effort and resources to an active research and development culture. Related to this,
and also noteworthy in terms of the Library’s successes was the fluid approach to financial
management that supported all Library activities and which enabled the flexible allocation
of funding where it was most needed, even between financial years and across organisational
units.
As well as adopting an organisational structure that facilitated success, the National Library
Data Centre was also praised for its commitment to evaluating the extent of its achievements,
as well as the areas in which it might improve. A number of examples of external evaluation
were identified as having taken place within the audit. The most recent completed assessment
was undertaken by KPMG, which highlighted the lack of off-site backup facilities among
its chief concerns. KPMG staff responsible for performing the audit were not particularly
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expert in the area of digital preservation, and repository staff were themselves responsible
for identifying and documenting a significant proportion of the points detailed in the final
report. This appeared to confirm that demands for repository audit services were not being
fully met by traditional providers. Plans for a comprehensive risk analysis investigation to be
undertaken by Zurich Insurance (encompassing every aspect of the Library’s operation, both
technical and otherwise) were also discussed during our audit, again underlining an overall
commitment to excellence.
Although broadly successful in its activities, a number of areas were identified throughout the
course of our audit process that raised some further questions. The most critical shortcoming
we identified within the repository was the lack of off-site backup facilities, although we
were reassured that this was being addressed, and had been highlighted in prior external
investigations.
Our second criticism was associated with the identifiers allocated to objects within the repos-
itory. Consisting of a simple UNIX timestamp generated at the moment of ingest this may
have posed problems if multiple ingest machines were commissioned to operate simultane-
ously or the procedure was streamlined to facilitate the ingest of more than one object per
second. In the former case a solution would have been to add a prefix to distinguish objects
ingested by alternative machines. This would not have addressed the latter concern however,
and the repository’s technical staff agreed that some kind of alternative means of conceiving
identifiers would be preferable to mitigate potential future problems.
A further concern was associated with the fixity information that was collected and stored
within the repository, specifically CRC32 checksums. These were stored within the archival
repository alongside additional technical metadata. System compromises that threatened the
integrity of metadata or objects could in theory have also prejudiced the integrity of these
checksums, which were principally deployed to determine when and where unauthorised
changes had taken place.
The issue of software escrow was subjected to similar scrutiny during our audit, and also
emerged as an area of some concern. The Data Centre’s technical infrastructure was essen-
tially a proprietary system, consisting of both off-the-shelf and bespoke software developed
by IBM. No software escrow agreements were in place The likelihood of vendor collapse
was perceived as being extremely minimal, and irrespective of this, since the data and sys-
tem software were separable, such an eventuality could be survived until appropriate alter-
native software became available. Additionally, it was argued that since a number of large
global banks used and relied upon the same IBM software, there was sufficient motivation
for the vendor to continue to support it. This reveals the importance of adaptable or flexible
criteria. Even where a course of action has identifiable risks, the most important factor in
determining a successful repository is its willingness and capability to undertake the appro-
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priate risk/benefit assessment exercises. Self evaluation has an important role even in formal,
externally orchestrated audit exercises.
Related to software escrow concerns were fears that without formal succession plans the
Library was exposing its content to risk. Once again these were to an extent mitigated;
the Library staff argued that its legally defined mandate and obligation rendered such plans
unnecessary, ensuring the Library’s permanent existence. Notwithstanding this, some doubts
continued to persist, particularly associated with those collections not subject to these legal
considerations, such as international, non Dutch materials.
A final issue of concern identified was an example of system bottlenecking that was being
experienced within the system during the visit, preventing the ingest of objects. This issue
concerned a small script responsible for the allocation of identifiers. Since a system restart,
this script was no longer operational and consequently no objects could be added to the
system until the problem was resolved.
National Archive’s Data Centre Disregarding its considerable quantity, the quality of
documentation that was available to describe and inform almost every process and contin-
gency associated with the National Archive’s Data Centre was impressive. Discussions with
staff members within the organisation revealed that most of the shortcomings had already
been identified and earmarked for corrective action; a culture of ongoing improvement and
a commitment to excellence appeared to exist at the Data Centre and this was reflected in
many areas.
One area of concern was the lack of a true mission statement for the Data Centre. Similarly,
a more cohesive and well expressed definition of its designated community would have been
useful, if only to further legitimise the numerous policies and procedures that had been for-
mally documented. Also in organisational terms some ambiguities existed within the legal
context that surrounded the Data Centre. The closed data procedures had not been updated to
reflect Freedom of Information legislation and greater consideration should have been given
to the data that accompanied (and was necessary for the interpretation of) core materials, but
was licensed under different terms.
With respect to digital object management, more explicit and granular planning for specific
formats would also have been welcomed. It was anticipated that binary data formats would
become more commonplace within government data sets and the approach to dealing with
these appeared ad hoc in places. Related to the shortcomings defining a designated commu-
nity, it was recommended that the Data Centre explore in more detail the understandability
requirements of its users, and their anticipated requirements over time, in more expansive
terms than just accessibility. Some questions also surrounded those materials that were main-
tained in their original bit-stream format to support contemporary usability (such as the GIS
3.3. Findings 95
datasets described during discussions). Whether these were really being preserved more than
simply retained is questionable.
Technologically, and in terms of security the Archive seemed to be adequately supported,
although it was argued that ongoing revisions of security documents should have been main-
tained, and controls to maintain logical security made more explicit within documentation.
Overall though, the Data Centre represented a useful benchmark for contemporary reposito-
ries, at least in terms of the criteria expressed within the RLG-NARA check list.
UK Research Council Data Centre The pilot assessment of the Data Centre revealed
that policies ought to have been more rigorously conceived, documented and formalised,
and circulated widely among repository staff to create a widespread understanding of exactly
what the repository was engaged in, and how it was ultimately operating. In terms of staffing,
greater resources should have been invested in staff skills development, most notably archival
skills which were lacking in comparison with scientific expertise.
It was concluded that technical approaches to information integrity maintenance and verifi-
cation could be considerably refined. Then-current checksum provisions and other informa-
tion integrity measurements were largely insufficient to create an audit trail for the data and
processing in the Archive. Monitoring and checking schedules were well described but in
practice rarely applied. Likewise, data management rarely extended beyond the association
of simple web-page type information with digital datasets. More sophisticated data manage-
ment provisions were required for the Archive to consider itself to be OAIS compliant.
Preservation planning at the Data Centre was undertaken in an extremely ad hoc fashion.
Dealing with preservation issues and considering pitfalls and potential solutions were not
explicitly parts of anyone’s job, nor was there any reporting or internal information sharing
to influence or guide decision-making. Related to this, stringent requirements on file formats
dissuaded depositors from submitting content. A potential solution would have been to be
more open minded about acceptable ingest formats, but employ people or acquire software
capable of performing appropriate SIP to AIP to DIP conversion. A lack of funding was an
obvious a barrier here, although opening up the range of ingest formats might have been a
means to solicit greater funding. Fundamentally, curation activities seemed to take some-
thing of a backseat to facilitating access. To be trustworthy in terms of this assessment the
organisation would have to embrace its preservation responsibilities, and to identify issues
associated with mandate, legal status, services and functions that needed to adapt in service
of that.
US State Digital Archive The Archive provided an invaluable service to their state-
wide affiliates and their efforts were broadly successful. The infrastructure that had been
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established, the financial support that had been secured and the firm mandate upon which
the Archive was founded were all robust. As well as developing an infrastructure that cor-
responded favourably with much of the central work in this area, the Archive staff demon-
strated a keen willingness to determine the success of their efforts, and had already been
quick to identify their weaknesses.
Many suggestions were offered in the course of this audit, but the most important were typi-
cally those that the Archive had already identified themselves. The first was the appointment
of additional staff, with the most high priority being a manager for the Archive, who could
engage with affiliates and plan and direct future administrative and operational direction.
The Archive’s primary goal within the near future was to increase affiliate numbers and the
quantity and quality of content within it and to enhance its reputation.
There was a clearly identifiable need to engage with other organisations to arrange secure
storage that was sufficiently robust. Building relationships would have enabled succession
or escrow arrangements to be established, further remote storage of backed up materials, and
ultimately, assuming the emergence of DAITSS as a widely adopted tool, collaboration in
systems development and format description.
At the system level it was vital that the repository implemented a means for ongoing fixity
checking, either conducted in a random or methodical fashion. Without maintaining assur-
ances about information integrity until the point of dissemination there were implicit risks
that even a well implemented backup strategy might fail to solve, if errors, accidents or
malfeasance were noticed too late, and even backed up content demonstrates the emergent
problem.
Another key point that emerged was that many of the problems being addressed in the
Archive’s operations were dealt with on a somewhat ad hoc basis. There was little cen-
tral coordination of risk or challenges, or of the operational means to overcome them. By
composing its own catalogue of risks the Archive could better equip itself to manage re-
source effectively to meet all of the challenges, at the points where the greatest threats were
being faced.
On the whole though, the Archive demonstrated its status as an effective and well managed
organisation. Its efforts stood up well to even considerable scrutiny according to the criteria
within the RLG-NARA check-list, and also to those within comparable efforts such as the
German nestor project’s criteria catalogue.
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3.4 Gaps and Desiderata
The range of materials collected during each of our audits provides invaluable perspectives
for those wishing to implement or expand their own digital preservation environments, and
for those who would seek to evaluate their performance. Accounts such as these represent an
evidence base of practice aligned to the various audit standards - an insight into what it means
to satisfy - and to fall short of meeting - various criteria that are collectively considered vital
for repositories that would seek to be trustworthy.
We could not find comprehensive examples of best practice in any single institution - dif-
fering approaches had equivalent validity and value depending on the operational context.
We did find considerable evidence that understanding was lacking in a wide range of areas,
perhaps most pertinently in terms of actively preserving data. Each of the audited institutions
had custodial responsibility for their respective data collections. This was mandated via a
variety of means, including contracts, legislation and terms of funding agreements but was
generally explicit. Nevertheless, not all of the organisations appeared to prioritise the long
term preservation aspects of their remit. Instead, collection, or more commonly, the provi-
sion of access, were cited as primary motivations and the target of most time and resource
investment. Given the high profile nature of several of these organisations the fact that none
got every aspect of their operations right is revealing. Only the US State Digital Archive,
which operated as a dark archive (i.e. with no significant access function) was most focused
on preserving its collections. This is understandable; it is easier to justify investment for
contemporary than future uses. That is not to say that access and preservation are competing
or non-complementary goals but they are not equivalent. Assurances of sustainability are
not essential for the provision of access services, but are integral to a preservation effort.
Our studies revealed that many organisations are unclear about how such assurances can be
characterised. More widespread understanding of what it practically means to preserve will
encourage more organisations to ensure their infrastructures measure up to the demands. It
is reasonable to expect that many end users will tend to assume that if an organisation is
capable of serving a particular dataset today, that it will be able to do so in ten years time.
Functionality is a more marketable concept than longevity and end users are more likely to
assume the latter exists where there are few metrics on which to base their assessment.
Our sample of audited institutions comprised mostly an elite range of robustly funded or-
ganisations. National and state wide libraries and archives and disciplinary data centres may
reasonably be expected to be expert in long term preservation. Their success was evident
throughout our assessments; the process showed the diverse range of ways that success could
be realised, but also that not everyone gets everything right. The account from the Cultural
Heritage Archive is illustrative of something else; the challenges faced by those who aspire
to create, collect or aggregate data in a local, comparatively non-expert setting. As we de-
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scribed in earlier sections, preservation is no longer an issue faced solely by large, traditional,
memory organisations and responsibility is being increasingly delegated to the institution, re-
search project or individual. Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (which
at the time operated a companion data preservation service called the Arts and Humanities
Data Service), the Cultural Heritage Archive opted to exempt itself from depositing data in
the AHDS because of ambiguities surrounding the legal status of their collection and their
approach to collecting. To do so required them to commit to preserving their own data, and
to maintaining infrastructures and processes capable of supporting preservation. At the time
a single sheet form was sufficient to present a satisfactory justification and evidence of their
capacity to do so. In reality, the system in place was revealed by our research to be little more
than an effective system for content collection and dissemination. Organisational, techno-
logical and information-level sustainability were not demonstrated - there was substantial
evidence to suggest that none had really been systematically accounted for. If illustrative
of the type of experience that led the AHRC to discontinue the AHDS funding then it was
evidence of a gap in overall data management and preservation provision.
Today, data producers or collectors have less discretion whether to deposit or not - often
there is no appropriate custodial organisation that will accept and preserve content. If any-
thing, the onus is increasingly on data producing institutions to offer their own assurances
of data curation and of widespread, continued availability and accessibility. The best prac-
tice lessons of expert organisations - the evidence of what they do can inform the novice
research units and individuals who have inherited custodial responsibility. To ensure a fit to
these often dramatically different contexts (a national library shares little in common with
a University research group) the lessons must be flexible to transposition. A new resource
is required: something less than a rigid, absolute set of rules or guidance, but more than
the higher level expressions of best practice that can be found in international standards and
other such literature that remains inaccessible and incomprehensible to most.
These are this thesis’ desiderata - an accessible evidence base for preservation best prac-
tice that can be interrogated and used as a development tool for any organisation that has
custodial responsibility for digital information, and a means of classifying preservation in
terms of its fundamental components. At the very heart of this is the idea of evidence. How
can organisations be demonstrably successful at undertaking preservation? The problems
with existing approaches for preservation planning and validation lie not with methodolog-
ical shortcomings, but with difficulties in identifying and understanding vulnerabilities and
the associated consequences. Several knowledge facets that are not currently addressable
contribute to risk and inform or justify preservation decisions.
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3.4.1 The Relationship with Risk
The repositories we surveyed often struggled to relate their collections and preservation envi-
ronment to associated preservation risks and opportunities. On occasion, practitioners were
oblivious to potential risks or resolution strategies even though they may be considered com-
monplace elsewhere, cases that Donald Rumsfeldt may describe as “unknown unknowns”.
Instead of planning preservation based on specific information or representational properties,
we saw repositories electing to base their strategies on self evident characteristics, such as
file format. Preservation classification is a means of uniting those with things in common, to
enable information sharing, and the perception of common risks. Preservation environments
that appeared to vary markedly in terms of infrastructure, domain or scale actually demon-
strated a great deal in common, but making explicit such relationships was suffocated by a
lack of suitably expressive tools. It is possible to build a picture of preservation function and
risk that is broadly applicable, while still being practically meaningful.
Other problems relate to the breadth of the preservation challenge. Technical, legal, finan-
cial, management and content skills are all required to successfully ensure information avail-
ability. It is rare for any individual to have comprehensive oversight across a preservation
environment, and therefore understanding the whole can be complicated. Preservation plan-
ning is particularly constrained by perceptions, expectations and priorities of individuals.
It requires the input of diverse constituencies, each of which may have a differing prior-
ities. Case studies reveal that in any single preservation context stakeholders might vary
between curators, art historians, computer scientists, preservation specialists and manage-
ment [Becker et al., 2007]; each role can be reasonably associated with a myriad of policy
and procedural responsibilities. Given often opaque and sometimes conflicting priorities,
we observe situations where approaches are selected to suit the interests of an individual,
an organizational unit or a single functional component. The consequences of such choices
are rarely so isolated as their justification: understanding wider impacts and risk outcomes
ensures more informed preservation planning and more easily interpreted validation results.
Risks occur as a manifestation of those factors that threaten the accomplishment of goals,
prejudice the availability or quality of required resources and expose those performing preser-
vation functions to liabilities or negative perceptions. Better means for risk definition and
understanding will prompt greater awareness of influential factors, their consequences and
appropriate responses. Work in the related domain of internet security has revealed ontolo-
gies’ value in the identification and classification of attacks and threats to networked systems,
in terms of their relationships with technology, policy and use [Ahmed et al., 2007, Ekelhart
et al., 2007, Fenz and Neubauer, 2009, Raskin et al., 2001, Tsoumas and Gritzalis, 2006].
A more holistic view of risk and its cause and effects seems well suited to the complex
environments within which information is preserved, and its availability threatened.
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Work has also been done to explore conceptual modeling of preservation goals with risk in
mind [Dappert and Farquhar, 2009, Dappert, 2011], others have considered the role of risk
management in designing preservation solutions [Barateiro et al., 2010, Barateiro et al., 2012].
Other efforts have sought to form relationships between heterogeneous metadata. The P2
registry [Tarrant et al., 2009] uses the semantic web to link data from Pronom3 to support
rudimentary risk assessment based on file format characteristics. Ontologies were used in
the PANIC project’s prototypical preservation alert and response system [Hunter and Choud-
hury, 2004, Hunter and Choudhury, 2005]. More general documentation projects such as
PREMIS OWL [Coppens et al., 2010], and the CIDOC CRM [Doerr, 2003] enable documen-
tation to capture underlying semantics concealed beneath domain-dependent documentation
structures. Digital library models [Candela et al., 2008, Kova´cs and Micsik, 2005] describe
the digital library environment in terms of classes, subclasses and implicit relationships.
As part of the work of the CASPAR project a Core Ontology for Dependencies facilitates
documentation of information dependencies, both semantic and structural, and PreScan
[Marketakis et al., 2009] supports automatic extraction of metadata and its encoding in RDF.
Our assumption, which informed our development of DRAMBORA, is that preservation
can be understood as a complex interrelationship of several factors [McHugh et al., 2007].
Preservation goals are motivated or legitimized by rights and responsibilities, qualified by
parameters which in turn direct activities that both rely upon and enhance or develop re-
sources. Risk has a fluid relationship with each of these elements. The development of
coherent relationships between real world practical examples of elements and specific, cal-
culable risks enables a rich evaluation of risk causation and recovery - we can begin to see
things that increase or decrease a risks likelihood or impact, and trace these to more distant
dependencies. A core associated use case for this information is a risk identification tool
- preservation practitioners are expected to identify familiar practical circumstances in the
network of elements and by traversing the relationships identify unknown risk exposures, or
see where risks that they are already aware of can be managed through the introduction of
appropriate policy, process or resource.
The success of preservation planning and validation depends on robustly defined object prop-
erties and dependencies, explicitly stated environmental and contextual characteristics, and
a systematic appreciation of associated risk exposure. Implicit within conforming systems is
the capacity to trace these factors as a related matrix. A further application is the traversal of
a network of related risks, in order to determine the factors exacerbating each, and represent
more clearly the wider implications of a particular circumstance. Linear means for recording
such information, as currently exists (like a conventional organizational risk register) have
limited expressiveness.
Our preferred solution, presented in the following chapter, is to present risks and preservation
efforts alongside one another, and make explicit links of causality and mitigation. The first
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requirement is to represent preservation activities and infrastructures according to core goals
and associated efforts.
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Chapter 4
The Preserved Object and
Repository Risks Ontology
4.1 Theory and Components
We approach the concept of risk as an intuitive expression of the probability and potential
impact of negative outcomes. In many organisational contexts these may be characterised
according to financial loss but in those organisations performing information preservation
functions may be more widespread. They may include outcomes such as information loss,
loss of organisational sustainability, reputational harm or legal liabilities. Risks are con-
sidered in terms of their impact on valued outcomes and conceptualised as the inverse to
organisational objectives. The effectiveness of any approach can be understood in terms of
the extent to which it enables the avoidance or mitigation of barriers to the accomplishment
of given stated objectives. In that sense, risk management can be considered synonymous
with digital preservation - itself an active process of identifying, measuring and responding to
threats that may manifest on technical, cultural or social layers of activity. Risk management
is a tool to quantify and systematically address whichever threats arise. Conversely, the most
effective strategies, most prized resources and most enabling policies will be those that most
effectively limit risk exposure. As stated earlier within this thesis, risk management requires
a consciousness of the value of digital materials, an awareness of the implications of em-
ploying particular preservation strategies, and an understanding of one’s own priorities and
tolerances (risk appetite). We pursue a means of systematically identifying tenets of excel-
lent practice within digital preservation, characterise these as risk management techniques,
and align with corresponding risks, which can then be isolated and quantified.
A pivotal question in the conception of this thesis is why risk is a desirable basis for evalu-
ating preservation readiness when there are other approaches that might be considered com-
pelling alternatives. Risk offers a number of appealing advantages. We have covered at
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some length the limitations of a compliance, or standards-based approach to preservation
evaluation. Standards like ISO 16363 are valuable contributions to a common best practice
knowledge base but are limited. These limits are principally manifested in terms of the extent
to which their criteria are intuitively relatable and applicable when referenced in isolation as
part of a process of institutional evaluation. In contrast a risk based approach is widely appli-
cable but can reflect specific circumstances and priorities within a given institutional setting.
There are advantages in referencing available compliance standards, but as a sole measure of
success, these can be uncomfortably ill-fitting.
A risk based approach can be aligned with an established set of community norms just as
to very specific institutional objectives. In that spirit, our approach is firmly focused on the
process of evaluation, whatever that means to a given organisation. We make no assumptions
about whether any given metric is more or less objectively stated.
But why not adopt a market-led approach whereby those preservation environments that
prosper within a competitive marketplace will be determined as most successful? This strat-
egy suffers as a consequence of the very nature of digital preservation. Often shortcomings
in preservation approach are evident only after time as passed - cause and negative effects
are not always synchronous or even directly contiguous in time. A risk based strategy of-
fers the opportunity to distil the challenges of preservation into more granular (and related)
terms. That means that one can identify and remedy shortcomings without having to rely
on a market reaction that might be months or even years away. A commercial preservation
market appears to demand audit and certification systems as a precursor to its existence, so
it is difficult to envisage a scenario within which it can rely on traditional market indicators
to infer success. Given that many of the institutions within which preservation takes place
do not operate on the basis of commercial models the approach appears even more limited
in its usefulness.
Other alternatives to a risk-managed approach might include analytics-driven methods, stake-
holder satisfaction surveys and institutional peer review. In fact, each has a legitimate part to
play in our risk-based approach but in isolation are insufficient. Data analytics findings are
limited by the quality of one’s queries and these are driven by those operational goals and in-
teractions that comprise our risk-based ontology. The views of stakeholders are, like market
forces, of great potential interest but likely to be at best incomplete and at worst myopic and
detached from reality. Peer review is unquestionably valuable, but is expensive and depends
on a network of willing peers that (even in non-commercial contexts) may be difficult to
arrange. With the presentation of a shared and extensible knowledge base we hope to offer
some of the benefits of peer review.
Our primary goal is the distillation of the many facets of preservation into a flexible model
that can be comprehended and referenced by both humans and machines. The Preserved
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Object and Repository Risks Ontology (PORRO), our novel representation of institutional
and object-centric characteristics defines related elements as risk cause or effect factors. An
ontology represents knowledge within a domain in a hierarchical form. We choose it as
our adopted structure because it offers sufficient expressiveness to show properties and con-
nectivity between concepts that collectively comprise a given domain. Unlike for example
a simple criteria list or hierarchy the ontology format offers flexibility of relationships, in-
cluding the possibility of recursiveness to characterise the causality of activity and approach
within an operational context. Unlike a bespoke relational model it provides a form that can
be reused and shared. Combined with instances, the ontology comprises an interrogable and
extensible knowledge base for how to do digital preservation. Its value as a form of informa-
tion representation lies in its wide readability, its modularity and its potential connectivity
to representations of other domains. PORRO presents a multidimensional picture of preser-
vation best practice that can scale to accommodate emergent wisdom, and can be pitched
at a macro or micro level to ensure its accessibility to a range of users and applications. It
comprises both a fixed vocabularly and a scalable collection of practical manifestations of its
concepts. It is the outcome of efforts to highlight meaningful information interrelationships
within the preservation context. In subsequent sections we describe the ontology and its de-
velopment, presenting insights into its initial population and drawing conclusions about its
current and future applications. We prove its expressiveness to illustrate and convey diverse
preservation infrastructures and its associated capacity to support wider aspects of preserva-
tion planning and evaluation. Both functions are enhanced by an integral alignment between
discrete elements of preservation practice and an extensible knowledge base of examples
from real world environments. These illustrate what it practically means to pursue goals,
perform interactions, develop policies, respond to rights or obligations and establish appro-
priate resources. The model can be approached in one way as a glossary of terms defined
by examples. Risk management capacity is our metric for preservation readiness and we
have developed a set of fundamental preservation risks and linked them with those facets of
preservation infrastructure that cause, exacerbate or mitigate them.
Digital preservation goals have been distilled into a number of criteria catalogues and in-
ternational standards. The principle digital preservation standard throughout much of the
community’s development has been the Reference Model for an Open Archival Information
System [ISO 14721, 2012] (OAIS). This lends two key models which have characterised
much of the research activity in digital preservation. The most frequently cited (albeit ar-
gued by Giaretta to be the least interesting [APA, 2011] owing mainly to the simplicity with
which many seek to interpret it and demonstrate their conformity) is its functional model.
A high level overview of this breaks the challenge of digital preservation into a number of
fundamental functional chunks. The standard’s glossary and functional overview describes
each functional entity as follows, each reflecting part of the repository-centric information
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lifecycle.
An Ingest function contains the services that accept Submission Information Packages from
Producers, prepares Archival Information Packages for Archival Storage, and ensures that
Archival Information Packages and their supporting Descriptive Information become estab-
lished within the system. A Data Management function contains the services for populating,
maintaining, and accessing a wide variety of information. Some examples of this informa-
tion are catalogs and inventories on what may be retrieved from Archival Storage, processing
algorithms that may be run on retrieved data, consumer access statistics and billing, event
based orders, security controls, and OAIS schedules, policies, and procedures. Archival
Storage contains the services and functions used for the storage and retrieval of Archival
Information Packages. The Preservation Planning function provides the services for moni-
toring the environment of the OAIS and which provides recommendations and preservation
plans to ensure that the information stored in the OAIS remains accessible to, and under-
standable by, and sufficiently usable by, the Designated Community over the long term, even
if the original computing environment becomes obsolete. Administration describes the ser-
vices and functions needed to control the operation of the other OAIS functional entities on a
day-to-day basis. Finally, the Access function contains the services which make the archival
information holdings and related services visible to Consumers.
OAIS has informed and continues to inform the breadth of goals associated with informa-
tion preservation. Criticisms of OAIS as a closed model (with no explicit entry or exist
points) are countered with a subsequent standard describing producer-archive relationships
[ISO 20652, 2006]. We reflected and re-presented the OAIS model in a more practical
setting within the Trustworthy Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Checklist
[CRL/RLG, 2007], now an ISO standard [ISO 16363, 2012]. Both resources provided an
intellectual basis for example preservation goals that we characterised within DRAMBORA.
These were classified in DRAMBORA according to ten “functional classes” which reflected
earlier work [McHugh et al., 2008].
4.2 Development Methodology
In developing an ontology representative of preservation best practice we favoured a bottom-
up approach, focused on the identification of real world goals, in order to complement the
more prescriptive selection that comprise the above-noted standards. Information from our
audits described in the previous chapter provided a broad but very detailed perspective of
objectives, strengths and weaknesses, in very practical terms. We sought to reflect real world
priorities, anticipating that this would lead to the definition of a more intuitive information
model. We believe a top-down model in isolation to be uncomfortably limiting, although we
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acknowledge that a solely bottom-up model is also problematic.
We determined that an effective compromise was to focus primarily on the outcomes of
our audit exercises, but rather than constrain our conclusions according to existing criteria,
shape a new model. The subjects’ priorities and emphases informed our development of the
resource. We undertook a series of content analyses of audit reports and the full body of ad-
ditional evidence collected throughout each assessment scrutinising, parsing and coding the
evidence. Individual information elements were isolated and recorded in an Excel spread-
sheet initially. Initially utilising the high level conceptual areas outlined in TRAC (see the
tables in the previous chapter) and OAIS we recorded instances of activity that would con-
tribute, or be detrimental to each. Gradually we exploded individual concepts to establish a
set of goals, supported by evidence of real world attempts to pursue their completion.
The structure of the emerging resource evolved as information was collated and iteratively
classified, conceived as a taxonomy of repository properties corresponding broadly to a com-
bination of established community concepts. Given the role of TRAC in gathering much of
this evidence, we naturally encountered residual information alignments between our new
record and the TRAC structure. This was a quite deliberate methodological outcome. Our
intention was not to dismiss or disregard existing certification guidelines. Not least due to
their acknowledgement by ISO and establishment as international standards, we consider
that any resource that purports to support improved repository effectiveness can do so more
effectively by reflecting an existing regulatory ecosystem. Our intention was to reconfigure
and enrich such guidance into a form that offered greater accessibility and utility.
Information excerpts were structured according to a corresponding repository property. These
were then subdivided into issues associated with data ingest, data management and preserva-
tion, data access, organisational issues, policy issues and infrastructural issues. Higher level,
macro-classifications reflect the TRAC and OAIS origins in terms of terminology, but do not
share the same granularity of these sources. The simplification reflected the structure of the
audits which in turn were designed to reflect the most common distribution of responsibilities
evident within the preservation contexts.
We present an example of encoded information fragments in Table 4.1. One hundred and
twenty seven categories of information (preservation ‘goals’) were recorded, with corre-
sponding information facets aligned from each of the assessments that we conducted.
Once an initial set of categories was established we referred to a selection of other reposi-
tory assessments to align their findings with this taxonomy. Notable examples include as-
sessments of the LOCKSS archiving system [Dale et al., 2007], Portico [Waltz et al., 2010]
and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [Dale et al., 2006]
undertaken by the US Center for Research Libraries [CRL, 2012a]. Accounts from these
were deconstructed and encoded to also reflect the adopted classification. Further refer-
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ence was made to a selection of ISO standards on topics including information security
[ISO 27001, 2005] and quality assurance [ISO 9000, 2005], introducing a more generic set
of applicable information mappings.
Lastly, we mapped to TRAC’s criteria. This provided a broad functional classification that
would provide the basis for the ontology, which takes a firmly goal-oriented view. Emerging
mappings between ontology goals and TRAC criteria were in many cases not 1:1. This
is illustrative of the differing priorities between the ontology and the criteria lists, and in
some cases represents evident omissions from more formal criteria. Finally, the categories
were refined further, combined in some cases and rewritten as explicit goals. This process
reduced their number to 104 ontology goals compared to 84 TRAC criteria (several of these
are mapped to multiple ontology goals due to their compound nature).
The following tables illustrate the range of adopted information classifications and the corre-
sponding TRAC criteria. From these, a set of preservation goals was derived, again classified
according to the same high level schema. Parameterisations, implementations, dependencies
and drivers for each goal (extracted from the accompanying information excerpts) comprise
the main body of the organisational aspects of the ontology. They are discussed in more
detail in a subsequent section.
Table 4.2: Data Ingest Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Authenticate source of ingested packages B1.3, B6.10
Define ingest package specification A5.3, B1.1, B1.2, B5.1
Document software dependencies C1.1
Establish and exercise ingest policy A5.3, B2.4
Establish and exercise selection policy B2.4, A5.3
Establish and maintain terms of deposit B1.7, A5.3
Establish list of supported formats A5.3
Establish means to track data object through preser-
vation workflow/lifecycle
B6.8, B5.4, B6.9, B4.5, C1.9, B6.10, B3.4, B4.2,
B4.3
Establish naming convention B2.5
Initiate stakeholder dialogue B1.6, A5.3, A3.5
Maintain data integrity A3.8, B4.4, B2.11
Maintain depositor dialogue B1.6, B6.10, A5.3, A3.5, B6.3
Maintain link between data and metadata B5.4, B5.2, B5.3
Physically acquire content B1.5
Process ingested content B1.8
Record appropriate metadata B2.9, B5.1, B2.13
Select and appraise ingested content B2.4
Validate data integrity A3.8, B4.4, B2.11
Verify ingest package conformity with specification B1.4, B6.10
Data ingest goals are those concerned principally with the selection, acquisition, negotiation
and initial processing of data.
Data preservation goals are those concerned with physically accommodating the data as
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Table 4.3: Data Preservation Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Adopt appropriate preservation formats TRAC B2.9, TRAC B3.1, TRAC B4.2, TRAC B3.3,
TRAC B4.1
Classify archival data TRAC B2.1, TRAC B1.1
Continuously validate data integrity TRAC B2.11, TRAC A3.8, TRAC B4.4
Document archival data TRAC B4.5, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.13, TRAC
B2.1
Establish archival packages configuration(s) TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.2, TRAC B2.1, TRAC A2.1
Establish criteria for data identification TRAC B6.10, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.6, TRAC
B5.4
Establish criteria for data review TRAC B3.4, TRAC B2.10
Establish criteria for disposal TRAC B2.4
Establish data ownership TRAC A5.4
Establish designated community TRAC A3.1, TRAC B2.10
Establish levels of preservation TRAC B1.1, TRAC B4.1, TRAC B3.1, TRAC B3.3
Establish logical storage provisions TRAC B4.2
Establish means for data disposal TRAC B2.4
Establish means for data identification TRAC B6.10, TRAC B2.6, TRAC B5.4, TRAC
B5.1
Establish means for data review TRAC B2.10, TRAC B3.4
Establish relationship between ingest and archival
packages
TRAC B2.1, TRAC B2.11, TRAC B6.10, TRAC
B6.8, TRAC B4.3, TRAC B2.6, TRAC B2.3, TRAC
B5.1
Establish transformation procedure from ingest to
archival packages
TRAC B2.1
Evaluate and certify activities TRAC C3.1, TRAC C1.9, TRAC B6.8, TRAC B3.4,
TRAC A3.9
Exercise preservation plans TRAC B4.1, TRAC B3.4, TRAC B3.1
Maintain archival package referential integrity TRAC B5.2, TRAC B2.11, TRAC B5.3, TRAC
B4.3, TRAC B2.6, TRAC A3.8, TRAC B5.4, TRAC
B4.4
Maintain best practice awareness TRAC B4.2, TRAC C3.1, TRAC B3.2, TRAC C2.2
Maintain end user dialogue TRAC B6.10, TRAC A5.3, TRAC A3.5, TRAC
C2.2, TRAC B6.2, TRAC B6.3, TRAC B2.10,
TRAC B6.1
Make explicit (and optionally transfer) preservation
responsibility
TRAC B1.7, TRAC C1.8, TRAC B1.1
Make explicit (and optionally transfer) preservation
rights
TRAC A5.2, TRAC A3.3, TRAC C1.8, TRAC A5.4
Monitor and fulfil freedom of information responsi-
bilities
TRAC C1.8
Monitor and fulfil IPR responsibilities TRAC B6.3, TRAC C1.8, TRAC B6.4, TRAC A5.4,
TRAC A5.5
Monitor and fulfil other legislative and legal respon-
sibilities
TRAC C1.8, TRAC B6.4, TRAC B6.3
Monitor and respond to designated community evo-
lution
TRAC B3.2, TRAC A3.4, TRAC C2.2, TRAC
B2.10
Monitor file format obsolescence TRAC B3.2
Plan for preservation TRAC B3.1, TRAC B1.1, TRAC B2.9, TRAC B4.1,
TRAC B3.4, TRAC B4.2, TRAC B3.3
Record and maintain descriptive metadata TRAC B5.2, TRAC B5.1
Record and maintain representation information TRAC B2.8, TRAC B2.9, TRAC B2.7
Select preservation strategies TRAC B3.3, TRAC B3.1, TRAC B1.1, TRAC B4.3,
TRAC B4.1, TRAC B4.2
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well as the development and implementation of active preservation strategies and information
integrity validation.
Table 4.4: Data Access Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Establish conditions for access TRAC B6.4, TRAC B6.3
Establish physical and logical provisions for access TRAC B6.5, TRAC B6.1, TRAC C3.2, TRAC B6.4
Establish relationship between access and archival
packages
TRAC B2.1, TRAC B6.10, TRAC B4.3, TRAC
B5.1, TRAC B6.8
Establish terms of use TRAC A5.4, TRAC B6.3, TRAC A5.3
Implement access controls TRAC B6.9, TRAC B6.3, TRAC B6.5, TRAC B6.4
Implement categories of access TRAC B6.3, TRAC B6.1, TRAC B6.4
Manage formation of dissemination package TRAC B6.3, TRAC B6.7, TRAC B6.8, TRAC B5.1
Monitor access behaviours TRAC B6.9, TRAC C2.2, TRAC B6.6, TRAC
B2.10, TRAC B6.2, TRAC B5.1, TRAC A3.5
Monitor unauthorised access TRAC B6.6, TRAC B6.2
Data access goals correspond to the provision of discoverable, usable content and also en-
compass issues of authentication and authorisation.
Organisational issues cover a varied selection of topics including staffing, legal issues, man-
date and finance.
Technology issues are those concerned with the software and hardware platform within the
repository, but extend beyond simply digital (computer) technology to include physical plant
and infrastructure as well as the range of logical and security provisions available to support
the service.
In some respects policy aspects are prevalent across each of the previous categories but we
elected to include a dedicated categorisation to reflect their importance. This is to some
extent illustrative of the difference between good practice being done and being seen to be
done. Throughout the repository assessments we identified that policy was typically written
in formal documentation but can also be evident in software code, systems or organisational
structures.
Following the definition of a core set of preservation goals we began to extrapolate from
these information elements a relational structure - we modelled entities within the Semantic
Mediawiki online software and linked with information elements that had been isolated in the
previous work. Semantic Mediawiki is an extended version of the popular Mediawiki soft-
ware that lends additional semantic richness, SPARQL-like query support and form-building
functionality to articles and content. It is a very accessible and intuitive tool for developing
semantic links between concepts that have their origins in full text content. Our earlier work
developing DRAMBORA provided a vocabulary for defining preservation components as one
of “mandate”, “constraint”, “objective”, and “activity/asset” but comparison with the range
of information elements originating from our audit exercises exposed these as inadequate.
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Table 4.5: Organisational Infrastructure Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Ensure appropriate contractual management TRAC A5.1, TRAC B6.3, TRAC B6.4
Establish appropriate business planning TRAC A4.1, TRAC A4.2
Establish appropriate categories of staff (roles and
responsibilities)
TRAC A2.1, TRAC C3.3
Establish appropriate contingency funding TRAC A4.5
Establish appropriate coordination and steering plat-
form
TRAC C3.1
Establish appropriate financial accounting infras-
tructure
TRAC A4.3
Establish appropriate strategies for facilitating suc-
cession of organisation or content
TRAC A1.2
Establish assurances of sufficiency of staff skills and
capacity
TRAC A2.1, TRAC A2.2
Establish assurances that all costs are and will con-
tinue to be covered
TRAC A4.5
Establish budget dedicated to training provision TRAC A4.5, TRAC A2.3
Establish budgetary protection assurances TRAC A4.5
Establish portfolio of internal or external staff train-
ing provisions
TRAC A2.3
Establish ratification of preservation mission from
parent or governing entity
TRAC A1.1
Establish relationships with succession partners TRAC A1.2
Maintain budget carry-over facility TRAC A4.5
Maintain business planning autonomy TRAC A4.2, TRAC A4.1
Maintain comprehensive costings breakdown TRAC A4.5
Maintain risk awareness TRAC C1.10, TRAC C3.1, TRAC A4.4
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Table 4.6: Physical and Technological Infrastructure Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Backup documentation TRAC C1.2
Define disaster recovery policy TRAC C3.4
Define policy and procedures for undertaking back-
ups
TRAC C3.4
Ensure synchronisation of data separated by time or
space
TRAC C1.4
Establish appropriate backup redundancy provisions TRAC C1.3
Establish appropriate backup remoteness provisions TRAC C3.4
Establish appropriate database backup infrastructure TRAC C1.2
Establish appropriate hardware infrastructure TRAC C1.7
Establish appropriate logical security provisions TRAC B6.4, TRAC B6.5, TRAC C3.2
Establish appropriate physical security provisions TRAC B6.4, TRAC B6.5, TRAC C3.2
Establish appropriate provisions for backup TRAC C1.2
Establish appropriate software infrastructure TRAC C2.2, TRAC C1.1, TRAC B2.7, TRAC
C1.10
Establish appropriate technical documentation base TRAC C1.9, TRAC A3.2, TRAC C3.3, TRAC C3.1,
TRAC C1.7, TRAC C1.8
Establish assurances of availability of appropriate
technical skills
TRAC C3.3, TRAC B2.7
Establish assurances of recoverability of any lost
data
TRAC C3.4
Establish assurances of site stability TRAC C3.4, TRAC C3.1
Establish hardware upgrade policy TRAC A3.6, TRAC C1.9
Establish information security policy TRAC C3.3, TRAC C3.1, TRAC C3.4
Establish media refreshment policy TRAC C1.7
Establish software upgrade policy TRAC A3.6, TRAC C1.10, TRAC C1.9
Establish suitability of backup infrastructure
through testing
TRAC C1.2, TRAC C3.4
Limit data loss incidence TRAC C1.6, TRAC C3.4
Validate integrity of backups TRAC A3.8, TRAC C1.5
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Table 4.7: Policy Framework Goals Mapped to TRAC
Goals Corresponding TRAC Criteria
Define disaster recovery policy TRAC C3.4
Define ingest package specification TRAC B5.1, TRAC B1.1, TRAC B1.2, TRAC A5.3
Define policy and procedures for undertaking back-
ups
TRAC C3.4
Establish and exercise ingest policy TRAC B2.4, TRAC A5.3
Establish and exercise selection policy TRAC B2.4, TRAC A5.3
Establish and maintain terms of deposit TRAC A5.3, TRAC B1.7
Establish archival packages configuration(s) TRAC B2.1, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.2, TRAC A2.1
Establish conditions for access TRAC B6.3, TRAC B6.4
Establish criteria for data identification TRAC B6.10, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.6, TRAC
B5.4
Establish criteria for data review TRAC B3.4, TRAC B2.10
Establish criteria for disposal TRAC B2.4
Establish hardware upgrade policy TRAC A3.6, TRAC C1.9
Establish information security policy TRAC C3.1, TRAC C3.3, TRAC C3.4
Establish levels of preservation TRAC B3.3, TRAC B1.1, TRAC B4.1, TRAC B3.1
Establish list of supported formats TRAC A5.3
Establish logical storage provisions TRAC B4.2
Establish media refreshment policy TRAC C1.7
Establish physical and logical provisions for access TRAC C3.2, TRAC B6.4, TRAC B6.1, TRAC B6.5
Establish policy review policy TRAC B3.3, TRAC A4.2, TRAC C1.9, TRAC A3.2,
TRAC A3.4, TRAC C1.8, TRAC A3.6
Establish policy transparency TRAC A3.2, TRAC B2.12, TRAC A5.3, TRAC
A3.7
Establish relationship between access and archival
packages
TRAC B6.10, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B6.8, TRAC
B4.3, TRAC B2.1
Establish relationship between ingest and archival
packages
TRAC B2.3, TRAC B6.8, TRAC B6.10, TRAC
B2.1, TRAC B5.1, TRAC B2.11, TRAC B2.6,
TRAC B4.3
Establish software upgrade policy TRAC C1.10, TRAC A3.6, TRAC C1.9
Establish terms of use TRAC A5.4, TRAC A5.3, TRAC B6.3
Establish transformation procedure from ingest to
archival packages
TRAC B2.1
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Feedback from DRAMBORA training activities [Mchugh, 2009] suggested that it was not in-
tuitive for end users to consider their systems in these terms. Grouping activities and assets
maintained inflexible associations which limited opportunities for reuse.
In response to such concerns we elected to deconstruct these classifications, establishing
groupings of preservation “actions”, “resources”, “policies” and “mandates”, related in the
first instance by common associated preservation objectives. Our earlier content analysis had
yielded structured evidence examples that conformed with one or more of these categories.
We could take the practical responses to preservation problems that were evident in real
world environments and characterise them in terms of their status. Goals (often prompted
by specific mandate or other such compulsion) were pursued with the enactment of policies,
in turn implemented by actions which were supported by specific resources. These were
analogous to the example evidence entry accompanying each TRAC criterion. The collective
set of related elements is indicative of much more than just associated documentation or
resources though. Instead its purpose is to illustrate why particular objectives are necessary
or worthwhile, the wide variety of ways in which they can be approached, how in practical
terms they can be accomplished, and any dependencies for doing so.
This informed the object properties which were initially established within the Semantic
MediaWiki. Sharing the common “objective” domain these were “Is achieved by” (action),
“Is supported by” (resource), “Is defined by” (policy) and “Is legitimised by (mandate). We
conceived a further object property “Is validated by”, coupling the preservation goal with a
corresponding TRAC criterion (intended to offer some formal, regulatory legitimacy to the
corresponding objective). This is an example of how we envisage the interface between top
down and bottom up approaches.
Using PHP/MySQL we developed a bespoke ontology manager web application which fa-
cilitated the ontology’s definition and iteration. Firstly we generalised those information
elements considered too specific for widespread applicability, resulting in a two tier hierar-
chy of resources, activities, rights and responsibilities (formerly mandates) and parameters
(formerly policy). These would be reflected in a distinction between leaf node elements and
corresponding individuals. In ontology terms they were characterised as classes (the generic
fundamental parts of the preservation process) and instances, or individuals which are more
specific representations and more subjective, based on context or time. The individuals com-
prise the knowledge base but the ontology is structured principally at the level of entity. This
ensures the discoverability of more specific example practice via terminology with more
general meaning. It also introduces an abstraction between general best practice (intended to
be timeless and non context-sensitive) and specific implementations. Relationships between
classes were developed based on evidence from the audits and mappings to example support-
ing evidence from TRAC. Our online application yielded some 8899 individual relationships
between the individual ontology classes. Our mapping to TRAC, and to the Data Seal of
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Approval (see Chapter 5) is available from:
mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/ontologybrowser/viewTrac.php
We defined, modeled and iteratively evaluated relationships, reflecting and illustrating sys-
tematic, functional relationships within the given example preservation contexts, as well as
risk causality relationships, highlighting where elements were threatened by particular risks,
and where they were likely to influence risk probability and/or impact. We based a great
deal of this on evidence available from the DRAMBORA’s online tool (which we developed
and offer freely to information professionals wishing to perform systematic preservation risk
assessment) and the tracing of corresponding relationships between identified risks and risk
causation / recovery factors and the ontology elements.
A simple AJAX web application for traversing the ontology is available from:
mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/ontologybrowser/
A further application that exposes the rdf elements and relationships is at:
mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/ontologybrowser/viewRelatable.php
Our ontology editor, which was used to populate the ontology and make explicit the relation-
ships between individual elements, is available at:
mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/ontologybrowser/structureBuild.php
and
mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/ontologybrowser/customBuild.php
This is the tool that was used to conceive the many relationships that comprise PORRO. It
enables the individual building blocks to be related individually. The network effect that
the ontology offers is the ability to relate concepts that may be non-contiguous in terms of
causality but are nevertheless influential.
Initially relationships were developed between those concepts occupying a common lim-
ited area (e.g. Organisational→ Legal issues) [structureBuild.php] before graduating to the
development of relationships that spanned the entire conceptual space [customBuild.php].
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We related preservation goals derived from reference literature such as OAIS and TRAC (and
the case study details) to rights and responsibilities which motivate or legitimize them. Goals
find their first practical expression through their relationship with parameters, which charac-
terize them, illustrating what is required for their accomplishment (those characteristics that
transform broadly defined goals into specific, measurable objectives). Parameters also direct
the activities which are undertaken to satisfy them and are evidenced by specific resources
(most often documentation such as policy, but sometimes implicitly, for example in software
algorithms). Activities are supported by, and may also enhance resources. Resources may be
dependent upon other resources. Based upon this latter relationship we represent semantic or
structural dependencies between content information and infrastructure in PORRO. Figure
4.1 presents an entity relationship model that describes the classes and relationships encoded
within the ontology.
Figure 4.1: PORRO Relation Diagram
4.2.1 Ontology Classes and Object Properties
The complete set of Classes within PORRO is available as Appendix A. The modelled object
Properties are illustrated in table 4.8.
We consider generic statements of preservation objectives to be vulnerable to criticism be-
cause of the variety of preservation efforts, ranging in terms of physical scale, available
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resource, the backdrop of legislation and compliance, and the broad range of data types and
formats being preserved. We therefore define goals as equivalent to checklist criteria within
repository certification standards (such as forthcoming standard ISO 16363 which largely
builds on community criteria originally released as TRAC). These are preservation corner-
stones intended to represent a full range of the ambitions of the preservation practitioner,
although specific implementation will vary. While our expression of goals is generic, each
becomes specific and measurable by relation to one or more parameters which are typi-
cally qualifiers expressed as policy. There are 104 broadly stated preservation goals in total,
intended to provide a comprehensive account of preservation aims, in order to reflect the
diversity of goals evident throughout the digital library and broader preservation landscape.
We define resources as tangible or non tangible stuff within the preservation context that
influence the existence or severity of risk. Resources include both those things fundamental
to the preservation process (and normally intended to assist in the management of risk e.g.
software access systems), and those that are valued in and of themselves, as part of a core
business objective (e.g. preserved digital objects, financial profit). Resources are exposed to
threats of loss or failure with consequences in terms of their contribution to risk management
activities, and wider implications in terms of success of procedures and associated wider ob-
jectives. Resources’ contributions to risk causation may be in terms of their insufficiency,
associated conflicts, arising liabilities or a lack of their appropriate deployment. Repository
roles, including ‘typical’ preservation roles such as data archivists and librarians, informa-
tion architects, system administrators and developers and external roles such as depositors,
consumers and information owners are characterised as Resources.
Where applicable, existing ontologies may have a role - we reference examples such as the
eXtensible Characterization Language Ontology which provides robust property constraints
for a range of formats and may be substituted where applicable [Puhl, 2009, Thaller et al.,
2008, Becker and Rauber, 2011].
Rights or Responsibilities arise from the context within which preservation is undertaken; we
define them to include any kinds of debts, obligations, liabilities or enablers. Contracts or
legislative mandates are obvious examples. The conferment of mandate may be a risk limiter,
or expose greater risks. A common risk that may arise is associated with incompatibilities
between a particular liability and a business objective. A digitization project may face a
conflict between its objective to make available digitized copies of its whole collection with
intellectual property law liabilities which restrict the dissemination of copyright content. A
consequential risk is that either the objective will fail or the liabilities escalate.
We define Parameters as those characteristics enacted in some aspect of operational policy
(explicitly or otherwise), that lend a specificity and measurability to goals. Their value de-
fines in a more tangible way the meaning of satisfying individual preservation objectives,
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and reflects the diversity of the preservation landscape. For example, the establishment of
a designated community (a generic goal) depends upon designated community composition
and understandability definitions (each enacted in corresponding policy documentation or
other resources, such as a database of users).
We present Activities as those processes intrinsic to the preservation context, associated
with the execution of specified policy and/or the resolution of identified risk (including for
example the enacting of a preservation plan). Activities may influence risk if they introduce
conflicts, are incapable of satisfying their purpose, or are absent where otherwise required.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of Risk Cause and Effect
Consistent with our previous work we define Risks as the expression of the likelihood and
impact of an event with the potential to influence the achievement of an organisation’s objec-
tives [McHugh et al., 2007]. Risks do not arise or exist in isolation and can both influence,
and have their severity or realization determined by other risks, in various ways. Risk types
may be broadly subdivided into risks of failure (directly threatening objectives), loss (threat-
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ening resources or activities, and indirectly affecting objectives), or liability (imposing lia-
bilities which again threatens objectives). Risks can be influenced by the existence, absence
or specific characteristics of individual activities, resources, rights and responsibilities, and
by the cumulative effects of multiple concurrent factors. More importantly, risks can both
follow from or be rendered more severe as a consequence of other risks. The range of rela-
tionships between Risks and other PORRO categories of content is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
This presents expressions of risk causality and mitigation, including the at times compound-
ing quality of certain risk exposure. The emergence of an individual risk can increase the
likelihood and impact of other risks. For example, the property ”Staff Suffer Deterioration
Of Skills” has the relationship ”makes more likely” with several other risks. Evidence of par-
ticular Activities, Policies/Parameters, Rights and Responsibilities and Resources can each
similarly affect the probability or potential impact of any given risk, but we model not only
a relationship of increased risk exposure, but also mitigation. These relationships are made
explicit with one of four properties, corresponding to both risk likelihood and impact either
increasing or decreasing.
We assume no priority in terms of causal and consequential factors; PORRO is sufficiently
expressive to encapsulate not only overtly risk-related factors, but also descriptive, technical
and administrative information that may be subsequently relatable to risk. Unlike more static
existing resources PORRO supports not only the repository evaluation or risk assessment
exercise, but also documentation in a more general sense. The ontology approach offers
extensibility to enable the adoption of existing domain specific descriptions where necessary.
In the context of our goal to provide semantic structure to our understanding of digital preser-
vation systems we draw a distinction between the development of a taxonomy of terms
(preservation system facets) and a structure that reflects properties or linkages between them,
manifested as our overall ontology. Both are of intrinsic value and reflect the various use
cases for PORRO more generally. The iterative process of developing PORRO took as its
starting point accounts from real world audits, increasingly granularised to an atomic level,
whereby system characteristics and qualities identified within the course of institutional au-
dits were isolated and characterised as individual ontology elements. A compelling question
was of the appropriate level of granularity. Starting with broad functional distinctions (draw-
ing mainly from the widely acknowledged OAIS functional model [ISO 14721, 2012] we
divided further, initially based on those topical issues that had emerged as areas of enquiry
during the course of our assessments. These ultimately would be manifested as organisa-
tional objectives; our set of objectives is intended to provide a comprehensive selection of
goals that preservation organisations are established to pursue. Risks too were defined by
reference to the specific points of concern highlighted in our audits and the self-assessment
responses recorded within DRAMBORA Interactive. The existing risk catalogue published
within the original DRAMBORA release also provided a compelling resource in the definition
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of risk elements. Those other elements that we record in the ontology (and specifically the
level of granularity with which they were described) were determined by the relationships
that they supported. In order to characterise associations between goals and risks we were
required to define elements that were suitably independently meaningful and distinguish-
able. We remained resistant to incorporating elements that were implementations of more
general concepts. The process was partly artisan (as manual ontology development typically
is), but in order to ensure it remained systematic, representative and functionally appropriate
we sought constant feedback from project colleagues (for instance in the Digital Curation
Centre and 3D Coform) as well as end users and practitioners with whom we engaged in the
course of resource development. While we sought to ensure that we were not constrained by
existing top down expressions of best practice (we preferred to view with scepticism their
legitimacy and claims of authoritativeness) we nonetheless referenced them regularly to en-
sure compatibility and that no obvious omissions were evident in our own taxonomy and
ontology.
The world view we express with the development of PORRO is broadly compatible with the
DELOS Digital Library Reference Model. We extend this approach however, adding with
PORRO the dimension of Risk to enable the formation and expression of meaningful inter-
relationships between discrete system facets. The DELOS Model’s Quality Node is relevant
for preservation planning and validation, but appears insufficiently robust to enable its simul-
taneous exposure to a wide number of system and object properties. Quality measures in the
DL Reference Model are explicitly set, and classified as one of ‘Generic’, ‘Content’, ‘Func-
tionality’, ‘User’, ‘Policy’, and ‘Architecture’. Sub-classifications including ‘Interoperabil-
ity Support’, ‘Trustworthiness’, ‘Fidelity’, ‘Authenticity’, ‘Fault Management Performance’
and ‘Compliance with Standards’ are clearly relevant to a preservation agenda. However,
there is little opportunity to enforce information property-driven quality control over the
preservation process, at least not at a suitably granular level.
PORRO is a new model that offers means for recording diverse information facets to support
fully warranted preservation management decisions and conclusions. It makes accessible
properties and considerations that while relevant may otherwise be overlooked. Likewise, it
presents a holistic view of risk and risk implications, limiting the likelihood of risk impact
silos and making explicit organizational and informational relationships, de-emphasizing
boundaries. This is true both internally within organizations, and in a more global sense,
whereby common characteristics can be established across preservation environments, in
order to establish shared knowledge pools that may be broadly exploited.
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4.3 Applying PORRO to Real World Circumstances
4.4 Overview of Use Cases
PORRO has four primary use cases. The first is to facilitate the identification of risk, whereby
users or agents can traverse the knowledge base to identify linked concepts based on com-
mon contextual characteristics. Secondly we seek with PORRO to facilitate the resolution of
identified risks, mapping risks to appropriate mitigation, whether that entails particular inter-
actions or the creation or acquisition of particular resources, policies or mandates. Thirdly
we seek to enable gap analyses to be conducted more straightforwardly, whereby traversal of
the ontology can reveal appropriate policy definitions, interactions and resources to enable
the accomplishment of stated goals. Finally we seek to support the validation of approaches,
as seen in preservation planning. Traversing the ontology yields insights into whether the
prioritisation of particular policy, procurement or activities is likely to be beneficial in terms
of overall goals. We illustrate PORRO’s capacity to satisfy these use cases within the con-
text of two novel applications (in addition to the ontology browser/manager tools referenced
above) that use the ontology that we have developed in the course of this research.
4.5 3D Coform Long Term Preservation Component
4.5.1 About 3D Coform
3D Coform [Tzompanaki et al., 2011] was a four year project funded under the EU Sev-
enth Framework Programme focused on the sustainable documentation of tangible cultural
heritage using 3D technology. This incorporated research and development of 3D capture,
processing and repository software, and brought together a range of commercial, University
and cultural heritage partners and collaborators including the Victoria and Albert museum,
the Louvre and World Heritage sites in Cyprus.
We partnered on this project to contribute to the development of a metadata and object
repository for 3D content collections and associated metadata. A critical part of the overall
3D Coform architecture, this relied upon the CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model (CRM)
[Doerr, 2003] plus some digital extensions to record event based metadata relating to phys-
ical and digital materials (see Figure 4.3 which describes in high level conceptual terms the
overall 3D Coform Repository Architecture - the preservation modules are part of the RI
Web Service).
As part of this repository we developed a long term digital preservation component with the
explicit aim to provide the repository with a means for the storage, description, distribution
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Figure 4.3: 3D Coform Repository Architecture
and management of three-dimensional data and metadata. It consists of five individual ele-
ments. These are a Preservation Level Manager, which enables the conceptual formation of
preservation packages (including data and metadata - Figure 4.4 presents a screenshot from
the Java application); a METS Export Manager which enables the physical formation (en-
capsulation) of packaged data and export to METS format; a Dependency Manager which
enables the recording of semantic and structural (technical) dependencies associated with
rendering and manipulation of packaged data and or metadata; a Preservation Risk Man-
ager, established to record and iterrelate preservation risks associable with dependencies and
other contextual and infrastructural factors (see Figure 4.5, also presenting a screen from the
Java application); and finally an Obsolescence Manager, established to prompt preservation
interactions on the basis of evident risk exposure.
Our Preservation Risk Manager illustrates where and how generic risk factors and risks
are manifested within the 3D-Coform information space. Instead of manually encoding
risk relationships between 3D-Coform content we took PORRO’s more generic examples
and mapped these to 3D-Coform information elements to understand where risk exposure
may reside. A variably granular level of mappings are permitted between PORRO elements
and either 3D-Coform information types (based on a type-taxonomy developed within the
project) or specific instance values. One can map a particular generic resource (e.g. In-
gest Platform), with the broadly encompassing DeviceType Laser Scanners, or, if it is more
appropriate a specific individual model or example of laser scanner.
Similarly, we model information dependencies as specialist PORRO resource entities, based
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Figure 4.4: 3D Coform AIP Manager
Figure 4.5: 3D Coform Risk Association Manager
primarily on OAIS’ concept of Representation Information [ISO 14721, 2012]. These are
implicit within archival packages, which are therefore self-evident. Whether functional-
ity (i.e. tools) or just documentation are actually encoded/exported depends on a defined
preservation level. Properties are measurable facets of function. Functional components can
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exist hierarchically, and single functional behaviours’ may be grouped into wider functions.
Multiple versions of any individual dependency may exist; this may mean variability of ren-
dering, processing, and of preserved outputs, which may differ from an “original”. Different
versions share function, but may exhibit material differences. Within the context of each
version there must be an explicit mapping between content and dependency elements.
Traversing PORRO reveals relationships with other mapped content, or challenges the user
to determine whether generic activities, policies or resources which appear to be required
have been adequately implemented. In tandem with a preservation package manifest, which
is also created within this long term management tool, this enables a clear risk profile to be
presented, with closely associated risks and potential additional risk mitigation approaches
clearly identifiable, albeit generically expressed.
4.6 Collaborative Assessment of Research Data In-
frastructures and Objectives
Overview of CARDIO
The Collaborative Assessment of Research Data Infrastructures and Objectives (CARDIO)
tool was developed with colleagues from the Digital Curation Centre (DCC) [DCC, 2012], a
JISC [JISC, 2012] funded service that provides leadership and expertise in the curation and
management of digital resources. Most recently the DCC has focused on issues surrounding
the management of research data. Like digital preservation more generally, research data
management’s success is reliant upon a range of elements. The distribution of influences is
not limited to infrastructure, and also implies a number of internal stakeholders with a range
of responsibilities.
CARDIO is a tool and associated workflow for performing data management maturity and
capability assessment across a data context (typically an institution, project, data centre or
department), which supports and demands a collaborative approach. Its origins were in dis-
cussions within the DCC that revealed an appreciation of the importance of incorporating
a range of perspectives into the evaluation of data management infrastructure. Its central
conceit is that only by adopting a holistic view can such activities succeed. Individual func-
tions, roles and systems are considered not in isolation but in terms of their relationships
with and influence from others elsewhere. It was conceived to ensure a broad discourse and
consensus-based conclusions. To that end the tool presents a process that demanded firstly
the submission of a survey instrument by each participant and latterly their consideration and
evaluation of peer responses and agreement of a shared perspective. It uses social tools and
online survey instruments but has operated as successfully as an offline managed process.
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In more specific terms, CARDIO requires participants to reflect on data management matu-
rity in thirty individual areas. For each, users must apply a rating of 1 to 5 to reflect their
perception of how well their institution performs in that area. Some supporting text provides
details indicative of what it means to score 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 in that area. Users also have the
opportunity to respond with a “Don’t know” answer, or to declare a particular issue not-
applicable. Users may clarify or contextualise their selections with additional information in
the form of free text or uploaded documentation.
We developed CARDIO to promote institutional discourse and a collaborative approach to
data management problem solving; provide reassurance of infrastructural capacity and sat-
isfaction of data management planning commitments; highlight priority areas for resource
investment or areas where investment will have greatest impact; relate local data contexts to
the wider world of data management via a shared evidence base; and facilitate engagement
with senior management over data management responsibilities and shortcomings. These are
of course complementary to the goals of PORRO. The notion of a shared knowledge base in
particular is a reference to the role of the ontology in presenting a structured view of digital
preservation or data management best practice.
CARDIO has established a role in promoting widespread analysis across multiple perspec-
tives within a single institutional setting. It has been a core utility within the Digital Curation
Centre’s institutional engagement program, whereby around eighteen UK HE institutions
have benefited from consultancy services aimed at boosting data management capacity and
understanding1.
CARDIO is manifested as both an online interactive resource [DCC, 2011] and a traditional
methodology tool that entails interviews, focus groups and collaborative reporting. Managed
deployments in 2012 included studies at London School of Economics and Queen Mary Uni-
versity London. More details are included as part of Chapter 5, which focuses on PORRO’s
evaluation.
CARDIO and PORRO
CARDIO enables comparison with a consolidated collection of real world data, via the DCC
CARDIO Knowledge Base which is founded upon the PORRO ontology. PORRO has been
encoded to correspond with the thirty infrastructural facets that comprise the CARDIO as-
sessment, ranging between issues of organization, resources and technology. The mapping
is actually to the University of London Computer Centre’s Assessing Institutional Digital
Assets model for digital preservation [AIDA, 2010] which in turn has its origins in the Uni-
versity of Cornell’s [Kenney and McGovern, 2003] three leg / five stage model for digital
1See http://www.dcc.ac.uk/tailored-support/institutional-engagements
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preservation. This enables the provision of relevant considerations in each specific area, as
well as the illustration of more complex risk relationships. It means that users can identify ar-
eas of perceived weakness and explore opportunities for effective resolution, or alternatively
challenge perceived strength with robust gap analysis.
A bespoke web tool was developed using PHP/MySQL and AJAX to facilitate the creation of
mappings (see Figure 4.6 which shows the tool developed to map AIDA stages with PORRO
classes and in turn link to five stages of organisational maturity). The tool enables the associ-
ation of PORRO elements to CARDIO statements (survey concepts). Furthermore it supports
the streamlining of five levels of manifestation for each. This means that mappings between
CARDIO and PORRO concepts can be enriched with detail about the extent to which PORRO
concepts are realised. Built in tiers of manifestation are based on frequency (e.g., how often
particular PORRO actions are undertaken), quantity (e.g., how much of a particular resource
an organisation has), formality (e.g., the extent to which policies are formally enacted and
documented), maturity (e.g., a measure of how well established a policy is) and compulsion
(e.g. a measure of how serious a particular responsibility is).
Figure 4.6: Example CARDIO Mapper Application
Mappings between PORRO classes and CARDIO concepts are intuitive and straightforward.
An example of CARDIO’s mappings to PORRO follows. Given the close association be-
tween CARDIO, AIDA and the Cornell model this mapping additionally serves as a connec-
tion between these prior resources and PORRO.
Example CARDIO Mapping - AIDA Element “Technological Infrastructure”
Corresponding Goals
- E053 Establish Appropriate Hardware Infrastructure
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- E057 Establish Appropriate Software Infrastructure
- E064 Establish Assurances Of Sufficiency Of Staff Skills And Capacity
- E074 Establish Hardware Upgrade Policy
- E093 Establish Software Upgrade Policy
Corresponding Parameters
- E182 Media Refreshment
- E239 Rights And Ownership Definitions
- E260 Supported Systems And Applications
- E261 Systems Development Management
- E264 Technology Licensing
- E265 Technology Skills Development
Corresponding Activities
- E318 Develop Technical Training And Induction
- E353 Liaise With Technology Provider
- E393 Plan And Execute System Upgrades
- E401 Record System Changes
- E404 Refresh Media Or Hardware
- E409 Report Technical Status
- E418 Review Technical Provision
Corresponding Resources
- E479 Custodial History Record
- E480 Custodial History Records
- E502 Formal Contracts And Terms
- E587 Update And Upgrade Prompts
Corresponding Risks
- E596 Authentication Subsystem Fails
- E597 Authorisation Subsystem Fails
- E620 Hardware Failure Or Incompatibility
- E631 Ingest Subsystem Fails
- E657 Non-Availability Of Core Utilities
- E658 Non-Availability Of Information Delivery Services
- E667 Software Failure Or Incompatibility
The power of the associations is evident when referred to following a typical CARDIO as-
sessment. According to its established workflow, participants are given little insight into the
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meaning of particular categories, instead referred to short excerpts of text aligned to each of
five nominal maturity levels and asked to select the one that they think is most representative
of their own context’s circumstances.
Figure 4.7: Example CARDIO User Prompt
Figure 4.7 is an example form with an illustrative range of options.
Where the process highlighted shortcomings the tool is intended to provide guidance on what
should be implemented in order to improve and to assist in the construction of a case for why
this was necessary. Linking risk to each CARDIO element immediately provides a platform
upon which the latter can be achieved. Making a case to senior management is demonstrably
more successful with a coherent and succinct alignment of possible risks associated with
inaction in any given area. Furthermore, the association illustrates appropriate responses to
shortcomings and makes explicit gaps in existing provision.
Figure 4.8: CARDIO Example Report Excerpt
Figure 4.8 is an exerpt from a report illustrating the views collected from one study about the
issue of Technological Infrastructure. Tracing corresponding PORRO classes and named in-
dividuals via the ontology browser (see above) makes explicit such recommendations where
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there are shortcomings. Indeed, we can take an example corresponding risk “E658 Non-
Availability Of Information Delivery Services” and traverse the ontology to identify a range
of associated risk causation and mitigation factors. An excerpt of the links follows, and re-
veals the value of a holistic mapping of information system and organisational components.
E651 Non-Availability Of Information Delivery Services
- P12inv is made less likely by [E666 Preservation Risk Influences]
- E353 Maintain Access Platform
- - P05inv is supported by [E438 Preservation Support Resources]
- - E528 Network
- - E562 Security Platform
- - E499 General Hardware
- - E500 General Software
- - E497 Format Support
- - E441 Access Platform
- - - Database of affiliate stakeholders
- - - Means for logging access attempts
- - - Secure read/write access from affiliates via FTP
- - - Software infrastructure for encrypting data for transfer
- - - Software infrastructure for personalisation of user experience (e.g. MyData system)
- - - Suitable FTP server (e.g. ProFTP)
- - - Suitable web server software (e.g Apache)
- - - System for controlling information access
- - - Tivoli access manager
- - - Web browsing interface
- - - ...
- - - Another, e.g., remote access arrangements
- - - - P07inv is enhanced by[E296 Preservation Activity]
- - - - E399 Regulate Access To Data
- - - - - P04inv is directed by[E127 Preservation Parameter]
- - - - - - E135 Content Closure
- - - - - - E148 Cost Model For Access Provision
- - - - - - E198 Policy On Access Control
- - - - - - E260 Terms Of Access
A customised graph can be generated to illustrate related information facets - looping through
the hierarchy reveals deeper lying considerations that if resolved may in turn benefit multi-
ple identified issues. These implicitly provide a more systematic and coherent basis for
resolving preservation or data management shortcomings and offer a constructive, tailored
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mechanism to plan improvement that is independent of repository maturity or priorities. Not
only risk resolution can be managed in this way. It is similarly straightforward to select a
given preservation goal for example and trace it to identify associated drivers and facilitating
factors.
4.7 Summary of the Work
In the course of this thesis we have built a preservation process and metric for evaluation
around the concept of risk. A given risk (or its inverse) characterises one or more corre-
sponding preservation objectives - completing an objective means avoiding a risk - and risk
management is manifested in terms of those organisational, infrastructural and policy facets
that accomplish something. We have delivered a structured knowledge base for approach-
ing repository development and evaluation as well as several ancillary and complementary
results.
We start with an objective identified within a range of institutions: to establish and under-
stand best practice for taking custodial responsibility for digital information. This increas-
ingly prominent goal is overshadowed by widespread uncertainty. We developed DRAMB-
ORA to provide practical support to those organisations aspiring to best practice, but under-
served by highly prescriptive metrics that were available. In fact, DRAMBORA revealed
as much to its users as it did to our own research. Its development entailed a number of ex-
ploratory audits within a range of organisations, enabling us to shape an appropriate method-
ology for self and supported evaluation, but also exposed a set of practical evidence of how
information is preserved, and of those factors that contribute to success and failure. The
systematic analyses comprising this work were unprecedented and in a context often char-
acterised by organisations’ uncertainty about the future and hesitation to invite scrutiny, the
data that was collected was uniquely valuable.
The assessments, and DRAMBORA itself also revealed a shortcoming of a wholly bottom-up
approach. Although clearly more customisable to a given set of organisational objectives (es-
sential in such a heterogeneous arena) the lack of a clear objective benchmark was frustrating
to users. When we supported self assessments in the development of our methodology feed-
back clearly identified the value of an expert contributor, whose function became not only to
advise on methodological aspects of self assessment, but also to relate perceptions of matu-
rity to a broader context. How then to take our established body of best practice and expose
it as part of self assessment, essentially enabling that information to perform the role of an
expert facilitator.
Our interactive tool takes the core methodology of reflective introspection and adds a means
by which users can relate their efforts to those elsewhere, although still short of a complete
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inter-connected knowledge base of best practice. That almost one hundred and fifty organ-
isations have made extensive use of the tool in one or more self-assessments speaks to its
value - this usage far exceeds that associated with any other systematised preservation as-
sessment tool or instrument. The variety of countries and associated disciplines evident in
these statistics (described in full in chapter 2) lends further credibility to claims of the tools
success.
This methodology is a contribution of critical importance for the preservation community.
Many of the efforts to date associated with evaluating digital preservation have been driven
by the pursuit of validation of the competencies of a given preserving organisation. This has
yielded certification standards but little in the way of formal process for their application.
Our method is firmly aimed at those doing preservation, and provides the means for them to
be confident in the suitability and sufficiency of their work, and if appropriate to facilitate
a later exposure of their efforts to external certification. It also ensures that the dynamic
nature of preservation (which may change based on new technological innovations, such as
the increased dependency on cloud computing) continues to be reflected in best practice.
As DRAMBORA benefited from its deployment in formal audits, it similarly equipped us to
pursue our second research objective, a continuation of the work of surveying preservation
contexts. DRAMBORA Interactive reveals data corresponding to assessments that exhibit
diversity in geographic location, legal context, types of digital collection, mandate and bud-
getary model. DRAMBORA requires participants to describe their preservation efforts in
terms of objectives, activities, resources and risks, providing immediate evidence of how
leading organisations go about ensuring the longevity of digital materials. We undertook a
series of systematic audits based on evolving methodological and intellectual criteria (them-
selves developed iteratively based on our findings). Good and bad practice were both identi-
fied, characterised and related within these assessments, providing evidence that would form
the basis for lines of enquiry and evaluation feedback in subsequent audit exercises. Collec-
tively, the assessments yielded several benefits. The first, taken at face value was that the
participating organisations were given the opportunity to better understand their successes
and shortcomings, and to adapt to a critique based on comparison with a combination of
objectively conceived and empirical real world best practice. Secondly, we could refine our
approach both in terms of process and more importantly in the intellectual basis upon which
our evaluation was conducted. As we learned more about how preservation takes place we
became better equipped to identify opportunities for improvement elsewhere. Our knowl-
edge base was developing, and it became clear that the perspectives we had been granted
by exhaustively assessing a series of operations were unique. The existing instruments that
we were using were highlighted as being occasionally incomplete, more commonly at least
lacking in terms of specificity or applicability to real world motivations and approaches.
The outcomes of each audit were recorded, accomplishing our third research objective. We
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iteratively developed a taxonomy of concepts from these audit reports, characterising our ev-
idence base in terms of what organisations wish to achieve (agnostic of any given objective
standard) and the processes, tools, policies and mandates that inform and/or support that.
These were in turn related to a developing catalogue of risks, whether caused by or miti-
gated by these factors. Each facet was recorded in two forms; a higher level, more generic
expression was intended to be immune to issues of applicability across context and time,
complemented by specific examples the particular implementations or manifestations we
observed and recorded in our audit experiences. Injecting semantic qualities to the data is
of tremendous importance, as it allows the data to be interrogated by applications or human
users and enables the conception of a network of relatable factors that contribute to preser-
vation outcomes.
Fourthly we evaluated existing methodologies for undertaking preservation assessment. A
critical dimension of this work has been to establish where our outcomes are positioned
within an existing international preservation certification landscape. We are not content to
seek to replace wholesale the existing provisions, several of which have enjoyed formal
standardisation. Instead, we seek to identify and fill the gaps in what currently exists. We
considered the value and applicability of several standards and de facto standards and of-
fered a critical assessment of each. Several leading examples are collectively encapsulated
within the European Framework for Audit and Certification of Digital Repositories, which
presents a series of increasingly onerous certification tiers that correspond with the Data Seal
of Approval, ISO 16363 and the equivalent German standard. The first two tiers require just
documented self-assessment while the most involved requires a full externally administered
audit to be conducted within any organisation seeking certified status. We reflected on the
many positive aspects of these resources. Each has at least some intellectual basis in the
Trusted Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Checklist which can be considered a
seminal resource in this area. By extension, each can be considered a valuable expression of
generic aspects of preservation practice. TRAC’s formal standardisation can be considered
a more practical expression of - and companion resource to - the equally seminal Reference
Model for an Open Archival Information System. However, their shortcomings are mainly
in terms of their utility and practical applicability. Even though self-assessment comprises
two-thirds of the Framework there remains little explicit emphasis on processes to guide a
prospective repository administrators seeking to evaluate his or her efforts. While the Data
Seal of Approval presents as an advantage its low barrier to entry this is accompanied by
shortcomings, principally in terms of lack of granularity of coverage. The TRAC and ISO
standards, pursuing exhaustiveness, extend to many, many criteria; preservation is a compli-
cated business with implications spanning every aspect of an organisation’s administration,
technology and information management process. But they in turn expose themselves to
criticism as impractically conceived, beset by uncertainties in terms of how metrics can be
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satisfied and based upon a set of preservation requirements so generic that it doesn’t really
exist within any single organisational context.
In the area of ontology evaluation there are a number of possible alternative methods to as-
sess the quality and correctness of ontologies. There are likewise several criteria upon which
ontologies can be evaluated. Hlomani and Stacey [Hlomani and Stacey, 2014] offer ten de-
termining factors, which are quite compelling. These include accuracy (does the ontology
reflect expert knowledge about the domain); adaptability (the extent to which the ontology
supports specialisation or extensibility); clarity (how well it communicates its terms); co-
hesion (the extent to which classes are related); completeness (can it answer all appropriate
competency questions); computational efficiency (relating to the speed that tools can work
with the ontology); conciseness (limiting redundant or unnecessary elements in the context
of the domain); consistency (does not include or allow for contradictions); coupling (connec-
tivity with existing ontologies); and coverage (how well is the modelled domain represented).
In order to determine the extent to which any given ontology demonstrates these traits the
literature offers four primary evaluation approaches. The first is the gold standard compar-
ison [Maedche and Staab, 2002] whereby a given ontology is compared with a definitive or
authoritative ontology within the same domain. In our case there is no such gold standard
and therefore this approach is of limited value. In fact, we aspire for PORRO to ultimately
represent a gold standard ontology for encapsulating issues associated with the delivery of
preservation services.
A second approach for evaluation is based on the evaluation of tools that use a given ontology
[Porzel and Malaka, 2004]. We have employed this method with respect to the Collabora-
tive Assessment of Research Data Infrastructure and Objectives (CARDIO) tool developed
with colleagues in the context of the Digital Curation Centre’s work with UK Higher Edu-
cation institutions. Reassurances were offered in terms of the ontology’s clarity, cohesion
and computational efficiency by a combination of end user feedback and several information
outcomes, whereby meaning and implications of user outcomes were clarified and gaps and
shortcomings made more evident through the use of the tool.
We utilised further ontology evaluation approaches in our assessment of other DRAMBORA
assessments that were undertaken within the context of several digital libraries. A corpus
based approach, involving comparisons with a source of data (e.g. a collection of docu-
ments) about the domain to be covered by the ontology [Brewster et al., 2004] revealed the
ontology’s accuracy and coverage, as well as its adaptability to this specific sub-domain.
Finally, we leveraged a range of existing top-down approaches (such as TRAC and the Data
Seal of Approval to assess how well the ontology meets a set of predefined criteria, standards,
requirements [Lozano-Tello and Go´mez-Pe´rez, 2004], providing evidence of completeness
and conciseness. A full account of all these evaluation approaches is provided in Chapter 5.
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We have conceived the PORRO ontology as a structured expression of preservation best prac-
tice, collated from over a dozen full-scale audit exercises in addition to around one hundred
and fifty online self-assessments conducted using DRAMBORA Interactive. This qualifies
this data as a legitimate consolidation of overall preservation practice, a unique dataset that
was both conceived and validated by lengthy exposure to real world preservation efforts un-
dertaken by experts in the field. We have sought to take advantage of the resources that are
available and position our efforts in a fashion that ensures their compatibility. DRAMBORA
was our direct response to the difficulties posed by a wholly top-down approach, a process-
driven methodology that requires self-assessors to reflect on their own priorities and their
associated strengths and shortcomings. PORRO enhances this process by providing pliable
hooks to best-practice that are customisable to any given preservation context. This satisfies
our fourth objective, a presentation of best practice in a taxonomical and ontological format.
Like DRAMBORA, its design has been principally motivated by its associated use cases.
In isolation the value of an ontology is difficult to convey and therefore a suite of indica-
tive tools that use the ontology as their intellectual foundation is an important step. The
effectiveness of our prototype tool portfolio, the delivery of which is our final research ob-
jective, is evident within two operational contexts. The first is research data management,
where its adoption as a data source for the CARDIO collaborative data curation evaluation
tool has been demonstrably useful. That is a process that builds consensus of a given organ-
isation’s data management capacity. At the point where individual contributors have agreed
upon the status of their existing efforts reference is made to PORRO to identify potential
approaches to improve existing provisions. This can be considered PORRO’s preservation
planning application. Within the 3D Coform Repository Infrastructure (RI), PORRO is used
in the identification of risk, whereby a given set of real world circumstances are identified
within the ontology and traced to potential associated risk factors. This is what we mean by
bidirectionality within PORRO. Its applicability is such that it can be used to provoke the de-
velopment of preservation activities or resource acquisition, or to warn of threats associated
with existing or proposed systems.
Further practical evidence of PORRO’s value can be seen by referring to the core use cases
that PORRO is capable of satisfying. Through its adoption in the applications referenced
earlier we can say that PORRO supports the identification of risk (whereby users or user
agents can traverse the knowledge base to identify linked concepts based on common iden-
tified contextual characteristics); the facilitation of risk resolution (whereby risks that have
been identified externally or using the ontology are mapped to appropriate mitigation mea-
sures); performance of gap analysis (whereby real world generic goals are represented in
the ontology, as are prescribed criteria which in turn are mapped to PORRO concepts, both
fleshed out by their correspondence to required or appropriate parameter considerations, ac-
tions or resources); and validation of approaches (whereby particular policy, resource or
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activity prioritisation can be traced to corresponding objectives and risks which illustrate the
appropriateness of investment).
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Evaluation
5.1 Introduction
Our evaluation seeks to demonstrate the extent to which our proposed ontology and its asso-
ciated applications are sufficiently expressive, meaningful and usable to support institutional
self-assessment. As noted below, evaluation of preservation approaches is not easy, given an
inherent implicit temporal dimension, whereby the shortcomings of any approach may not
be completely evident until years later.
We approach the challenge by referencing existing tools and ensuring comparable expres-
siveness, and by deploying the ontology in a range of institutional settings to verify its per-
ceived usefulness and utility.
5.2 Long Term Preservation Evaluation
5.2.1 The Challenges of Preservation Evaluation
To date, the preservation community has wrestled with the challenge of empirically evalu-
ating its efforts, with variable success. Unlike, for example, the information retrieval com-
munity [NIST, 2013] there is no widely accepted resource or infrastructure to empirically
evaluate and compare results. This is partially a consequence of digital preservation’s tem-
poral dimension - it is difficult to evaluate success when its realization is not immediate.
Nevertheless, recent years have seen the emergence of a range of evaluation and validation
approaches spanning both infrastructural and more focused elements of preservation. The
former can be further subdivided into top-down and bottom-up approaches. The Trustwor-
thy Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Checklist and the associated ISO 16363
standard each detail characteristics that should be demonstrable in trustworthy preservation
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environments. Our Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assessment (DRAMB-
ORA) is a more subjective means of determining repositories’ fitness for purpose, based on
their own specific priorities and responsibilities. Both approaches have been rigorously ap-
plied in a range of contexts, and therefore a considerable quantity of data exists describing
not only instances of repository conformity, but also identified risks, which may be associ-
ated with both infrastructural and information characteristics.
Elsewhere, in the context of more micro-level evaluation of specific preservation actions,
Plato’s evaluation process employs utility analysis to determine the suitability and viabil-
ity of specific migration or emulation approaches given a particular organizations data and
organizational requirements and obligations. Similarly, the Planets Testbed provides a com-
mon data corpus and an experimental environment to facilitate more objective, comparable
and re-creatable evaluation of preservation tools and processes. We can also look to criteria
published by Library of Congress for influential factors for file format evaluation, corre-
sponding to issues of sustainability, fidelity and functionality, and work exploring formats’
vulnerability to information loss from file corruption [Thaller et al., 2008].
Much of this work has focused on support for efficient retention of content properties, and
its collective success is dependent on a number of factors. One must establish the capacity
to characterize content properties, in unambiguous terms that are suitably comprehensive.
Secondly, one must be able to measure and subsequently validate these properties, in order
to determine their prolonged existence or availability during a preservation timeline. Finally,
one must establish an understanding of infrastructural and contextual influences on both
materials themselves, and any proposed preservation interventions. PORRO can be used
to ensure that chosen properties of content and context are comprehensive and that their
area of influence (and that of any proposed preservation intervention) is sufficiently well
understood.
5.3 Comparison with Best Practice
Our proposal implies a capacity to represent and illustrate a full range of digital preservation
facets and their relationships irrespective of discipline or domain and support and inform
validation and planning activities (and ultimately their automation). It is in these terms that
evaluation is undertaken.
Our objectives can be distilled into core desirable qualities of completeness, applicability
and usefulness. The first is evaluated by comparison with evidence of existing practice. To
date, discounting “spambot” and other erroneous registrations, around three hundred and
fifty repositories are registered as users of DRAMBORA’s interactive online tool, represen-
tative of institutions including national libraries and archives, academic research reposito-
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ries, commercial data centers and financial services institutions. Of these, the database and
logging systems reveal high usage activity from around one hundred repositories. Map-
ping user submissions to PORRO has revealed the ontology’s breadth is sufficient. Its dual
tiered approach to recording information facets (with generalized entries linking to more spe-
cific example ‘implementations’) ensures its scalability to encapsulate emerging trends while
maintaining its generic qualities and without becoming skewed in any specific disciplinary
direction. Likewise, its alignment with de facto standards such as TRAC, and by extension to
forthcoming standards like ISO 16363 (as described above, the ontology contains mappings
to TRAC criteria) provide further reassurance of its completeness, at least in terms of scope.
The validity of the ontology, and the extent to which it is representative of the real world is
assessed by exposure to real world scenarios. PORRO’s integration within novel tools and
its increasingly prominent role in high profile Digital Curation Centre engagement activities
provide some assurances of its effectiveness. Likewise, this provides some evidence of its
applicability to diverse domains. Within 3D-Coform mappings have been made between
ontology elements and discipline-specific terminology with success.
We turn to testimonials of stakeholders involved in order to further validate the ontology.
Reflecting upon its role in supporting checklist-based audits provides further evidence. The
CARDIO tool uses PORRO to inform breadth of data management requirements and re-
sponsibilities. It relates tangible provisions to a conceptual model for data management and
therefore provides meaningful information to support improved implementation. Pilot col-
laborations with colleagues at London School of Economics and the Queen Mary University,
London have generated excellent feedback based on the ontology’s role not only in the eval-
uation of existing data management infrastructures, but also in the subsequent development
of strategies, resources and approaches. With mappings established to CARDIO’s thirty fo-
cal areas users have been able to straightforwardly interpret risks and associated causal and
remedial factors.
Full evaluation case studies are not particularly widely available within the preservation and
data management context, but brief reports from the Center for Research Libraries’ Certifi-
cation of Digital Archives and Certification and Assessment of Digital Repositories projects
[CRL, 2012a] were published via its website. These projects included assessments of Por-
tico (on two separate occasions); the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research; the LOCKSS distributed archiving system; and HathiTrust at the University of
Michigan. Aligning the broad findings of these to PORRO reveals broader recommendations
than issued within these brief reports.
The latter series of CRL audits align identified concerns with corresponding TRAC crite-
ria, reflecting the methodology and process adopted. Portico was audited twice in 2006 and
2010 as part of both CRL projects. The most recent evaluation concluded that the reposi-
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tory had some shortcomings in its succession planning (TRAC A1.2); its definition of roles,
responsibilities and job descriptions (A2.2); its policy documentation (several policies suf-
fered from inconsistencies and contradictions) (A3.2); availability of documentation (A3.6);
its definitions of “understandability” or “usability” of preserved content (B2.10); its systems
for auditing collections and determining completeness (B2.12); its procedures for software
and hardware upgrade (A3.6 and C1.10); and its capacity to deliver content (owing primarily
to its status as a dark archive) (C2.2).
HathiTrust’s 2011 audit describes concerns associated with a lack of succession planning
(A1.2), ambiguity over content and system ownership and control (A3.3, A3.7, A4.3); and
unclear quality assurance standards (A3.8, B1.1, B1.7, B1.8, B2.4), which is particularly
critical since the repository aims to aggregate content from third party libraries.
The LOCKSS distributed archiving system was criticized in a corresponding audit report for
lacking means to determine when content which should be ingested was being withheld by
depositing publishers and once more for a lack of succession planning. While CRL did not
align these evaluations explicitly with individual criteria within TRAC, it is possible to do so
via with the relationships within PORRO. Doing so reveals thirteen relevant criteria on the
first point (implying a wide range of related considerations), and only criterion A1.2 on the
issue of succession planning.
ICPSR was criticized in the report documenting its evaluation for lacking strict controls in
the execution of its media migration policy, succession agreements or partnerships, an ex-
plicit policy for preservation, a traceable collection history, a policy for documenting system
changes, explicit assurances of preservation rights and for failing to transfer copyright on
ingest and monitor physical access by master key users.
PORRO has been retrospectively used in association with these reports to simulate the ways
in which the ontology may support the evaluation process. The first conclusion is that the
ontology supports the straightforward mapping of these findings to its implicit information
elements, most obviously via the corresponding TRAC criteria, but also with ease via cor-
responding activities, resources, policies or rights whether by virtue of their existence or
omission. Its added value is the straightforward revelation of associated issues and addi-
tional risk exposure. Taking the issue of succession planning which consistently appears
we can look to one of two corresponding objectives within PORRO, “Establish relationships
with succession partners” or “Establish appropriate strategies for facilitating succession of
organization or content”. Traversing the ontology we see that the “Succession arrangement”
parameter which helps characterize the first objective in turn directs the activity “Establish
succession arrangements”. While this appears perfectly intuitive it is at this point that we be-
gin to attain greater insights as illustrated in Figure 5.1, where we see that this activity may
be supported with resources such as “Membership of partners’ network”. We also reveal
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additional motivations for pursuing this activity, since it can limit the impact of risks such as
“Loss of mandate”, “Budgetary reduction” or “Enforced cessation of repository activities”.
Figure 5.1: PORRO Ontology Browser
Clearly this example is simple, but illustrative of the value of a related network of elements
one may more intuitively use these links to explore from a starting point of risk exposure to
find the elements best suited to their resolution. The ontology is more useful still when used
in tandem with TRAC. The generic TRAC criteria are accompanied by examples of evidence,
intended to illustrate what must be demonstrable to achieve conformity. PORRO not only
reflects this example evidence (which typically amounts to types of documentation within
which evidence might be found), it exceeds it, with details of all the associated contextual
arrangements which may indicate the criteria’s satisfaction. TRAC criterion B1.2 (a random
selection) is entitled “Repository clearly specifies the information that needs to be associated
with digital material at the time of its deposit (i.e., SIP)”. Suggested example evidence for
auditors includes transfer requirements and producer-archive agreements. This is mapped
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to PORRO via the goal E029 Define Ingest Package Specification and provides means for
interpretation of TRAC’s frequently misunderstood provisions.
Table 5.1: Goal: Define Ingest Package Specification
Define ingest package specification
characterisedBy Policy on relationship between ingest,
archival and dissemination packages
characterisedBy Minimal required metadata
characterisedBy Package specifications
characterisedBy Metadata creation responsibility
characterisedBy Metadata creation workflow
legitimisedBy Has prescribed minimal metadata require-
ments
threatenedBy Extent of what is within the archival object
is unclear
threatenedBy Shortcomings in semantic or technical un-
derstandability of information
threatenedBy Archival information cannot be traced to a
received package
threatenedBy Loss of authenticity of information
threatenedBy Incompleteness of submitted packages
threatenedBy Structural non-validity or malformedness
of received packages
threatenedBy Destruction of primary documentation
threatenedBy Loss of information provenance
In terms of its ability to accommodate diverse information facets and support the expression
of myriad associations, PORRO is successful. PORRO’s content is navigable, relatable and
intuitive, capable of illustrating close and distant relationships between various system and
information components. Even in isolation, the ontology enables digital libraries to reference
the encapsulated knowledge in order to support their own risk assessment and preservation
planning exercises. Since the ontology is intended to present a holistic vision of managed
risks one can determine risk exposure by reference to infrastructural components that are
lacking in an example institution, or focus on risks threatening vital provisions in priority
areas. In the context of risk management, respondents’ confidence in their perceived or-
ganizational maturity would be challenged by exposure to possible risks (with real world
precedent) that may pose threats. For example, if respondents consider elements of their
legal infrastructure to be very mature they can traverse a small number of relationships to
confront possible risk scenarios concerning IPR infringement, Freedom of Information lia-
bilities or contractual breach. If satisfied that these risks are adequately countered they will
have greater faith in their assertion. Conversely, the process may prompt an awareness of
shortcomings that were not previously well understood. The ontology is expected to scale
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to reflect the very latest perspectives in preservation decision making, and with additional
population, to present further insights.
5.4 Methodology
Our evaluation methodology for PORRO has two primary components. The first is a scrutiny
of existing assertions of preservation capability and their comparison with PORRO. The eval-
uations are limited to those undertaken by ostensibly trusted organisations and therefore we
focus on those institutions awarded the Data Seal of Approval [DSA, 2012]. Each submis-
sion presented in support of an application for a DSA is available publicly and structured
in a fashion that facilitates comparison. To simplify, the correspondence between DSA and
PORRO entities is determined by mapping via the TRAC criteria. Individual responses pro-
vided to satisfy individual criteria are in turn analysed and their alignment with the PORRO
criteria assessed.
Secondly, we completed a further series of institutional assessments using DRAMBORA and
CARDIO tool and refer to their results to in order to reveal evidence of PORRO’s value, as
well as further insights into its applicability to a range of audit contexts.
5.4.1 Comparison with Other Metrics
The first phase of evaluation is principally intended to reveal the top-down utility of a PORRO
supported repository evaluation. We focus on the popularly deployed Data Seal of Approval
[Harmsen and de Leeuw, 2010] and explore the extent to which PORRO is capable of reflect-
ing and supporting its criteria and methodology.
The Data Seal of Approval comprises of sixteen individual guidelines that collectively de-
scribe a conforming organisation - one that is demonstrably capable of providing digital
preservation services. We take twenty-two successful awards of the Data Seal (granted be-
tween 2010 and 2015) and employ a combination of document research, textual content
analysis and participant observation to map evidence of conformity with properties encoded
within the PORRO ontology. By doing so we demonstrate the completeness of PORRO and
its ability to map to existing criteria and provide further granularity of meaning to those high
level, broadly expressed guidelines.
5.4.2 Comparison with Organisational Typologies
The second phase of evaluation is intended to illustrate PORRO’s success in providing an
adaptable framework for evaluation based on the individual priorities of a given institution
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or set of institutions. We focus on digital libraries and research data management systems,
distinct types within an overall spectrum of digital custodial organisations.
Employing case study, textual analysis and participant observation we established risk pro-
files for digital libraries. We utilised the semantic structure of PORRO to undertake a series
of assessments in a set of international digital libraries, identifying and aligning PORRO with
the common objective, activities and challenges.
Secondly, we operated case studies in two research data management environments, London
School of Economics and Political Sciences and Queen Mary, University of London. Using
the CARDIO tool and the PORRO semantic framework we demonstrate organisational capac-
ity to manage data and generated agreed intervention recommendations by relating identified
issues with ontology elements, and ultimately with corresponding risk mitigation steps.
5.5 Evaluation Participants
Organisations awarded the Data Seal of Approval to date are as follows:
• 3TU.Datacentrum (2010)
• Archaeology Data Service (2014-2015)
• BABS - Long Term Preservation at the Bavarian State Library- Library Archiving and
Access System (2010)
• Banco de Informacin para la Investigacin Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales (BIIACS)
(2014-2015)
• BAS CLARIN (2010)
• CLARIN-D Resource Center Leipzig (2010)
• CLARIND-UDS (2010)
• DANS: Electronic Archiving SYstem (EASY) (2014-2015)
• Deutsches Textarchiv (2010)
• German National Library/ Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (DNB) (2010)
• HZSK Repository (2010)
• IDS Repository (2010)
• IMS Repository (2010)
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• Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (2010)
• LASA (2010)
• LISS panel data (2010
• Odum Institute Data Archive (2014-2015)
• Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (PARADISEC)
(2010)
• Platform for Archiving CINES (PAC) (2010)
• The Language Archive - Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (2010)
• Tbingen CLARIN-D Repository (2010)
• UK Data Archive (2010)
Participants in the Case Study sections were London School of Economics and Political Sci-
ence, The Michigan-Google Digitization Project and MBooks at the University of Michigan
Library, Gallica at the Bibliothque nationale de France, the Digital Library of the National
Library of Sweden and CERN’s Document Server.
5.6 Results Against Certification Process
5.6.1 Overview of Mapping Between PORRO and DSA
As described in a Chapter 2, the Data Seal of Approval (DSA) [Harmsen and de Leeuw, 2010]
is a set of requirements and certification developed in the Netherlands by the Dutch Data
Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) [DANS, 2012]. The DSA comprises sixteen
broadly expressed guidelines that despite their brevity aim to cover questions of preservation
capacity as inclusively as detailed standards such as TRAC and ISO 16363. In fact, the crite-
ria extend beyond the archive’s responsibilities to also encapsulate required commitments of
data producers and data consumers. Nevertheless, for practical purposes it is the archive that
is considered the “primary implementer” of the guidelines, and should assume responsibility
for verifying and demonstrating evidence of the other actors’ commitment and capacity. To
that end, a mapping between DSA and PORRO is feasible and intuitive.
The mappings below were produced to illustrate the applicability of PORRO to a range of
certification contexts. Each DSA guideline is mapped to corresponding PORRO goals which
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can in turn be traced to corresponding parameters, resources, activities and risks. The map-
ping incorporates some redundancy but there are notably sixteen PORRO goals considered
not explicitly mappable to the DSA criteria, as follows:
• E105 Maintain Business Planning Autonomy
• E046 Establish Appropriate Business Planning
• E048 Establish Appropriate Contingency Funding
• E057 Establish Appropriate Strategies For Facilitating Succession Of Organisation Or Content
• E091 Establish Relationships With Succession Partners
• E063 Establish Assurances Of Sufficiency Of Staff Skills And Capacity
• E051 Establish Appropriate Financial Accounting Infrastructure
• E064 Establish Assurances That All Costs Are And Will Continue To Be Covered
• E066 Establish Budgetary Protection Assurances
• E104 Maintain Budget Carry-Over Facility
• E106 Maintain Comprehensive Costings Breakdown
• E049 Establish Appropriate Coordination And Steering Platform
• E096 Evaluate And Certify Activities
• E047 Establish Appropriate Categories Of Staff
• E065 Establish Budget Dedicated To Training Provision
• E087 Establish Portfolio Of Internal Or External Staff Training Provisions
These mainly correspond to aspects of organisational sustainability and staffing but their
omission (or rather lack of explicit inclusion) is problematic. Technical aspects of preserva-
tion are only as effective as the organisation that oversees them. The Data Seal of Approval
would be more compelling if organisations were required to demonstrate that even if their or-
ganisation faces risks of continuity an appropriate succession arrangements have been made.
There are no aspects of DSA that cannot be comfortably accommodated within PORRO’s set
of goals.
Each successful application for the Data Seal of Approval is documented on a corresponding
website where the evidence of satisfaction of each criteria is reproduced [DSA, 2012]. This
information is itself a useful reference resource for subsequent applicants seeking the seal
of approval for their own institution. It is argued that by illustrating PORRO’s encapsulation
of applicants’ evidence, PORRO’s own applicability as a tool to support wider evaluation is
validated.
A mapping between each of the Data Seal’s sixteen guidelines follows below. For three
of the guidelines (numbers two, seven and ten), those that correspond most closely to the
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major preservation functions of ingest, preservation and dissemination, a more comprehen-
sive mapping is provided. The corresponding justificatory texts submitted in support of each
of the existing twenty two data seals awarded to date have been collated and parsed, with
elements mapped to individual, related PORRO elements. That is, rather than simply in-
cluding a correspondence between high level goals, the PORRO resource, parameter and
right/responsibility elements that define and serve to accomplish these goals are included.
This validates the mappings and illustrates the expressiveness of the ontology.
Guideline 1: The data producer deposits the data in a data repository with sufficient in-
formation for others to assess the quality of the data, and compliance with disciplinary and
ethical norms.
• E043 Establish And Maintain Terms Of Deposit
• E108 Maintain Depositor Dialogue
• E112 Make Explicit Preservation Responsibility
• E122 Physically Acquire Content
• E041 Establish And Exercise Ingest Policy
• E042 Establish And Exercise Selection Policy
• E086 Establish Policy Transparency
• E069 Establish Criteria For Data Review
• E128 Select And Appraise Ingested Content
• E030 Authenticate Source Of Ingested Packages
• E116 Monitor And Fulfil Freedom Of Information Responsibilities
• E118 Monitor And Fulfil Other Legislative And Legal Responsibilities
• E117 Monitor And Fulfil Ipr Responsibilities
• E035 Define Ingest Package Specification
• E110 Maintain Link Between Data And Metadata
• E124 Process Ingested Content
• E132 Verify Ingest Package Conformity With Specification
• E076 Establish List Of Supported Formats
• E080 Establish Means For Data Review
Guideline 2: The data producer provides the data in formats recommended by the data
repository.
This first fuller mapping illustrates the complexity of the challenge of information ingest,
providing a means to identify comprehensiveness of provisions. Collectively, the Data Seal
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applications reflect the full range of interactions associated with this aspect of deposit. No-
table again though is a failure to relate the functional aspects of the repository with its op-
erational or adminstrative aspects. The Data Seal application process appears to encourage
applicants to disregard organisational aspects. PORRO’s linked approach is validated with
these explicit relationships, which makes its mappings to TRAC for instance (which is simi-
larly holistic in its approach) more balanced.
x - E043 Establish And Maintain Terms Of Deposit
x - - P03inv is characterised by E138 Compliance Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E542 Mandate Definition
x - - - P04 directs E344 Exchange Transfer Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E355 Log Accessions
– - - - P04 directs E388 Negotiate Data Management Mandate
x - - P03inv is characterised by E166 Exemptions To Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E542 Mandate Definition
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E203 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E201 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
– - - - P04 directs E303 Accept Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E238 Rights And Ownership Definitions
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E344 Exchange Transfer Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E355 Log Accessions
x - - P03inv is characterised by E244 Selection
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E491 Acquisition Tracking System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E452 Content Processing Forms
x - - - P04 directs E304 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
– - - - P04 directs E320 Dispose Of Non-Ingested Content
x - - - P04 directs E404 Refuse Content Ingest
x - - - P04 directs E409 Request Data Deposit
x - - - P04 directs E411 Retrieve Content
x - - P03inv is characterised by E255 Supported Acquisition Methods
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E504 Content Processing System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E505 Content Retriever
x - - - P04 directs E304 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
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– - - - P04 directs E318 Digitise Analogue Content
x - - - P04 directs E320 Dispose Of Non-Ingested Content
x - - - P04 directs E389 Notify Data Originator Of Data Receipt
x - - - P04 directs E411 Retrieve Content
– - - P02inv is legitimised by E274 Data Management Objectives Consistent With Parent
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E275 Data Management Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E276 Data Management Rights
– - - P02inv is legitimised by E282 Has Mandate To Aggregate Published Data
x - E100 Initiate Stakeholder Dialogue
x - - P03inv is characterised by E203 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E201 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
– - - - P04 directs E303 Accept Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E275 Data Management Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E276 Data Management Rights
x - E108 Maintain Depositor Dialogue
x - - P03inv is characterised by E203 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E201 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E303 Accept Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E275 Data Management Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E276 Data Management Rights
x - E112 Make Explicit Preservation Responsibility
x - - P03inv is characterised by E166 Exemptions To Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E542 Mandate Definition
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E203 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E201 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E303 Accept Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E275 Data Management Responsibility
x - E029 Adopt Appropriate Preservation Formats
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x - - P03inv is characterised by E155 Data Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E430 Verify Characteristics Of Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
– - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E224 Preservation Package Structure
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
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– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
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x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E035 Define Ingest Package Specification
x - - P03inv is characterised by E214 Policy On Relationship Between Ingest And Archival And Dissemination Packages
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E558 Preservation Management System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E514 Data Transformation Plans
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E357 Log Object Lifecycle
x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E322 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E399 Record Media Movement
– - - - P04 directs E379 Monitor Data Citations And Reuse
x - - - P04 directs E380 Monitor Dataset Usage
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E396 Publish Package Specifications
x - - P03inv is characterised by E187 Minimal Required Metadata
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E469 Metadata Schema
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
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x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E415 Review Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E190 Package Specifications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - - P04 directs E396 Publish Package Specifications
x - - P03inv is characterised by E182 Metadata Creation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E183 Metadata Creation Workflow
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E289 Has Prescribed Minimal Metadata Requirements
x - E132 Verify Ingest Package Conformity With Specification
x - - P03inv is characterised by E272 Validation Checks And Requirements
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E588 Validation System
x - - - P04 directs E428 Validate Content
x - - - P04 directs E347 Generate Fixity Information
– - - - P04 directs E418 Scan For Viruses
x - - - P04 directs E429 Validate Media And Storage
x - - P03inv is characterised by E173 Ingest Specification
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E428 Validate Content
x - - - P04 directs E373 Manage Package Specifications
x - - P03inv is characterised by E250 Specification Relationships
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E428 Validate Content
x - - - P04 directs E373 Manage Package Specifications
x - E076 Establish List Of Supported Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
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x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
Guideline 3: The data producer provides the data together with the metadata requested by
the data repository.
• E043 Establish And Maintain Terms Of Deposit
• E100 Initiate Stakeholder Dialogue
• E108 Maintain Depositor Dialogue
• E112 Make Explicit Preservation Responsibility
• E035 Define Ingest Package Specification
• E037 Document Archival Data
• E110 Maintain Link Between Data And Metadata
• E125 Record And Maintain Descriptive Metadata
• E126 Record And Maintain Representation Information
• E127 Record Appropriate Metadata
• E132 Verify Ingest Package Conformity With Specification
Guideline 4: The data repository has an explicit mission in the area of digital archiving and
promulgates it.
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• E100 Initiate Stakeholder Dialogue
• E088 Establish Ratification Of Preservation Mission From Parent Or Governing Entity
• E108 Maintain Depositor Dialogue
• E109 Maintain End User Dialogue
Guideline 5: The data repository uses due diligence to ensure compliance with legal reg-
ulations and contracts including, when applicable, regulations governing the protection of
human subjects.
• E039 Ensure Appropriate Contractual Management
• E116 Monitor And Fulfil Freedom Of Information Responsibilities
• E118 Monitor And Fulfil Other Legislative And Legal Responsibilities
• E117 Monitor And Fulfil Ipr Responsibilities
• E111 Maintain Risk Awareness
• E103 Maintain Best Practice Awareness
Guideline 6: The data repository applies documented processes and procedures for manag-
ing data storage.
• E034 Define Disaster Recovery Policy
• E036 Define Policy And Procedures For Undertaking Backups
• E041 Establish And Exercise Ingest Policy
• E042 Establish And Exercise Selection Policy
• E073 Establish Hardware Upgrade Policy
• E074 Establish Information Security Policy
• E082 Establish Media Refreshment Policy
• E086 Establish Policy Transparency
• E092 Establish Software Upgrade Policy
• E085 Establish Policy Review Policy
• E031 Backup Documentation
• E058 Establish Appropriate Technical Documentation Base
• E038 Document Software Dependencies
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Guideline 7: The data repository has a plan for long-term preservation of its digital assets.
As seen below in this fuller mapping, the ontology corresponds very closely with the Data
Seal applications. Notable is PORRO’s explicit association between rights issues and preser-
vation approaches. No Data Seal application describes the rights implications of their preser-
vation approaches within its response to the requirements of Guideline 7. This is illustrative
of PORRO’s more comprehensive approach (as indicated too with its coverage of issues of
organisational infrastructure and sustainability which are not addressed with the Data Seal
of Approval.
Despite DSA’s obvious and quite explicit focus on preservation several applicants provided
less evidence to support satisfaction of this guideline than any other (if only in terms of num-
ber of words). PORRO’s preservation entities and associated relationships are demonstrably
fuller.
x - E112 Make Explicit Preservation Responsibility
x - - P03inv is characterised by E166 Exemptions To Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E542 Mandate Definition
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E203 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E457 Deposit Agreement
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P03inv is characterised by E201 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E303 Accept Data Management Responsibility
x - - - P04 directs E330 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E275 Data Management Responsibility
x - E029 Adopt Appropriate Preservation Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E155 Data Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E430 Verify Characteristics Of Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
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x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E224 Preservation Package Structure
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
– - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
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x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E075 Establish Levels Of Preservation
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E221 Preservation Level Assignment
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E244 Selection
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E491 Acquisition Tracking System
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E452 Content Processing Forms
x - - - P04 directs E304 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
– - - - P04 directs E320 Dispose Of Non-Ingested Content
– - - - P04 directs E404 Refuse Content Ingest
– - - - P04 directs E409 Request Data Deposit
– - - - P04 directs E411 Retrieve Content
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E282 Has Mandate To Aggregate Published Data
x - E081 Establish Means To Track Data Object Through Preservation Workflow And Lifecycle
x - - P03inv is characterised by E214 Policy On Relationship Between Ingest And...
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E558 Preservation Management System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E514 Data Transformation Plans
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
– - - - P04 directs E357 Log Object Lifecycle
x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E322 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
– - - - P04 directs E399 Record Media Movement
– - - - P04 directs E379 Monitor Data Citations And Reuse
– - - - P04 directs E380 Monitor Dataset Usage
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E396 Publish Package Specifications
x - - P03inv is characterised by E140 Content Change
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E453 Custodial History Record
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E475 Processing Record
x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E322 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
– - - - P04 directs E399 Record Media Movement
x - - P03inv is characterised by E143 Content Removal And Deletion
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E491 Acquisition Tracking System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E453 Custodial History Record
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E475 Processing Record
x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E322 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
– - - - P04 directs E399 Record Media Movement
x - - P03inv is characterised by E156 Data Review
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E453 Custodial History Record
x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E307 Audit Collections And Procedures
x - - P03inv is characterised by E164 Documentation Review
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E453 Custodial History Record
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E468 Metadata Records
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x - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
x - - - P04 directs E307 Audit Collections And Procedures
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E390 Perform Metadata Format Conversion
x - - - P04 directs E415 Review Metadata
x - - P03inv is characterised by E230 Process And Infrastructure Review
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E475 Processing Record
x - - - P04 directs E307 Audit Collections And Procedures
– - - - P04 directs E400 Record System Changes
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
– - - P02inv is legitimised by E301 Sufficiency And Suitability Of Audit Practice
x - E097 Exercise Preservation Plans
x - - P03inv is characterised by E155 Data Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E430 Verify Characteristics Of Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E224 Preservation Package Structure
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
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x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E221 Preservation Level Assignment
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E181 Media Refreshment
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E586 Update And Upgrade Prompts
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E479 System Maintenance And Support Agreement
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
– - - - P04 directs E403 Refresh Media Or Hardware
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
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– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
– - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E123 Plan For Preservation
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E181 Media Refreshment
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E586 Update And Upgrade Prompts
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E479 System Maintenance And Support Agreement
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
– - - - P04 directs E403 Refresh Media Or Hardware
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
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– - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E129 Select Preservation Strategies
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x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E227 Preservation Strategy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E345 Execute Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - P03inv is characterised by E228 Preservation Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E561 Preservation Validation System
x - - - P04 directs E342 Evaluate Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E430 Verify Characteristics Of Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E181 Media Refreshment
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E586 Update And Upgrade Prompts
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E479 System Maintenance And Support Agreement
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
– - - - P04 directs E403 Refresh Media Or Hardware
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E223 Preservation Mechanism
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E582 Storage Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
– - - - P04 directs E364 Maintain Backup Platform
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– - - - P04 directs E367 Maintain Network Protocol Support
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
– - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E144 Content Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E582 Storage Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E365 Maintain Generic And Shared Technology
x - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E371 Maintain Storage Platform
x - - P03inv is characterised by E185 Metadata Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E492 Administration Platform
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E582 Storage Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E113 Make Explicit Preservation Rights
– - - P03inv is characterised by E153 Copyright And Access Restrictions
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– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E511 Copyrighting Mechanism
– - - - P04 directs E338 Evaluate Data Copyright Status
– - - - P04 directs E378 Monitor Copyright Status
– - - P03inv is characterised by E157 Data Rights Transfer
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E571 Rights Database
– - - - P04 directs E338 Evaluate Data Copyright Status
– - - - P04 directs E378 Monitor Copyright Status
– - - P03inv is characterised by E195 Policy Covering Distribution Of Copyright Material
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E571 Rights Database
– - - - P04 directs E338 Evaluate Data Copyright Status
– - - - P04 directs E378 Monitor Copyright Status
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E283 Has Mandate To Manage And Distribute Copyright Materials
– - - P02inv is legitimised by E294 Has Restrictions On Data Management Or Distribution Based On Copyright Status
x - E032 Classify Archival Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E222 Preservation Level Implications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E474 Preservation Policy
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
– - - - P04 directs E402 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
– - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - E120 Monitor File Format Obsolescence
x - - P03inv is characterised by E256 Supported Dissemination Formats
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E488 Access Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E359 Maintain Access Platform
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E257 Supported Ingest Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E535 Ingest Platform
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
– - - - P04 directs E366 Maintain Ingest Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E258 Supported Preservation Formats
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E527 Format Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E545 Media Support
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E560 Preservation Platform
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
– - - - P04 directs E360 Maintain Administration Platform
x - - - P04 directs E368 Maintain Preservation Platform
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E168 Format Migration
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - - P04 directs E431 Verify Data Formats
x - - P03inv is characterised by E188 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
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x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
x - - P03inv is characterised by E239 Risk Assessment Validation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E462 Format Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E543 Means For Format And Media Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E551 Obsolescence Metric
x - - - P04 directs E339 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
x - - - P04 directs E372 Manage Format And Media Support
x - - - P04 directs E376 Migrate Format Or Media
Guideline 8: Archiving takes place according to explicit work flows across the data life
cycle.
• E089 Establish Relationship Between Access And Archival Packages
• E070 Establish Criteria For Disposal
• E081 Establish Means To Track Data Object Through Preservation Workflow And Lifecycle
• E035 Define Ingest Package Specification
• E059 Establish Archival Packages Configuration
• E102 Maintain Archival Package Referential Integrity
• E114 Manage Formation Of Dissemination Package
• E078 Establish Means For Data Disposal
• E040 Ensure Synchronisation Of Data Separated By Time Or Space
• E132 Verify Ingest Package Conformity With Specification
• E095 Establish Transformation Procedure From Ingest To Archival Packages
• E090 Establish Relationship Between Ingest And Archival Packages
Guideline 9: The data repository assumes responsibility from the data producers for access
and availability of the digital objects.
• E071 Establish Data Ownership
• E043 Establish And Maintain Terms Of Deposit
• E067 Establish Conditions For Access
• E072 Establish Designated Community
• E084 Establish Physical And Logical Provisions For Access
• E098 Implement Access Controls
• E099 Implement Categories Of Access
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• E114 Manage Formation Of Dissemination Package
Guideline 10: The data repository enables the users to discover and use the data and refer
to them in a persistent way.
The provision of permanent access once more sees broad correspondence between PORRO
and the DSA applications.
x - E068 Establish Criteria For Data Identification
x - - P03inv is characterised by E155 Data Representation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E333 Establish Preservation Plan
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E348 Identify Data Properties
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E430 Verify Characteristics Of Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E214 Policy On Relationship Between Ingest And...
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E559 Preservation Plan
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E558 Preservation Management System
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E471 Package Relationship Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E514 Data Transformation Plans
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E334 Establish Referential Integrity
x - - - P04 directs E354 Link Preserved Content With Original
x - - - P04 directs E357 Log Object Lifecycle
– - - - P04 directs E306 Assign A Processing Record To Data
– - - - P04 directs E322 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E399 Record Media Movement
x - - - P04 directs E379 Monitor Data Citations And Reuse
x - - - P04 directs E380 Monitor Dataset Usage
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E396 Publish Package Specifications
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E290 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E291 Has Preservation Responsibility
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E292 Has Preservation Rights
x - E079 Establish Means For Data Identification
x - - P03inv is characterised by E186 Metadata Storage
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E190 Package Specifications
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - - P04 directs E396 Publish Package Specifications
x - - P03inv is characterised by E184 Metadata Format
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E470 Metadata Standards
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E468 Metadata Records
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - - P04 directs E390 Perform Metadata Format Conversion
x - - P03inv is characterised by E146 Content Versioning
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E470 Metadata Standards
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
– - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E182 Metadata Creation Responsibility
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E183 Metadata Creation Workflow
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E289 Has Prescribed Minimal Metadata Requirements
x - E125 Record And Maintain Descriptive Metadata
x - - P03inv is characterised by E186 Metadata Storage
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x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - P03inv is characterised by E187 Minimal Required Metadata
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E469 Metadata Schema
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E415 Review Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E184 Metadata Format
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E470 Metadata Standards
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E468 Metadata Records
– - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E353 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
x - - - P04 directs E390 Perform Metadata Format Conversion
x - - P03inv is characterised by E255 Supported Acquisition Methods
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E504 Content Processing System
– - - - P06inv is evidenced by E505 Content Retriever
– - - - P04 directs E304 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
– - - - P04 directs E318 Digitise Analogue Content
– - - - P04 directs E320 Dispose Of Non-Ingested Content
– - - - P04 directs E389 Notify Data Originator Of Data Receipt
– - - - P04 directs E411 Retrieve Content
x - - P03inv is characterised by E235 Repository Integration
x - - - P04 directs E304 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
x - - P03inv is characterised by E182 Metadata Creation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
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– - - P03inv is characterised by E183 Metadata Creation Workflow
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E289 Has Prescribed Minimal Metadata Requirements
– - - P02inv is legitimised by E282 Has Mandate To Aggregate Published Data
x - E083 Establish Naming Convention
x - - P03inv is characterised by E187 Minimal Required Metadata
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E472 Package Specification Documentation
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E469 Metadata Schema
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E308 Automate Metadata Extraction
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E415 Review Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E182 Metadata Creation Responsibility
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P03inv is characterised by E183 Metadata Creation Workflow
x - - - P06inv is evidenced by E467 Metadata Creation Guidelines
x - - - P04 directs E323 Document Package Content
x - - - P04 directs E324 Document Package Structure
x - - - P04 directs E312 Define Package Specifications
x - - - P04 directs E310 Create Object Metadata
x - - - P04 directs E311 Create Package Descriptor
x - - P02inv is legitimised by E289 Has Prescribed Minimal Metadata Requirements
Guideline 11: The data repository ensures the integrity of the digital objects and the meta-
data.
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• E036 Define Policy And Procedures For Undertaking Backups
• E101 Limit Data Loss Incidence
• E061 Establish Assurances Of Recoverability Of Any Lost Data
• E093 Establish Suitability Of Backup Infrastructure Through Testing
• E031 Backup Documentation
• E102 Maintain Archival Package Referential Integrity
• E044 Establish Appropriate Backup Redundancy Provisions
• E045 Establish Appropriate Backup Remoteness Provisions
• E050 Establish Appropriate Database Backup Infrastructure
• E055 Establish Appropriate Provisions For Backup
• E033 Continuously Validate Data Integrity
• E107 Maintain Data Integrity
• E130 Validate Data Integrity
• E131 Validate Integrity Of Backups
Guideline 12: The data repository ensures the authenticity of the digital objects and the
metadata.
• E029 Adopt Appropriate Preservation Formats
• E081 Establish Means To Track Data Object Through Preservation Workflow And Lifecycle
• E123 Plan For Preservation
• E129 Select Preservation Strategies
• E030 Authenticate Source Of Ingested Packages
• E102 Maintain Archival Package Referential Integrity
• E110 Maintain Link Between Data And Metadata
• E114 Manage Formation Of Dissemination Package
Guideline 13: The technical infrastructure explicitly supports the tasks and functions de-
scribed in internationally accepted archival standards like OAIS.
• E052 Establish Appropriate Hardware Infrastructure
• E056 Establish Appropriate Software Infrastructure
• E060 Establish Assurances Of Availability Of Appropriate Technical Skills
• E077 Establish Logical Storage Provisions
• E050 Establish Appropriate Database Backup Infrastructure
• E058 Establish Appropriate Technical Documentation Base
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• E062 Establish Assurances Of Site Stability
Guideline 14: The data consumer complies with access regulations set by the data reposi-
tory.
• E094 Establish Terms Of Use
• E067 Establish Conditions For Access
• E084 Establish Physical And Logical Provisions For Access
• E098 Implement Access Controls
• E099 Implement Categories Of Access
• E115 Monitor Access Behaviours
• E121 Monitor Unauthorised Access
• E109 Maintain End User Dialogue
• E054 Establish Appropriate Physical Security Provisions
• E053 Establish Appropriate Logical Security Provisions
Guideline 15: The data consumer conforms to and agrees with any codes of conduct that
are generally accepted in the relevant sector for the exchange and proper use of knowledge
and information.
• E039 Ensure Appropriate Contractual Management
• E094 Establish Terms Of Use
• E067 Establish Conditions For Access
• E109 Maintain End User Dialogue
• E119 Monitor And Respond To Designated Community Evolution
• E116 Monitor And Fulfil Freedom Of Information Responsibilities
• E118 Monitor And Fulfil Other Legislative And Legal Responsibilities
• E117 Monitor And Fulfil Ipr Responsibilities
Guideline 16: The data consumer respects the applicable licences of the data repository
regarding the use of the data.
• E039 Ensure Appropriate Contractual Management
• E094 Establish Terms Of Use
• E067 Establish Conditions For Access
• E098 Implement Access Controls
• E099 Implement Categories Of Access
• E119 Monitor And Respond To Designated Community Evolution
• E116 Monitor And Fulfil Freedom Of Information Responsibilities
• E118 Monitor And Fulfil Other Legislative And Legal Responsibilities
• E117 Monitor And Fulfil Ipr Responsibilities
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5.7 Results Against Evaluatory Deployments
5.7.1 DELOS Digital Library Audits
The purpose of the case study that follows is to compare the best practice on display at four
mature, international digital libraries with the contents of the PORRO ontology and to verify
its completeness and applicability to these contexts.
During November and December of 2007 the DELOS Projects Digital Preservation Cluster
undertook a series of evaluative facilitated assessments of a series digital library infrastruc-
tures. From the perspective of this thesis, the studies principal objective was the validation
of a common set of criteria that may be applied to digital libraries irrespective of their organ-
isational spacing, scale or the specific characteristics of their collections. These criteria are
realised as PORRO.
Four digital libraries participated in the pilot assessments, hand picked to reflect the diver-
sity that exists within this highly active field. The Michigan-Google Digitization Project
and MBooks at the University of Michigan Library, Gallica at the Bibliothque nationale de
France, the Digital Library of the National Library of Sweden and CERNs Document Server
exhibit a range of organisational and functional characteristics representative of most of that
which is conceivable within a digital library context. The conclusions that followed each
assessment would be distilled into a broadly applicable generic template, focussing not on
diversity, but the fundamental commonalities that distinguish digital libraries.
Each assessment incorporated an onsite visit that took an average of three days, preceded
by a lengthy period of dialogue and information exchange between project facilitators and
institutional participants, and considerable desk-based research. DRAMBORA presented an
explicit 6 step method for performing assessment and during the onsite activities this was
conformed with closely; initial stages built towards the development of a comprehensive
organisational profile which incorporated detailed and documented expressions of organisa-
tional purpose and process. Taking the organisation’s mission or mandate as a starting point,
a process of hierarchical analysis, investigation and expansion resulted in the formalised ex-
pression of organisational objectives, implicit activities, regulatory and technological influ-
ences and fundamental roles and responsibilities. This provided an input to the latter stages
of risk identification, assessment and management, where threats posed to the organisational
infrastructure and the continued delivery of services were defined and evaluated, with plans
for their ongoing management formulated and prioritised.
The process was insightful and highlighted opportunities for improvement of the DRAMB-
ORA methodology, as well as a range of generic objectives, functions and concerns common
to digital libraries. A greater understanding of the practical ways in which organisations as-
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sess their own risks was reached; a generic risk profile for digital libraries was established
and provides a means to verify PORRO’s applicability.
Finally, from the perspective of each of the audited institutions the process was overwhelm-
ingly successful; testimonials from representatives of each described in detail the benefits of
formally scrutinizing the organisational characteristics and implicit challenges faced within
their own digital library.
Case Study Summary Findings
A number of conclusions were drawn from these audits about the current state of digital
libraries, capable of usefully informing an emerging and more general profile for these in-
stitutions. Determining the expressiveness of PORRO requires comparison with common
objectives, activities and challenges being faced and embraced by leading custodial institu-
tions. An initial assertion that was quickly affirmed was the presence, at the heart of digital
libraries, of a digital repository.
Common Objectives A common core goal that was shared by each of the audited digi-
tal libraries was to facilitate access to digital materials. In general terms, much of the digital
content overseen by the four participating digital libraries were derivatives of physical infor-
mation assets. Digital formats and dissemination infrastructures enabled these organisations
to reach an increasingly wide audience, and to more effectively pursue their stated mandates,
which uniformly prioritised not just the collection but also the distribution of information.
As described at length above, preservation appeared to be a less high priority objective, at
least in terms more familiar to digital archivists. Format stabilising is performed at ingest in
most cases, but there appeared little commitment to more complex preservation measures.
Only in anticipated service extensions, such as those mooted at Gallica and the University of
Michigan, or where born-digital materials were being managed, as in the case of the CERN
Document Server, did semantic information preservation appear to be occupying a more
central focus.
More fundamental organisational objectives were similarly common. A pivotal part of the
business operations of all four audit participants was revenue generation; across each insti-
tution the specific methods employed to secure resource varied. Notwithstanding the natural
and predictable sentiment that more resource would be welcomed, none of the participating
digital libraries appeared to be overly concerned about the availability of sufficient finances,
and all had made reasonably robust provisions to ensure adequate sums would continue to
be available to support their endeavours.
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All libraries appeared to have shared objectives with regard to employing suitably qualified
staff, although the extent to which the digital infrastructure was ’mainstreamed’ within the
overall library context varied. University of Michigan and BnF were explicitly committed to
blurring the lines that separated digital and traditional physical materials, and this appeared to
be a model that others were moving towards. By leveraging the skill sets of a range of library
staff objectives could be more straightforwardly achieved, with minimal need to conceive and
construct additional facilities and infrastructures where the challenges of managing digital
and analogue materials were comparable.
All libraries were committed to the provision of secure technological infrastructures, and
each had established robust facilities to support widespread dissemination of content while
limiting threats to data integrity posed by remote or physical intrusions.
Common Constraints Relatively few generalisations could be made about the con-
straints affecting each of the participating digital libraries; a range of organisational context
types is represented within the four, and each was subject to distinct legislative requirements.
These often subjective constraints tended to add extra definition to the broadly stated aims
and objectives that appeared to exhibit greater commonality. This is a validation of PORRO’s
fundamental structure which relates individual goals to one or more parameters, enabling a
single generic goal to be interpreted flexibly depending on context.
From a legal perspective the most pervasive influence appeared to be intellectual property
law, most specifically copyright, which largely affected the terms within which content could
be distributed. Even those organisations that seek to ingest public domain materials acknowl-
edged and were required to account for associated responsibilities. Other laws provided more
context-specific influence; for example, legal deposit laws varied substantially between ju-
risdictions and could have the effect of adding additional responsibilities or empowering
libraries, legitimising and validating strategic intentions.
Technical constraints were extremely specific to individual organisations, and corresponded
to available expertise and to existing technical provisions and infrastructures. The most ob-
vious common areas are the standards with which each of the participants conformed with.
MARC and METS were both relied upon by the majority of these digital libraries, and were
likely to find a place in most mainstream environments. Image formats such as TIFF were
frequently utilised to encode archival image content. Other standards commonly conformed
to include web accessibility standards, which are, notwithstanding local variations and speci-
ficities, broadly international in scope, and must be satisfied by web based access systems.
No standards appear to be consistently utilised for ingest, other than where particular for-
mats, such as METS, are relied upon as wrappers for ingest packages.
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Common Roles Roles within each digital library varied in terms of nomenclature, al-
though sufficient similarities could be identified to derive a sense of those which are com-
mon. In general terms each digital library appeared to operate under several layers of man-
agement. Ultimate responsibility could be traced to the highest organisational tiers of the
environment within which the digital library exists, or even beyond where additional um-
brella accountabilities could be traced. Of greater interest were the more hands-on roles with
responsibilities for the maintenance and running of the digital libraries. Each of the examples
assessed in this study relied upon the efforts of a single digital library manager, with duties
to oversee related efforts, facilitate communication with higher levels of management and
ensure the organisationally suitability and viability in terms of staff allocations, and overall
resource availability. Selecting content, facilitating creation or digitisation efforts, oversee-
ing ingest, ensuring quality control, managing access (including verifying the legal status of
digital content) and managing technological and information security infrastructures were
other commonly identified roles. Needless to say, in different libraries the relationship be-
tween roles and individuals was not necessarily one to one; sometimes individual roles were
occupied by several staff, and at other times a single staff member might have occupied
multiple roles. No explicit preservation role was generally identified, although this appeared
likely to evolve as ambitions increasingly encompass overt preservation objectives.
Common Activities and Assets Activities generally corresponded closely with the
common roles identified above; the more functional activities amounted to a generic work-
flow for digital libraries, beginning with selection of content, followed by digitisation, in-
gest, quality control, and finally access provision. Numerous resources were relied upon to
facilitate the satisfactory completion of each; intellectual assets included selection criteria,
standard digitisation parameters, ingest and metadata schema (describing the structure of a
submission package for example), quality control standards and access authorisation sys-
tems. More technologically-oriented assets included systems to support each of these stages,
such as digitisation software and hardware, ingest systems, scripts to automate the process of
quality control, and authentication and authorisation subsystems, each of which often relied
on additional data held in separate databases. Human resources were of course necessary to
support each of these stages; even where automation was possible, human interaction was
generally required to perform or support validation or system monitoring. More granular
aspects of activities and assets naturally tended to be more specialist to individual organi-
sational contexts, and associated with specific characteristics or objectives. Organisational-
oriented activities were similarly common; revenue generation, staff training, legal monitor-
ing and policy development were all fundamental activities within each of the participating
organisations.
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Common Risks Some of the foremost risks that appeared to be almost completely generic
are in fact not particularly unique to digital libraries. Threats to resource availability, or-
ganisational cohesion, retention of key skills and legal conformance face all organisations,
irrespective of their business or the context or domain area within which they operate. The
specifics of these challenges of course varied; within the small sample in the DELOS project
for example a range of organisational settings were observed, each with practical conse-
quences. There were difficulties in defining common risks for all organisations, even those
that claimed common status as digital libraries, because the practical variances are potentially
significant. Nevertheless, even a general understanding of applicable risks can be useful for
digital libraries. These represent broadly daubed strokes, given meaningful definition on a
canvas of risks by the addition of finer detail that relates to more subjective aspects of the
implicit threats.
Process-oriented risks are most generically applicable and immediately meaningful within
the digital library landscape. For example, threats relating to adequacy and completeness of
metadata to facilitate ingest, preservation and, most notably, discovery are faced by all digital
library infrastructures. The adoption of common library and other information interchange
standards such as MARC and METS was evident throughout each of the audited institu-
tions; systems generally demanded valid and well formed examples of metadata to function
appropriately. Digital object acquisition carried similarly widely evident risks; a common
one related to the quality assurance of digital materials and metadata created and ingested
in often highly automated processes. For all of the participating digital libraries there were
risks associated with dissemination of content. Perhaps the most universal was the threat of
liability for breach of intellectual property law caused by circulating copyrighted materials.
For some this was more dangerous, as digital collections included known copyright materi-
als, with access privileges calculated at the point of dissemination. All the digital libraries
acknowledged that there may be in-copyright material within their collections, even where
the intention was to digitise and provide access to only public domain materials.
Digital preservation appeared to have been vocally embraced by each of the audited libraries,
but there were evident risks associated with the current adopted approaches. In some re-
spects the potential impacts of information loss were negligible, given that in most cases re-
digitisation would entirely alleviate the impact; within the participating organisations digital
objects could seldomly be described as original, or non-reproducible. A bigger preservation
problem related to a lack of appropriately comprehensive and formally defined policies. In-
deed, this omission appears to be responsible for many of the most pertinent common risks
faced by digital libraries. Each of the libraries involved in this study was well established,
and functionally effective. But their maturity in terms of policy infrastructure was at times
questionable. It was thought that in order to formalise their objectives, procedures, and in-
deed their very legitimacy, digital libraries must make extra efforts to document their policies
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in a transparent fashion.
Digital Library Risk Profile Conclusions Applying risk analysis based auditing method-
ology to digital libraries identified both common strengths and weaknesses in their work.
While digital libraries were highly efficient in automating the ingest of digitised content, and
providing flexible access to their collections, the acquisition of born-digital content posed
more difficult requirements that needed bespoke solutions and often semi-automatic pro-
cessing. For metadata management and provision of access digital libraries relied on exist-
ing library standards and electronic catalogues that could be linked to simple storage solu-
tions. Relying primarily on standard formats had introduced some complacency, exaggerated
further because within such contexts digitised collections represent little more than access-
facilitating surrogates of their analogue collections. The observed technical infrastructure
was adequate and secure for the purposes of the digital library services.
The areas within which the audited digital libraries were identifiably falling short included:
• policy management and policy/procedure documentation and maintaining the knowledge-
base of the organisation on the whole;
• creation and management of preservation metadata;
• documentation of systems in use and maintenance of audit trails of processing applied
to digital objects in librarys care;
• stakeholder transparency and participation;
• management of assigning responsibility for preservation planning and effective preser-
vation strategy building.
All participating libraries were in the process of expanding and changing their services,
which would bring these weaknesses increasingly to the fore.
Case Study Conclusions
The most overwhelming response from the audited institutions was that the audit process
yielded numerous benefits, and provided insights that would undoubtedly prompt further
investigation and probable response. However, a general response that appeared to be con-
sistent from each of the audited organisations was the value of the process would be lessened
if the facilitators were not present. If organisations were incapable of exploring their own
risks independently then the potential benefits of the process may not be fully exploitable.
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This reaction may simply be a methodological consequence of the way these audits were
undertaken. Generally speaking, facilitators elected to refrain from impressing upon library
staff shortcomings that they regarded as self evident, instead preferring to lead them to their
own independent realization via the various stages of the DRAMBORA process. At times this
worked well but there were several opportunities where the DELOS facilitators shared their
experiences of visiting other organisations; they were well positioned to comment on and
compare systems to those in place elsewhere. This reveals the value of an external perspec-
tive in what is really an internal, reflective process, and is a critical validation of PORRO’s
value. Individuals responsible for self assessment have an implicit understanding of their
own organisations mandate, objectives and fundamental activities as a direct consequence of
their personal and professional association. These can be systematically explored in PORRO
to verify their completeness.
The value of PORRO’s implicit flexbility is similarly reflected in these conclusions. With
the ontology model success can be verified by reference to specific aims and circumstances
of a given repository. Only relevant constraints and contextual influences need even be con-
sidered, and significant additional information is available to reveal the meaning and inter-
relationships between functional and contextual building blocks. A tailored approach has
unquestionable applicability and value - repositories within this case study exhibited consid-
erable diversity (notwithstanding their common ’digital library’ status) and a customisable
approach to interrogation is therefore of value. This contrasts with more objective audit pro-
cesses that might be criticised as either irrelevant or meaningless on account of their more
generally applicable scope. Without a knowledge base, there is an implicit vulnerability
in this approach, threatening the extent to which repositories can independently improve.
With adequate resource to best practice documentation, customisable to their circumstances,
self assessing repositories can only reasonably identify problems within the bounds of what
they believe that they should be doing. A knowledge base illustrates the boundaries of best
practice. It presents the precise implications of particular actions, and enables a user to feel
reassured that they are doing everything necessary to accomplish a particular activity, support
a particular resource or mitigate a particular risk. Those cases where organisations are obliv-
ious to their shortcomings, or unaware of the available possibilities that they might usefully
seize (which could happen using DRAMBORA in isolation) are dramatically reduced.
Such information can form the basis for repository profiles. Just as on can map existing
criteria to PORRO, as has been done with the CARDIO, TRAC and Data Seal of Approval
guidelines, one can do this with repository classes, geographic or legislative jurisdictions or
strategic priorities. Core roles, responsibilities, functions and risks for a variety of repository
types can be displayed.
Another value of PORRO’s evidence base is its linked nature, which combines roles, activ-
ities and responsibilities that may be wide ranging organisationally. All of the role holders
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and individuals involved in the repositorys business must engage and be engaged with to
ensure the success of an evaluation, because digital preservation, as its characterised, com-
prises so many different aspects, organisationally and technologically. In order to be of real
value to the organisation, everyone with any relevant responsibilities or concerns ought to be
involved and PORRO facilitates this by linking the at times diverse contributions into a single
ontology. The audit process is in reality little more than a formalised means of facilitating
dialogue and discussion between the stakeholders and PORRO models the lines across which
this dialogue can meaningfully take place. In those organisations that did invest time and ef-
fort from every functional and organisational unit there were visible benefits, as everything
from minor confusions to more long-standing concerns were raised, discussed and generally
resolved. Communication on an organisation-wide basis is always acknowledged as vital,
but all too often overlooked or underemphasised. The self-audit represents an invaluable
opportunity to develop a shared and globally acceptable interpretation and understanding of
overall strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats. This benefit should be more explicitly
expressed within DRAMBORA.
Following the identification of risks, a considerable part of the time spent on site during the
DELOS audits was committed to risk assessment; for each risk repository staff discussed the
severity of the threat and provided impact and probability scores. The original DRAMBORA
text adopts a fairly granular scale for both impact and probability, although during the assess-
ments it was generally felt that this complexity presented unnecessary additional barriers to
the process. Again, PORRO supports this process, by indicating not only where risks occur in
terms of interactions, but also the practical steps or resource investments that can be made to
mitigate or reduced their impact. In isolation a risk can be identified more straightforwardly
than it can be quantified. Historical data can inform where risks are likely to occur multiple
times, but preservation is typically littered with risks that may have no history of occurrence.
Identifying which explicitly identified risk management measures are implemented reveals
corresponding probability and potential impact. When DRAMBORA is utilised to support a
self assessment process, its results are of most value for internal use - it seems likely that in
isolation risks will be considered in terms of their relative severity against those already iden-
tified. PORRO is constructed ’bottom-up’ from real world environments but its combination
of a wide range of perspectives lends it an objective weight. This can inform risk assessment
results that have considerably greater objective weight, and may then be the basis for a more
global comparison, in the same way that deploying a consistent group of individuals to assess
multiple organisations lends a global applicability to the results of each.
A vital commodity when describing risk is a means to determine, or express risk impact.
It appeared that the perception of challenge associated with preservation within digital li-
brary contexts is quite distinct from that of those dealing with born digital or otherwise
unique digital assets. In most cases within the audited institutions, the value of digital con-
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tent was mainly surrogacy for physical assets. Libraries remain primarily access-focussed
and digitised content is considerably more plentiful than born-digital materials. Preservation
is naturally prioritised lower since, notwithstanding the significant cost of rescanning large
quantities of content, anything that is lost can generally be digitised again. The original
DRAMBORA text describes risk impact in terms of only loss of digital object authenticity
and understandability. Initial concerns with this limited definition of impact were to some
extent met with subsequent reference to the loss of organisations ability to ensure authenticity
and understandability of their digital collections. However, the experiences of the DELOS
assessments revealed that even this slightly broader definition was too narrow to be either
universally usable or applicable. PORRO by contrast introduces a far greater granularity of
impact, where the outcomes of individual risks can be traced to each explicitly threatened
goal or resource. Also modelled are the potentially viral pathways risks can take where if a
risk occurs another is made more likely or more destructive. Many valid risks could be only
loosely related to digital holdings and the consequent loss of digital information, rendering
any attempt to quantitatively express the extent of potential impact in such terms unfeasible.
An objective risk impact scoring system that considers only one manifestation of success
or failure is unnecessarily restrictive. DRAMBORA sought to extend the grammar of risk
impact by enabling users to select from four classes of risk impact, which were ’Reputation
and Intangibles’, ’Organisational Viability’, ’Service Delivery’ and ’Technology’, but this
still renders risks disconnected and their wider implications unknown. Since PORRO en-
ables the association of risk with any number of goals, risks or resources cause and effect
can be much better understood within an organisational setting.
The four organisations that participated in this process were all in a state of transition. New
services were being developed, expansions being planned to other areas, new contracts being
signed and new responsibilities embraced as novel legislation emerged. In light of the almost
constant development that characterises the repository and digital library community it be-
comes difficult to say at any particular moment whether a particular organisation satisfies a
requirement to be trustworthy. This is especially true when assessment is based upon heavy-
weight, monolithic standards with significant associated audit costs. PORRO’s metric is
much more focussed on facilitating improvement than on the imposition of transitory judge-
ments. Its model is compatible with an ongoing process of maturity modelling. Concerned
with not only validating the effectiveness of existing infrastructures, but also determining the
suitability of proposed developments, the ontology effectively reflects the dynamic character-
istics of the repository domain. In general terms, it is easier to isolate and accredit individual
services that the repository is offering, irrespective of their maturity, and then make some
conclusions about the organisation as a whole, aimed at its overall development. If the aim
of the audit is simply to judge the entire organisation at once, any verdict will have to be
accompanied by numerous caveats. This will not really assist those stakeholders concerned
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about the sustainability or effectiveness of the repository in question, whereas a more gen-
eral expression of maturity, structured according to available services and measured against
mandate and objectives has considerably greater value.
5.7.2 CARDIO Evaluation
Introduction to the CARDIO Evaluations
As described above, the Collaborative Assessment of Research Data Infrastructure and Ob-
jectives (CARDIO) process and associated tool was developed by the Digital Curation Centre
in 2012 to support evaluation of institutional provisions to support management, sharing and
long term preservation of research data. Following its initial release, PORRO was introduced
as an integral part of CARDIO, providing an intellectual context to support the provision of
responses to its thirty individual sections. The purpose of the case study that follows is
to illustrate the value of PORRO in contextualising and informing the process of institu-
tional assessment for a wide range of user types and backgrounds. CARDIO/PORRO was
the basis for institutional assessments undertaken as part of the Digital Curation Centre’s
programme of institutional engagements. These were largely prompted by institutional con-
cern surrounding increasing demands from Research Councils UK regarding the sharing and
management of research data. This case study focuses on the assessment that took place at
the London School of Economics (LSE) in summer 2012.
Evaluation Summary (LSE)
As part of its programme of institutional engagements the Digital Curation Centre supported
ongoing efforts at LSE to develop research data management capability and capacity. This
assessment and subsequent report respectively sought to capture and document the status
and perceptions across a range of areas influential to research data management. These were
subdivided into matters of organisation, technology and resources.
Following the survey and programme of interviews described in this thesis first chapter, six
LSE employees (including both researchers and support staff) completed a full-scale “CAR-
DIO” assessment, considering 30 individual areas influential to research data management
capacity / capability and scoring LSE provisions from 1 to 5. Their composition was in-
tended to reflect the range of service providers and data-supported research methods under-
taken within the institution. This provided useful insight about strengths and shortcomings
of current research data management provisions.
A number of methods were used to administer the CARDIO workflow during the assess-
ments, with lessons having been learned from earlier, internal pilot exercises conducted by
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colleagues at the University of Bath and by the author during an assessment of Queen Mary
University of London. Prior to the introduction of PORRO, CARDIO’s initial test user base
had reported some criticism. CARDIO leads users through a process that requires them
to evaluate the performance of their institution with respect to data management in thirty
individual areas. Reflecting earlier work these areas ranged from organisational to techno-
logical aspects. The tool was deliberately succinct but according to feedback was prone to
ambiguity. User testimonials revealed confusion from some users of the meaning of partic-
ular questions [Ball and Darlington, 2012]. PORRO was introduced to lend context and was
demonstrably successful.
Agreed ratings across each individual area were provided in detail in the subsequent pages.
Most LSE provisions were rated between 1 and 3 out of 5. The surveys illustrated the
widespread opportunities for improvement, and prompted some thoughts on what actions
should be prioritised in order to meet emerging research data management requirements.
The key recommendations were as follows:
1. Publish data policy that defines responsibilities and clarifies a data definition and en-
sure its widespread circulation, adoption and systematic review.
2. Identify and promote institutional and funder requirements for sharing.
3. Develop guidance for selecting and preparing data for long term accessibility (e.g.
metadata, format choices, migration).
4. Encourage registration of LSE and LSE-licensed data in central systems and promote
repository data storage functionality.
5. Promote implications and applicability of appropriate legislation through staff training
and publicity.
6. Offer legal guidance, providing greater clarity on data ownership and IPR, especially
with respect to reconfigured licensed datasets.
7. Re-evaluate service (e.g., IT service) portfolio to ensure that it meets researchers re-
quirements in order to make a more compelling case for charging a proportion of
research income. As part of this, ensure IT services are involved in project application
process.
8. Promote risk awareness and the resourcing of mitigating measures via data manage-
ment planning during grant application, project and post-project processes.
9. Offer explicit data management training for doctoral students / early career researchers.
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10. Develop and promote experts directory to clarify who should be contacted with specific
types of request/query.
5.7.3 Case Study Conclusions
At QMUL the CARDIO process took the form of an interactive workshop; participants re-
flected upon a starter set of institutional assessments provided by a small cross-section of
representatives from University service and academic departments. A reference manual con-
textualised individual sections for participants. At the example assessment at LSE a cohort
provided their responses in conversation with the author who was coordinating the assess-
ment. At times the discussions labored as the author attempted to explain to participants
what was being asked of them. Greater clarity was clearly offered with the introduction of
contextualising PORRO mappings. Others used the online tool and had the opportunity to
identify corresponding PORRO classes via the CARDIO reference manual [McHugh, 2011].
Both approaches were successful in further contextualising the process.
In addition, the provision of the linked PORRO entities was thought to offer an additional
range of entry points to consider the respective capacity and capabilities in each area. Re-
sponses could be provoked by identification of a pertinent risk or an omitted, failing or
demonstrably successful system characteristic.
Perhaps more significant was PORRO’s role in forecasting or planning future developments.
CARDIO is partly about diagnosing issues and concerns but has most value in supporting
the definition of plans to ensure their resolution. The recommendations above were wholly
conceived using PORRO’s implicit relationships and both welcomed and endorsed by par-
ticipating members of LSE’s Research Data Management Committee.
CARDIO’s workflow requires, following the submission of individual perspectives, the estab-
lishment of consensus between participants. The online tool provides a set of social functions
(including persistent chat client and notification system) to support this but in the example as-
sessments undertaken at Queen Mary University and London School of Economics physical
interaction between respondents was preferred, in a workshop or meeting format. A common
semantic model was shown to inform a coherent perspective and enable agreement to take
place more straightforwardly, whereby participants were less concerned with understanding
the parameters of the question than agreeing their response.
End users’ collective perspectives are aggregated into a single institutional view. This im-
mediately directs one towards disproportionately strong or weak areas. Improvement is a
critical part of the CARDIO process, and therefore one can prioritise at a glance the areas of
greatest concern. PORRO’s association enabled the identification of facets that can be linked
to specific organisational policy, process and assets.
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Conclusion
The experiences of legacy research in preservation and data management risk awareness,
coupled with analysis of preservation planning approaches reveal clear opportunities for
richer knowledge management structures. Digital preservation is a pressing priority across
sectors and disciplines posing many challenges that span conceptual boundaries. How we
characterise and share best practice for safeguarding materials threatened by technical obso-
lescence, organisational failure and physical and logical degradation is pivotal. Success is
contingent on a wide range of factors, diverse and variable individual priorities, emphases
and contextual circumstances. Each can be tremendously influential in both presenting chal-
lenges to and facilitating preservation.
To establish common consensus on the implications of particular preservation choices and
environments we must first understand the interrelationships that comprise the preservation
context. We have presented PORRO as a means of enabling such expression. It supports the
classification of preservation profiles, pockets of objective meaning in a necessarily subjec-
tive context. This in turn supports preservation decision making, and the establishment of
greater collective awareness of risks implicit in classes of preservation approach and infor-
mation.
6.1 Performance Against Research Objectives
At the heart of our research objectives is risk: success would establish the concept as a
measurable and relatable means of classifying activities associated with the process of digital
preservation. Our results complement existing prescriptive standards for preservation with a
set of structured criteria and corresponding methodology that reflect a widespread appetite
for responsive, adaptable and flexible instruments to support preservation evaluation. We
have conceived and built a unique knowledge base of preservation practice based on accounts
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directly presented in the course of preservation audits and observed via the DRAMBORA
Interactive online tool and a further series of facilitated self-assessments.
It is evident, not least through research undertaken at LSE (referenced in Chapter 2) and
other externally conducted research such as the surveys undertaken by the Digital Curation
Centre [DCC, 2015] that preservation capacity is an ambition shared by practitioners within
commercial, cultural heritage and academic sectors. From each community there is an evi-
dent perception that while there is value in defining objective metrics to assess the realisation
of such goals there is an equally legitimate need for more customisable support systems and
tools.
In order to satisfy our first research objective, the establishment of a method and tool for un-
dertaking risk management in preservation contexts, we initially surveyed a range of repre-
sentative contexts within which data is created, used and preserved. The series of repository
audits documented within this thesis is a unique collection of perspectives of preservation
practice. These analyses are of demonstrable benefit to prospective and more experienced
data custodians. We have successfully characterised the range of elements that comprise
a successful preservation system and present these as an illustrative account of practice.
More recent audits conducted beyond this research have yielded similar online examples
[Rosenthal, 2014, Greenberg and Marks, 2012]. These examples have also illustrated the
value of sharing the experiences of the audit process as well as the characteristics of a trusted
(or risk prone) preservation system. Their efforts and the associated community response (in
common with that which was inspired by our research) offer some additional validation of
the benefits of presenting a transparent account of preservation practice. They also affirm
technological choices made within the course of this research. For instance, they share our
adoption of wiki technology and the alignment of documentation and associated knowledge
with a structured certification instrument (in each case the TRAC criteria). It is encouraging
that they also appear to embrace a similar spirit of transparency as prompted our efforts.
DRAMBORA and its manifestation as an interactive online tool closely reflect the findings
of these surveys. Our methodology was subject to an iterative process of development that
refined several aspects. Among the most notable was its initial insufficiently prescriptive
nature; many of those participating in self-assessments reported difficulties determining their
risk exposure, lacking a sufficient comprehensiveness of perspective to understand the extent
of shortcomings or optimal approaches for improvement. Our interactive tool takes the core
methodology of reflective self-assessment and adds a means by which users can relate their
efforts to those underway elsewhere.
Our development of this methodology into an integrated online tool and its development by
both direct and indirect exposure to a range of real life preservation scenarios has enhanced
the methodology and overcome several of the challenges associated with a primarily self-
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assessment driven approach. DRAMBORA Interactive is a demonstrably successful online
resource, and has enjoyed high impact and considerable usage since its release by a world-
wide audience of practitioners and educators.
This methodology is a contribution of critical importance. Many of the efforts to date as-
sociated with evaluating digital preservation have been motivated by funders and repository
end users seeking affirmation or validation of the competencies of a given preserving or-
ganisation. This has yielded certification standards but seldom has an associated process
for determining conformity been explored. More recently, a companion standard describing
Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of candidate trustworthy digital
repositories has emerged but this remains of value and significance mainly to a small elite of
accredited individuals and organisations. Our method is firmly aimed at those doing preser-
vation, and provides the means for them to be confident in the suitability and sufficiency of
their work, and if appropriate to facilitate a later exposure of their efforts to external certi-
fication. It also ensures that the dynamic nature of preservation (which may change based
on new technological innovations, such as the increased dependency on cloud computing)
continues to be reflected in best practice.
As DRAMBORA benefited from its deployment in formal audits, it similarly equipped us to
pursue our second research objective, a continuation of the work of surveying preservation
contexts. Our online tool DRAMBORA Interactive has yielded data corresponding to assess-
ments that exhibit diversity in geographic location, legal context, types of digital collection,
mandate and budgetary model. DRAMBORA requires participants to describe their preser-
vation efforts in terms of objectives, activities, resources and risks, providing immediate
evidence of how leading organisations go about ensuring the longevity of digital materials.
Taking this as a starting point we sought to complement this data by engaging directly with
a selection of organisations that was similarly representative as those using the tool online.
We undertook a series of systematic audits based on evolving methodological and intellec-
tual criteria (themselves developed iteratively based on our findings). Good and bad practice
were both identified, characterised and related within these assessments, providing evidence
that would form the basis for lines of enquiry and evaluation feedback in subsequent audit
exercises. Collectively, the assessments yielded several primary benefits. The first, taken
at face value was that the participating organisations were given the opportunity to better
understand their successes and shortcomings, and to adapt to a critique based on comparison
with a combination of objectively conceived and empirical real world best practice. Sec-
ondly, we took the opportunity to refine our approach both in terms of process and perhaps
more importantly in the intellectual basis upon which our evaluation was conducted. Sim-
ply, as we learned more about how preservation takes place we became better equipped to
identify opportunities for improvement elsewhere. Our knowledge base was developing, and
it became clear that the perspectives we had been granted by exhaustively assessing a series
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of operations were unique. The existing instruments that we were using were highlighted
as being occasionally incomplete, more commonly at least lacking in terms of specificity or
applicability to real world motivations and approaches.
Subsequent assessments, and analysis of third party undertaken assessments enabled us to
produce evidence of the robustness and applicability of our best practice conclusions, de-
tailed in the evaluation chapter of this thesis. Similarly, surveys of other institutions such
as the London School of Economics and Political Science provide empirical evidence of the
growing institutional appetite for appropriate data management and preservation capacity.
To enjoy these latter benefits the outcomes of the audit were recorded, accomplishing our
third research objective. DRAMBORA Interactive’s existing data structure provided a means
for recording facets of individual preservation efforts. We used this as the basis for initial dis-
tillation of survey outcomes to a more structured and easily comparable format, developing
our taxonomy on an iterative basis. Maintaining a legacy association with the categories of
analysis outlined in the TRAC standard we characterised our evidence base in terms of what
organisations wish to achieve (agnostic of any given objective standard) and the processes,
tools, policies and mandates that inform and/or support them. These were in turn related
to a developing catalogue of risks, whether caused by or mitigated by these factors. Each
facet was recorded in two forms; a higher level, more generic expression was intended to
be immune to issues of applicability across context and time, complemented by specific ex-
amples - the particular implementations or manifestations we observed and recorded in our
audit experiences. Injecting semantic qualities to the data is of tremendous importance, as it
allows the data to be interrogated by applications or human users and enables the conception
of a network of relatable factors that contribute to preservation outcomes.
Fourthly we evaluated existing methodologies for undertaking preservation assessment. A
critical dimension of this work has been to establish where our outcomes are positioned
within an existing international preservation certification landscape. We are not content to
seek to replace wholesale the existing provisions, several of which have enjoyed formal
standardisation. Instead, we seek to identify and fill the gaps in what currently exists. We
considered the value and applicability of several standards and de facto standards and of-
fered a critical assessment of each. Several leading examples are collectively encapsulated
within the European Framework for Audit and Certification of Digital Repositories, which
presents a series of increasingly onerous certification tiers that correspond with the Data
Seal of Approval, ISO 16363 and the equivalent German standard. The first two tiers require
just documented self-assessment while the most involved requires a full externally admin-
istered audit to be conducted within any organisation seeking certified status. We reflected
on the many positive aspects of these resources. Each has at least some intellectual basis in
the Trustworthy Repository Audit and Certification Criteria and Check-list. By extension,
each can be considered a valuable expression of generic aspects of preservation practice.
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TRAC’s formal standardisation can be considered a more practical expression of - and com-
panion resource to - the equally seminal Reference Model for an Open Archival Information
System. However, their shortcomings are mainly in terms of their utility and practical appli-
cability. Even though self-assessment comprises two-thirds of the Framework there remains
little explicit emphasis on process to guide a prospective repository administrators seeking
to evaluate his or her efforts. While the Data Seal of Approval presents as an advantage
its low barrier to entry this is accompanied by shortcomings, principally in terms of lack
of granularity of coverage. The TRAC and ISO standards, pursuing exhaustiveness, extend
to many, many criteria; preservation is a complicated business with implications spanning
every aspect of an organisation’s administration, technology and information management
process. But they in turn expose themselves to criticism as impractically conceived, beset by
uncertainties in terms of how metrics can be satisfied and based upon a set of preservation
requirements so generic that it doesn’t really exist within any single organisational context.
We have conceived the PORRO ontology as a structured expression of preservation best prac-
tice, collated from over a dozen full-scale audit exercises in addition to around one hundred
and fifty online self-assessments conducted using DRAMBORA Interactive. This qualifies
this data as a legitimate consolidation of overall preservation practice, a unique dataset that
was both conceived and validated by lengthy exposure to real world preservation efforts un-
dertaken by experts in the field. We have sought to take advantage of the resources that are
available and position our efforts in a fashion that ensures their compatibility. DRAMBORA
was our direct response to the difficulties posed by a wholly top-down approach, a process-
driven methodology that requires self-assessors to reflect on their own priorities and their
associated strengths and shortcomings. PORRO enhances this process by providing pliable
hooks to best-practice that are customisable to any given preservation context. This satisfies
our fourth objective, a presentation of best practice in a taxonomical and ontological format.
Like DRAMBORA, its design has been principally motivated by its associated use cases.
PORRO is demonstrably successful when applied to a range of contexts, most importantly
evidenced by its usefulness in a further series of evaluator deployments, participants ex-
pressing satisfactions at the extent to which it is capable of off-setting the challenges of self-
assessment. Further validation and evidence of adaptability was obtained by using PORRO
as part of data management planning exercises at Queen Mary University of London and
LSE (used in association with the DCC’s CARDIO tool). Its completeness and coherence
with respect to existing metrics is also evidenced within our further two pronged evalua-
tion, whereby the ontology elements were mapped to facets of systems that have enjoyed
community-approved certification and also simulated against third party audit results to re-
veal their expressiveness.
In isolation the value of an ontology is difficult to convey and therefore a suite of indica-
tive tools that use the ontology as their intellectual foundation is an important step. The
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effectiveness of our prototype tool portfolio, the delivery of which is our final research ob-
jective, is evident within two operational contexts. The first is research data management,
where its adoption as a data source for the CARDIO collaborative data curation evaluation
tool has been demonstrably useful. That is a process that builds consensus of a given organ-
isation’s data management capacity. At the point where individual contributors have agreed
upon the status of their existing efforts reference is made to PORRO to identify potential
approaches to improve existing provisions. This can be considered PORRO’s preservation
planning application. Within the 3D Coform Repository Infrastructure (RI), PORRO is used
in the identification of risk, whereby a given set of real world circumstances are identified
within the ontology and traced to potential associated risk factors. This is what we mean by
bidirectionality within PORRO. Its applicability is such that it can be used to provoke the de-
velopment of preservation activities or resource acquisition, or to warn of threats associated
with existing or proposed systems.
Similarly practical expression of PORRO’s value is evidenced by referring to core use cases
that PORRO is capable of satisfying. Through its adoption in the applications referenced
earlier we can say that PORRO supports the identification of risk (whereby users or user
agents can traverse the knowledge base to identify linked concepts based on common iden-
tified contextual characteristics); the facilitation of risk resolution (whereby risks that have
been identified externally or using the ontology are mapped to appropriate mitigation mea-
sures); performance of gap analysis (whereby real world generic goals are represented in
the ontology, as are prescribed criteria which in turn are mapped to PORRO concepts, both
fleshed out by their correspondence to required or appropriate parameter considerations, ac-
tions or resources); and validation of approaches (whereby particular policy, resource or
activity prioritisation can be traced to corresponding objectives and risks which illustrate the
appropriateness of investment).
6.2 Future Work
Future work associated with PORRO has the potential to be exciting and, with certification
establishing increasing practical momentum [Giaretta and Lambert, 2012], highly impactful.
With the definition of a robust means of storing properties of objects, representation methods,
context and risk we aim to develop existing tools to support formation of more sophisticated
relationships between object, system and contextual properties and risks that encapsulate
their relationships. Automating the processes of repository, object and risk classification
will in turn support existing preservation planning and maturity modeling approaches.
In specific terms we hope to take the evaluation activities undertaken here and continue to
focus more explicitly on not just preservation infrastructures, but also specific properties as-
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sociated with digital objects themselves, and their relationship with the contexts within which
they are preserved. More domain specific analysis will provide insights intended to support
better understanding of risk relationships at the level of content, relatable to wider aspects of
repository and external context. Furthermore, as we have done with publicly available case
studies detailing existing preservation infrastructures, we will look to exploit existing data
property resources, including the Plato preservation planning tool. By documenting infor-
mation properties and values from its varied implicitly recorded preservation plans we will
continue to extend and enrich the PORRO knowledge base. In turn we anticipate that this
will offer greater insights into preservation optimization and risk awareness.
Meanwhile, we aim to continue to extend institutional provisions, structuring and ingesting
activity, resource, risk and liability data from over one hundred newly completed organiza-
tional assessments undertaken using the DRAMBORA interactive tool. The implicit sensitiv-
ity of much of this data limits opportunities to exploit it more widely, but its anonymisation
and redistribution in a public tool also remains a critical planned outcome of this work.
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PORRO Classes
The complete set of PORRO classes follows in this Appendix. Indentation is indicative
of superclass/subclass relationships. The .owl file representing the full ontology, including
properties, is available from:
http://mchughontology.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/porro.owl
E001 Porro Entity
- E002 Preservation Criterion
- E003 Preservation Criterion Evidence
- E004 Preservation Criteria Source
- - E005 International Standard
- - E006 National Standard
- - E007 Community Standard
- - E008 Article Or Conference Proceeding
- - E009 Research Report
- - E010 Audio Or Transcript
- - E011 Tool or Learning Resource
- - E012 Audit Or Certification Report
- - E013 Law Or Regulation
- E014 Custodial Entity
- E015 Context Characteristic
- - E016 Funding Source
- - E017 Budget
- - E018 Staff
- - E019 Staff Role
- - E020 Domain
- E021 Functional Entity
- - E022 Preservation Goal
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- - - E023 Adopt Appropriate Preservation Formats
- - - E024 Authenticate Source Of Ingested Packages
- - - E025 Backup Documentation
- - - E026 Classify Archival Data
- - - E027 Continuously Validate Data Integrity
- - - E028 Define Disaster Recovery Policy
- - - E029 Define Ingest Package Specification
- - - E030 Define Policy And Procedures For Undertaking Backups
- - - E031 Document Archival Data
- - - E032 Document Software Dependencies
- - - E033 Ensure Appropriate Contractual Management
- - - E034 Ensure Synchronisation Of Data Separated By Time Or Space
- - - E035 Establish And Exercise Ingest Policy
- - - E036 Establish And Exercise Selection Policy
- - - E037 Establish And Maintain Terms Of Deposit
- - - E038 Establish Appropriate Backup Redundancy Provisions
- - - E039 Establish Appropriate Backup Remoteness Provisions
- - - E040 Establish Appropriate Business Planning
- - - E041 Establish Appropriate Categories Of Staff
- - - E042 Establish Appropriate Contingency Funding
- - - E043 Establish Appropriate Coordination And Steering Platform
- - - E044 Establish Appropriate Database Backup Infrastructure
- - - E045 Establish Appropriate Financial Accounting Infrastructure
- - - E046 Establish Appropriate Hardware Infrastructure
- - - E047 Establish Appropriate Logical Security Provisions
- - - E048 Establish Appropriate Physical Security Provisions
- - - E049 Establish Appropriate Provisions For Backup
- - - E050 Establish Appropriate Software Infrastructure
- - - E051 Establish Appropriate Strategies For Facilitating Succession Of Organisation Or Content
- - - E052 Establish Appropriate Technical Documentation Base
- - - E053 Establish Archival Packages Configuration
- - - E054 Establish Assurances Of Availability Of Appropriate Technical Skills
- - - E055 Establish Assurances Of Recoverability Of Any Lost Data
- - - E056 Establish Assurances Of Site Stability
- - - E057 Establish Assurances Of Sufficiency Of Staff Skills And Capacity
- - - E058 Establish Assurances That All Costs Are And Will Continue To Be Covered
- - - E059 Establish Budget Dedicated To Training Provision
- - - E060 Establish Budgetary Protection Assurances
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- - - E061 Establish Conditions For Access
- - - E062 Establish Criteria For Data Identification
- - - E063 Establish Criteria For Data Review
- - - E064 Establish Criteria For Disposal
- - - E065 Establish Data Ownership
- - - E066 Establish Designated Community
- - - E067 Establish Hardware Upgrade Policy
- - - E068 Establish Information Security Policy
- - - E069 Establish Levels Of Preservation
- - - E070 Establish List Of Supported Formats
- - - E071 Establish Logical Storage Provisions
- - - E072 Establish Means For Data Disposal
- - - E073 Establish Means For Data Identification
- - - E074 Establish Means For Data Review
- - - E075 Establish Means To Track Data Object Through Preservation Workflow And Lifecycle
- - - E076 Establish Media Refreshment Policy
- - - E077 Establish Naming Convention
- - - E078 Establish Physical And Logical Provisions For Access
- - - E079 Establish Policy Review Policy
- - - E080 Establish Policy Transparency
- - - E081 Establish Portfolio Of Internal Or External Staff Training Provisions
- - - E082 Establish Ratification Of Preservation Mission From Parent Or Governing Entity
- - - E083 Establish Relationship Between Access And Archival Packages
- - - E084 Establish Relationship Between Ingest And Archival Packages
- - - E085 Establish Relationships With Succession Partners
- - - E086 Establish Software Upgrade Policy
- - - E087 Establish Suitability Of Backup Infrastructure Through Testing
- - - E088 Establish Terms Of Use
- - - E089 Establish Transformation Procedure From Ingest To Archival Packages
- - - E090 Evaluate And Certify Activities
- - - E091 Exercise Preservation Plans
- - - E092 Implement Access Controls
- - - E093 Implement Categories Of Access
- - - E094 Initiate Stakeholder Dialogue
- - - E095 Limit Data Loss Incidence
- - - E096 Maintain Archival Package Referential Integrity
- - - E097 Maintain Best Practice Awareness
- - - E098 Maintain Budget Carry-Over Facility
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- - - E099 Maintain Business Planning Autonomy
- - - E100 Maintain Comprehensive Costings Breakdown
- - - E101 Maintain Data Integrity
- - - E102 Maintain Depositor Dialogue
- - - E103 Maintain End User Dialogue
- - - E104 Maintain Link Between Data And Metadata
- - - E105 Maintain Risk Awareness
- - - E106 Make Explicit Preservation Responsibility
- - - E107 Make Explicit Preservation Rights
- - - E108 Manage Formation Of Dissemination Package
- - - E109 Monitor Access Behaviours
- - - E110 Monitor And Fulfil Freedom Of Information Responsibilities
- - - E111 Monitor And Fulfil Ipr Responsibilities
- - - E112 Monitor And Fulfil Other Legislative And Legal Responsibilities
- - - E113 Monitor And Respond To Designated Community Evolution
- - - E114 Monitor File Format Obsolescence
- - - E115 Monitor Unauthorised Access
- - - E116 Physically Acquire Content
- - - E117 Plan For Preservation
- - - E118 Process Ingested Content
- - - E119 Record And Maintain Descriptive Metadata
- - - E120 Record And Maintain Representation Information
- - - E121 Record Appropriate Metadata
- - - E122 Select And Appraise Ingested Content
- - - E123 Select Preservation Strategies
- - - E124 Validate Data Integrity
- - - E125 Validate Integrity Of Backups
- - - E126 Verify Ingest Package Conformity With Specification
- - E127 Preservation Parameter
- - - E128 Alignment Of Roles And Skills And Function
- - - E129 Backup Strategy
- - - E130 Budgetary Separation And Autonomy
- - - E131 Business Prioritisation Areas
- - - E132 Compliance Responsibility
- - - E133 Content Access Levels
- - - E134 Content Change
- - - E135 Content Closure
- - - E136 Content Modification
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- - - E137 Content Removal And Deletion
- - - E138 Content Representation
- - - E139 Content Selection And Acceptance
- - - E140 Content Versioning
- - - E141 Content And System Redundancy
- - - E142 Contract Types
- - - E143 Contract And Mandate Cessation
- - - E144 Coordination And Steering
- - - E145 Copyright Challenge Response
- - - E146 Copyright In Collection
- - - E147 Copyright And Access Restrictions
- - - E148 Cost Model For Access Provision
- - - E149 Data Representation
- - - E150 Data Review
- - - E151 Data Rights Transfer
- - - E152 Designated Community Definition
- - - E153 Disaster Planning
- - - E154 Discontinuing Preservation
- - - E155 Dissemination Specification
- - - E156 Documentation Availability
- - - E157 Documentation Requirements
- - - E158 Documentation Review
- - - E159 Evaluation Metrics And Participants
- - - E160 Exemptions To Preservation Responsibility
- - - E161 External Skills Procurement
- - - E162 Format Migration
- - - E163 Funding Sources
- - - E164 Identification And Naming
- - - E165 Income And Expenditure
- - - E166 Ingest Mechanism
- - - E167 Ingest Specification
- - - E168 Internal Budgetary Allocation
- - - E169 Legal Requirements For Due Process
- - - E170 Legal Responsibilities
- - - E171 Logical Authorisation
- - - E172 Logical Security Measures
- - - E173 Logical Security Responsibility
- - - E174 Logical Storage
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- - - E175 Media Refreshment
- - - E176 Metadata Creation Responsibility
- - - E177 Metadata Creation Workflow
- - - E178 Metadata Format
- - - E179 Metadata Representation
- - - E180 Metadata Storage
- - - E181 Minimal Required Metadata
- - - E182 Obsolescence Risk Tolerance
- - - E183 Oversight For Policy Review
- - - E184 Package Specifications
- - - E185 Physical Access Authorisation
- - - E186 Physical Security Measures
- - - E187 Physical Security Responsibility
- - - E188 Physical Storage
- - - E189 Policy Covering Distribution Of Copyright Material
- - - E190 Policy Describing Designated Community
- - - E191 Policy Development Traceability
- - - E192 Policy Development Triggers
- - - E193 Policy Flexibility
- - - E194 Policy For Documenting Change
- - - E195 Policy For Negotiation Of Preservation Responsibility
- - - E196 Policy For Wider Data Management Integration
- - - E197 Policy Governing Withdrawal Of Data Management Responsibility
- - - E198 Policy On Access Control
- - - E199 Policy On Accountability
- - - E200 Policy On Backup Frequency
- - - E201 Policy On Backup Location
- - - E202 Policy On Budgetary Management
- - - E203 Policy On Budgetary Planning
- - - E204 Policy On Business Planning
- - - E205 Policy On Circumstances That Provoke Change
- - - E206 Policy On Content Availability
- - - E207 Policy On Contents Of Backup Package
- - - E208 Policy On Relationship Between Ingest And Archival And Dissemination Packages
- - - E209 Policy On Supported Access Types
- - - E210 Policy Responsibility
- - - E211 Policy Review Due Process
- - - E212 Policy Steering
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- - - E213 Policy Transparency
- - - E214 Preservation Commitment
- - - E215 Preservation Level Assignment
- - - E216 Preservation Level Implications
- - - E217 Preservation Mechanism
- - - E218 Preservation Package Structure
- - - E219 Preservation Prioritisation
- - - E220 Preservation Risk
- - - E221 Preservation Strategy
- - - E222 Preservation Validation
- - - E223 Procedure For Change Management
- - - E224 Process And Infrastructure Review
- - - E225 Professional Membership
- - - E226 Quality Assurance Responsibility
- - - E227 Recovery Drills
- - - E228 Recruitment And Retention
- - - E229 Repository Integration
- - - E230 Required Redundancy
- - - E231 Review Of Designated Community
- - - E232 Rights And Ownership Definitions
- - - E233 Risk Assessment Validation
- - - E234 Risk Management
- - - E235 Risk Tolerance
- - - E236 Scalability Requirements
- - - E237 Security Failure Defaults
- - - E238 Selection
- - - E239 Service Breadth And Prioritisation
- - - E240 Service Business Model
- - - E241 Service Level
- - - E242 Service Level Parameters
- - - E243 Specification For Archival Packages
- - - E244 Specification Relationships
- - - E245 Staff Resource Scalability Requirements
- - - E246 Staff Turnover
- - - E247 Succession Arrangement
- - - E248 Succession Responsibilities
- - - E249 Supported Acquisition Methods
- - - E250 Supported Dissemination Formats
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- - - E251 Supported Ingest Formats
- - - E252 Supported Preservation Formats
- - - E253 Supported Systems And Applications
- - - E254 Systems Development Management
- - - E255 Technical Review
- - - E256 Technological Contingency
- - - E257 Technology Licensing
- - - E258 Technology Skills Development
- - - E259 Technology To Workflow Mapping
- - - E260 Terms Of Access
- - - E261 Terms Of Reference
- - - E262 Training
- - - E263 Understandability
- - - E264 Usage To Preservation Level Relationship
- - - E265 User Competency Requirements
- - - E266 Validation Checks And Requirements
- - E267 Preservation Right Or Responsibility
- - - E268 Data Management Objectives Consistent With Parent
- - - E269 Data Management Responsibility
- - - E270 Data Management Rights
- - - E271 Has Assurance Of Financial Sustainability
- - - E272 Has Business Steering
- - - E273 Has Legal Responsibility To Manage Data
- - - E274 Has Legal Responsibility To Share Data And Provide Access
- - - E275 Has Limitation Of Liabilities
- - - E276 Has Mandate To Aggregate Published Data
- - - E277 Has Mandate To Manage And Distribute Copyright Materials
- - - E278 Has Mandated Data Closure Responsibilities
- - - E279 Has Mandated Data Sharing Responsibilities
- - - E280 Has Mandated Data Sharing Triggers
- - - E281 Has Mandated Staff Development Requirements
- - - E282 Has Mandated Transparency Requirement
- - - E283 Has Prescribed Minimal Metadata Requirements
- - - E284 Has Preservation Policy Discretion
- - - E285 Has Preservation Responsibility
- - - E286 Has Preservation Rights
- - - E287 Has Responsibility To Limit Access
- - - E288 Has Restrictions On Data Management Or Distribution Based On Copyright Status
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- - - E289 Has Restrictions On Termination Of Data Management Responsibilities
- - - E290 Has Rights To Defer Data Management Responsibility
- - - E291 Has Selection Mandate
- - - E292 Has Stakeholder Management Responsibility
- - - E293 Mandate For Policy And Procedure Discretion
- - - E294 Succession Partnership Agreement
- - - E295 Sufficiency And Suitability Of Audit Practice
- - E296 Preservation Activity
- - - E297 Accept Data Management Responsibility
- - - E298 Aggregate Data Referenced By Or Contextual To Dataset
- - - E299 Anonymise Data
- - - E300 Assign A Processing Record To Data
- - - E301 Audit Collections And Procedures
- - - E302 Automate Metadata Extraction
- - - E303 Communicate Service Disruption
- - - E304 Create Object Metadata
- - - E305 Create Package Descriptor
- - - E306 Define Package Specifications
- - - E307 Define Policy And Procedure Review Triggers
- - - E308 Develop Active Training Plans
- - - E309 Develop Dedicated Budget
- - - E310 Develop Income Streams
- - - E311 Develop Technical Training And Induction
- - - E312 Digitise Analogue Content
- - - E313 Dispose Of Content And Media And Metadata
- - - E314 Dispose Of Non-Ingested Content
- - - E315 Disseminate Content And Metadata
- - - E316 Document Interactions Surrounding Dataset
- - - E317 Document Package Content
- - - E318 Document Package Structure
- - - E319 Document Public Release Of Dataset
- - - E320 Duplicate Content
- - - E321 Duplicate Metadata
- - - E322 Duplicate Systems
- - - E323 Enforce Secure Logical Environment
- - - E324 Engage In Dialogue With Stakeholder
- - - E325 Engage Internally On Policy Review
- - - E326 Establish Income Streams
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- - - E327 Establish Preservation Plan
- - - E328 Establish Referential Integrity
- - - E329 Establish Succession Arrangements
- - - E330 Evaluate And Reform Policy
- - - E331 Evaluate And Reform Procedures
- - - E332 Evaluate Data Copyright Status
- - - E333 Evaluate Format And Media Risk
- - - E334 Evaluate Logical Security Threats
- - - E335 Evaluate Physical Security Threats
- - - E336 Evaluate Preservation Plan
- - - E337 Evaluate Risk Exposure
- - - E338 Exchange Transfer Documentation
- - - E339 Execute Preservation Plan
- - - E340 Expose Data To Access
- - - E341 Generate Fixity Information
- - - E342 Identify Data Properties
- - - E343 Incentivise And Retain Staff
- - - E344 Justify Resources
- - - E345 Liaise With Security Provider
- - - E346 Liaise With Technology Provider
- - - E347 Link Metadata To Corresponding Data
- - - E348 Link Preserved Content With Original
- - - E349 Log Accessions
- - - E350 Log Actions And Interactions
- - - E351 Log Object Lifecycle
- - - E352 Log Unauthorized Access Attempts
- - - E353 Maintain Access Platform
- - - E354 Maintain Administration Platform
- - - E355 Maintain Appropriate Documentation
- - - E356 Maintain Authentication Platform
- - - E357 Maintain Authorisation Platform
- - - E358 Maintain Backup Platform
- - - E359 Maintain Generic And Shared Technology
- - - E360 Maintain Ingest Platform
- - - E361 Maintain Network Protocol Support
- - - E362 Maintain Preservation Platform
- - - E363 Maintain Redundant Systems And Data
- - - E364 Maintain Risk Register
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- - - E365 Maintain Storage Platform
- - - E366 Manage Format And Media Support
- - - E367 Manage Package Specifications
- - - E368 Manage Policy Revision
- - - E369 Manage Unique Identification
- - - E370 Migrate Format Or Media
- - - E371 Monitor Access
- - - E372 Monitor Copyright Status
- - - E373 Monitor Data Citations And Reuse
- - - E374 Monitor Dataset Usage
- - - E375 Monitor Designated Community Evolution
- - - E376 Monitor Security Status
- - - E377 Monitor Skills Gaps
- - - E378 Monitor Training Opportunities
- - - E379 Monitor Training Requirements
- - - E380 Monitor User Requirements
- - - E381 Monitor User Satisfaction
- - - E382 Negotiate Data Management Mandate
- - - E383 Notify Data Originator Of Data Receipt
- - - E384 Perform Metadata Format Conversion
- - - E385 Perform Test System Recoveries
- - - E386 Plan And Execute System Upgrades
- - - E387 Plan Expenditure
- - - E388 Plan For Risk Mitigation And Avoidance
- - - E389 Procure External Expertise
- - - E390 Publish Package Specifications
- - - E391 Pursue Dedicated Research Funding
- - - E392 Record Changes
- - - E393 Record Media Movement
- - - E394 Record System Changes
- - - E395 Recruit Skilled Staff
- - - E396 Reference External Sources During Data Management Planning
- - - E397 Refresh Media Or Hardware
- - - E398 Refuse Content Ingest
- - - E399 Regulate Access To Data
- - - E400 Regulate Dataset Closure
- - - E401 Renegotiate Legal Mandate
- - - E402 Report Technical Status
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- - - E403 Request Data Deposit
- - - E404 Respond To Ipr Challenge
- - - E405 Retrieve Content
- - - E406 Review Business Performance
- - - E407 Review Business Priorities
- - - E408 Review Legal Responsibilities And Rights
- - - E409 Review Metadata
- - - E410 Review Partnerships And Alignments
- - - E411 Review Technical Provision
- - - E412 Scan For Viruses
- - - E413 Securely Store Data And Media
- - - E414 Seek Budgetary Assurances
- - - E415 Self-Evaluate Activities
- - - E416 Synchronise Redundant Data
- - - E417 Technological Training And Induction
- - - E418 Test Effects Of Changes
- - - E419 Transfer Skills
- - - E420 Undertake Independent Audit
- - - E421 Undertake Test Recovery
- - - E422 Validate Content
- - - E423 Validate Media And Storage
- - - E424 Verify Characteristics Of Data
- - - E425 Verify Data Formats
- - E426 Preservation Resource
- - - E427 Preserved Resource
- - - - E428 Preserved Source
- - - - - E429 Preserved Source Bitstream
- - - - - E430 Preserved Source Metadata
- - - - - E431 Preserved Source Fixity
- - - - E432 Preserved Process
- - - - - E433 Preserved Process Bitstream
- - - - - E434 Preserved Process Metadata
- - - - - E435 Preserved Process Fixity
- - - - E436 Preserved Performance
- - - - - E437 Preserved Performance Metadata
- - - E438 Preservation Support Resource
- - - - E439 Access Control System
- - - - E440 Access Personalisation System
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- - - - E441 Access Platform
- - - - E442 Access Processing System
- - - - E443 Access Validation System
- - - - E444 Acquisition Tracking System
- - - - E445 Administration Platform
- - - - E446 Alarm System
- - - - E447 Ambient Environment Sensors
- - - - E448 Authentication Subsystem
- - - - E449 Authorisation Subsystem
- - - - E450 Awarded Certifications
- - - - E451 Backup And Recovery Management System
- - - - E452 Backup Media
- - - - E453 Backup Platform
- - - - E454 Budgetary Assurances
- - - - E455 Business And Organisation Documentation
- - - - E456 Business Plan
- - - - E457 Catalogue
- - - - E458 Change Management System
- - - - E459 Changelog
- - - - E460 Closed Data Policy
- - - - E461 Communication Channels
- - - - E462 Communication Records
- - - - E463 Content Processing Forms
- - - - E464 Content Processing System
- - - - E465 Content Retriever
- - - - E466 Content Skills
- - - - E467 Contingency And Reserve Fund
- - - - E468 Contingency Fund
- - - - E469 Contingency Non-Monetary Resources
- - - - E470 Copyright Trigger
- - - - E471 Copyrighting Mechanism
- - - - E472 Custodial History Record
- - - - E473 Custodial History Records
- - - - E474 Data Documentation
- - - - E475 Data Management Skills
- - - - E476 Data Security Enforcement
- - - - E477 Data Transformation Plans
- - - - E478 Dedicated Budget
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- - - - E479 Dedicated Human Resources
- - - - E480 Delineated Roles And Responsibilities
- - - - E481 Deposit Agreement
- - - - E482 Depositor Fixity Values
- - - - E483 Disaster Plan
- - - - E484 Discovery Metadata
- - - - E485 Documentation Discovery System
- - - - E486 Employment Flexibility
- - - - E487 Employment Incentives
- - - - E488 Expenditure Projections
- - - - E489 External Evaluators
- - - - E490 External Policy Influences
- - - - E491 External Skills Pools
- - - - E492 Feedback Mechanism
- - - - E493 Fire Detection And Suppression
- - - - E494 Focus Group
- - - - E495 Formal Contracts And Terms
- - - - E496 Format Documentation
- - - - E497 Format Support
- - - - E498 Forum For Technical Exchange
- - - - E499 General Hardware
- - - - E500 General Software
- - - - E501 Generated Fixity Values
- - - - E502 Glossary Of Preservation Terminology
- - - - E503 Historical Policy Records
- - - - E504 Identifier Resolver
- - - - E505 Income Generation Skills
- - - - E506 Income Streams
- - - - E507 Ingest Platform
- - - - E508 Justification Of Resources
- - - - E509 Legal Advice
- - - - E510 Legal Expertise
- - - - E511 Legislation
- - - - E512 Logger
- - - - E513 Logical Security Monitoring System
- - - - E514 Management Board
- - - - E515 Management Skills
- - - - E516 Mandate Definition
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- - - - E517 Means For Format And Media Representation
- - - - E518 Media Degradation Diagnosis Tools
- - - - E519 Media Support
- - - - E520 Membership Of Partner Network
- - - - E521 Metadata Creation Guidelines
- - - - E522 Metadata Extraction Software
- - - - E523 Metadata Management System
- - - - E524 Metadata Records
- - - - E525 Metadata Schema
- - - - E526 Metadata Standards
- - - - E527 Moisture Detection And Mitigation
- - - - E528 Network
- - - - E529 Obsolescence Metric
- - - - E530 Package Relationship Documentation
- - - - E531 Package Specification Documentation
- - - - E532 Peer Evaluator
- - - - E533 Physical Security Monitoring
- - - - E534 Policy Documentation
- - - - E535 Policy Makers
- - - - E536 Policy Review Manager
- - - - E537 Policy Stakeholders
- - - - E538 Preservation Capacity
- - - - E539 Preservation Documentary Resource
- - - - E540 Preservation Management System
- - - - E541 Preservation Plan
- - - - E542 Preservation Platform
- - - - E543 Preservation Policy
- - - - E544 Preservation Validation System
- - - - E545 Processing Record
- - - - E546 Quality Assurance Infrastructure
- - - - E547 Recruitment Network
- - - - E548 Redistribution Rights
- - - - E549 Redundant Data And System Site
- - - - E550 Redundant Resources
- - - - E551 Redundant Storage
- - - - E552 Redundant Utilities
- - - - E553 Relationship With Partner Associations
- - - - E554 Representation Information Registry
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- - - - E555 Rights Database
- - - - E556 Risk Intelligence Data
- - - - E557 Risk Register
- - - - E558 Room Access System
- - - - E559 Secure Network Infrastructure
- - - - E560 Secure Safe
- - - - E561 Secure Storage Location
- - - - E562 Security Platform
- - - - E563 Skills Monitoring System
- - - - E564 Societies And Professional Organisations Membership
- - - - E565 Stakeholder Liaison Forum
- - - - E566 Stakeholder Relationships
- - - - E567 Storage Platform
- - - - E568 Succession Partner Agreement
- - - - E569 System Documentation
- - - - E570 System Maintenance And Support Agreement
- - - - E571 Technical Capacity
- - - - E572 Technical Community And Literature
- - - - E573 Technical Skills
- - - - E574 Terms Of Access And Use
- - - - E575 Terms Of Use
- - - - E576 Training Budget
- - - - E577 Training Materials And Infrastructure
- - - - E578 Transaction Documentation
- - - - E579 Understandability Definition
- - - - E580 Update And Upgrade Prompts
- - - - E581 User Database
- - - - E582 Validation System
- - - - E583 Weather Protection System
- E584 Preservation Risk
- - E585 Accidental System Disruptions
- - E586 Activity Is Overlooked Or Allocated Insufficient Resources
- - E587 Ambiguity Of Understandability Definition
- - E588 Archival Information Cannot Be Traced To A Received Package
- - E589 Authentication Subsystem Fails
- - E590 Authorisation Subsystem Fails
- - E591 Budgetary Reduction
- - E592 Business Fails To Preserve Essential Characteristics Of Digital Information
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- - E593 Business Objectives Not Met
- - E594 Business Policies And Procedures Are Inconsistent Or Contradictory
- - E595 Business Policies And Procedures Are Inefficient
- - E596 Business Policies And Procedures Are Unknown
- - E597 Change Of Terms Within Third-Party Service Contracts
- - E598 Community Feedback Not Acted Upon
- - E599 Community Feedback Not Received
- - E600 Community Requirements Change Substantially
- - E601 Community Requirements Misunderstood Or Miscommunicated
- - E602 Deliberate System Sabotage
- - E603 Destruction Of Primary Documentation
- - E604 Destruction Or Non-Availability Of Repository Site
- - E605 Documented Change History Incomplete Or Incorrect
- - E606 Enforced Cessation Of Repository Operations
- - E607 Exploitation Of Security Vulnerability
- - E608 Extent Of What Is Within The Archival Object Is Unclear
- - E609 Externally Motivated Changes Or Maintenance To Information During Ingest
- - E610 False Perception Of The Extent Of Repository Success
- - E611 Finances Insufficient To Meet Repository Commitments
- - E612 Financial Shortfalls Or Income Restrictions
- - E613 Hardware Failure Or Incompatibility
- - E614 Hardware Or Software Incapable Of Supporting Emerging Repository Aims
- - E615 Identifier To Information Referential Integrity Is Compromised
- - E616 Inability To Evaluate Effectiveness Of Technical Infrastructure And Security
- - E617 Inability To Evaluate Repository Successfulness
- - E618 Inability To Evaluate Staff Effectiveness Or Suitability
- - E619 Inability To Validate Effectiveness Of Dissemination Mechanism
- - E620 Inability To Validate Effectiveness Of Ingest Process
- - E621 Inability To Validate Effectiveness Of Preservation
- - E622 Incompleteness Of Submitted Packages
- - E623 Inconsistency Between Redundant Copies
- - E624 Ingest Subsystem Fails
- - E625 Legal Liability For Breach Of Contractual Responsibilities
- - E626 Legal Liability For Breach Of Legislative Requirements
- - E627 Legal Liability For Ipr Infringement
- - E628 Liability For Non-Adherence To Financial Law Or Regulations
- - E629 Liability For Regulatory Non-Compliance
- - E630 Local Destructive Or Disruptive Environmental Phenomenon
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- - E631 Loss Of Authenticity Of Information
- - E632 Loss Of Availability Of Information Or Service
- - E633 Loss Of Budgetary Autonomy
- - E634 Loss Of Confidentiality Of Information
- - E635 Loss Of Information Provenance
- - E636 Loss Of Information Reliability
- - E637 Loss Of Integrity Of Information
- - E638 Loss Of Key Member Of Staff
- - E639 Loss Of Mandate
- - E640 Loss Of Non-Repudiation Of Commitments
- - E641 Loss Of Other Third-Party Contracts And Services
- - E642 Loss Of Performance Or Service Level
- - E643 Loss Of Trust Or Reputation
- - E644 Loss Or Non-Suitability Of Backups
- - E645 Management Failure
- - E646 Media Degradation Or Obsolescence
- - E647 Metadata To Information Referential Integrity Is Compromised
- - E648 Misallocation Of Finances
- - E649 Negative Perception Of Curation Capacity
- - E650 Non-Availability Of Core Utilities
- - E651 Non-Availability Of Information Delivery Services
- - E652 Non-Discoverability Of Information Objects
- - E653 Non-Traceability Of Received Or Archived Or Disseminated Package
- - E654 Obsolescence Of Hardware Or Software
- - E655 Physical Intrusion Of Hardware Storage Space
- - E656 Preservation Plans Cannot Be Implemented
- - E657 Preservation Strategies Result In Information Loss
- - E658 Remote Or Local Software Intrusion
- - E659 Shortcomings In Semantic Or Technical Understandability Of Information
- - E660 Software Failure Or Incompatibility
- - E661 Staff Skills Become Obsolete
- - E662 Staff Suffer Deterioration Of Skills
- - E663 Structural Non-Validity Or Malformedness Of Received Packages
- - E664 Unidentified Information Change
- - E665 Unidentified Security Compromise Or Vulnerability Or Information Degradation
- E666 Preservation Risk Influence
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Appendix B
Case Studies
B.1 Background to these Case Studies
The case studies which can be found below are structurally roughly equivalently to those
sections presented in the draft RLG-NARA check-list document which represents the intel-
lectual foundation for each of these assessments. This is also the adopted structure for the
section that summarises findings across the institutions in Chapter 3. Each case study aims
to offer a readable account of the areas of success, and perceived shortcomings within the
approach and infrastructure adopted and demonstrated by the datacentre. Common sections
are Organisational Infrastructure, Digital Object Management, and Technologies and Tech-
nological Infrastructure. Within each, further subsections vary between the case studies.
The National Library case study provides an exception to this model. Unlike the other eval-
uation case studies this assessment was not led by the author; instead he joined colleagues
from the US Center for Research Libraries [CRL, 2012a] who were completing a number
of assessments as part of their Trustworthy Digital Repositories project. This was the third
in their series of four assessments. As a consequence the account is more brief and differs
structurally. Nevertheless, outcomes from this activity were similarly useful in informing the
ontology of preservation infrastructure described in subsequent chapters.
B.2 Letter of Invitation to Participate
Dear <Repository Coordinator>,
My name is Andrew McHugh, and I’m a colleague of Seamus Ross at the Humanities Ad-
vanced Technology and Information Institute (HATII) at the University of Glasgow. I’m
writing to request your assistance in the development of audit and certification mechanisms
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for digital repositories through participation in the Digital Curation Centre’s pilot repository
audit programme.
The JISC/EPSRC funded Digital Curation Centre coordinates work being undertaken in four
UK institutions, namely the Universities of Glasgow, Edinburgh and Bath and the Coun-
cil for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC). The Centre’s aim is to
provide a national focus for research and development into curation issues and to promote
expertise and good practice for the management of digital information. A key current work
area is the development of processes, tools and services to support the development of digital
repositories. A significant question mark that continues to surround repositories is the means
by which we can determine which repositories can be trusted to maintain our digital assets
so that they might be used and reused at an uncertain point in the future. Therefore, we are
working in collaboration with various US and European based efforts to contribute towards
the development of evaluation criteria for digital archives; we ultimately aspire to play a key
role in the establishment of formal audit and certification services for digital archives within
the UK. In parallel with this we are committed to the provision of training to institutions to
prepare them for the challenges that audit will pose.
In order to determine the most effective methodology for digital repository evaluation and to
assess the existing criteria that have been conceived we are currently planning a short series
of UK based pilot audits to be conducted within the forthcoming months, intended to com-
plement those already undertaken by our international collaborators. The goals closely mir-
ror those pursued in existing efforts, with the conception of audit processes, the assessment
of existing evaluation metrics and the identification of applicable costs among the highest
priorities. When we first began to plan a short series of UK based pilot audits Seamus iden-
tified the work being done at <ArchiveName> and recognised the tremendous experience
and expertise that has been accumulated. We would therefore be very grateful if you and
the Archive would agree to become involved in our efforts by providing the organisational
context for a pilot audit exercise. As well as contributing to the wider international under-
standing of the audit process, it is expected that participating organisations themselves will
benefit from a range of insights into the effectiveness of their existing processes, organisation
and methods and enable them to display leadership in best practice.
The attached paper, entitled “The DCC Approach to Audit and Certification” presents some
more background information about the subject area as well as some more details of the
team that the DCC has assembled, its proposed methodology for conducting audits and the
anticipated outputs of the process. At this stage we’d be delighted if you’d offer a general
indication of your willingness to participate in this activity. It’s likely that the audit would
take place sometime in the next two to three months, although needless to say, we’d be able
to offer a great deal of flexibility in order to best suit yours and <ArchiveName>’s interests
and requirements.
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I look forward to receiving your response, and will be glad to supply any additional infor-
mation that you might require.
thanks in advance,
Andrew McHugh
B.3 The National Library Repository
Introduction
Founded in 1798 the this National Library had been financed by its corresponding Ministry of
Education, Culture and Science since 1993. The Library received an annual lump-sum grant
from the Ministry; in 2004 this totalled 31.6m. Additional self-generated income (from,
for example, library passes and document provision) amounted to less than 10 per cent of
annual income. Budgetary autonomy enabled the reallocation of funding to support research
and development activities. This facilitated the management of the library’s digital repository
facility. In addition, since 2003 the library received some 1.1m per year from the Ministry
for system maintenance (outsourced to IBM) and part of the staff handling the operations.
In 2004 a further 1m was added to this annual grant for preservation of both digital and
paper content, which incorporated around 0.2m for research and development associated
with long-term preservation. In 2005 a further 900k was contributed for such research and
development.
The library’s relationship with two internationally established publishers had been integral
to the establishment of the repository. Negotiations with Elsevier began in 1996 with the
aim of acquiring the content of Elsevier e-journals to incorporate within the library’s repos-
itory. An agreement was signed in June of that year to permit the library to load Dutch
language journal, followed shortly afterwards by the formation of a similar agreement with
Kluwer. In 2002 the Elsevier arrangement was extended to cover the entire set of Elsevier
(including future published journals and those digitised as part of Elsevier’s retrospective
digitisation programme). Consquently, the library became responsible for preserving ap-
proximately 1500 journals, covering all areas of science, technology and medicine. Follow-
ing this agreement similar arrangements were established with Kluwer Academic Publishers
(2003), BioMed Central (2003), Blackwell (2004), Oxford University Press (2004), Taylor
and Francis (2004), Sage (2005), Springer (2005) and Brill Academic Publishers (2005).
Each of these agreements required the library to preserve that which the publishers send
to the library, intended to ensure that the preserved content reflects exactly the published
content.
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At the end of 2005 the repository accommodated around 3,500 e-journal titles, comprising
some 5 million articles and totalling around 6.3 Tb.
Mission and Mandate The library’s mission statement described a very broad commu-
nity of end users:
“As a national library the library provides access to everyone in the Netherlands and beyond.
Within this target group the library directs its attention especially to researchers and other
people with a specific interest in [national] history, language and culture in a wide inter-
national context. In addition, the library wants actively to promote its collections among
the general public. This aim to be there for everyone implies and anticipatory attitude and
service focused on consumer orientation and reliability.”
Designated Community Content of the repository was publisher-driven, with the obli-
gations that exists within deposit regulations operating in an alternative fashion from most
jurisdictions. Whereas the traditional approach was to formalise a system of ’legal deposit’,
the onus in this jurisdiction was on the library itself, which was compelled to accept any
received published content. Under this system, around 95 per cent of regular publishers did
deposit their materials with library; this could be attributed to the strong relationships that
had been fostered with publishers and the way in which the benefits of electronic archival
storage had been identified and promoted.
Two categories of designated community were identified. The first was primarily publish-
ers, what the library described as their business to business profile. This was expected to be
extended in the future with the addition of additional cultural and heritage depositors; the
development of formal service level agreements would enable and facilitate these emerging
relationships. The second category of relationship was with end users, described as the li-
brary’s business to consumer profile. This relationship was less explicitly stated, and few
formal guarantees were offered to those seeking content as to what was available and the
infrastructure that was available to support its delivery. Nonetheless, library users could re-
motely access catalogue information about publications, access resources on-site, or access
faxed or printed copies of articles in libraries elsewhere as inter-library loans. In turn the li-
brary was compelled by contract to provide a ’minimal level of functionality’ which included
bibliographic searches, publisher publication listings at the volume and issue level, listings
of issue content, article views, copyright information views article or “smaller than article
components” (e.g., metadata) downloads consistent with the terms of each contract.
System Functionality and Workflow The repository system consisted of functionality
for processing, archiving and maintaining e-publications and for more typical digital library
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functions. The Digital Information Archiving Service (DIAS) was the core deposit system,
and represented a separate and dedicated entity within the library’s digital infrastructure. It
was therefore not necessary to duplicate the functions like cataloguing, authentication, and
search and retrieval. The DIAS functional design was based on the CCSDS Reference Model
for an Open Archival Information System (OAIS). It featured functionality to facilitate the
receipt and loading of digital content, its preservation and its subsequent search, retrieval and
delivery. The repository’s primary function was preservation, and access was in contrast a
low priority. Stored content was managed for preservation and access but except in limited
circumstances remote access to content (i.e. outwith the library premises) was not avail-
able. The library’s catalogue could be searched from elsewhere but National Bibliographic
Number unique IDs were checked to determine whether requested content was one of the
few open access documents or available only internally. Publishers were granted a limited
number of user accounts to access protected resources from off-site locations; authentication
was performed using LDAP. IP checks ensured that unprivileged users not in situ within the
library were restricted from accessing the content and instead were prompted to visit the
library itself. The technological means to deliver content outside the library (and ensure its
continued integrity) were not established.
Prior to ingest, content tended to originate on installable CDs, in PDF format via the File
Transfer Protocol or on locally received digital tapes. Installable content was installed along
with the necessary helper applications on a reference workstation; the ingested content was
a disk image snapshot of the reference machine. PDF documents (which represented the
vast majority of received content) were validated via checksums and batched for processing.
Both digital content and associated metadata were ingested, with bibliographic information
standardised and a unique identifier (based on millisecond-level timestamps) associated with
each object. Descriptive and structure metadata was provided by the publishers.
A technical questionnaire revealed a significant organisational investment in IBM software,
with the Digital Information Archiving System software at the heart of the repository, pro-
viding the breadth of its functionality. Although this relied on additional off-the-shelf IBM
products (such as Tivoli Access Manager for authentication and authorisation and Tivoli
Storage Manager for object management and backup) the system was designed and built
specifically for the repository application according to the OAIS reference model. IBM was
chosen as the supplier following a tender process on the basis of mainly functional require-
ments. Questionnaire responses suggested good practice with measures in place to optimise
performance and capacity, mitigate risks to system security, and deal with any environmen-
tal unpredictability (UPS and climate control). Some concerns were raised with regards to
several technical responses. No off site backup facilities were employed and although the
library had a disaster plan at the institutional level, there was nothing in place at the reposi-
tory level, nor was there anything specifically addressing ICT concerns. This was thought to
226 Appendix B. Case Studies
be of particular concern given the library’s low-lying nature, and its propensity for flooding.
That backups were stored in facilities two floors below ground, in the same building within
which the repository operates raised some concerns. Repository technical staff explained
that moisture sensors were installed within these backup storage facilities.
Assessment Findings and Comments The library was also praised for its commit-
ment to evaluating the extent of its achievements, as well as the areas in which it might im-
prove. The most recent completed assessment was undertaken by KPMG, which highlighted
the lack of off-site backup facilities among its chief concerns. It was of limited, but still
notable concern that the KPMG staff responsible for performing the audit were not particu-
larly expert in the area of digital preservation, and therefore repository staff were themselves
responsible for identifying and documenting a significant proportion of the points detailed
in the final report. Plans for a comprehensive risk analysis investigation to be undertaken by
Zurich Insurance (encompassing every aspect of the library’s operation, both technical and
otherwise) were also discussed during this evaluation, again underlining the library’s overall
commitment to excellence.
The most critical shortcoming identified within the repository was the lack of off-site backup
facilities, which (particularly given the low-lying Netherlands landscape) was of some con-
cern. Repository staff assured the auditing team that this was currently being addressed,
and had been highlighted in prior external investigations independently commissioned by
the library.
A second criticism was associated with the identifiers allocated to objects within the repos-
itory. Consisting of a simple UNIX timestamp generated at the moment of ingest this was
considered potentially problematic if multiple ingest machines were commissioned to oper-
ate simultaneously or the procedure was streamlined to facilitate the ingest of more than one
object at a rate that exceeds the timestamp’s lowest level of granularity. In the former case
a solution would be to add a prefix to distinguish objects ingested by alternative machines.
This would not address the latter concern however, and the repository’s technical staff agreed
that some kind of alternative means of conceiving identifiers would be preferable to mitigate
potential future problems.
A further concern was associated with the fixity information that was collected and stored
within the repository, specifically CRC32 checksums. These were currently stored within
the archival repository alongside additional technical metadata. System compromises that
threaten the integrity of metadata or objects could in theory also prejudice the integrity of
these checksums, which were principally deployed to determine when and where unautho-
rised changes have taken place.
The issue of software escrow was subjected to similar scrutiny during the audit, and also
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emerged as an area of some concern. The repository’s technical infrastructure was essen-
tially a proprietary system, consisting of both off-the-shelf and bespoke software developed
by IBM. No escrow agreements were in place which might leave the library in a dangerous
position in the event of the withdrawal of the Tivoli software suite or the discontinuation of
its support. Dismissing such concerns, staff explained that the issue was given significant
consideration, but that IBM were deemed the only adequate supplier given their technologi-
cal requirements. They perceive the likelihood of vendor collapse as extremely minimal, and
irrespective of this, since the data and system software were separable, such an eventuality
could be survived until appropriate alternative software became available. Additionally, it
was argued that since a number of large global banks use and rely upon the same IBM soft-
ware, there was sufficient international weight to ensure that IBM will continue to maintain
the software in its current, or similar form. That this was deemed acceptable by the audi-
tors suggests that the check-list was subject to varying levels of compulsion. It indicates
that even where a course of action has identifiable risks, the important factor in determin-
ing a successful repository was its willingness and capability to undertake the appropriate
risk/benefit assessment exercises.
In a sense related to the software escrow concerns were fears that without formal succession
plans the library was exposing its content to future risk. Once again these were to an extent
mitigated; the library staff argued that its legally defined mandate and obligation renders
such plans unnecessary, ensuring the library’s permanent existence. Notwithstanding this,
some doubts continue to persist, particularly associated with those collections not subject to
these legal considerations, such as international, non Dutch materials.
A final issue of concern identified was an example of system bottlenecking that was being
experienced within the system during the visit, preventing the ingest of objects. This issue
concerned a small script responsible for the allocation of identifiers. Since a system restart
this script was no longer operational and consequently no objects could be added to the
system for the duration of the problem.
B.4 The National Archives Data Centre
Organisational Infrastructure
The service itself had over 25 years of experience of managing and preserving large quanti-
ties of digital materials. Originally serving a UK University, the service subsequently grew
into a regional and then national computing centre, diversifying its services to include infor-
mation hosting and management, web site development and e-learning advice and training.
Digital Archives was a department within the service, which remained legally part of its
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parent University, but also operated as a limited company, which was owned in its entirety
by the University. Most services had traditionally been provided on a commercial basis to
outside parties, supported by contracts that made explicit the University’s responsibilities.
However, increasingly, services were being provided to the University itself. A key service
was the National Digital Repository, which provides a range of digital preservation services
for various customers. The contract with The National Archives to run the datacentre was
the biggest by some considerable distance.
Mandate and Mission A legislative mandate was covered by the Public Records Act
1958 (as amended by the Freedom of Information Act 2000). A contract made explicit the
business aims with respect to the datacentre. It stated as follows:
“The AUTHORITY’s aim, as set out in its Corporate Plan 1997 - 1998, was ‘to assist and
promote the study of the past through the public records in order to inform the present and
the future’. It’s supporting aims are:
1. selection: to safeguard records covered by the Public Records Acts and ensure the
selection of those worthy of permanent preservation;
2. preservation: to acquire and preserve the records that ought to be kept;
3. access: to provide access to, and encourage and promote the use of, the records”
This represented the mission statement of the the datacentre service, but since it remained
inaccessible to stakeholders other than TNA and the service fell somewhat short of the ex-
pectations of the audit check-list which demands not only the existence of a mission that
expresses a preservation commitment, but also its availability to depositors and other stake-
holders. The datacentre website’s ’About’ page contained an expression of its mandate and
objectives, but failed to explicitly define the legislative relationships that justified its exis-
tence. Further background was freely accessible from the web pages within data transfer
overview documentation, which described in more detail the applicability of legislation, the
obligations arising from it and the particular data that the datacentre was responsible for pre-
serving. One would perhaps like to have seen this information presented in a more prominent
location, encapsulated within a succinct and clearly defined mission statement. The service
did have its own mission statement (“the service aims to be the preferred provider of infor-
mation, communication and learning technology service across the public sector”) but, while
far from incompatible with the datacentre’s commitment to long term data management and
access provision, was hardly synonymous.
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Succession Arrangements The datacentre contract described an exit and transfer strat-
egy, and a corresponding Service Transfer Plan covered the transfer of the service to TNA
or another contractor. This remained necessarily vague in places, but its existence reflects a
pragmatic acknowledgement of the likelihood that the value of at least some of these data
were likely to survive the the datacentre contract, or the the service itself. Return of digital
objects to depositors was not considered to be particularly applicable, since TNA’s archival
responsibilities were permanent. Copies of transferred datasets could be requested by the de-
partment from which they originated, but this was a separate issue, and the service’s respon-
sibilities to provide this service would cease at the conclusion of the the datacentre contract.
As outlined within the check-list self responses, the provision of succession or contingency
plans to address the issue of wider funding cessation or legislative amendment that threatens
the existence of an the datacentre contract more generally was really the responsibility of
TNA, and was to some extent beyond the scope of this assessment.
Staffing and Staff Development The Digital Archives department existed within the
the service’s Application Services group. As well as archiving, this group incorporated the
JISC Regional Support Centre for London. The Digital Archives Department’s intrinsic ob-
jectives, responsibilities and service levels were spelled out quite comprehensively within
the TNA contract, and given practical reality within a range of procedure manuals. A team
of archivists, content specialists and software specialists, led by a department manager col-
lectively ran the datacentre. According to job summaries, archivists were responsible for
deputising for and assisting the senior archivist in all aspects of work connected with the
datacentre and other the service projects and services, including transfer, accessioning, cat-
aloguing and dissemination of electronic data and related documentation. Each one was
a fully qualified archivist, supported by archival assistants who were generally from cul-
tural heritage backgrounds, such as museums or galleries, often with experience of digi-
tisation projects or digital imagery more generally. Content and software specialists were
responsible for working within the the datacentre team, collaborating with archivists and
IT specialists, liaising with TNA and government departments, providing specialist support
to users and contributing to system development. Content specialists had varied skillsets,
reflecting the position’s invented origins. Individuals within these posts exhibited a range
of experience, including database development and administration, public service in gov-
ernment, professional IT development, administration, auditing and systems assessment and
work flow analysis and validation. Software specialists were primarily programmers. The
divisions of responsibility appeared to be well expressed, and logical, and therefore the staff
members available appeared competent to undertake the identified duties. The availability
of both archival science and more domain specific data expertise was laudable, and to some
extent enabled many of the challenges to be mitigated. Dovetailing was evident in internal
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interactions between these groups. As part of a recent ISO 9000 certification process the
datacentre’s job descriptions were revised to correspond more closely with duties. Similarly,
as part of the parent university’s own job appraisal scheme, job descriptions and personal
development plans were developed and reviewed on an ongoing basis.
There appeared to be sufficient procedures in place to ensure that staffing numbers were ad-
equate. The heads of Application Services and Digital Archives, in association with senior
staff, were responsible for allocating staff resources, and monitoring appeared to be under-
taken to detect staffing shortfalls based on the requirements made explicit within the the
datacentre contract. To this end, there appeared to be adequate staffing provisions at the time
of the audit.
Professional staff development within the service was covered by both in house training poli-
cies and procedures, and by the wider infrastructure provided by the parent university. With
respect to the latter, job appraisal schemes provided opportunities for staff and line man-
agers to jointly mould personal and professional development, to identify their own training
needs and to arrange for them to be formally addressed. A training budget existed for the
Digital Archiving Department and given the involvement of the service in a variety of other
training activities there were ample opportunities for specific training. Furthermore, the dat-
acentre’s Inhouse and Training Procedure Manual described fairly comprehensive processes
associated with staff induction, training needs assessment and review and training delivery.
New staff were presented with a staff handbook, which described benefits, facilities and re-
sponsibilities in fairly wide terms. They then received a tailored induction process, which
was generally delivered verbally and incorporated discussions with other the datacentre staff
about aspects of work and procedures implicit within the repository. Following appointment,
new staff were interviewed as part of their probation review; steps were taken at this stage
to identify skills shortcomings, which were made evident by comparing existing skills with
requirements defined within a relevant job specification. Training requirements were then
documented and planning was undertaken for meeting these as part of probation. Training
needs were also assessed on an ongoing basis (at least annually) to determine further emerg-
ing training requirements and staff members can suggest training that would help with their
job at any time. Also, if new procedures or responsibilities were introduced for any job an
opportunity was taken to assess whether additional training was required.
Training was delivered in a variety of forms, including, but not necessarily limited to:
• Inhouse training by fellow staff members
• Inhouse training by an outside training provider
• Outside training
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• Attendance at regular courses organised by professional bodies
• Membership of relevant professional committees and working parties
• Production of reports for inhouse circulation by staff who have attended training courses
and professional meetings
• Training of staff who have not attended courses by those who have
The range of training types and the monitoring infrastructure in place appeared more than
adequate, and interviewed staff spoke highly of the procedures that were in place. The fact
that training requirements were being identified by both staff and their line managers ensured
that few opportunities were missed.
Designated Community The designated community served by the datacentre was de-
fined both legislatively, and in extremely general terms in the ’Help’ section of the the data-
centre website. The Public Records Act of 1958, as amended by the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 described the following:
It shall be the duty of the Keeper of Public Records to arrange that reasonable facilities were
available to the public for inspecting and obtaining copies of those public records in the Pub-
lic Record Office which fall to be disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act 2000.
“The Lord Chancellor shall, as respects all public records in places of deposit appointed by
him under this Act outside the Public Record Office, require arrangements to be made for
their inspection by the public comparable to those made for public records in the Public
Record Office”
A broad designated community was therefore established, encompassing the public in its
widest sense. The web definition alluded to the reasonable facilities that were in place to
comply with this legislation, stating that users must have a compatible web browser and at
least a rudimentary knowledge of how to use it. There were also accessibility provisions
made explicit within the website, although one can contrast usability in a web interface from
the issue of understandability, as expressed within the Reference Model for an Open Archival
Information System. In a pre-audit correspondence, the department manager suggested that
this web definition also explicitly mentions adults with a reading knowledge of English, but
this could not be found. During interview it was suggested that data were made available in
an identifiable form, although no assurances were offered as to its usability or understand-
ability. There was little evidence within any of the specific the datacentre documentation of a
designated community definition; the service level agreement between the service and TNA
described various responsibilities implicit within the the datacentre contract but none really
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associated with the specific communities that must be able to use data within the archive. It
was suggested that notwithstanding the breadth of its designated community it would have
been prudent to publish, probably within a mission statement, the fact that the datacentre
was legislatively bound to serve the public as a whole, and that therefore represents its des-
ignated community. It would have been similarly worthwhile to make explicit the data pro-
ducers from whom public records originate, which was outlined in the amended legislation.
Formal feedback mechanisms (including regular appraisals of server logs) indicated that the
datacentre’s users were using both the data and the catalogue information which indicated a
more historical interest in the fact that data existed at all, as opposed to the specifics of that
data.
An interesting stance related to the designated community was presented by one staff mem-
ber, who described the fact that the datacentre was ultimately bound to reflect TNA’s own
policies on data accessibility, and restricted in terms of the strategies they may implement
to facilitate discovery. The datacentre’s own catalogues for instance were required to be
broadly compatible with the Catalogue. It was the staff member’s contention that defining
and monitoring the designated community was the sole responsibility of TNA. This was
worrying because irrespective of where the parameters of the community were determined,
archival decisions within the datacentre should have been based at least partially on their
expectations, capabilities and knowledge.
Policy and Procedures The datacentre had a range of policy and procedural documen-
tation available. Formally documented procedures included:
• Security Procedures
• Transfer Procedures
• Site Exchange Procedures
• Digital Preservation Procedures
• Paper and Paper Preservation Procedures
• Helpdesk Procedures
• Inhouse and Training Procedures
• Closed Data Access Procedures
• Data Protection Act Procedures
• Finding Aids Procedures
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• Contingency Planning Procedures
• Style Guides (issued by TNA)
Each set of procedures was realised in one or more associated documents; this is an extensive
list.
The datacentre also maintained policies that described in detail necessary steps to intro-
duce, review and retire procedures within the archive. As outlined within the Inhouse and
Training Procedures Manual, all the datacentre procedures were documented in appropriate
procedures manuals, supplemented where necessary by detailed working instructions. These
could be changed in three ways. The first was where the datacentre service manager had
identified the need to revise a procedure manual, and this duty could be delegated to a mem-
ber of staff. A draft revision was then presented and discussed in a physical meeting, by
email or in the datacentre usenet discussion. Amendments were then actioned, prior to the
creation of a final draft, which was then approved by the the datacentre service manager, and
linked to from a central HTML index page. Staff were informed that all prior versions should
be immediately disregarded. Alternatively, any staff member could suggest changes at any
time. Suggested changes were circulated via email or usenet, comments were aggregated
and a brief report conceived, for discussion at a subsequent meeting. Final revisions, and the
replacement of earlier versions were actioned as above, subject to the service manager’s ap-
proval. Finally, all procedures manuals were subject to ongoing review, on an at least annual
basis. The introduction of new procedures was conducted on a similar basis. Once more,
these could be prompted by the service manager, an independent member of staff or during
a regular procedures review meeting.
The quality assurance and consultation procedures associated with the conception of new
procedures were broadly equivalent to those associated with amending existing procedures.
A new procedure could be justified by the introduction of a new procedure that extended the
range of work; a major change in the way a procedure was undertaken; sufficient numbers
of small changes to an existing procedure to necessitate a wholesale review or its granu-
larisation into multiple procedures; or, finally, the insistence by a staff member that a new
procedure was otherwise necessary. In most cases of procedural change, the existing manu-
als would simply be updated. The benefits of this approach to procedures management were
clear. The availability of each of these three methods for introducing and modifying proce-
dures were intended to ensure that they remain relevant, representative and comprehensive
in their coverage. Procedures were allowed to both dictate the work undertaken within the
datacentre, and reflect emerging working practices that may reveal themselves and optimise
the repository’s efforts.
Further policy describes the mechanism for retiring redundant procedures within the data-
centre. Again, this could be prompted by any staff member, or within discussions within
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a procedures review meeting. In the event of a procedure being nominated for retirement,
a staff member was delegated the responsibility for collecting comments to support or op-
pose the motion (or suggest merely revision of the procedure). These were amalgamated
into a report which provided the basis for subsequent discussion and a final decision by the
the datacentre service manager. Retired procedures were moved to a special section of the
staff intranet, with a note describing the fact that the procedure did once exist and had been
superseded. Details of any procedures manuals that did supersede retired procedures were
also recorded. Procedures could be retired if they were classified as redundant; this could
incorporate situations where working practices had changed to the extent that the proce-
dure was no longer relevant; staff hade suggested that the procedure was no longer relevant;
procedures corresponded to work areas that were no longer active; sufficient smaller-scale
changes necessitated reformulation of policies or the creation of more granular policies; or
where procedures were subsumed within an existing procedures manual.
There could be little doubt about the datacentre’s commitment to ongoing periodic review,
assessment and self measurement. As well as participating in this pilot assessment, perhaps
the most convincing evidence of this was the service’s completion of the ISO 9000 series
quality assurance certification.
Costs and Financial Information On occasions, costs associated with the accession-
ing of datasets led to the datacentre’s resistance to archive. Data had been turned down in
the past due to unnecessary expense associated with it a prominent example was a dataset
encoded in a proprietary format associated with an unnamed document management system.
Mechanisms were offered by the system’s developers to export these documents to PDF, but
the datacentre was unwilling to pay the charge. Had TNA insisted, it was acknowledged that
the datacentre would have had to go ahead, such were the terms of the contract. This was to
some extent worrying, although it appears that the relationship that existed between the ser-
vice and TNA would make it unlikely for TNA to insist that transfer should take place where
it might significantly undermine the financial position of the service and the datacentre.
The service’s turnover associated with digital preservation amounted to approximately 1m,
about 20 per cent of its overall turnover. The datacentre contract was negotiated at a fixed
price, which was adequate to meet most costs, although in some circumstances where the ser-
vice exceeded expectations there were additional costs that had to be met. History suggested
that increased costs would be met with favourable terms in subsequent contract renegotia-
tion. The original datacentre contract was priced too low; the service was losing money and
forced to rely on its own additional funding reserves. A subsequent contract compensated
this loss and acknowledged the increased cost of providing the service.
The datacentre was required to meet performance targets in order to ensure its financial remu-
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neration. A system of service credits was made explicit in Schedule 11 of the the datacentre
contract. TNA could waive its right to reduce the fees payable in the event of such circum-
stances, and there was no liability for degradation of service caused directly by a failure of
TNA or transferring departments, assuming the failed responsibilities were previously agreed
in writing. Potentially costly failings could include less than satisfactory service availabil-
ity, failure to meet accession timetable agreements, inefficiency in satisfying access requests
and network non-availability. These provisions were generally fair and thought unlikely to
prejudice the datacentre’s budget. A maximum of 10 per cent of fixed charges for any three
month period could be deducted according to this agreement.
Legal Issues The contract that the service had with TNA afforded the former a degree of
protection, since the liabilities were expressly indicated within that contract, and many im-
plicit issues were TNA’s responsibility. Similarly, questions about the the datacentre mission
being at odds with the service or the parent university were largely moot since the Univer-
sity had legitimised the contract, with the vice chancellor signing the contract and formally
expressing his satisfaction of the datacentre’s alignment with the University mission.
At the end of the the datacentre contract the service was required to return the content to TNA
and destroy any copies that might continue to exist on their own systems. Either TNA or the
service could choose to back out of the contract giving a minimum of six months notice;
there were directions to follow in the event of this happening, but specific details would be
negotiated at that time. Generally speaking, conflicting contracts with the commercial sector
would be avoided by the service.
The datacentre maintained ongoing relationships with both government departments and data
owners (as well as client and contract managers at TNA) to ensure that its procedures were
endorsed where appropriate and that it was ultimately able to adequately fulfil its mandate.
Dataset transfer forms changed hands during the initial stages of transfer, following the no-
tification by TNA of data that was to be preserved. Signed by data owners and departmental
records officers these provided the means to issue formal authorisation to transform source
data, detail parts of data sets that must remain closed or be redacted, and describe condi-
tions for managing transport media. Subsequent receipts issued by the datacentre further
formalised the agreement that preservation would take place, and confirmed the instructions
issued by owners and departments. An accessioning tracking system monitored and main-
tained a record of every interaction between parties and interaction with data.
Intellectual property rights were unlikely to concern the datacentre too much since it was
dealing with public records with an explicitly expressed legislative mandate. Nevertheless,
evidence highlighted a concerning shortfall in policy in the event of an intellectual property
rights challenge. One staff member recounted in a checklist self-response that the datacentre
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had been challenged in the past and had redacted data, in the absence of a suitable policy
saying otherwise. She expressed some (albeit tentative) concerns that perhaps everything
might be redacted if challenged. This should have been addressed by both the development
of formal documentation describing a policy for this situation and internal awareness raising
to communicate more clearly the legal status of the datacentre records. It seemed unlikely
that the datacentre would be conforming to its contractual requirements if it acted unilater-
ally on this occasion, and therefore an expression of TNA policy in this area was probably
quite adequate. In fact, in this case the approach went via TNA who oversaw negotiations
prior to making a decision. Further ambiguity surrounded challenges to non-availability; for
example, a database containing fifty year old information about beer duty was deemed by
the Department of Trade and Industry to be too commercially sensitive to release but may
be covered by FOI. It appeared that there has been no retrospective assessment of previously
closed datasets in light of FOI, and this was something that could have been considered. FOI
requests remain primarily the responsibility of TNA, to whom the request should be issued.
Following a representation by the relevant government department, TNA makes a decision
as to whether content should be released.
Further legal complications arose as a result of some records within the datacentre being
exempt from the Public Records Act, due to the fact that they were not in fact Crown Copy-
right. For example, materials originating from the Coal Authority must be preserved only
under explicit license. Furthermore, on some occasions parts of certain accessions would be
subject to intellectual property law. For example, software user manuals have been submit-
ted in the past as part of a dataset’s accompanying documentation, and this introduced some
ambiguities that could have been addressed within a formal policy document.
Digital Object Management
The datacentre responsibilities were summarised during the audit meetings as follows:
• Arranging Transfers from Government Departments
• Confirming the Receipt of Datasets
• Aggregating Contextual Material
• Preserving and Describing Datasets
• Providing Access to Datasets (where they were to be made available)
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Acquisition and Ingest The datacentre’s duties began when datasets had been identi-
fied for transfer by TNA working in association with Government Departments. Dataset
transfer prompted a variety of datacentre processing activities, while preservation charac-
terised most data interactions. Archival activities included acquiring documentation, dealing
with government departments, cataloguing datasets, and specifying access conditions and
culminate with the upload of catalogue information. Concurrently, data specialists assumed
responsibility for ingesting datasets, performing analysis, transforming and converting data,
documenting data and exposing data to validation and checking procedures, before the data
were uploaded. Meanwhile, digitisation activities were also ongoing, including the scanning
of paper documents, their conversion, processing and checking, and eventual upload. Once
catalogue information, data and associated documents were uploaded, they were subject to
final checking prior to being made available as live items on the the datacentre website.
Administration also played a key role, as the issuing of transfer receipts, establishment of
dataset-specific targets and maintenance of liaisons with TNA legitimised the process. The
final group of responsibilities were developmental, with software support, tool design and
process development aimed at facilitating and improving every other aspect of the datacen-
tre’s activities.
Every stage of dataset acquisition was recorded within the datacentre’s Accession Track-
ing System (ATS). Its role was to document all events that related to individual accessions.
These included communications that took place surrounding the dataset (whether internal or
with data owners, government departmental records officers or Client Managers or Contract
Managers at the National Archives); suspensions on the accessioning process, for instance
where the government departments’ inactions result in the stalling of the process; and the
final public release of the dataset. This provided provenance and traceability up to the point
of the dataset’s dissemination.
The procedure to be followed for dataset transfers was documented mainly within the Trans-
fer Procedures Manual, which made explicit procedures for initiating dataset transfer, ap-
propriate communications that must be undertaken, physical transfer procedures, checks,
documentation and receipts that must be issued. Templates for various documentation that
were required to be exchanged throughout this process were available from the the datacentre
website, and also within its internal electronic filing system. As detailed above, The National
Archives was responsible for the appraisal and selection of datasets, which was undertaken
at the level of individual datasets, and the transfer process was prompted by the TNA’s writ-
ten notification to the service that a dataset has been identified for transfer. This notification
contained information gathered during TNA’s appraisal activities, and was accompanied by
a notification form. Usually, transfer would be expected within the current contractual year.
Occasionally, TNA would request the transfer of content that did not actually exist. The
datacentre would then communicate this error. When severe problems arose with datasets
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the datacentre could petition to TNA for the transfer to be abandoned. Ultimately, TNA had
the discretion to compel transfer irrespective of concerns. Datasets that contained unreliable
or unuseful information were likely to be accepted, and documented nevertheless. The only
absolute condition that the datacentre imposed with respect to the transferred datasets was
that they should be accompanied by the appropriate, signed transfer forms.
The service’s initial responsibility was to document on transfer forms any information al-
ready supplied by TNA about the dataset, including appraisal information. A Departmental
Records Officer (DRO) within the transferring government department was contacted and
issued with a copy of the DRO transfer form and transfer list, generally within two weeks
of the issue of a transfer notification. An accompanying letter stated that completion and
return of the transfer form indicated a readiness to transfer a dataset to the datacentre and
incorporated guidance notes or a reference to a location online where these were available.
Concurrently, the service sent copies of both a Data Owner Transfer form and the transfer
list to the relevant data owner, along with a covering letter, unless explicitly instructed not
to in TNA’s originally submitted notification form. In the event of such an instruction, both
DRO and Data Owner forms were sent to the Departmental Records Officer. Government
departments were not required to provide finding aids for electronic records, and therefore
the service was required to prepare these based on the information provided within transfer
forms.
Government DROs and data owners could complete transfer forms themselves, or with the
assistance of relevant individuals such as Information Systems or IT staff. Documentation
was aggregated by the relevant department and if available only in physical form packaged
in containers to be sent to the datacentre. Upon receipt of transfer forms the service could re-
quest further information. Under normal circumstances, both DRO and Data Owner transfer
forms were required to commence transfer; the receipt of the former indicated an authorisa-
tion for transfer to take place, and was required to have been received, except in exceptional
cases. No formal documentation described such circumstances however. Data Owner forms
made explicit more technical details, which was of particular value for new Series, and es-
sential in such cases. However, it was conceded that for repeat transfers it could sometimes
be acceptable for just the DRO form to have been received. The exceptions that permit this
should have been made more explicit, or if down to a human judgement call, then this should
be formally stated.
A number of media types were suggested as appropriate for transfer, and these were made
explicit within the explanatory notes document that accompanied the Data Owner transfer
form. ’Approved’ media were:
• 9-track reel tape (6250 BPI GCR encoded and 1600 BPI phase-encoded)
• CD (High Sierra format or ISO 9660 format)
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• 3.5” floppy disk and 5.25” floppy disk, in MS-DOS, MacOS, VMS or multi-volume
TAR format (as produced by GNU tar)
• Exabyte 8200 and 8500 format 8mm tape cartridge (2.2 GB and 5 GB versions only)
• DDS2/3 DAT (4mm) tape cartridge, 4GB and 12GB types, but not including older
DAT tapes that use proprietary methods to exceed 2 GB of storage capacity
• 3480, 3490 and 3490E 0.5” cartridge tapes which hold 200 MB, 400 MB and 800 MB
respectively
Despite these strictly defined parameters, the transfer procedure did maintain that alternative
media could be suggested by the owning department when the transfer form was returned,
and the service would subsequently deem this acceptable or otherwise. The overwhelming
majority of data arrived on CD or some kind of magnetic tape, with some low volume and
non-confidential material also appearing by email. It was not clear whether integrity checks
were undertaken prior to delivery to ensure that what arrives at the datacentre corresponds to
what left the government department. In one staff member’s checklist reponse it was noted
that objects were manually or electronically checked to ensure that the contents match the
information in the “Datasets Transfer Form”, but no detail of how this was done was offered.
Following these stages the transfer would begin in earnest; departments packaged data and
associated documentation along with accompanying transfer lists. Dataset documentation
and associated documentation were packaged separately. Each box was marked with ref-
erence codes and titles of the datasets contained within, and numbered, starting at 1, and
describing the total number of boxes (e.g., 1 of 5, 2 of 5, etc.). Although numbering was not
applied on a per item basis, the transfer list documented each item being transferred. Help
and advice about packaging and transporting datasets was provided to departments by the
service.
Upon receipt of the datasets, documentation and accompanying transfer paper work, the re-
ceipt was logged in the Accession Tracking System and items placed within the the service’s
paper store. This was be the permanent environment for paper dataset and associated docu-
mentation. For electronic materials, it represented a temporary home, prior to their accession
into the hierarchical storage management system (HSM). Security was maintained in this in-
terim period by requiring the recording of any media movements within a loans register.
Items were verified against the transfer list to ensure completeness and an initial receipt was
sent to the transferring department. This was a confirmation that content has been both trans-
ferred and received, that documentation appeared to be adequate and that preservation would
be undertaken.
Following the issue of this initial receipt a target date was set by which time the dataset
would be completed in accordance with Schedule 11 of the the datacentre contract. The
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datacentre would then continue with the creation of finding aids; these were based upon a
combination of appraisal information supplied by TNA, the information on transfer forms
and other information arising from the dataset and its documentation. A second receipt was
issued to transferring departments to confirm that processing has been completed, all rights
had been agreed and that the datasets were to be released.
Every transfer undertaken by the datacentre was allocated a processing record, and following
the initial notification by TNA, responsibility for each datasets was allocated to an individual,
named data specialist. This individual need not have been the sole contributor to this dataset’s
transfer, but was responsible for ensuring that resources were allocated, procedures were
followed appropriately and that the processing record was completed. Generally, the same
individual would be responsible for subsequent dataset processing too.
Each accessioned dataset was allocated with a reference code to uniquely identify it within
the repository. This took the form CRDA/n/aa/m where:
• ’n’ was a number representing all occurrences of a particular datasets (irrespective of
whether these were received in one batch or incrementally), allocated in the order in
which datasets were notified
• ’aa’ was an alphabetic code indicating the format of the records listed, including DS for
a dataset, and parts thereof, DD for dataset documentation, and AD for accompanying
documentation
• ’m’ was a numeric value indicating that the dataset was one of a series, which may be
distinct as an annual dataset, or by its type, by snapshot, by other modification, or by
sub-series.
Following copying to the HSM transfer media was disposed of. As outlined in the Digital
Preservation Procedures Manual, departments would have outlined at the time of transfer
whether they wanted source media to be erased and returned or securely destroyed. Irrespec-
tive, except in the case of non-rewritable media (e.g., CD-ROM), erasure was the first step.
Procedures demanded that staff check, and recheck with the assistance of a colleague to en-
sure they were dealing with the correct volume. Once satisfied, media specific erasure steps
were made explicit within the documented procedures. Media were then either returned in
their original or similar packaging, or alternatively, irreperably destroyed using the the ser-
vice’s approved destruction kit (strong sacking, gloves, a hammer and goggles). Both returns
and media destruction were subsequently recorded within the locations register.
Procedures for ingesting bitstreams into the the datacentre repository were outlined within
the Digital Preservation Procedures Manual. Like each of the datacentre’s digital preserva-
tion procedures these were generally carried out by the data and software specialists within
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the the datacentre team, occasionally with the support of systems staff (who for instance
were always responsible for media checking). Security was a key consideration throughout
amid concerns that sensitive data within even open datasets might required anonymisation.
Amendments or deletions were not made without the explicit prior permission of TNA. All
material was required to be preserved, although its form was permitted to change as part of
the transformations that were implicit within the preservation process. As a general secu-
rity measure, policy demanded that media write protection mechanisms were enabled at all
times.
The creation of ’bit-wise’ copies of source data was the first step that immediately followed
the successful physical transfer of datasets. These were stored on a server in a filesystem that
was designated for the storage of incoming content. Thereafter, it was these copies that were
subjected to subsequent transformations or further processing, rather than the source origi-
nals. Numerous devices were available to read media although only those within the secure
network and equipped with necessary software and validation tools were deemed suitable.
Policy demanded that sys-admin staff oversee the use of appropriate drives and systems for
this purpose. The fact that only those devices deemed suitable were actually capable of writ-
ing to the server provides an additional technological control. Formalised procedures also
acknowledged that the creation of copies could be time consuming and staff were therefore
required to follow documented security steps when leaving their computer during the process
(using the xlock or similar screen locking programs was compulsory while terminals were
unattended). Basic characteristics of the copied data were required to be checked following
their accession (e.g., file size and content type) and any discrepancies noted in the dataset’s
processing record. Transfers over FTP were performed in binary mode to avoid undesirable
modifications. Virus checks were implemented with procedures in place that describe the
appropriate steps to take in the event of the discovery of a virus. In the event of a virus dis-
covery its existence and any steps to remove it were recorded. The documentation suggested
that TNA approval may have to be acquired prior to virus removal if normal transformation
steps would result in virus removal as a convenient side effect then such authorisation was
unnecessary, although it was acknowledged that it was unlikely to be withheld.
Transformation and Preservation The point of transforming data within the datacen-
tre was to regularise its form to facilitate access and usability. Target formats were chosen
based upon their amenability to subsequent conversion as part of ongoing preservation, and
their ability to preserve the content and intellectual ordering of the original dataset. Datasets
were organised and documented to facilitate the representation of their implicit information,
and not necessarily to reflect their form when they arrived. Nevertheless, documentation
made it possible to trace back to see the structure of content upon accession. All steps to
transform the data were recorded, with the procedures demanding that staff were satisfied
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that not only could they repeat the process exactly with only the original data, their descrip-
tion of the process and the metadata that accompanies the dataset, but that a different staff
member could do the same.
The initial stages of data transformation required staff to document the source dataset’s struc-
ture, as well as the content and format of each field within. Following their initial assessment,
data specialists were required to formally document their anticipated actions within an ’Ap-
proach’ document, to be evaluated by other members of the team.
Where content arrived in popular formats such as Microsoft Access .mdb files documentation
was fairly straightforward to automate. In other cases, where more proprietary or bespoke
formats or data structures were employed it could be necessary to use more labour intensive
techniques, such as text analysis of data documentation or alternatively manual keying. In
even more complex cases, it could be necessary to reverse engineer software to retrieve a
description of data structures. It was not clear whether the potential legal implications of
such techniques had been formally explored, but it was suggested that this should be done
and documented with some priority. The end user license agreements of software vary, but a
policy statement encouraging staff to investigate their rights with respect to such procedures
was considered appropriate for inclusion in the Digital Preservation Procedures Manual. If
reverse engineering failed to yield a clear definition then raw data analysis was undertaken,
using tools such as od, or the datacentre’s own flook. Concerns surrounded such procedures
which amounted to little more than (highly educated) guesswork, but given the shortcomings
implicit within the received data, and the pressures placed upon the datacentre to archive
whatever they were given, this was probably unavoidable from time to time. It appeared
that communications with departments and data owners were suitably extensive to limit the
likelihood of these circumstances in almost every case. Irrespective of which methods weere
employed for documentation, the required elements remained consistent. Characteristics that
were documented for each accessioned dataset included:
• File layouts
• Record Structures
• Field formats (including field widths, repeat counts and relationships between fields
(e.g., whether they were keys or indexes)
• Field descriptions usually one line descriptions, explaining what a field was for, and
also documenting any ambiguity that might surround the data specialists’s interpreta-
tion
Data were also anonymised at this stage if there had been indications from the transferring
department that this was necessary. The transferring department would indicate in their
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initial correspondence how this anonymisation should take place (summarisation of data or
suppression of certain fields). An Anonymisation Procedures Manual contained detailed
descriptions of the process that should be followed.
Following analysis, description and the completion of any required anonymisation, data spe-
cialists decided upon the form within which the dataset would be preserved. It was not
necessary to maintain the original table structure, and it in some cases could be desirable
to normalise if this has not already taken place. Any temporary, or redundant tables could
be discarded, but their prior existence was recorded so that it was possible to maintain an
understanding of the form of the data at the point of its transfer. Any proposed conversion or
disposal was expressed within the ’Approach’ document detailed above, a discussion group
or in direct conversation with the service manager. These modifications were approved by
TNA prior to their execution.
Departments were empowered by the Public Records Act to request copies of their trans-
ferred data. Therefore, the original bitstream was copied onto new media and also preserved.
Indistinguishable from the packages that represent the datacentre’s submission information
packages, these were probably classifiable as separate Archival Information Packages. The
right of departments to recall their content under the Public Records Act was unlikely to
preclude the archive (or the custodians in this case), from retaining their copy, although the
issues of possession associated with digital content were quite different from those associ-
ated with physical materials.
Of some concern were situations where coded values could not be transformed, or indeed
translated, since information (such as lookup tables, or references linking data to existing
lookup tables) had been omitted from the documentation supplied by data owners or depart-
ments. In such cases the datacentre staff were required to simply deduce the meaning of
these codes.
Content Validation Validation was a mechanism to ensure that transformations were
true and accurate, and sufficiently representative of the original source dataset. The identi-
fication of inaccuracies or deficiencies in the original data could also be found at this stage
and brought to the attention of researchers or data users. Two terms, ’transformation val-
idation’, and ’content validation’ were internally coined by the datacentre to describe the
two types. Software was available to perform content validation on various types of data,
performing a similar role to the US National Archives and Records Administration’s ERIC
tool. It validated against metadata descriptors to ensure that content within database fields
corresponded to the documented schema, and if so, that metadata was retained with the pre-
served dataset. For instance, it was capable of checking that columns that ought to be dates
were dates, and those that ought to be integers were integers. The tool was also used to
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automate the creation of data description metadata based on the characteristics of the data
where none previously existed. Measurement checks ensured that content corresponded to
that described in transfer forms, accompanying documentation or in any other referenced
publication. This typically compared averages, counts, or other quantitative characteristics
of the dataset with this evidential information. Results of each of these checks were recorded
within the dataset’s processing record. Irrespective of how poor the results of these checks
were, the datacentre had a policy not to change data, even if errors were obvious and straight-
forwardly correctable. All such problems and inconsistencies were documented. Only once
exception to this had been documented, and related to corruption prior to accession by the
datacentre that prevented data processing. The dataset in question had relied upon fixed-
width fields to distinguish individual content fields and the corruption had misaligned the
data, with significant effects, whereby some closed data (i.e. not for general viewing) had
been shifted into open field positions. This was therefore repaired. It would have been useful
to have a more formally expressed policy to document the circumstances within which such
interventions would be permissible. Documentation described an example occasion where
intervention was legitimate, but it was suggested that the datacentre extrapolate this into a
more generally applicable policy statement.
Immediately prior to committing a dataset to permanent preservation storage, responsible
staff submitted it for review by a fellow the datacentre staff member. An individual was ap-
pointed with responsibility for data checking, although in the event of his/her non availability
other staff might have been required to provide this final quality assurance input. Typically,
the review comprised checks for consistency between the transformed dataset, the original
source and associated documentation, completeness and accuracy. Documented procedures
supported random checking by senior datacentre staff, and mechanisms were in place to
involve more than one individual in this final review process (up to the entire the datacen-
tre team) for datasets identified as presenting particularly challenging problems or layers of
complexity. The datacentre Checking procedure checklist was completed immediately prior
to the dataset being committed.
Media replacement took place in one of four circumstances. The first was the result of
ongoing activities, with the latter three reactions to atypical circumstances that might arise.
• A tape has reached its maximum usage count (set at 10,000 mounts) or age (set at 7
years);
• A tape has been damaged due to hardware failure;
• Unanticipated readability problems;
• Other failures or the procurement of information that suggests a tape or batch might
be suspect.
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Automated checks within the system monitored usage and tape age the current values were
subject to review on an occasional basis, and systems staff were granted suitable discretion
to retire tapes prior them reaching the maximum age or usage if more convenient.
When faced with errors or discrepancies administrator made a judgement as to whether it
was the media upon which data reside that was to blame. Suspect media was disabled from
interacting with the wider system until this judgement was made. When the media itself was
found to be at fault a procedure existed for media replacement. In the event of above average
media failures administrators were expected to pursue with manufacturers the possibility that
a batch was affected with a common fault. Where hardware was identified as being at fault
staff would liaise with engineers from vendor who would perform appropriate maintenance
and corrections. Consultation would follow to determine whether any media on a failing
hardware drive might have been affected.
Initially, administrators would determine from the system which files were stored on the tape
that was set to be replaced. Each of these files was recalled to online storage, and verified to
ensure their integrity has been maintained. These files were then copied to a new tape, and the
system was instructed to disregard the previous tape. Media retirement was recorded within
the media register, and the media was then erased and destroyed (presumably according to
the guidelines expressed within the Digital Preservation Procedures Manual, although this
was not made explicit).
Preservation Technologies According to the Digital Preservation Procedures Man-
ual, the datacentre’s software handled binary or mixed format best when dealing with fixed-
width character fields and/or numeric or date fields. An alternative approach was the use
of CSV (comma separated values) files, with data represented entirely by text. The latter
approach was used in circumstances where data was unclean, and content did not conform
to data types that correspond to particular fields, something that most RDBMs will not toler-
ate. Character data was always converted to extended (8-bit) ASCII, but this could introduce
some problems depending upon the encoding of source data, with some glyphs inconsistent
across different platforms, and some not available. Staff were required to use all available
evidence (e.g., any printouts of original data that were available, other contextual material
that exists) to ensure an appropriate representation was used. Similarly, mappings were iso-
morphic to ensure that even if 8-bit ASCII was incapable of rendering a particular glyph, it
maintained its distinct status and could be reverted to its original encoding, with its meaning
retained.
For binary files, integer data was stored in twos-complement integers of 8, 16, 32 or 64 bits.
Unsigned integers in source data were changed to positive integers using a larger storage
width if necessary. Floating point numbers were stored using in the IEEE format using dou-
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ble precision (64-bit) unless the original used IEEE single precision, or a less precise IEEE
variant. For precise dates, the ACM jday algorithm was used to create 32-bit Julian day
numbers. Two digit year representations were avoided. Imprecise dates which exhibit incon-
sistency of expression (e.g., some tuples contain a year, others a month and year) were pre-
served as just character data, as described above. Binary object data implicit within datasets
was extracted and packaged on a per table basis using tar, with a reference to each item within
stored in the database. Each binary file was named using a fixed width integer sufficient to
name all the files corresponding to a single table (e.g, up to a thousand images would use the
names 000.tif, 001,tif and so on). TIFF was suggested as the appropriate format for images
(unless the original was JPEG encoded, and could be left as it was) and NeXT .au format ap-
propriate for audio. No other formats were suggested for alternative multimedia types. The
Procedures Manual did make explicit the immaturity of the policy in this area, and that the
light of experience would inform the development of more specialist treatment and guide-
lines. Nevertheless, the procedure did highlight the possibility of ingesting word processor
documents, spreadsheets or Powerpoint-style presentations as part of submitted databases. It
was suggested that a policy about the appropriate file format for maintaining these types of
resources should also be made explicit, even if it might be subject to further refinement. Ir-
respective of whether government departments embed binary content directly into databases
or store links to content in the form of file-system references, it was the responsibility of the
datacentre to preserve such assets, and therefore a policy for managing potentially diverse
file formats was necessary. Policies for the transformation of digital documentation were
quite explicit, and correspond closely to those applicable to datasets.
All digital documentation was retained in a plain text version. In addition, rich, word-
processed files were also retained in pdf or image versions. There was no explicitly preferred
choice for particular circumstances, or documentation describing what image format(s) were
considered suitable. Postcript encoded documentation was stored in both its native format
and a TIFF version, to facilitate text extraction, using optical character recognition. All avail-
able metadata was extracted from files prior to their regularisation. Metadata was generally
encoded within a MySQL database or in XML, in conformance with the Encoded Archival
Description standard’s Document Type Definition.
As a member of the Digital Preservation Coalition, the datacentre was exposed to emerging
preservation trends and performed an active role within the community more generally. On
a six monthly basis, according to the contract with TNA, the datacentre was required to flag
any concerns of a technical nature, which provided further assurances that current awareness
in the area of preservation was maintained.
The datacentre’s concept of understandability appeared to be mainly related to accessibility,
with the only cited examples concerning format conversion based on end user feedback. Less
emphasis appeared to have been placed on more semantics-oriented issues of understandabil-
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ity that might rely upon specialist knowledge and levels of understanding that may evolve
over time. Representation information stored by the datacentre amounted to just finding aids
and preservation or descriptive metadata.
Access and Dissemination The web site provided a range of functionality including
extensive browse and search (including advanced search) features. As described above how-
ever, there appeared to be some restrictions imposed on the datacentre in this context, since
their access mechanisms were required to conform to a TNA specification. Various metadata
were created to facilitate discovery, although omissions in technical metadata (which must
be inferred from initial deposit communications) were noted.
Referential integrity between archived objects and descriptive information was established
with the creation of links between the ISAD(G) cataloguing and CRDA dataset identifers,
with the access mechanisms also creating unique HTTP URIs that corresponded to individual
APIs.
Access to the datacentre’s archived content was almost exclusively via its website. Until
the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act in 2005 the distinction between closed
and open content within the archive was quite clear cut. Since then there is more confusion.
For instance, statutory bar, the mechanism that enables government departments to collect
sensitive data with the proviso that it may not be used for purposes other than its original
stated one might no longer apply to the same extent, or at all in some circumstances. The
Closed Data Access Procedures Manual describes the procedures for:
• Datacentre staff access to closed data
• TNA staff access to closed data
• Departmental staff access to closed data
• Privileged access by members of the public to closed data
• Reasons for which access might be granted to any of the above
• Means for establishing authorisation for access to closed data
• Permitted mechanisms for accessing closed data
• How must such accesses be recorded
It was of some concern that the most current version of this procedures document predated
the introduction of FOI legislation. Enough time ought now to have passed to issue a revised
version that corresponds more closely to the requirements set out in this legislation. There
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was an awareness of the implications of FOI expressed within this documentation, and of
the possibilities that policy revisions might be necessary (“further updates to this manual
covering the implications of the Freedom of Information Act may be required prior to the
coming into effect of this Act in January 2005”), but at the time of the assessment updates
had not taken place.
’Closed data’ covered any data, documentation or associated material held within the Archive
that was to be withheld from public access. Generally, this would only apply in situations
where a Freedom of Information exemption applied. The thirty year access rule for pub-
lic records no longer applies (although the Closed Data Procedures manual erroneously
included this as a possible justification). Where FOI exemptions did exist these were com-
municated to the datacentre at the time of transfer by the data owner or departmental records
officer. Various options were available, including closure of an entire dataset, closure of one
or more of its tables, closure of selected fields, aggregation of data to a higher level or any
combination of these. Data was nevertheless transferred in its entirety, with the datacentre
taking the responsibility to close the relevant sections as instructed. A cron task executed a
script that opened closed datasets when their closure period expires. It was unclear following
FOI whether this script was still active or necessary.
The datacentre did operate a user registration service, formerly akin to an archive application
process and a required precursor to accessing content. With the advent of FOI however, users
were required to register only in order to take advantage of additional website features.
At the time of the evaluation, various alternative access provisions had been considered,
following feedback from the datacentre’s designated community. For example, the format
that databases were disseminated in had been subject to some discussion, with suggestions
including the adoption of an XML Document Type Definition to support database markup,
or the introduction of an SQL export function so that users can more straightforwardly use
the data within their own local RDMBS.
Within the the datacentre system, DIPs were created dynamically, constructed from the cor-
responding database or flat CSV file to provide an interrogable, web accessible dataset. Cat-
alogue data was available alongside datasets, encoded within HTML pages. Individuals very
rarely requested their own copy of archived datasets, and instead the web interface appears
overwhelmingly the most popular means of accessing the datacentre’s content. Nevertheless,
if tables were required to be delivered in an incomplete form (either due to legal restrictions
or to conform with a specific sub-set request) this could be be done. A checksum was cre-
ated at the point of the DIP’s request, which was intended to ensure that it was both complete
and correct with respect to the request issued. Similarly, the original SIP bitstream could
be requested when it was of value. An example offered during discussions was of certain
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) datasets that could not really be understood when
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converted from their source form and separated from the application that created them.
In technical terms, the system that stores the archived materials had no direct contact with
the outside world. The datacentre web server operated as a client to the archival servers,
with limited, read only access. Therefore if the web server was compromised the extent to
which a malicious individual could damage the archival storage component of the system
was limited.
The service’s expected performance levels were made explicit within Schedule 11 of the
the datacentre contract. For datasets not exceeding 2.5 GB delivery was required to follow
within 10 minutes of requests in 90 per cent of cases and within 30 minutes of the remainder.
5 minutes was added to these targets for every gigabyte of data over the 2.5 GB threshold.
This appeared to be comfortably achieved, and was reflected in the system design; after a
request had lasted 10 minutes without response it was cancelled and the user was referred
to the ordering page. A further requirement compels the service to provide access to paper
documentation within five days of a request. Granular targets based on media type were
specified but since in practice most requests were satisifed with online delivery these were
not largely relevant. Service availability was also required to meet levels of satisfaction.
Availability for 98 per cent of working hours was the minimum threshold and periods of
scheduled non-availability were communicated explicitly to the datacentre users via the web.
In practice, the datacentre maintained its dialogue with customers by presenting detailed
accounts of all service disruption on their website. Extensive failures associated with any
aspect of the the datacentre service level agreement could be penalised with the imposition
of service credits leading to a reduction in funding, as described above.
Technology, Technical Infrastructure and Security
All the datacentre systems aimed to use community-supported software and hardware, in-
cluding open source systems where possible. There was a variety of bespoke code that was
used during various data processing and validation stages but this was generally written in
mainstream scripting languages. Some data that arrived within the datacentre was encoded in
closed formats and therefore during the ingest and accessioning stages it becomes necessary
to rely on both proprietary software and hardware. Generally speaking however the choice
of system infrastructure raised no substantial risks of itself being irreplaceable, irrepairable
or subject to unanticipated and unavoidable licensing changes that will prejudice the ability
of the datacentre to continue at the same level.
Backups and Synchronisation Although backup strategies were well known through-
out the datacentre they differed from many aspects of policy in terms of their limited corre-
sponding documentation. One software specialist within the datacentre was unsure about the
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specifics of the procedures, and suggested that logs were “probably available”, and unable
to say for sure whether backup validation and firedrill recovery procedures were in place.
Furthermore, he suggested that only a single copy of data was retained, which contrasted
from the apparent reality, where four copies of each the datacentre dataset were maintained.
PCs within the service were purchased from Dell. There were also Sun servers in use, with
storage technologies provided by StorageTek. Other vendors documented as key equipment
maintainers (for the service as a whole) were Silicon Graphics, PDQ Computers and IBM.
Backup policy was alluded to within the Site Exchange Procedures Manual, which outlined
the procedures for moving media between onsite and offsite storage, and recording these
procedures. Mainly performed by systems administrators working with archival assistants,
other than during normal repository operation, these processes were undertaken when both
onsite copies of data were lost at the same time, in which case a third (off-site) copy was
recovered and if a particular media batch was determined to be faulty. At no point were all
copies of a particular dataset permitted to be in one place simultaneously; four copies were
maintained in total. All movements were recorded, identification of transit staff was required
to be checked and confirmations of receipt acknowledged and logged.
A Cron task ran a script that checked and compared checksum information (MD5), and
highlighted any discrepancies to be subsequently manually checked and repaired. This was
sufficiently regular to ensure that within the space of a week all the datasets (at the time of
assessment around 1 TB) had been checked. Some questions surroundedd closed files that
resided on unmounted filesystems, and whether or not these were subject to the same checks.
In order to ensure the ongoing appropriateness of the datacentre’s technological provisions,
the service’s newsgroups provided a forum to maintain current technological awareness and
discuss emerging trends, and any potential problems that might threaten the ongoing viability
of current mechanisms. Furthermore, the service maintained an active role within the wider
digital preservation and technology world and this enabled it to absorb a great deal of up
to date information. Finally, it has been responsible for providing training materials to a
diverse selection of communities and was therefore implicitly well versed in contemporary
technologies and trends. Omitted from the documentation provided to auditors was an up to
date hardware and software asset register which according to the service’s continuity plans
does exist.
Information Security System security provisions were mainly outlined within the data-
centre’s seemingly quite comprehensive Security Procedures Manual. This outlines proce-
dures for:
• obtaining security clearance for staff;
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• the method of recording such clearance;
• notifications to TNA that were required under the contract;
• other declarations required from staff, including dataset-specific declarations;
• physical access to archive areas
• procedures associated with closed or anonymised materials (these were made even
more explicit within the dedicated Closed Data Procedures Manual)
Security clearance was provided only with the consent of TNA, after they had received a sub-
mission from the datacentre containing details about the individual seeking access. Anyone
that would have regular access to archived data as part of their work required such clearance,
as did those that while not working explicitly with the data, could access by virtue of their
work (such as systems administrators). Forms were available (with criminal record checks
performed as standard) and following the granting of clearance this paperwork was retained
by the datacentre. A declaration was required to be made by all staff in accordance with the
Official Secrets Act, in common with all employees that might have access to government
information. Access to specific datasets required additional declarations on an individual
basis. Staff awaiting or refused clearance could work in other areas within the service but
not where exposure to data was possible.
Each of the three locations where archives were stored were governed by procedural restric-
tions. The Security Procedures Manual described only physical controls; according to this
document, logical security mechanisms were described elsewhere, but these were not dis-
closed during the evaluation. The datacentre Procedures Manual index did not appear to
include a separate manual dedicated to measures to control electronic access.
Key-only controls limited physical access to the paper storage area within the datacentre,
and a register of key holders was maintained. It was prohibited to loan keys to other staff
and any loss of keys was required to be reported to Infrastructure Services Management
(the parent university service dedicated to maintaining security), the key issuer or the head
of building services at the service. No one other than datacentre staff was ever permitted
to be left alone in any archive storage area. The silo storage facility had similar controls,
with physical interactions with data, as well as logical accesses recorded and logged. If third
party personnel required access this was to be provided with a member of the datacentre staff
present. At the offsite facilities administered by Recall Ltd., access was only available to the
datacentre staff following prior arrangement, under the terms of the service agreement.
The service building was protected by extensive physical security. A front desk was manned
at all working times by staff, with an on-site security company covering reception and build-
ing security outside the hours of 0700-1800, Monday to Friday. All members of staff were
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required to display a parent university ID card and visitors received and were required to dis-
play temporary passes, after having signed in. External doors were alarmed, although during
working hours these were disabled and CCTV cameras were strategically placed around the
outside of the building.
Documented procedures describe further good practice for the datacentre staff; these in-
cluded not leaving workstations unattended and unlocked, not copying data to workstation
disks, or to personal computers or media and not to send closed data via e-mail. It was
forbidden to print out material on shared printers, other than in the specific designated staff
area, and these copies were not to be left unattended. Source copies marked for destruction
could be destroyed only by the individual responsible for processing that particular dataset.
One apparent anomaly that arose relating to these restrictions was that several staff during
the audit were believed to be working from home, but the security arrangements for remote
working were not clarified.
The service business continuity plan made explicit some more aspects of security and con-
tingency planning, presenting details of appropriate contacts and policy guidelines. Outlined
within were emergency procedures, disaster recovery and service continuity arrangements
and an organisational risk register. This document applies to the service as a whole as op-
posed to just the datacentre. Detailed documentation described procedures that would follow
the loss of the the service computer suite, although these were mainly focussed on JANET,
the UK Academic network that was partially based within the service.
A range of contingencies were considered, including personnel accidents, break ins, flood-
ing, electricity or gas problems and fire. For each a description of avoidance and treatment
mechanisms was provided, along with appropriate steps to take and details of both external
individuals and staff that should be informed.
Computing systems within the datacentre provided some contingency with independent fail-
ure of most components unlikely to prove fatal. Disk redundancy was built in with RAID
5. The tape robot represented the archive’s only single point of potential failure; since it
had only one arm its non-availability would impact on service. A complete robot replace-
ment could be provided in only six hours, so this did not represent too severe a risk, and it
was unlikely that such extreme measures would be required. StorageTek, who supplied this
hardware, were responsible for undertaking repairs should a fault occur.
Finally, the continuity guide also contained a list of temporary office space providers for use
in the event of the non-availability of the Guilford Street Offices.
Three backup copies of all the datacentre data were created, ensuring that there was always
a set at the service, one at the offsite store and another at either of the locations or in transit
between them. According to documentation, the entire service could be recreated from one
set of backup tapes, which also contained cataloguing information and metadata.
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Conclusions
One area of concern was the lack of a true mission statement for the datacentre, that was
sufficiently succinct and widely available. Similarly, a more cohesive and well expressed
definition of its designated community would be useful, if only to further legitimise the
numerous policies and procedures that was has formally documented. Also in organisational
terms some ambiguities exist within the legal context that surrounds the datacentre. The
closed data procedures should be updated to reflect FOI and greater consideration given to
the data that accompanies (and was necessary for the interpretation of) Crown Copyright
materials, but was itself licensed under different terms.
With respect to digital object management, more explicit and granular planning for specific
formats would also be welcomed. The likelihood was that binary data formats will be ever
more present within government data sets and the approach to dealing with these appears
somewhat ad-hoc in places. Related to the shortcomings defining a designated community,
it would be good to see the datacentre explore in somewhat more detail the understandability
requirements of its users, and the anticipated requirements over time, in more expansive
terms than just accessibility. the datacentre should also take every effort to avoid having to
deduce information from datasets that arrive at from government departments. While these
departments continue to exist the bandwidth of communication should be extended wherever
possible to involve the departments more explicitly with the accessioning process. Some
questions also surround those materials that were maintained in their original bitstream form
to support contemporary usability (such as the GIS datasets described during discussions).
Whether these were being actively preserved was open to debate.
B.5 The UK Research Council Data Centre
Organisational Infrastructure
Mission and Mandate The datacentre’s mission statement was most formally expressed
within the ’About’ section of its website. It read, “The role of the [datacentre] was to assist
UK researchers to locate, access and interpret atmospheric data and to ensure the long-term
integrity of atmospheric data produced by Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)
projects”. This clearly reflected a degree of commitment to persistent retention, management
and access. NCAS itself, which was the National Centre for Atmospheric Science did not
include “long term” within its mission statement, but its self-described role did incorporate
issues of stability and sustainability, and reflected a commitment to such issues. However,
the datacentre core services included only “physical storage and adequate backup for data
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collections”, which was not quite the ’long-term retention and management’ that the check-
list demanded. The fundamental objective of the Centre appeared to be data provision, which
despite the implicit temporal issues associated with that, was not quite long-term preserva-
tion.
The NERC Data Policy Handbook described the detailed responsibilities of all NERC data
centres. NERC grant holders within academia were required to lodge research data with an
appropriate subject data centre. In turn, the appropriate data centre was required to:
• ensure adequate physical custody, validation, dissemination, review and purging of
that data;
• maintain standards of data stewardship;
• proactively seek out data within its subject area that would merit stewardship;
• promote the case for investment where necessary to facilitate the above;
• promote the use of data;
• formally arrange licenses to control the release of datasets to non-NERC recipients,
and the uses to which it can be put, and to protect NERC from legal liability;
• advise on the licensing or purchase of non-NERC data that was required by researchers;
• handle all requests for data within its subject area made to NERC;
• maintain up-to-date details of holdings available via the world-wide web;
• act as a gateway to other NERC data custodians;
• represent its discipline within NERC on matters concerning data
There can be little question that these generic requirements placed the burden of archival
responsibility upon the datacentre. Furthermore, the datacentre was expected to not only
respond to the submission of content, but also seek out relevant data, secure further resources
to support its activities, assume responsibility for the legality of its operations and work to
develop a network of NERC data centres. These requirements spell out the fundamental
mandate of the datacentre, and provide an operational context within which assessment was
meaningfully carried out.
Further data protocols and policies described other specific responsibilities that related to
data originating from only particular NERC programmes. For instance, the QUEST Data
Policy builds upon the NERC generic policy, extending it for data originating from QUEST
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member research. In some ways, these data policies were analogous to deposit agreements,
and defined more specific responsibilities for both depositors and the data centre. Some
points from this example, which appeared to be quite illustrative, include:
• The datacentre has primary responsibility for all QUEST data sets;
• The datacentre can refuse data that was of insufficient quality (e.g., lacks appropriate
documentation) or was of little long term value;
• Data must be lodged with datacentre as soon as they were validated and no later than
three months after acquisition (except where it cannot be determined whether data was
suitable for long term post-project curation);
• Data must be made available to all QUEST community following submission to dat-
acentre. Within the first year after submission uses by members of QUEST that were
not producers must get the permission of producers for use in order to enable princi-
ple investigators to get the first chance to exploit its value. All QUEST creators were
encouraged to share, and required to keep this embargo period as short as possible, up
to a maximum of one year;
• All data must be made publicly available after one year. However, any data users
within two years from the end of the originating project will be required to give the
name originators of data the option of co-authorship on any resulting papers.
Immediately apparent from these requirements was the onus placed upon the datacentre to
determine the quality and value associated with particular datasets. This would seem to indi-
cate that there was considerable emphasis on archival appraisal for submitted data, although
there seemed little to suggest the availability of sufficiently robust policies and procedures to
support this. Policies for data review and retention were stated within the centre’s Operations
Manual, although the implementation of these appeared somewhat weak.
Organisation and Steering A NERC Steering Committee was responsible for advising
on programme development, and ensuring the implementation of associated data manage-
ment plans. A data management sub group, including representation from the datacentre (or
other appropriate data centre(s)) was convened to support the Science Coordinator in these
activities. The Steering Committee was responsible for ensuring that data management was
carried out effectively (by providing adequate support and resources during the programme);
an appropriate data management plan was created; a realistic proportion of the overall pro-
gramme budget was devoted to support data management; and all holders of programme
awards comply with the data management policy of the programme, as outlined in the Data
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Management Plan. On this last point in particular the curation manager revealed some scepti-
cism, indicating that there were issues with enforcement. Consequently, circumstances have
arisen where NERC grant holders have failed to deposit content, or have provided incom-
plete datasets. The datacentre was not involved in the grant process, and therefore could not
compel deposit where it would be worthwhile. It was suggested that the datacentre would
have benefited from access to a more detailed online register of grant awards, to support their
pursuit of worthwhile data. In practical terms, discussions suggested that the datacentre was
simply not offered a great deal of data; however, it was also suggested that this situation was
changing, and therefore it was imperative that the datacentre was equipped to cope with a
consequent upsurge of deposited data.
Organisationally, the datacentre existed within a research institution setting under a Service
Level Agreement which describes core services, infrastructural developments, support for
other NERC Centres for Atmospheric Sciences and research. The SLA was renegotiated on
an annual basis. Core services as stated in the 2005-2006 SLA include the following, which
correspond closely to the NERC data policy requirements:
• Acquisition and distribution of observational data from the MET Office;
• Acquisition of numerical weather prediction data from the Met Office and European
Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecasts;
• Physical storage and adequate backup for data collections;
• Computing system to support data storage and limited user processing;
• An online catalogue of all data collections to help users to find the data they require;
• A distribution service to allow users to access data (including maintenance of both
FTP and web interfaces to the data.
Similarly, and again under the SLA, the datacentre was required to provide technical and
management advice for existing data activities in other NCAS centres, promote the datacen-
tre and NCAS by maintaining a prominent presence in meetings and providing appropriate
publicity and liaising with other data centres from other disciplines within the UK. There was
an additional research requirement, whereby in order to maintain the validity and relevance
of datacentre activities, the Centre should carry out an active research programme in climate
physics and data assimilation research.
The datacentre was one of two distinct NERC designated data centres sharing a parent insti-
tution. The two had resisted merger, favouring a ’two front doors’ approach that seemed to
permit greater influence over NERC.
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Succession or contingency planning was not regarded as the responsibility of the datacentre.
Instead, as noted in the curation manager’s self-assessment responses, this was regarded as
an issue that NERC was responsible for resolving. Little evidence was available to indicate
whether NERC had implemented appropriate arrangements to deal with any cessation of
repository operations.
Staffing The datacentre directly employs around twelve full time staff members, although
the close relationship with its sibling repository mades it difficult to determine where some
positions (specifically research oriented positions) predominantly lie. There was evidence
to suggest that there were appropriate staff numbers to fulfil the functions of the repository.
below the director and then curation manager levels the staff hierarchy incorporated a num-
ber of roles. The first was Environmental Data Scientists; these individuals were responsible
for managing data ingest from data suppliers, with duties including the documentation of
datasets, collation of metadata, negotiation with suppliers and responding to queries from
users and suppliers. Generally, the staff members performing these roles were from atmo-
spheric science backgrounds, with postgraduate qualifications at either Masters or PhD level,
and capable of demonstrating general IT competence. The second role includes those respon-
sible for Operations and Delivery, which was concerned with providing generic services for
datasets. This includes hardware infrastructure, media handling, query management, access
services, user management and other more generic curation issues. These staff were required
to demonstrate expertise in one or more of a range of disciplines including computer science,
systems administration and atmospheric science. The final role encompasses researchers and
developers. The former were expected to have PhDs in atmospheric science with the latter
expected to have accumulated experience of software development, most probably through
the completion of a computer science degree.
Staff numbers were sufficient, and evidence suggested that the organisation had a broad un-
derstanding of the implications in terms of workload and personnel requirements of a move
towards a more ’OAIS compliant’ infrastructure. As indicated above, the organisation would
have benefited from committing extra resources towards activities associated with preserv-
ing content. For instance, in physical bit-level terms, data storage, hardware, backups and
checksum management could have been prioritised. Similarly, archival lifecycle activities
such as ingest, data and metadata management could have been assigned explicit ownership
by individuals or roles within the Centre. Furthermore, legal advise should have been at least
solicited given the doubt that to some extent surrounds agreements with depositors and con-
tent creators. These recommendations were primarily focussed on enhancing the repositorys
scalability.
Training was available for staff, although it was presented in a fairly ad-hoc fashion, based
mainly on staff demand. At the time of the audit, recent training had been offered in scripting
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languages such as Perl and Python whereby several copies of prominent learning texts were
purchased and staff were encouraged to learn as a group. Atmospheric science courses were
available for those with less experience of the datacentre’s community’s primary discipline.
STFC forms were available to request other specific training opportunities, and management
courses and health and safety training were encouraged for all staff. There were however few
mechanisms in place to identify knowledge or skills gaps and therefore staff were expected
to maintain a degree of consciousness of their own shortcomings, which was perhaps un-
realistic. Better structured training programmes could have been developed and associated
with particular roles within the Centre, in order to ensure the effective development of staff.
Notwithstanding this, evidence and testimony within the Centre suggested that training was
provided promptly when needs were identified, although this seemed to be most obviously
true when a wide desire was expressed.
Turnover of staff within the Centre was low, which implied that those employed were both
experienced and competent. An inevitable consequence of course was that longer term staff
would cost more money to keep employed. Since CCLRC deals almost exclusively in perma-
nent contracts with good terms this factor must be taken into consideration when accounting
for the Centre’s financial sustainability.
Designated Community The Centre’s designated community was defined more nar-
rowly than its overall potential user base. The definition included UK based atmospheric
scientists or non-undergraduate researchers in atmospheric science who were English speak-
ers and had access to Internet services. Of users registered within the system only 45 per
cent fitted within these parameters, reflecting the diverse range of individuals interested in
accessing content, but the Centre’s commitment (in terms of preservation) was limited to
making materials usable for that stated group. Although an internal understanding of the
designated community of the datacentre was demonstrated during discussions with the cura-
tion manager, there was no evidence of a centralised, published definition. Similarly, little
evidence was available to suggest that formal mechanisms were in place to monitor the evo-
lution of this community, although the relationships that were maintained with depositors,
who were in turn likely to be end users, were close, and provided insights into latest devel-
opments. However, of the 8000 or so registered users of the datacentre web access system,
a small fraction (less than 5 per cent) were responsible for depositing. Further insights into
community developments were available as a consequence of the research work that dat-
acentre staff were personally involved in; staff were in many cases themselves part of the
defined designated community, and their interests, knowledge base and expectations were
to a greater or lesser extent representative of the wider world. A further means of moni-
toring was provided by conducting user surveys (usually comprising around ten questions,
and part of regularly conducted NESC assessments). Finally, the Centre maintained a user
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queries system whereby users can provide any feedback about data, services, or any other
aspect of the datacentre. In reality, each of these mechanisms had community monitoring as
something of a side effect, rather than representing its primary rationale. Nevertheless, they
provide evidence of an ongoing dialogue with the designated community.
There was little to indicate the existence of formal mechanisms to react to accumulated evi-
dence of community evolution. One anticipated an ad-hoc approach to dealing with changes
in understandability or usability expectations. Frequently, the datacentre’s approaches did
appeared to reflect the capabilities of their defined communities. For instance, it was re-
vealed that despite a management will to provide more digital materials encoded in the binary
NetCDF format there was an internally held perception that this would represent a barrier to
usability for up to 70 per cent of the designated community who would struggle with this
choice in terms of usability (through lack of required skills or software). However at the
time of this evaluation perceived changes in the designated community had not led to any
notable changes to systems or processes. The sole recorded case where there was evidence
of a reaction to changing community expectations was when the Centre sought additional
resource for a period to cater for emerging communities associated with a particular surface
dataset. The NERC Data Management Advisory Group financed this activity, enabling the
datacentre to reflect the changing needs of the (expanding) designated community.
Policies and Procedures In terms of policies and procedures, the datacentre’s most ob-
vious omissions were a rigorously defined preservation policy and a complementary disaster
plan. As well as lacking specific policies, it appeared that those policies currently in place
were seldom subject to systematic review; instead updates seemed more likely to be applied
reactively, in response to specific circumstances or problems that have arisen. The monitor-
ing activity within the centre was very good, with considerable technological mechanisms
to facilitate inter-team communication, and a weekly team meeting. However, evidence of
structured policy assessment was lacking. Similarly, although research activities were ex-
tremely active and closely aligned with the management of the data service, and there was
evidence of an awareness of emerging trends and technologies, this too seemed to be more
ad-hoc than formalised. However, this may not represent a particular problem; it might be
argued that as long as an awareness was maintained of the best contemporary exchange for-
mats for the Centre’s designated community, in association with sufficiently low risk storage
and backup systems, the preservation aspects of the datacentre’s mission were likely to be
realised. Perhaps more important than monitoring technological changes, and therefore wor-
thy of greater investment, was being equipped (both intellectually and in terms of resource
availability) to react to changes when they became apparent. The conception of disaster
plans, accompanied by the introduction of regular fire-drills and data recovery testing was
also recommended.
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The lack of an explicitly defined chain of custody within the Centre was of some concern;
it was clear from discussions that the datacentre had no audit trail throughout the life-cycle
of a data resource within its custody. This meant that trust in the data or data integrity
could be compromised. Cases were described where users have requested proof that the
data delivered to them was correct and complete, and the solution has simply been to verify
this with the data creator. Such reliance creates obvious problems when data creators were
no longer available or lack complete records of the content they’ve created. Although the
tangible risks associated with such circumstances remain difficult to quantify, the damage to
reputation and trust (two assets of considerable value to a service like the datacentre) could
be considerable. In order to achieve trustworthy status greater investment was required into
archive management practices and the creation and management of documentation.
Validation of Policy There was little doubt about the datacentre’s willingness and en-
thusiasm to seek assessment and external review. Their very participation in this pilot audit,
and overall enthusiasm about the process and the subsequent opportunities that may arise for
formal certification indicated as such, and demonstrated an understanding of the potential
benefits of such activities. Similarly, each of the NERC Centres for Atmospheric Sciences
were required to undertake an external and independent Science and Management Audit,
intended to demonstrate management effectiveness. In the report of the 2004 audit the dat-
acentre was rated as excellent, delivering a significant national capability. Concurrently,
during the same period the datacentre conducted a survey of its registered users (April/May
2004), and although only 7 per cent responded, the exercise yielded a sense of successes
(range and quality of data; fast network; prompt human response) and shortcomings (access
restrictions; lack of tools; update frequency) which have seemingly informed subsequent
efforts.
A final concern with respect to policy and procedure was that the datacentre risk register,
potentially one of the Centre’s most useful documents, existed only in a prototype form. It
was suggested that as a mechanism to support and facilitate contemporary organisational
management (and of course more long term sustainability), this should be brought up to full
production status at the earliest opportunity.
Business Planning The self-completed check-list response submitted by the curation
manager prior to the onsite audit activity indicated the existence of an NCAS business plan,
which contained details related to short and long term planning for the datacentre. However,
these documents were not made available to auditors. Similarly, although processes exist at
a parent level for the review and adjustment of these planning instruments, there was little
evidence of an autonomous and more granular approach to business planning and ongoing
management to ensure the ongoing strategic resource investment to facilitate infrastructural
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sustainability. This reflects an earlier stated concern that NCAS was failing to engage ade-
quately when negotiating issues that datacentre staff ought to be more closely involved with.
Examples included the negotiation of contracts (or data protocols/policies) with NERC grant
holders and the conception of succession plans or agreements.
Financial and Accounting Infrastructure Accounting procedures were consistent
with those of the datacentre’s institutional parenT, and evidence was made available to
demonstrate compliance with standard accountancy best practice. Money was available to
alleviate problems associated with short term funding gaps, but of some concern was the
suggestion within the Centre’s prototype risk register that there was a thirty per cent likeli-
hood of funding being cut with a significant impact, meaning the irrecoverable loss of some
medium priority and high priority data. It was suggested that the Centre may therefore wish
to seek more formal assurances for financial allocations where these were available or al-
ternatively investigate the possibilities that may be available for generating self-sustainable
services. Nevertheless, the datacentre had contracts established with NERC to store and dis-
seminate data originating from NERC funded research. There were three tiers of projects
that contribute to datacentre budget, and therefore the risk that all three would disappear for
a long period of time appeared to be quite low.
Much of datacentre funding came as a consequence of NERC directed mode programmes,
where scientific researchers bid for a particular pot of money to undertake experimental re-
search. Alternative NERC funding comes in the form of response mode grants, although
these rarely generated data that the datacentre was interested in. Finally, NERC consortium
grants, involving substantial funding and widespread participation, were a frequent source
of income for datacentre, given the nature of data originating from such research. There was
an intrinsic flexibility associated with the core NCAS funding. A written agreement allowed
the datacentre to use this money to match funding in other activities, in order to bring in
more money, assuming that core service needs were adequately satisfied. Similarly, money
could be carried over from year to year, an important facility given the often unpredictable
costs associated with maintaining a technical service. Internal datacentre research activi-
ties were financed partially by NCAS, although this amounted to little more than a single
FTE researcher; there was an expectation that the Centre would pursue research grants to
supplement these resources.
Of some concern was the revelation that the availability of content originating from the MET
Office (which, it was suggested, the datacentre relied upon for its very survival) was not
guaranteed due to the non-renewal of the agreement between the MET and the datacentre.
An original archive and dissemination agreement ended in 1999 and its terms stated then
that datacentre should destroy all data upon cessation of agreement. Notwithstanding an
ongoing renegotiation of this contract between NERC and the MET Office, it was suggested
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that this, and similar idiosyncrasies should be addressed with high priority, particular where
unforeseen legal impediments might impact fatally on the datacentre’s ability to continue
to operate. At the time of the audit, a new contract between NERC and the MET Office
was in the midst of being negotiated (agreement was regarded as a mere formality), with
an appendix explicitly permitting the datacentre to redistribute MET Office data to bona fide
researchers for the purposes of publishing papers. Although NERC incurred no direct charge
from the MET Office for providing access, it costs a great deal in terms of time; at least 25
per cent of datacentre staff time was spent on MET office data requests. The extent to which
this could be sustained might be questioned, and perhaps ought to have been more formally
documented. There were suggestions that the availability of MET Office datasets were a
necessary precursor to the datacentre’s conception and necessary for its survival.
Ownership, Rights and Legal Issues The datacentre appeared to operate without
formal deposit agreements, and where agreements exist there appeared to be a somewhat
loose approach to contractual management. The relationship with the MET Office outlined
above provides a good example. Data originating from NERC was subject to more formal
terms, and these were outlined within the NERC data policy and associated program-specific
data protocols and policies. These appeared to be negotiated at a level beyond the immediate
datacentre management (although appeared to involve at least some degree of consultation
with datacentre).
Further rights-related questions were associated with ambiguities over the datacentre’s right
to change data, which might be regarded as ’preservation rights’. The internally held per-
ception was that the datacentre probably did not have the rights to change, or even reformat
data. Instead the rights were to share data. In practical terms though, it was argued that irre-
spective of the existence of these rights, the datacentre would not change data because of the
question of trust (the internally held perception being that users don’t trust the archive to alter
content), and the comparatively small number of widely acknowledged data formats: both of
the principle formats utilised by the datacentre, NASA AMES and NetCDF, appeared stable
and widely used. Ownership of data was similarly unclear; NERC was committed mainly to
making data public, and therefore questions of ownership were given considerably less pri-
ority. Discussions and analysis of example NERC funding agreements suggested that NERC
was unlikely to own data generated from funded research since this was not expressly stip-
ulated in the grant award documentation. Notwithstanding such ambiguity, it was claimed
that the datacentre might not to make data public if there was a notable associated revenue
stream that might be exploitable. In the case of NERC data, contracts exist between NERC
and the appropriate universities/researchers providing (and in many cases owning) the data.
No direct agreements were formed between the datacentre itself and depositors, with mutual
responsibilities mainly encompassed in a data protocol corresponding to each NERC pro-
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gramme. There were questions about the extent to which the datacentre was legally entitled
to make such management decisions based on their perceived value of archived data.
Monitoring of intellectual property rights existed in embryonic form in the Operations Man-
ual on the datacentre wiki, but this fell short of the “comprehensive overview” demanded
by the audit checklist. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that this issue could be taken to
extremes, and ISO 9000 series certification might be regarded as necessary in order to con-
form to the check list. However, within this context, it was felt that to make such demands
of the Centre was not helpful and ultimately unnecessary. Of potentially greater relevance,
conversations revealed that no formal policies or procedures exist relating to requirements
arising from Data Protection and Freedom of Information legislation. the curation manager’s
(layperson’s) view was that neither Act presents any problems or legal incompatibilities with
existing datacentre practice. With respect to Freedom of Information, the rationale appears
to be that existing Environmental Information Regulations supersede FoI, encompassing all
of its requirements (and more). However, in order to ensure that everybody at the archive
was aware of legal issues and the appropriate approaches to resolve any associated concerns,
it was suggested that written guidance should be conceived. This was especially true for
those members of staff responsible for answering user queries and providing user support.
Legal doubts were apparently quite widespread and the current non-formalised approach,
which seemed to be based on continuing as long as no legal challenges arise, might be un-
sustainable. Contracting a lawyer to advise for a month or two should not represent a vast
investment, and was recommended. NERC has set some precedent with respect to legal is-
sues, when it provided the datacentre with legal input for the purposes of drafting a limitation
of liability statement. STFC has in house legal expertise available.
A final concern in this area relates to the current system workflow evident within the data-
centre. Control of access to datasets was built into the access system/interface, with those
responsible for information ingest responsible for determining the appropriate access level
for particular datasets and content. There was therefore perhaps scope for concern when
dealing with atypical access rules. Nevertheless, this was a small concern, as the system
demonstrated sufficient fluidity to suggest that it could be altered to reflect emerging re-
quirements.
Digital Object Management
Acquisition and Ingest Ingest processes at the datacentre were in an ongoing state of
evolution, a fact that was acknowledged within the Centre’s Online Operations Manual. The
most urgent requirement appeared to be the development of increasingly formalised ingest
methods to ensure both robustness and scalability amid an increasing quantity of deposited
and retrieved data.
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The datacentre’s Environmental Data Scientists were responsible for engaging with data sup-
pliers and providing overall management for the ingest process. At the beginning of each
NERC project, staff liaised with the relevant community to determine expectations, and to
get a sense of the form that data was likely to assume. In some circumstances data was rela-
tively easy to obtain; the most notable examples were ’pulled data’, retrieved automatically
from remote, networked instruments. In other cases, a greater onus was on datacentre staff
to actively pursue the acquisition of data.
In quantitative terms, the datacentre’s five ingest staff each dealt with around twenty datasets,
and each has a corresponding named contact. Following this initial contact, a number of
mechanisms existed to practically support the ingest of content. The most common required
scientists to simply upload their data following its capture via the File Transfer Protocol.
Data transferred in this fashion was delivered to the datacentre ’incoming’ directory, where
it would reside until the ingest team manually transferred it into the archive. An alternative
mechanism, the web based file uploader tool, was only marginally distinct from this ap-
proach, with additional file format validation and file integrity verification controls exercised
prior to upload. Although such automated controls were not available for data arriving via
FTP, some such content was subject to random validation and verification. ’Pulled data’ was
retrieved to a ’deliveries’ directory, broadly equivalent to the ’incoming’ directory mentioned
above. Files ingested into the archive shared a common naming convention, as indicated be-
low:
instrument location YYYYMMDD[hh][mm][ss][ extra].ext
Both instruments and locations were required to be registered with the the datacentre to en-
sure their validity. Some ambiguity existed though over the extent to which an instrument
could change and still maintain the same identity. For instance, if components were replaced,
was an instrument the same as it was before? Similarly, some confusion appeared to surround
the location and time information of certain data, such as those mounted on aircraft. Gener-
ally speaking, such ambiguities, as well as processing that has been undertaken on particular
data, will be documented within file-specific metadata. At the point of ingest, documents
may have been associated with datasets in order to provide format descriptions, details of
problems or further information about particular instruments. This documentation was as-
sociated with data in one of various ways. The first was to include it within a file named
00README that was located within the relevant data directory. An alternative approach
was to create a file entitled 00instrument location date.txt, which seemed to be a more ro-
bust means of enforcing the association. Finally, staff explained that some file formats, most
notably the NASA AMES format, supported the addition of in-line comments.
Following deposit or retrieval, ingest staff were required to undertake some subsequent pro-
cessing prior to archiving. High level catalogue information was created at the datacentre;
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a proactive process, this demanded engagement with creators and information owners. The
CDML or CSML XML schema provided a transparent vehicle to describe model data, and
this incorporated details of all permitted instruments and locations. Relational databases
were used to store data metadata corresponding to non-modal/gridded data. Files were
checked too for instance, the NetCDF file checker determined that mandatory constituent
parts of such files were present and valid. Processing to split the files could also be under-
taken. Scripts to handle this data processing and the ultimate deposit within the archive were
created for each data stream being ingested into the datacentre, based on a generic deposit
program. As outlined within the Operations Manual, this meant that there was a real need
for rationalisation, given the wide number of only slightly different scripts that exist. In-
deed, the Operations Manual outlined a number of requirements for an improved ingestion
methodology, which closely reflect the findings of this assessment. Firstly, there have been
historical examples of data files in the archive being incorrect or corrupt, caused by bad data
from suppliers, or errors during data transfer (both from the outside Internet to the datacentre,
and within the internal network of servers). Discussions suggested that in at least one case,
content that arrived automatically could be ingested into the main archive even if lacking
documentation, encoded in an incorrect format or non compliant with file naming conven-
tions. This issue was one of trust; the datacentre’s relationships with certain depositors were
such that they would store any content that originates from them (even, it was suggested, if
that content was rubbish). Such arrangements were not formally defined however. Questions
of data inventory abound; during the audit staff appeared surprised at the existence of .avi
movie files within the archive, with no obvious means to preserve such formats.
Several other areas for improvement had been already identified. These include more modu-
larisation of the ingest process (so that for instance the method of ingest was not influenced
by the physical manner with which data arrived at the datacentre); more automation, to limit
errors and optimise staff time; logging to maintain an appropriate audit trail; better metadata;
quality control mechanisms; and more formalised methods for data pre-processing. There
was a requirement for substantial efforts at both an organisational and technological levels
to introduce formal, internally enforceable policies on ingest.
Since no deposit agreements were formed between archive and depositors, it was difficult to
determine whether all of the properties of digital objects were being preserved. The practice
at the datacentre implied a commitment to preserve the received file format and its accom-
panying documentation. There did not seem to be any other explicit ’properties’ defined
that were being actively preserved. Similarly, the data policies and protocols associated with
specific NERC programmes revealed little about acceptable file formats or levels of docu-
mentation that should accompany data. A specification did exist to describe the information
that should accompany data submissions, and depositors were made aware of the deposit
requirements. Unsurprisingly, SIP configurations may differ slightly for different deposits,
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depending on how the data was collected and managed prior to deposit to datacentre.
Content Selection The NERC data policy did permit the datacentre some discretion in
deciding whether or not to accept deposited content. “The sole reason for keeping data”,
described the datacentre Operations Manual, “is to distribute it for use”. This did not pre-
suppose contemporary use, instead acknowledging the fact that even long term curation was
undertaken with a view to one day using the information that has been preserved. The two
most influential considerations were the usability and usefulness of data. The former was
influenced by such factors as the format within which the information was encoded (NASA
AMES and NetCDF formats were the most common, and likely to be usable by most of
the datacentre’s registered user community) and any conditions of use associated with the
dataset. The latter consideration related to the likelihood with which people would actually
want to use the data its quality, including scale, coverage and number of gaps were relevant
here, as were its uniqueness, its potential for strategic use by the datacentre and the breadth
of its parameters, a key factor for determining its reuse potential. Expressed elsewhere, the
datacentre described its efforts as a combination of facilitation and curation. The former
was concerned with adding value, by storing and disseminating from within datacentre. The
latter was about ensuring survival and ultimately, long term usefulness. These primary mo-
tivations were expressed with a greater degree of granularity within the Centre’s Operations
Manual, summarised below:
• Facilitation Arguments
– Good coverage in terms of time and space, with few gaps and high resolution;
– Data exhibits parameters of sufficient breadth to ensure their usefulness outside
of the projects that collected them;
– High contemporary usage;
– Complementary to funding body objectives;
– Shortcomings inherent in the current data source;
• Curation Arguments
– Uniqueness;
– Data lacks a primary archive;
Dataset Review Of note were the lack of efforts to assess the ongoing value, usability
and performance of data stored within the datacentre. In fact, the Centre has considerable
documentation describing a dataset review process, and it was therefore regrettable that to
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date, this has not been particularly well implemented. Dataset reviews can be considered in
similar terms to archival appraisal, and within the Operations Manual the procedure was de-
scribed as a Retention Process. The process, as documented, was prompted by an automatic
notification that data review was due, with a milestone in the project database conceived
to correspond to each review. When this happens, a responsible individual was required to
evaluate:
• the content of the data’s corresponding catalogue entry (checking that links were work-
ing for example);
• the extent to which corresponding web pages were current, appropriate, informative
and usable;
• the extent to which data was usable, accessible and adequately documented;
• whether any representation information (specifically software) was required to use the
data;
• the effectiveness and security of corresponding ingest mechanisms; and
• the extent to which data was adequately documented, creating and aggregating docu-
mentation where appropriate.
Applying these criteria would result in evaluation marks between 1 (’Poor’) and 5 (’Excel-
lent’) corresponding to both data usability and usefulness. Reviewers were then required to
propose subsequent action, which could be to leave the dataset as is, keep the dataset but
implement some changes or remove the dataset from the archive. The latter seemed to im-
ply destruction, with no overt infrastructures in place to support transfer of stewardship to
a more appropriate repository elsewhere. Despite the reasonably robust provisions for data
review, discussions with the curation manager revealed that the process has seldom been
undertaken. The number of datasets currently within the Centre, combined with the time
consuming nature of the review process has been the most critical factor simply put, review
notifications were arising more quickly than staff can undertake reviews. This was undoubt-
edly a problem, and threatens the viability of long term archiving within the Centre. The
datacentre’s emphasis was very much on ingest, with dissemination enjoying a comparable,
albeit secondary level of prioritisation.
No explicit mechanisms existed to authenticate the source of data that arrived at the Centre,
with depositors authenticated using the system relied upon for end user access. The expres-
sion of interest in depositing data with the datacentre was weighed by the ingest department
using circumstantial evidence (e-mail address, name of institution named as employer, was
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the depositor known in the scientific community of the subject area). No agreement or con-
tract, legally binding or otherwise, was usually signed between the depositor and the archive.
In many cases, the depositor could be compelled to deposit their data with the datacentre
(e.g., through a funding contract with NERC), in which case authentication was by associ-
ation with the funding agency. Submission Information Packages (SIPs) were verified, but
usually as a statistical sample of the whole deposit. Since this was deemed as sufficient
for the datacentre, there was no reason to expect that all SIPs should be inspected at full
length. Especially given that some continuous data streams were uploaded automatically to
the datacentre about every minute, it would be difficult to verify all data contained in these
datasets in real time, before they become available to the users. Verification was performed
by using automated scripts (python and perl languages) which were custom-developed for
each dataset.
A transfer process was also performed by using automated scripts that enabled datacentre
staff to verify that all files had been transmitted in a single submission session. However,
checksums were not used at the data transfer stage nor during ingest processing (only AIPs
receive checksums).
The introduction of tracking mechanisms was considered worthwhile to enable depositors to
see at what stage of the ingest or preservation process their data had actually reached. During
the audit, ingest staff spoke of some experiences where depositors had misunderstood the
time-scales within which the ingest process would be undertaken and were expecting their
data to become available immediately, following its upload to the datacentre. This indicates
that the ingest workflow could be better explained and made more visible for the depositors.
Preservation Policy and Levels Within the archive, a distinction was drawn between
three classes of data, tentatively known as A, B and C data, which correspond roughly to the
extent to which their preservation was prioritised. The characteristics of each was explained
in simple terms by the curation manager. Class A data was that for which the datacentre
was the primary archive, and this amounted to approximately one third of all data holdings.
Class B was that for which although the datacentre was not the primary or sole custodian,
scepticism existed about the ability of the primary archive to provide adequate preserva-
tion services. Class C data was that which was adequately preserved elsewhere, but was
sufficiently useful to retain. Only class A and some class B data for which the datacen-
tre considers itself to be the primary steward was really relevant when considering issues
of preservation. The fundamental differences between classes were not formally expressed
anywhere at the time of this assessment - the internal classification was a realisation of an
appraisal - but had tremendous influence over the preservation activities to which particular
data sets will be subject.
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Following ingest, data that arrived into the datacentre’s archival storage were likely to have
already been subject to some processing. Class A, B and C data were distributed across
several disks; a single directory contained symbolic links that corresponded to each dataset,
and pointed to the physical space where individual data streams were located. All access,
including end user access was via this directory. The server that this directory resided upon
probably represents the most vulnerable point of the system. If compromised this could limit
the extent to which data can be retrieved or its completeness ensured. Worth noting here was
the fact that by maintaining a single system for archive and delivery, the Centre was limited
in terms of the extent to which system changes could be implemented while maintaining an
optimal level of service.
The transition of a SIP into an AIP and subsequently a DIP was not regulated by a formal
policy, nor documented anywhere other than the resulting directory structure on the archival
storage media. The datacentre only accepts data that it has appraised as suitable for de-
posit. Therefore, SIPs were always transformed into an AIP/DIP. The choice of structure for
archival and dissemination packages was made by the ingest staff, who make their decision
based on how the dataset was most likely to be used. Therefore, the primary criteria for
converting SIPs into AIPs was ease of use. But no strict policy existed, and the decision to
convert a particular dataset in one way or another, was not documented in a separate log,
audit trail or documentation. It was only visible from the consequent presentation of the data
in the storage system.
No formal criteria were established to determine when preservation responsibility was ac-
cepted by the datacentre, and neither was the transfer of responsibility acknowledged in a de-
posit agreement exchanged with the depositor. In practice, the datacentre assumed preserva-
tion responsibility from the moment the data had been transferred (uploaded) to the datacen-
tre and an e-mail had been received from the depositor containing the script of the completed
transfer. The datacentre could have benefited from formalising this process, especially for
the class A datasets. In terms of current practice, whereby the datacentre generally utilised a
single file format for SIP, AIP and DIP, the conception of detailed depositor agreements may
not seem to have been necessary. However, looking into the future when the datacentre may
have had to consider AIP or even SIP migration as part of preservation processing, it would
have to be clear about the rights and responsibilities it has with respect to data.
Since a finite number of AIP ’types’ were generally accepted (measurement data, model
data, satellite data, Met Office data), the Operations Manual specified an AIP configuration
for each. However, the AIP configurations were not documented in a sufficiently struc-
tured way to permit the automatic verification or validation of an archival package. The AIP
definitions maintained by datacentre were largely sufficient to meet long term preservation
requirements, although, again, were rather poorly documented. The choice of file formats
for each class of data stored was more based on data usage criteria than on issues of long-
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term preservation. In fact though, they also happen to be suitable for preservation without
requiring extensive processing at short intervals. Although the datacentre Operations Man-
ual described the process of constructing archival packages from submission packages, no
documentation was created in practice that enabled one to verify whether the instructions had
been followed. The division of a SIP into constituent AIPs (i.e. files in a directory structure
different from that of the original SIP) was not tracked no checks were performed to verify
whether all files transferred to the datacentre were in the stored AIP.
Perhaps more relevant with respect to this point was the appraisal of datasets for classifica-
tion into class A, B and C datasets. The appraisal criteria were fundamentally sound. The
problem though was that the class or category assignment did not mean anything for the AIP
configuration irrespective of whether a dataset was classified as A, B or C, it was kept in
the same file format and supplemented with the same kind of documentation. The only dif-
ference was in storage and back-up practices whereby class C data was supported by fewer
safe copies (if any). It could have been argued that the AIP configuration was sufficient for
preserving the class A data, and that it could do no more harm to also apply it also to class
B and C data. However, the in principle the content with high preservation priority should
have been accompanied by richer supplementary information, in greater quantity. Documen-
tation as such was a weak point at the datacentre, at least from the archival point of view.
One could argue have argued that all AIPs of class A should have had their entire custo-
dial history logged, all processing decisions documented, all usage occasions tracked, and
all changes to documentation audited. This was not done at the time of this assessment. An
example was offered of the Hierarchical Data Format raw data that arrived from the HIRDLS
instrument aboard the Earth Observing System (EOS) AURA Mission Spacecraft. Given the
nature of the data, which was tied very closely to the spacecraft’s instruments, it was vital
that the semantics of the data were appropriately documented with sufficient representation
and provenance information.
Integrity Validation Identifiers were assigned at ingest as described above, and the file
naming convention was publicly documented. The instrument name (itself unique), time
and location information created sufficient heterogeneity for the file names to act as unique
identifiers, at least internally within the archive itself. These were maintained throughout the
archival process, and therefore ensured traceability between SIPs, AIPs and DIPs. Because
each of these packages maintains a mutual one to one relationship (SIPs were never split into
multiple AIPs for instance) then this maintained the integrity of the references.
Ingested files were not immediately protected against alteration (checksums were applied
later in the archival process) and no audit trail was created from the processing done at the
ingest stage. The ingested files were vulnerable to malicious or accidental alterations until
checksums were calculated (upon creation of the AIP), but this process could take up to 40
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days. A monthly automated script was responsible for calculating checksums and comparing
them to the stored value that was taken at the point of AIP creation.
The only links between updates to an AIP exist in the form of directory structure of the AIPs
within the storage system. The location of AIPs in the storage system was managed by a
single machine which provided symbolic links from a single directory to the actual physical
locations that data was stored. If datasets were moved then the symbolic links were updated
to reflect that. Dissemination and archive management mechanisms use the directory when
referencing content. Because only weekly backups were made of this machine there was a
risk that links between access systems and archive management systems may have become
fractured.
In terms of preservation metadata, some popular fields were present, but since the Centre
had not formally compiled or published its metadata standard, there was no way to evaluate
how the metadata creation taking place actually was. Some provenance information was
included in the description of the dataset on the web, question marks remain as to how this
was collected. It appears to be created by the Ingest department, but the extent to which it
was based on information provided by the depositor, was unclear.
Metadata documenting preservation actions and processing performed at the datacentre was
generally not created in a systematic way. The use of archive management software or a work
flow tracking system may have facilitated metadata collection and management. Discussions
touched on the possible use of datacentre’s Trac WiKi system to record the tasks and stages
that each dataset goes through within the repository.
There was no formal mechanisms to support representation information acquisition and man-
agement, or for determining approaching file format obsolescence. However, since content
was mainly restricted to one of two file formats, and staff maintained close relationships
with theire designated community, they should be reasonably well informed and forewarned
should one of these file formats begin to appeared vulnerable. Questions remained though
about the extent to which these relationships were formally and systematically explored.
Understandability was ensured by consistently employing data scientists from within the
communities that ultimately use archived content (and were therefore able to demonstrate
comparable knowledge bases), and this seemed a sensible and pragmatic approach. Given
the tradition of low staff turnover this might just be a problem over time if the communities in
the outside world change unbeknownst to those operating within the staff of the datacentre,
who have long completed their studies and other academic activities.
Since no preservation policy as such existed, it was difficult to remark on processes for
changing it. There did not seem to be a steering board, council or working group that would
meet regularly to discuss preservation issues and how to change the existing policies and
practices. It was suggested that this might be rectified to give a clearer, more structured
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insight into the ways in which the archive can evolve and develop. Similarly, there was no
clear way to determine the effectiveness of the repository’s preservation planning, although
it was acknowledged that this was tremendously difficult to demonstrate; it was much more
straightforward to identify where such activities have failed, and the datacentre appeared to
have a good track record with respect to avoiding data loss, particularly of the most highly
prized, class A assets.
Preservation was a somewhat simplistic task at datacentre effectively just storage of bits in
an particular file format and no preservation activities were undertaken on a regular basis
that could endanger the semantic properties of original deposited files. The rationale be-
hind this was partially one of trust; as the curation manager explained, and was described
above, scientists and other users do not trust the data centre to make changes to the data.
A degree of scepticism surrounds science, the curation manager continued; historically, few
scientists would use commercial software products due to fear of data distortion, instead
favouring their own bespoke FORTRAN programs. The other factor was a general reliance
on reasonable, well documented and open formats that were well supported by a range of
widely accessible tools. NASA AMES and NetCDF were the primary atmospheric data for-
mats employed. The former was simple, non-binary and requires a minimum of metadata,
and although the latter was more complex, and a binary format, it was nevertheless an open
standard. The decision to primarily support these two formats was cited as a preservation
decision. Alternatives such as Gridded Binary (GRIB) and the MET Office’s proprietary
PP-format were also evident within the datacentre; the latter was supported by a range of
contemporary software packages, and therefore appeals despite its limited features (one can-
not encode comments into PP files for instance). GRIB, despite enjoying the status of World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) standard was a complex file format that seemed some-
what ill-suited to preservation each GRIB file consisted of six sections, each with their own
header information, and required external look-up tables to be interpreted. More worrying
was the range of other, undocumented file formats that existed within the archive, such as
movie data encoded within the .avi format there was little evidence of appropriate preser-
vation action to reflect such diversity. Little explicit time or effort appears to be allocated
to monitoring emerging preservation strategies, with the datacentre service seemingly more
focused on engaging with depositors to ensure that submitted data were appropriately pack-
aged to limit risks of loss over time.
Dissemination and Access To facilitate the designated community’s identification and
discovery of content, the datacentre’s website offered just a narrative description of each
dataset. Search and browse functionality complemented this metadata. There was however
no evidence of the use of formal description metadata standards for resource discovery such
as ISADG, or EAD. Nevertheless, the requirements of their designated community were
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probably met, with descriptive metadata available on the web sufficient to cater for the pri-
mary user group. A separate, but related, project called Claddier (funded by JISC) was
developing further access methods, including better support for data citation. Metadata was
both requested from the depositors and also created by datacentre staff. The metadata to be
included in the SIP was stated for depositors, but covered only a description of the data and its
implicit variables. Relationships between metadata and archival packages were maintained
by storing metadata within a separate directory adjacent to the data directories of the cor-
responding data sets. No separate techniques, persistent links or identifiers were employed
to make this association more explicit. Since staff interactions with data sets might feasibly
result in disassociation of this metadata-to-dataset relationship this might be considered as
something of an implicit risk.
Access to the datacentre’s stored content was via two principle means, using the datacentre
data browser (aka, the website, available at http://datacentre.rl.ac.uk/) and an FTP service. At
the time of the audit, 8625 users were registered to access data. An Ingres relational database
management system included the user database, the dataset catalogue and various metadata
that supported information discovery. No formal policy was in place for informing the users
about access conditions, and the datacentre staff interviewed seemed to admit that outreach
to both depositors and users currently left a little to be desired. No formal policy existed,
but access monitoring and statistics was built into the access system. Documentation was
limited (predominantly as comments in the system scripts). Access attempts were logged as
FTP login instances and accessing directories where datasets were stored. Access control
was maintained at the storage level using standard UNIX user/group based security, with
access rights managed on a directory-by-directory basis corresponding to where particular
datasets were stored. Access cannot be controlled directly on the file level (except where
directories contain only single files). The ProFTP server software used for dissemination
permits access based only on the conditions specified for individual directories. Restrictions
were changed manually when access requests for specific datasets were made; the user was
added to the group with the appropriate permissions to read information from a specific
directory.
Formal deposit agreements did not really exist for NERC data, but access conditions were set
based on pre-ingest negotiations with depositors, and on the basis of data policies that related
to specific NERC programmes. Datasets fell into publicly available and restricted access cat-
egories. In order to gain access to the restricted datasets users had to register and qualify for
access. Registration may include sending in a signed user agreement as a paper document. In
some circumstances (for instance, within one year after the data was created), principle data
creators were required to endorse requested access, in order to ensure that they had the first
opportunity to exploit research results. Access was not granted immediately, even for the
completely automated forms, since datacentre staff were required to provide final authorisa-
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tions for all registered users. This represented good practice from the perspectives of both
security and user management, in the absence of more sophisticated user validation function-
ality. The access and user authentication systems appeared to implement the requirements
that have been set by depositors. Auditors did not get a chance to witness the user regis-
tration process from the repository’s perspective, and therefore it was difficult to comment
on the extent to which the human decision-making process corresponded to the check-list
criteria. The logging of unsuccessful access attempts was currently not really done, although
any problems were formally monitored via the FootPrints helpdesk software system, which
facilitated tracking and escalation of user queries. The FootPrints software and its usage
policy were documented as part of the Operations Manual.
Because submission, archival and dissemination packages within the datacentre were gen-
erally synonymous, the need to demonstrate that the DIP (or AIP) creation process was
complete and correct was perhaps less pressing. Interviews revealed that the last time some-
one ordered a dataset to be delivered on transfer media was a long time ago. At the time of
the assessment, DIPs were delivered exclusively online. Since the data was accessed via an
online interface, DIP creation was virtually a one stage process, with archival packages sim-
ply delivered via web or FTP protocols. The onus of ensuring that packages correspond to
requests was placed upon the user. Subsets of web accessible data were not really supported
as such.
Technologies, Technical Infrastructure and Security
Technical Platform The datacentre appeared to operate upon a combination of standard
infrastructural hardware and software systems with a number of scripts conceived within
the organisation aimed at achieving specific workflow goals. Standard open source soft-
ware in use included (but was not limited to) GNU/Linux, ProFTP, MySQL, PostgreSQL,
and Apache. Staff were computer literate above an average level, so there was no perceived
problem with the management of the software side of the repository. System administra-
tion expertise was available within the core datacentre team. There were some concerns
over documentation that existed most notably with respect to the bespoke scripts created for
uploading, verifying, storing and downloading datasets. Over time, these scripts had been
written in many different computer languages (at the time of the evaluation the most common
examples were written in Python or Perl) and had not been sufficiently documented to enable
re-use after longer periods of time. The solution to this was that the scripts were re-written
in a new language and the old ones discarded.
Backups and Synchronisation Three principle methods were available for data backup
within the Centre. These were to a local tape archive stored within a datacentre fire safe;
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via rsync to separate disk storage and to a bespoke petabyte datastore, also maintained at
the same facilities but around five hundred metres away. The UNIX df command revealed
around 62 terabytes of content within the archive. Class A data were backed up to local tape
on a mainly ad-hoc basis, and to the petabyte store as part of a regular backup job. Smaller
class A data were also subject to daily backup via rsync. Class B data was subject to similar
backup processes, although it was rarely if ever backed up to local tapes. Little documented
backup policy surrounded Class C data; large data within this category were unlikely to be
backed up at all smaller datasets may be backed up to the petabyte store for convenience.
The datacentre had at least one recorded instance of data loss, when a large Class B satellite
dataset was lost following a catastrophic filesystem failure, leading to the loss of everything
stored on the RAID array. Reacquisition of the data was possible, albeit complicated, and its
size was considerable; other data was consequently afforded higher priority, and this partic-
ular dataset was not backed up at datacentre. It was unclear what explanation was provided
to the depositor and users about the non-availability of this dataset. There were also daily
dumps of Ingres, MySQL and PostgreSQL databases that supported the catalogue, website
and various ancillary systems within the datacentre. These were stored on tape within a fire-
safe, rsynced to another disk and backed up to the petabyte datastore. With respect to Atlas
storage, at least two copies of class A datasets were maintained, with at least one copy of
class B examples. The datacentre should have therefore had at least 4 copies of each class A
dataset. Documentation was included in the directory structure of an AIP, so was also backed
up. There was one issue identified with respect to the backing up of large datasets; the phys-
ical capacity of storage systems would sometimes limit the extent to which policies could
be adhered to with larger files manually split between storage volumes and partitions. The
petabyte system was a Storatek tape library (produced by Sun Microsystems). The datacen-
tre’s own storage system relied upon Cyberview servers configured for RAID 5. Redundancy
was therefore maintained on all disks clusters; however, although a single disk’s failure could
be tolerated, the failure of two or more within a single cluster would result in loss (albeit in
many cases recoverable).
All of the copies of data were maintained in a common geographic area (distributed up to
500 metres). None of the redundant storage provisions could really be classified as off-
site. This was of particular concern given the safety notification that one receives upon
entering the site - a sounding bell denoted a firm alarm, whereas a klaxon would sound in the
event of a nuclear incident! This did not appeared on any of the datacentre risk assessment
documents, and although no doubt capable of destroying much of the local environment,
little has apparently been done to assess the threat or to conceive of contingencies (most
obviously to store redundant copies of data in a more remote location).
Tapes were checked randomly, but not systematically and there seemed to be little evidence
of documentation of test results. Tapes and servers were decommissioned at regular inter-
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vals, and it appeared that resource availability was not a premium concern with respect to the
replacement of faulty media or infrastructural hardware. However, although procedures for
replacing a tape were in place, there were no formal mechanisms for identifying faults. Simi-
larly, although a disaster recovery plan did exist as part of the datacentre Operations Manual,
it could have been more detailed and ought to have been tested in fire drill procedures and
the test results documented.
Security Arrangements The data centre maintained fairly stringent physical access re-
quirements around its main data store, where backup copies of the highest priority datasets
were maintained. Similarly, archival/access storage facilities were subject to physical secu-
rity systems. Pass card authentication was enforced within the store facility, and although
visitors could be signed in, they were required to be accompanied by authorised individ-
uals. More generally, the main site facility boasted considerable security. All employees
were required to display identification badges at all times and visitors to liaise on arrival and
departure with gatehouse security staff in order to be issued with a visitor’s pass.
System security was perhaps less well enforced. Many of the software scripts utilised by the
BADC staff ran as a shared UNIX user, which immediately let any staff member access the
full range of functionality that all of the repository’s collective scripts offer. Essentially a
root account, this could be exploited to tremendously destructive effect if compromised, and
the responsible individual would be very difficult, if not impossible, to trace.
Conclusions
The pilot assessment revealed that policies ought to have been more rigorously conceived,
documented and formalised, and circulated widely among repository staff to create a culture
that understands exactly what the repository is engaged in, and how it is ultimately operating.
In terms of staffing, greater resources should be invested in staff skills development, most
notably archival skills which were lacking in comparison with scientific expertise.
It was concluded that technical approaches to information integrity maintenance and verifi-
cation could be considerably refined. Then-current checksum provisions and other informa-
tion integrity measurements were largely insufficient to create an audit trail for the data and
processing in the archive. Monitoring and checking schedules were well described but in
practice rarely applied. Likewise, data management rarely extended beyond the association
of simple web-page type information with digital datasets. More sophisticated data manage-
ment provisions were required for the archive to consider itself to be OAIS compliant.
Preservation planning at the data centre was undertaken in an extremely ad hoc fashion.
Dealing with preservation issues and considering pitfalls and potential solutions was not
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explicitly part of anyones job, nor were there any (collective) reports written on this to in-
fluence or guide decision-making. Related to this, the stringent requirements on file formats
dissuaded depositors from submitting content to BADC. A potential solution would have
been to be more open minded about acceptable ingest formats, but employ people or ac-
quire software capable of performing appropriate SIP to AIP to DIP conversion. A lack of
funding was an obvious a barrier here, although on the other hand, opening up the range of
ingest formats might have been a means to solicit greater funding. Fundamentally, curation
activities seemed to take something of a backseat to facilitating access. To be considered a
trustworthy repository demanded that the organisation embrace challenges of preservation,
and determine the issues associated with mandate, legal status, services and functions that
ought to be amended in support of that goal.
B.6 The US State Digital Archive
Organisational Infrastructure
The eleven state universities in Florida fell within the remit of a state-wide central board of
governors. This group fulfilled various central duties and delegated a variety of other respon-
sibilities to the individual University boards of trustees. Universities consequently enjoyed
a degree of autonomy with regard to the way that they conducted their affairs. However,
there were some services and programs that while of great value (and necessity) to individ-
ual institutions could not be provided independently at each. For instance, although many
Florida Universities were involved in marine research, it was not feasible for each to acquire
their own vessel for conducting field studies. Instead, such resources were provided at a
centralised level; there were about twelve to fifteen system wide resources that were essen-
tially shared among the eleven Universities. The datacentre was similarly structured, and
with its budget generated at a central level it was accountable to each of the other University
libraries and ultimately the state board of governors. Like each of the shared system-wide
resources the datacentre was based at a single institution. The rationale for this was largely
political, with the intention to demonstrate that money was being allocated more directly to
students. Although the budget was maintained at the local level it was generated centrally,
and the host institution was not permitted to revise or restructure financial allocation prior to
its subsequent delivery to datacentre. The datacentre was required to report to both the host
institution’s provost and also the Council of State University Libraries (CSUL) made up of
library directors at each state University. That board’s role was officially an advisory one,
but it derives a degree of power from the fact that dissatisfaction among other state libraries
would have negative implications for the datacentre.
Within the datacentre a number of services were provided for University libraries. These
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included the operation of a shared integrated library management system and licensing of
electronic resources. The archive, upon which this study focuses, represented an additional
datacentre service, and consisted of a repository infrastructure providing support for the
preservation of digital collections and the digital outcomes from state university studies and
research.
Mission and Mandate Eight key responsibilities were outlined for the archive within
the archive Policy Guide, describing the major constituent parts of their activities, and their
relationships with their depositors. These were to implement bit-level or full preservation of
submitted content (determined according to preservation agreement); to restrict those who
were authorised to deposit or sanction the withdrawal or dissemination of content; to provide
detailed ingest and error-related feedback for every submitted package; to preserve ‘origi-
nal’ files as submitted, maintaining integrity, viability and authenticity; to employ appropri-
ate preservation strategies to persistently maintain a usable version of each file for which
full preservation was sought; to provide dissemination information packages (DIPS) on re-
quest; to provide appropriate reports to affiliates for management purposes; and to ultimately
achieve and maintain certification as a trusted digital repository, when the infrastructure to
support this becomes available.
Affiliates were those eligible groups that had signed agreements to use the archive’s ser-
vices. Eligibility was limited to state university libraries within the state of Florida and their
PALMM (Publication of Archival Library and Museum Materials) partners. The latter in-
cluded any institution that had a formal partnership agreement with a Florida state university
library to participate in one or more of these projects. Non library units within the state
university infrastructure were permitted to deposit content, but this was required to be done
indirectly via the responsible library at that particular institution.
The archive adopted an attitude of shared responsibility for preservation, between both the
archive and its affiliates. It was perhaps for this reason that institutions were describe not
passively as ‘depositors’, but instead as ‘affiliates’, suggesting a degree of mutual cooper-
ation. To this end, as documented in the archive Policy Guide, affiliates were responsible
for negotiating an agreement (which must be counter-signed by representatives of both their
institution and the datacentre), incorporating details of authorised individuals for deposit,
withdrawal and dissemination and details of projects and sub-accounts; selecting content for
archiving and maintaining adequate local descriptive metadata; ensuring legal permissions
were obtained and transferred to the archive (assuming liability for breach of intellectual
property rights occasioned by the deposit); submitting content to the archive in the format
specified in the archive Submission Information Package (SIP) specification; maintaining
records of what was archived within the archive (including at minimum the entityID of the
SIP and links to locally stored metadata); verifying the success of the submission process
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via the generated error and ingest reports; requesting withdrawals where preservation was no
longer required; and requesting dissemination when access to information was necessary.
The archive’s mission statement was “to provide a cost-effective, long-term preservation
repository for digital materials in support of teaching and learning, scholarship, and research
in the state of Florida”. This was endorsed by the datacentre board (which consisted of the
CSUL group plus representatives of the Florida’s Division of Colleges and Universities and
Division of Community Colleges and the Florida State Librarian) lending the commitment a
weight of legitimacy.
Succession Arrangements Two ‘options’ existed in the event of the archive’s cessa-
tion of operations, as described in the archive Policy Guide. The first was to simply re-
turn content to the appropriate affiliate, in the form of a Dissemination Information Package
(DIP). This was practically viable, although one may question whether returning content was
a compelling succession arrangement. In addition, the success of this approach presupposed
that the archive operations would be maintained for a period that was sufficient to permit a
comprehensive dissemination. The second option, which was at the time only planned and
not practically implementable, was to send content to an alternative preservation repository
in a DIP exchange format (the precise format of which was yet to be conceived). While in
principle much closer to a true succession plan, the practical barriers of no format and no
repository greatly impeded its viability. However, discussions were already ongoing with
the California Digital Library with whom research monies were being sought to collabora-
tively define an appropriate exchange format and it was hoped that this joint endeavour might
be extended to represent a reciprocity agreement capable of facilitating succession and the
remote accommodation of content.
In addition, given the anticipated public release of the DAITSS software, it was quite feasi-
ble to suggest that if widely adopted, the barriers to information exchange across common
systems would be considerably lessened, and that many of the practical or technical difficul-
ties associated with succession planning would be lessened. Nonetheless, it was acknowl-
edged that several of the barriers associated with succession planning and feasibility are not
technical, and instead are based in inter-organisational, political and legal concerns. It was
suggested that the archive continues to pursue a formally expressed collaboration with CDL
or another equivalent preservation repository to seek formal assurances for succession and
service continuity, and to define means for effective inter-organisational digital object ex-
change. Although it was suggested that funding was reasonably assured for the foreseeable
future there was no evidence of a legal or regulatory compulsion upon the state to continue
to support the archive. It was suggested that if such assurances could not be obtained then
this should be considered and documented within an overall risk mitigation strategy.
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Staffing Twelve individuals had direct formal responsibility with respect to the archive,
including five dedicated IT staff, but most contributions were less than full time. The data-
centre’s director assumed administrative responsibility for the efforts of the archive (propor-
tionately 0.04 of an FTE), although currently many of the more hands on aspects of man-
agement were undertaken by another individual (0.3 of an FTE), whose time was distributed
between the archive and other datacentre library systems. Five IT staff were employed full
time in continuing to develop the DAITSS system and maintain relationships with affiliates
and process the content they deposit and respond to dissemination requests. Finally, five
systems administration staff dedicated a proportion of their time (from a fiftieth to a fifth of
an FTE) to maintain the repository’s hardware and software infrastructure and its associated
security systems. Additional input came from the datacentre board. As noted above, this
board convened in mainly an advisory capacity, but the nature of the organisation conferred
upon it a degree of leverage, and it was generally the first stop in seeking endorsement or
policy approval.
Each staff member was subject to an annual review, which provided an opportunity to reflect
on the work of the previous year and offer projections for the future. In addition, any train-
ing requirements were identified by individual staff members based on their expectations of
changing or emerging roles and responsibilities. The travel and training allocation was doc-
umented in the archive’s prototype budget as being five thousand, five hundred US Dollars,
although it was suggested during discussions that this figure was modest and that the real
allocation was significantly in excess of this sum. Given the number of staff and the nature
of training that was undertaken (which included attendance at international conferences and
workshops), the stated figure was low. It was suggested that in addition to staff identifying
their own skills shortages and training requirements that a top-down approach to training
could be adopted in parallel (beginning with a more representative and reliable budgetary
allocation).
The assembled team was well suited to the current activities within the archive: a signifi-
cant amount of development work was still being undertaken and therefore the availability
of software development expertise was essential. However, as the archive’s technical infras-
tructure approached completion and emphases were increasingly placed on the operation of
the archive it was suggested that the organisational structure may be less than optimal. Dis-
cussions revealed aspirations within the archive to introduce a charging model for archival
services based on quotas, to provide better statistical information to those groups that the
archive were accountable to and to build and maintain closer relationships with affiliates.
Each of these would require a level of managerial and administrative input that was not
feasible with existing staff allocations.
Within the self-assessment document completed by the archive staff it was suggested that
the creation of an the archive manager position might be desirable; this action was strongly
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endorsed, particularly with an eye to the viability of the archive’s future activities. This step
would also facilitate a more proactive training approach a manager could more effectively
provide a top-down identification of skills gaps and learning opportunities within the archive.
A managerial appointment could also coincide with a more general shift in focus from de-
velopment to operations. It was suggested that this may require the acquisition of at least
one more staff member to undertake a more operational role. Alternatively one or more of
the current IT developers could be redeployed to more operational duties.
A final staffing concern related to an absence of documentation. At the time of the evalua-
tion, even within the sample job descriptions surveyed, there was little evidence of granularly
defined roles and responsibilities. This had obvious advantages in terms of the flexibility it
provided in terms of the activities of staff members, but to some extent threatened the com-
prehensive fulfilment of archival responsibilities and limited the extent to which trustworthi-
ness may be attained. It was therefore suggested that the archive should aim to describe and
document the tasks being performed within the context of each position.
Designated Community The archive defined its designated community based upon
what was realistic for it to achieve, and its contextual spacing, with regard to depositors and
end users. Eschewing the need to cater for diverse types of access the archive described a
shared responsibility with the affiliates that deposit content for long term preservation. From
the Policy Guide, “[f]or the archive, the Designated Community is the set of professional
staff of the archive affiliates. Staff members interact with the archive and serve as proxies
for the constituencies they serve in the academic and research communities. They must be
able to render materials disseminated to them by the archive and present these materials to
users in understandable form. This may require them to write or acquire rendering software,
for example METS-based page turners or media players, but it will not require extraordinary
efforts, such as digital archaeology or the acquisition of obsolete software or hardware”. The
archive operated as a dark archive, with strictly limited access, and as described above, infor-
mation packages requested from the archive may not have been immediately usable, possibly
requiring transformation which should be undertaken by the appropriate affiliate.
Policy and Procedures Various aspects of repository policy were outlined in a range
of publicly available documents. These included the archive Policy Guide itself and a range
of documents within the Digital Archive Information page of the archive’s website, includ-
ing documentation describing the specification for valid content submissions, background
reports and action plans for preservation of specific formats and practical recommendations
for affiliates. Less transparent were aspects of policy that were embedded in software code
an example that emerged during the audit was the procedure for dealing with inconsisten-
cies between copies of archived materials (multiple copies were retained for redundancy, as
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explained below). Discussions suggested that the software was capable of determining the
authentic version and taking appropriate steps, but its method of doing so and the supporting
algorithm remained unclear. Such embedded policies should have been extracted and more
clearly documented.
Rights and Legal Responsibility Given its partnership-based approach, the respon-
sibilities of the archive itself were limited, and the extent to which end user needs might
vary became less relevant. Nevertheless, numerous mechanisms were in place to monitor
feedback from affiliate organisations. For example, a mailing list was available for technical
contacts at each affiliate university and a queue had been established within the datacentre’s
problem reporting system exclusively for the archive. There was little evidence of policy or
designated community refinements based on the feedback received, although this may have
simply indicated a satisfied community of affiliates. It was again suggested that a manage-
rial role might incorporate responsibilities for monitoring feedback and redesigning policy
to reflect the community’s expectations and/or ongoing usability concerns.
Another useful consequence of the partnership model was associated with legal aspects of
preservation. Liability for intellectual property rights infringements remained with the de-
positing organisation, and submitted content would only be accepted after standard Library
agreements had been countersigned. The affiliate library was required to commit to being
“responsible for compliance with all applicable copyright laws and other laws applicable to
deposited materials, and that [they have] the authority to grant to datacentre non-exclusive
rights to copy, display and create derivative versions of deposited files.” In the event of le-
gal challenge (which had at the time of the evaluation not occurred), the archive’s policy
was to disseminate the content to the owning affiliate and withdraw it from the archive. If a
challenge subsequently faltered then they would replace the object without charge. The only
concern associated with this approach was that it might be abused, with challenges possibly
decimating the scale of the archived collection (admittedly a far-fetched scenario). Since the
archive was operating as a dark archive it seemed unlikely that either hoax or legitimate chal-
lenges were likely, given that it remained impossible for non-affiliate parties to determine the
nature of or access the archived content via any archive-provided mechanisms. Nevertheless,
with the onus of proof of legality resting on the affiliate, this presented a potential risk.
A final point of legal concern related to materials that were associated with the digital ob-
jects, and also stored within the archive. The archive’s documented ‘localization’ policy
described a process that occurred when a submitted file contained links to other files (such
as an XML file which references a DTD or Schema). In such cases, the remote, referenced
file was retrieved and added to the archival content (AIP). There were obvious legal con-
cerns, given that affiliates were required to only vouch for the legality of submitted content,
not that to any referenced material. This had been earlier acknowledged, and the system
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was modified (albeit without a corresponding change to the archive policy documentation)
to download only a small format-specific subset of all linked files, most notably DTD and
XML Schema files. The alternative would be that every online document cited within a
PDF dissertation might be harvested and stored with no permission. A remaining doubt was
whether legal permission was required to store these remaining file types. In all likelihood
this would vary on a file-by-file basis, but it was recommended that archive staff explore,
with some urgency, the legal implications of storing each of the linked schemas and DTDs
within the digital collections. Liability in such cases may not be assumed to fall upon the
affiliate within the current wording of the library agreement (given that it explicitly covered
just ‘deposited files’). Therefore, if potential legal consequences could be identified these
should be addressed by either refining the text of the standard agreement or conceiving and
documenting an appropriate policy that alleviates the remaining concerns.
Funding In addition to the 2002 IMLS grant which concluded in the latter part of 2005,
the greatest proportion of repository funding originated from centralised, state channels. Al-
though the budget came via the host institution, there was little to no direct independent
budgetary interaction. Instead, budget plans were subject to review by the board of eleven
University Library directors, who would offer their approval, assuming sufficient finances
were available. Plans would then pass to the centralised, state board of governors, whereby
each University’s vice-president met and agreed before final ratification by the council of
University presidents. Budgetary flexibility was evident, and had been exploited in the past.
For instance, when systems were transferred from a costly mainframe system to cheaper
UNIX systems monies were freed up, enabling the datacentre to acquire additional human
resources. The base budget, allocated annually, continued automatically, although it was
noted that in past periods of recession the datacentre budget has been reduced. For instance,
in 1991 when the host institution was asked to reduce 3 per cent of its spending the data-
centre was asked to cut that amount of their yearly budget, which was collected from the
mid-year free balance. This accompanied a much wider commensurate series of public sec-
tor budget cuts within the state. Within the model, the datacentre was capable of maintaining
a carry-over fund which was useful to meet costs that recur on a less than annual basis, such
as replacement of expensive technological infrastructure equipment. These monies resided
in a separate budget, which unlike the main datacentre budget could be accessed by the host
institution. Such tampering would be likely to elicit a strong negative reaction from the
other state university libraries, and was therefore considered unlikely. One consequence of
the protection afforded to the datacentre budget (which further emphasised the value of the
carry-over fund) was that no overspending could take place; budgetary separation meant that
the University was unable to cover any deficits. At the time of the evaluation the datacentre
budget had never been in the negative; rather their annual spending had consistently yielded
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spare cash to carry over into the following financial year. There was also evidence of antic-
ipatory budgeting for subsequent years, if not within the archive, certainly within the wider
datacentre. For instance, when a significant proportion of the datacentre’s library infrastruc-
ture moved from dumb terminals to PCs they were able to project across a five year period
the anticipated budgetary requirements and spending.
There was no charging model in place for the archive services, but the library agreement
countersigned by each affiliate included a caveat explaining that although no fee was cur-
rently payable, this may be introduced in the future. Discussions suggested that a quota-
based system of billing might be adopted, with a view to both income generation and pro-
voking a more thoughtful and selective approach to archiving from depositors. The adminis-
trative consequences of such a decision were thought likely to be considerable, and this again
provided a clear justification for the appointment of a full time archive manager. There were
many benefits associated with introducing a charging model, not least from a sustainability
perspective. Perhaps the most profound was that the introduction of such a system would
immediately reduce some of the concerns that surrounded the scalability of the archive; con-
tinuing without charge was quite conceivable if the level of content remained roughly the
same. However, an increasingly widespread use of the archive services would introduce
additional costs across the whole archive budget. If these could be mitigated by a self-
sustainable, charging-based system then the archive could be less worried about attracting
additional depositors. Income generation of this type provides a degree of insurance against
possible future funding gaps, which as noted, cannot be met by the local host University. The
datacentre director suggested in discussion that the primary operational budget was guaran-
teed, but given previous funding dips in periods of recession, it was realistic to think that
funding may be less than expected.
There was at the time of the evaluation no formal, distinct budget for the archive, rather its
allocations were consumed within an overall budget for the datacentre. This was a situa-
tion that staff were seeking to amend however, and recent efforts had been made to develop
a prototype budget for just the archive, with the intention to make it increasingly indepen-
dent from its organisational context. A spreadsheet detailed individual costs associated with
staffing, software and hardware, and the third party hardware hosting services provided by
the host institution’s Computing and Networking Services and the Northwest Regional Data
Centre in Tennessee. This overall budget amounted to around 550,000 USD of expenditure,
a proportion of the total datacentre budget of just under 13 million USD. The most significant
archive expenditure was staff salaries; given the strong suggestion above, it was likely that
this would extend beyond the current 384,774 USD following the appointment of a full time
manager.
Greater budgetary independence for the archive appeared appropriate. In order to not only
manage but also actively demonstrate the sustainability of the archival operations it was
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useful to isolate expenditure, incomes and assets (or proportions of each) that related to
the archive. This would in turn facilitate business planning, and the allocation of monies
for contingency. The archive could also consider maintaining a similar distinction with re-
gard to the carry forward balance in order to ensure that cash saved in archival operations
could be subsequently channelled back to cover those less frequent costs associated with
archival preservation functionality. Preservation is unpredictable business and flexible assets
are therefore extremely valuable, particularly in the absence of a parent organisation capable
of providing support in times of financial strain.
It was suggested that greater physical separation of the archive might accompany a move
towards greater financial independence. In contrast, this was not recommended, since the
rich skills and other resources evident within the archive team’s operational context provided
scope for intellectual and resourcing economies of scale that would benefit both the archive
and its associated services.
In terms of transparency, public law within the State of Florida ensured that all organisations
funded by the state legislature were bound to full disclosure of financial record keeping,
ensuring that transparency was maintained, and that shortcomings in accounting practice
could be immediately identified and corrected.
Managing Risk There was a notable lack of evidence of appropriate risk management
activity. The lack of risk-based strategy resonated throughout much of the organisational,
technological and digital object management infrastructure at the archive. Emergent thinking
regards digital preservation itself as a risk management exercise; by identifying contextual
and object-centric uncertainties one can transform these into manageable risks, documenting
their probability and potential impact, as well as any mitigation or contingency strategies
one has in place to limit their likelihood or lessen the degree of harm that their occurrence
(or non-occurrence) might cause. A repository with well managed (and well demonstrated)
risk management was therefore one that was more likely to engender trust. Furthermore,
the process of identifying risks was of value in and of itself, helping to identify areas where
resource ought to be most effectively committed to overcome perceived barriers to success.
Every affiliate of the archive was required to countersign the datacentre Library Agree-
ment, which as noted above obligates the affiliate to provide assurances about the legality
of preserving the content, transfer the necessary rights to undertake preservation, and retain
full liability for the illegality of any preservation activities. An appendix to this document,
which could be amended and resubmitted by affiliates at any time, named the local individ-
uals authorised to interact with the archive, and request withdrawals and disseminations and
the preservation requirements. These agreement documents were maintained in paper form,
with copies residing both in the datacentre offices and within the host institution’s central
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administration office. These had been digitised too, and it was anticipated that they would be
deposited within the archive. The affiliate information that related to access and preservation
policies within the system was also maintained in a MySQL database. The only ‘access’
to content that was available was via the archive’s strictly maintained dissemination system,
which would deliver content only to individuals named within the agreement appendix, and
therefore issues of tracking the implementation of access rights and restrictions was less
significant.
Digital Object Management
Acquisition and Ingest Digital materials selected for preservation by affiliates were
submitted to the archive via the File Transfer Protocol. Upon upload they resided within a
corresponding affiliate directory prior to their ingest. Affiliates were required to submit not
only the content that requires preservation, but also an accompanying METS XML docu-
ment that corresponded to a given schema and both referenced and described each incorpo-
rated file. Collectively, this amounted to the Submission Information Package; the archive
SIP specification and METS SIP profile were documented on the datacentre web pages .
Packages were generally represented using a single tier directory structure or zip, with the
directory or zip-file’s file-name corresponding to the name of the METS file within (the
latter was suffixed .xml). Compressed or bundled files other than zip (e.g gzipped, rarred
or tarred files) were not currently supported for packaging SIPs, although it was expected
that this functionality would be introduced. Similarly, although the current FTP method of
submission distinguished affiliates as different users with unique accounts and submission
directories, it was anticipated that digital signature support would be imminently introduced
to more effectively authenticate the source of materials. Part of the archive SIP Specification
contradicted information provided in the DAITSS overview. Although the latter clearly in-
dicated that .zip aggregated files were supported, the specification suggested that “[t]he the
archive can not accept SIPs that were tarred or gzipped or otherwise bundled or compressed”.
Identification and Naming Affiliates were not limited in terms of the file-names that
they could allocate, which could result in unpredictable behaviour should multiple packages
be submitted by a single affiliate with identical names. It was suggested that archive tech-
nical staff should explore the potential results of such action and if problems were evident
implement more robust procedures. New arrivals to the archive were first processed with the
prep module, part of DAITSS. This ensured the validity of the SIP, removing files that were
not described within the corresponding METS file. In addition, support was maintained for
the Metadata Exchange Format (MXF), an XML format previously defined for the SUS Dig-
ital Library and PALMM. When the prep module identified these files a conversion to METS
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was performed, and the process continued as normal. If a submitted packaged contained no
SIP descriptor then one could be created; this was contingent upon creation being specified
as a term of the archiving agreement associated with the corresponding affiliate project or
sub-account. Otherwise the package was rejected. When invalid or non-well formed SIP
descriptors were identified packages were rejected and the process logged. Any files that
existed within the submission package that were not documented in the associated package
descriptor were rejected, although this step was not formally documented. Rather, the report
that described the subsequent ingest listed each of the files that was successfully accessioned.
It was therefore suggested that such disposal instances should be reported explicitly. The fi-
nal action of the prep module was to place the processed package in the ingest directory for
ingest processing.
Having determined the validity and completeness of submitted packages the operators pro-
ceed to the next stage of processing, characterised by the ingest module of DAITSS. After
a series of simple checks to verify the completeness and correctness of packages and de-
scriptors a selection of metadata was extracted from the SIP descriptor for subsequent use.
Following this, data file objects were created to correspond to each file in the submitted pack-
age. Formats were identified (using mime-type, filename suffix and output from the UNIX
file command); anti-virus checking took place (the presence of a virus resulting in rejec-
tion); agreed preservation level (full, bit-level or none) was determined by looking up the file
format and project in the account’s table of preservation requirements; and formats were val-
idated (using combination of first and third party tools any format profile non-conformance
was recorded, and in certain cases could result in an automatic downgrading of preservation
level). Fixity checks were then implemented if the depositing affiliate supplied checksum
values within their submission then these were compared to those evaluated at this stage. In
the absence of affiliate-supplied values these initial checks were recorded for subsequent, on-
going comparison within the METS descriptor file. Files were then subdivided according to
their implicit bit-streams (some files, such as .avi movie files contain multiple bit-streams),
with each allocated a persistent identifier (consisting of the date of creation in numeric for-
mat with a daily, auto-incrementing alphabetic suffix ). Individual identifiers were allocated
to every intellectual entity (aka AIP), file and bit-stream. A persistent association was main-
tained with AIPs by encoding the identifier within the descriptor file-name, recording the
identifiers within the XML content of that descriptor and logging the association in the man-
agement database. It was suggested that the archive may wish to consider the adoption of
one or more identifier schemes that was capable of generating an ID that was unique within
a global context. Handles and Digital Object Identifiers were two examples of possible ap-
proaches. One of the benefits of doing so could be realised if a reciprocal object transfer and
storage agreement was reached with another organisation, where global uniqueness might be
required. Technical metadata were automatically extracted wherever possible.
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Localization was one of three preservation activities that then took place; any schema or
DTDs referenced within packaged files and stored remotely were automatically retrieved
and data object files created to accompany their referrer in the preservation environment.
Where files were due to receive full preservation and suitable forward migration and/or nor-
malisation methods existed these were performed, with the resulting file(s) added to the SIP,
with a data file object created and allocated a persistent identifier. Metadata for intellectual
entities and every data file object were created, with relationships and events documented.
Reporting was consistently undertaken throughout the ingest process, with affiliates notified
via email of ingest activities that were being undertaken and of any errors that had been
identified during the overall process. In addition to the delivery of XML encoded documents
each event and outcome was recorded within the corresponding descriptor and in the MySQL
database associated with DAITSS. Reporting enabled the archive to formally document the
point at which preservation responsibility was accepted, and to describe the specific objects
that were affected.
Generating Archival Packages The AIP creation procedure that exists within the archive
and DAITSS more generally was well documented, although there were some notable omis-
sions or shortcomings in terms of that which was fully described. Similarly, there were
some concerns relating to a degree of bottlenecking within the ingest system that could be
addressed by streamlining the physical process.
Following the initial stages of ingest associated primarily with management of the submit-
ted package a number of steps were involved in the creation of a corresponding archival
package. Each AIP corresponded to a single intellectual entity (some examples might in-
clude a volume, dissertation or home movie). Some files (perhaps those originating from
digital collections at affiliate institutions) would have a preservation level of none, and in
such cases these files would be excluded from the archived package. The next stage corre-
sponded to a development decision to limit the duplication of consistently referenced files; a
global directory existed to accommodate any files that may be linked to by several archived
objects. There was actually little evidence of savings in terms of bandwidth or processing
the remote, referenced file would still be checked in all cases in order to ensure that it re-
mained unchanged from a previously retrieved globally stored example. The storage savings
were likely to be negligible too for several reasons (including potential legal issues, as dis-
cussed above) only linked schema and DTD files were retrieved, and since these were text
and comparatively small in terms of file-size the benefits appeared minimal. Conversely, the
associated risks were potentially serious. Relying upon a system of shared files meant that
no archived package was independently complete, and if one was acquired in isolation from
the rest of the archive this may be problematic. Any value obtained from capturing remotely
referenced content was at best threatened. In order to maintain the link it was necessary
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to alter references to point to the global directory, not the remote resource, which could be
argued to be in contrast to the archival goals. It was suggested that the archive should retire
the global directory approach in favour of independently complete archival packages, despite
the additional resulting storage overhead.
The AIP descriptor was created, corresponding to the original SIP descriptor but with addi-
tional documentation of all files, relationships and events that the object has been subject to
within the archive. In comparison with the SIP, which was described thoroughly in the public
SIP specification and associated METS SIP Profile, the archive’s expectations with respect
to the structure or content of AIPs were minimally documented. A short AIP definition ex-
isted within the DAITSS overview document, and the same document described the process
within which SIPs were converted AIPs, but it was suggested that this should be extended,
given that maintaining an understanding of the AIP was, in the longer term, a higher priority.
The final stages of ingest were to write the AIP to an output directory, write it to archival
storage, which with DAITSS’ redundancy support can be at any number of physical loca-
tions (the archive relies upon two local copies at host institution’s CNS in Gainesville and
a third at the Northwest Regional Data Center in Tallahassee) and commit the update to the
management database. At the time, technological shortcomings within the DAITSS soft-
ware presented some bottlenecking, as each ingest write process had to be completed prior
to the software proceeding. Better software thread support would alleviate this issue and
streamline the process. This was considered to be essential in order to facilitate scalability,
and discussions suggested that the development was internally of high priority. The SIP was
subsequently deleted from the ingest input directory, and finally confirmation information
was formatted in XML and emailed to the appropriate affiliate.
Integrity Validation Although fixity checking was undertaken during the ingest process
it was not performed on a periodic basis. The infrastructure to facilitate this was essentially in
place, with Storage Maintenance functionality built into the system. The means to automate
random or comprehensive monitoring were yet to be developed, but this was perceived as
little more than adding some glue to bind the various aspects of functionality that already ex-
isted. DAITSS supported both MD5 and SHA1 message digest algorithms and was capable
of recording both in association with a single object. Mechanisms and policies apparently
existed for resolving a situation where a single archival package demonstrated corruption,
although this was not demonstrated and remained apparently undocumented. To implement
this functionality was a reasonably trivial challenge (opinions expressed by repository staff
endorsed this view).
Understandability and Usability A notable shortcoming evident in the archive’s check-
list responses was that there was no process (documented or otherwise) for determining the
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understandability and usability of archived content. It was suggested that this could be im-
plemented in the short term by exploiting the existing communication channels that existed
between the archive and its designated community. Without implementing a means for ver-
ifying ongoing understandability the archive could not confidently claim to be preserving
content (other than at the bit-stream level). Given the finite breadth of its designated commu-
nity it was thought to be quite feasible for the archive to establish a straightforward method.
It was likely that such increased interaction with affiliates would require an additional ad-
ministrative commitment; this would represent a further justification for the appointment of
a full time archive manager.
Preservation Policy Within the archive the shape of preservation activities was based
on the agreement between the archive and a given contracting affiliate. This agreement
could describe preservation expectations as one of full, bit or none. Preservation levels
were determined at the level of individual files at the ingest stage, based on the account
(the identity of the particular affiliate, or the repository itself), the project code (enabling
individual accounts to allocate alternative preservation levels for the same file format) and file
format. Although sub accounts could also be defined within individual accounts, these were
relevant only for billing and reporting purposes and were irrelevant from a strict preservation
perspective. Full preservation meant that all applicable and available preservation techniques
were employed, including migration, localization and normalisation. Bit preservation meant
that files would be ingested and stored and subject to refreshing and integrity checks, but
no further preservation methods would be employed. A preservation status of none was to
accommodate content that arrived within a larger package of submitted content, which for
some reason had not been isolated and removed prior to deposit.
Full preservation services were only practically applicable to a comparatively small subsec-
tion of all file formats. These had been identified based on a combination of their preserva-
tion viability and their popularity. For each format (the full range was listed on the archive
information web page ) a background report was prepared detailing a selection of technolog-
ical characteristics, and documenting additional associated sociological or legal issues (e.g.
adoption rate, licensing implications). These were internally ratified by the archive group as
a whole to determine their completeness of coverage. No additional external registries (such
as representation information registries) were automatically referenced although it was ac-
knowledged that the research activity undertaken to understand each format could involve
consultation with a variety of sources. Following the completion of an initial report a further
document was conceived to detail the action plan that would be undertaken with respect to
the corresponding format. This document represented the most critical aspect of preservation
planning within the archive. In some respects, the format-centric approach has limitations in
terms of the effectiveness with which one can preserve content, or more specifically, the sig-
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nificant properties of individual items. The principal value of an item may relate to any one of
its physical or semantic characteristics. There were implicit risks in adopting a preservation
approach that dwells on formats and not objects. It was acknowledged that until relatively
recently the archive had given very little consideration to the subject of significant properties
at all. However an even more granular, affiliate-oriented approach should have been pursued;
indeed, much of the overhead related to the identification of significant properties might have
been allocated to affiliates as an additional responsibility. To date, no affiliate had explicitly
notified the archive of the properties that ought to be preserved within any deposited content
but it was suggested that once a suitable infrastructure was conceived to accommodate such
varying degrees of preservation, it should be encouraged.
Three main preservation approaches were implemented within the archive, and reflecting the
overall philosophy of the archive these were applied exclusively at ingest. In the case of full
preservation the archived AIP would contain both an original bit-stream or bit-streams (that
is, the originally deposited file or files) as well as the last-best migrated preservable example
of that file or those files. In some cases the original and last-best preservable example would
be synonymous. Normalization, Migration and Localization were all identified as means
to manage format obsolescence, and based on format transformation. Normalization was
intended to ensure that those files that were in formats that were less than optimal for preser-
vation were created in a more preservation worthy format. For instance, PDF files would be
normalised into a set of page-image TIFF files. Normalized files were not saved, rather the
process itself was recorded as having been successful. Some question marks remained about
the value of this process since the ongoing availability of a successful normalisation method
relies upon the preservation of the corresponding tool or script. Migration was intended to
alleviate the risk of obsolescence by creating a version of at-risk formats that was considered
to be a reasonable successor to that format. This could be an equivalent but higher version
example of the original format (e.g., PDF 1.4 files might be migrated to PDF 1.6) or a dif-
ferent format altogether. This then represented the ‘last-best’ preservation version, replacing
any that might have existed within the AIP before. Localization, as discussed above, was in-
tended to ensure that remotely referenced files were, wherever possible, harvested and stored
locally to ensure the independent completeness of AIPs. For files subject to full preserva-
tion (as specified by affiliates in Appendix A of the datacentre Library Agreement), the
appropriate preservation strategy was documented within each format-specific action plan.
For those files formats that had no corresponding action plan the archive would commit to
bit-level preservation until a suitable preservation strategy was identified. At that time the
affected files would be disseminated and reingested, and during this process the appropriate
preservation steps implemented. Discussions revealed that decisions to research and con-
ceive background and action plans for new formats were prompted by the nature of content
that had been received within the archive.
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Since it took around three months to fully document a format and conceive an appropriate
action plan it was suggested that the archive should seek to modularise the DAITSS code to
encourage the development of format plugins from beyond the archive development team.
By facilitating and motivating external development the work could be effectively shared
and many more than the eighteen supported file formats (at the time of the evaluation) could
be preserved. In addition, DAITSS adoption would be likely to increase and its status as a
stable archiving solution increasingly consolidated. An action plan review schedule existed
in order to identify when format information was approaching obsolescence, although as a
result of intensive development commitments within DAITSS there had been evidence of
failure to undertake some reviews in an appropriately timely fashion. A wider community of
format specialists in a range of institutions would provide a considerably more effective, and
ongoing means of policing to ensure that preservation planning remains both optimal and vi-
able. Of considerable concern was the lack of regular integrity checking that was undertaken
within the archive, an issue that was described above. It was hoped that the commitments
made during discussions will be fulfilled, and an appropriate automated procedure will be
conceived to execute fixity checking on a regular basis.
Removing Content In addition to continuing to preserve content the archive also sup-
ported withdrawal functionality to enable content to be removed from the archive. This
would take place only upon the request of an authorised agent of the corresponding deposit-
ing affiliate. Although files belonging to a withdrawn AIP were deleted entirely from storage,
the archive maintained a record of the object’s ingest and subsequent withdrawal, with the
affiliate notified of the withdrawal via an emailed Withdrawal Report. A common use of
withdrawal functionality was to correct a previously submitted package. In such cases with-
drawal would be followed by a subsequent ingest of the package, with any errors amended.
The archive could unilaterally withdraw archived content if the preservation of specific ma-
terial was subject to external legal challenge, in accordance with the policy described above.
Dissemination and Access Although the archive operated primarily as a dark archive
there were examples of descriptive metadata maintained in association with archived content.
The majority of descriptive metadata derived from SIP descriptors provided by affiliates. In-
formation that would be captured when supplied by affiliates included a SIP package identi-
fier (the only mandatory metadata), affiliate-assigned entity identifier, identifiers of external
metadata records, title, serial volume and issue number. File names were also maintained for
each file within the SIP. The archive would add further internal identifiers associated with
each individual AIP, file and bitstream. All of this metadata was stored within the archive
management database and within the corresponding AIP.
There were no end-user discovery functions incorporated within the archive or within DAITSS
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software more generally. The archive had elected to place the onus for maintenance of de-
scriptive metadata upon the affiliates, since only they were permitted to request dissemination
of their own deposited materials. the archive Policy Guide demanded that affiliates “maintain
records of what was archived within the archive [including] at minimum the entityID of the
SIP and a link to any locally maintained metadata”. Nevertheless there were residual con-
cerns that the archive did not make it sufficiently clear to affiliates exactly what was required
of them with respect to content description. It was suggested that the archive should define
much more explicitly and specifically the metadata that must be supplied and recorded by
affiliates for retrieval. It was likely that considerably closer interaction with the community
would yield a greater understanding of the archive expectations; this additionally further
justifies the appointment of an the archive manager.
The archive had committed most of its efforts to date to conceive effective procedures and
infrastructures to support ingest and its three key preservation strategies of normalisation,
migration and localisation. Only in the few months prior to this evaluation was the first dis-
semination functionality completed, and there had as yet been no instances of organisations
seeking access to their archived materials. Nevertheless, the policies surrounding access
were established, and communicated explicitly in a range of documentation, perhaps most
explicitly within the archive Policy Guide. Archived content was disseminated via FTP when
requested by an authorised agent of the depositing affiliate. A copy of the relevant AIP was
placed within a special reingest directory, where it was treated as a SIP. Then, the pack-
age was subject to a reingest process, at which time files were once again identified using
the latest identification techniques and subjected to the most recently defined preservation
strategies. The resultant AIP was then transferred to archival storage, replacing the original
AIP, and also written as an identical Dissemination Information Package to the appropriate
affiliate’s FTP output directory. This process ensured that the disseminated content was al-
ways as up to date as the system was capable of ensuring, and one could trace and verify that
the DIP was complete in relation to the requested AIP. Upon a successful dissemination the
affiliate received a comprehensive dissemination report that describes the content of the DIP.
During the evaluation some aspects of the dissemination procedure demonstrated unpre-
dictable behaviours, and this was attributed to the newness of the software, and its com-
parative lack of testing. At one point, when dissemination of a recently added test object
was attempted the process failed, with the system reporting that no such objected existed.
Of greater concern were the means by which repository operators were required to process
dissemination (and withdrawal) requests. The process was currently extremely reliant upon
manual interactions, using UNIX shell interface. For disseminations a script was executed
and it was up to the operator to provide details of the authorised individual requesting the
content, which could be obtained by performing a manual look up of a relevant table within
the management database. There was significant scope for human error. Additional automa-
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tion would to some extent alleviate this problem and was actively encouraged.
The management of affiliate information (which was required to ensure the appropriate im-
plementation of access policies) was rather crude. Database tables were updated manually
and could conceivably be accidentally or maliciously altered to permit illegitimate dissem-
ination or withdrawal requests. It was therefore suggested that more restrictive interfaces
were developed to limit the opportunities for sidestepping or subverting repository policies
at the database level.
Technologies, Technical Infrastructure and Security
Technical Platform The archive archive’s technical infrastructure was part of a wider
system associated with the datacentre as a whole. DAITSS itself runs within a Linux en-
vironment, and the chosen distribution at the archive was Red Hat Enterprise version 4. In
addition to the core operating system software DAITSS relies upon Sun Java and the MySQL
database server. Archival storage was managed by IBM’s Tivoli software, a proprietary so-
lution deployed in a wide and diverse range of storage environments.
Redundancy DAITSS supports multiple archival master copies, for the purposes of re-
dundancy. Within the archive configuration three copies were maintained. A Tivoli client
was installed upon the DAITSS Linux server. At ingest the system packaged and sent the
archival files via Ethernet to an IBM AIX Tivoli server, based in Gainesville at the host in-
stitution’s Computing and Networking Services (CNS). This in turn connected via a storage
area network switch to the tape robot and library at the same location, committing two sepa-
rately addressable copies of the AIP. The CNS Tivoli server also connected via the Internet to
a further IBM AIX Tivoli machine located at North West Regional Data Center (NWRDC)
in Tallahassee, where a third copy of the AIP was committed to tape. There were plans to
simplify this model in the near future, installing a Tivoli for Linux server on the DAITSS
machine, which, it was expected, would streamline the process. It was suggested that if AIP
packages were stored as a series of independent files it could be difficult to maintain dissem-
ination performance as content scales, and files becoming increasingly fragmented. It was
possible that a single AIP could become distributed, requiring multiple passes over multi-
ple tapes. This would also have implications for the expected lifetime of the media. The
Tivoli storage manager could be configured to store files physically closer on archival me-
dia, although doing so could have merely transferred the processing overhead to ingest. An
alternative solution would have been to package AIP content within a single, uncompressed
format such as tar.
Tivoli’s data management relied upon its own proprietary database, which made the system’s
ability to disseminate completely dependent on its availability. It was possible to export con-
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tent from within the Tivoli-based environment, for instance using the tar command. This
doesn’t represent a significant concern; the software was in wide international use by a range
of organisations, including many (such as national banks) for whom sustainable and persis-
tent access to content were multi-million dollar concerns. IBM were very unlikely to simply
withdraw Tivoli without warning, and similarly their existence seemed assured for at least
the foreseeable future. While an openly accessible form would be desirable, the extent of
management functionality offered by Tivoli probably outweighed the concerns associated
with the proprietary barriers it presented for simple access.
Integrity Validation At the point of ingest the DAITSS system performed fixity checks
to ensure that each master copy was identical. Since any AIP interactions were actioned
by re-ingesting content these synchronous fixity checks would be undertaken at the point of
dissemination or the execution of new preservation strategies. Staff offered a limited descrip-
tion of mechanisms and policies embedded in the DAITSS software code to resolve fixity
inconsistencies, but as noted this was undocumented. There did not appear to be any explicit
procedures or mechanisms to report bit loss or corruption to repository administration. The
fact that no bit loss had yet been incurred was a weak justification for the absence of such
mechanisms.
Storage media were refreshed annually, with a scheduled job within Tivoli to transfer all
stored content to new tapes on the 9th of November. In addition, Tivoli supported a range
of functionality to determine tape deterioration or increased error probability. A healthily
paranoid level of administration was consistently maintained, and any tapes that prompted
concerns would no longer be written to, and content immediately transferred to an alternative
fresh tape.
System Updates System updates were undertaken based on a needs and risk based as-
sessment. Numerous security mailing lists were subscribed to in order to determine potential
problems associated with software that may need to be patched. New and update packages
were installed using the Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) and updates made available via
Red Hat’s Update Agent. Upgrading was tested within the controlled environment in Talla-
hassee on legacy hardware that corresponded closely with the live configuration. This also
demonstrated that the system operate adequately on even old hardware and offered a de-
gree of assurances that its performance and functionality will be optimal on the production
system. The archive staff met with system administrators on a biweekly basis providing
an opportunity to plan software and hardware maintenance and customisation to suit any
emerging user needs.
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Backup Management Backups were performed regularly, with DAITSS system soft-
ware and the MySQL management database included within the procedure. Three archival
copies of AIPs were maintained at all times as discussed above. Although some datacentre
software was also accommodated at the San Diego Supercomputer Center the archive con-
tent was not currently included. It was suggested that relationships should be continuously
pursued with more geographically diverse organisations in order to conceive and build recip-
rocal agreements to mutually accommodate content. Although no complete system recovery
tests had been undertaken, datacentre staff described a number of occasions where individ-
ual items had been recovered. It was noted that system administrator staff claimed to have
undertaken simulations of data destruction and recovery from Tallahassee, which were ap-
parently successful, but this was not documented in a prominent place, and appeared to be
an ad-hoc test. Some aspects of this were covered in the archive’s (at the time unfinished)
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), conceived to meet state legislature requirements.
This described the steps to overcome problems associated with disaster, although omitted to
describe the specific steps required to reestablish the archive service or the location of key
documentation.
There was little question of the suitability of hardware at either the CNS or NWRDC sites.
Both featured dedicated machines for processing and storage, which were new and subject
to appropriate renewal schedules. At Gainesville all but some networking facilities were
exclusively deployed for the archive. Similarly, the tape robot at NWRDC was leased solely
by the archive. At the time of the evaluation this arrangement was due to expire shortly and
it was thought that for little additional financial outlay the archive would be able to buy their
own tape robot, which would be housed at NWRDC.
Physical Security Infrastructure The level of security implemented at the physical
facilities at Gainesville’s CNS and within the associated DAITSS software was impressive.
Secondary accounts of the security at Tallahassee’s NWRDC suggest a similar high quality
setup. Electronic locks protected the central machine room and each of the core network fiber
huts. All doors opening to public spaces were configured to fail to a secure state. Alarms
were immediately investigated by local staff or referred to campus police. Key fobs and
proximity cards were required for access, with rights granted based on work requirements
and staff integration needs. This meant that most technical staff would have access to the
areas in which the archive machines were based. PIN codes were required in addition to
physical fobs during non-working hours. A variety of environmental security measures were
also implemented, with heat and water detection facilities subject to continuous monitoring.
Uninterrupted power supply facilities provided power for all computer equipment in the
event of grid failure, and a diesel generator offered a day’s power for all systems before it
needs to be refueled. The only perceivable shortcoming from a physical perspective were the
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lack of hurricane proof windows within the central server room which were in any case due
for imminent installation.
NWRDC was a bespoke secure data centre, and therefore physically optimised to ensure
security, accessibility and connectivity. Non-stop security monitoring, video surveillance, air
temperature and humidity control and monitoring, and redundant cooling were all available.
Lightning protection, smoke detection and fire suppression and emergency power were also
provided.
A notable concern was the lack of geographical diversity between the two sites, and one
might conceive of a disaster (natural or otherwise) that might render both sites non-operational.
The datacentre director described an informal hurricane threat assessment exercise that sug-
gested that the chances of a single hurricane affecting both sites was very low; however,
two hurricanes might occur simultaneously or in quick succession. The biggest continuity
issues were largely organisational and the archive had already demonstrated a willingness to
collaborate (notably with California Digital Library) to address these.
Logical Security Infrastructure Passwords were rotated every one hundred and eighty
days, and were strictly enforced to include numbers, letters, punctuation, upper and lower
case characters. A single database user permitted insert and delete rights, although these
were applied to all tables (although according to established workflows only the affiliate
user information should ever be changed by a human user). These rights could therefore be
restricted to limit insert and delete privileges more strictly. DAITSS scripts were executable
by the five IT staff within the DAITSS group, and config files were editable only by these
individuals. Of more concern was the issue highlighted earlier was that there was potential
for human error during the processing of scripts. It was suggested that applications and user
interfaces should be refined to maximise automation, limit manual interactions and render
the system less vulnerable to accidental or malicious misuse.
Managing Risk Another issued noted earlier concerns the creation of an organisational
risk register. Its omission was of relevance throughout every aspect of archival operations.
Some aspects of risk were covered in the archive’s Incident Event Threat Matrix, but greater
effort should have been invested into identifying the risks that threaten the business activities
of the archive (i.e., the provision of preservation services) in economic, organisational, digital
object management and information security terms. Each could be catalogued alongside
details of their probability and impact, and descriptions of the repository’s means to mitigate
their likelihood or provide contingencies in the event of their occurrence or non-occurrence.
A further suggestion relates to certification; it was noted that system administration staff had
been awarded various software certificates of competence and this was important in eliciting
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trust. In addition to this, it was thought potentially valuable for the archive or datacentre more
widely to welcome auditors within the organisation to certify information security provisions
(according to international standards such as ISO 27001).
Conclusions
The archive provided an invaluable service to their state-wide affiliates and their efforts had
been broadly successful. The infrastructure that had been established, the financial support
that had been secured and the firm mandate upon which the archive was founded were all
robust. As well as developing an infrastructure that corresponds favourably with much of the
central work in this area, the archive staff demonstrated a keen willingness to determine the
success of their efforts, and had already been quick to identify their weaknesses.
There were many suggestions incorporated in this report, but the most important were prob-
ably those that the archive had already identified themselves. The first was the appointment
of additional staff, with the most high priority being a manager for the archive, who could
engage with affiliates and plan and direct the future administrative and operational direction
of the archive. The archive’s primary goal within the near future was to increase affiliate
numbers and the quantity and quality of content within it and to enhance its reputation.
There was a clearly identifiable need to engage with other organisations to facilitate secure
storage that was sufficiently robust to meet the range of challenges that prejudice the integrity
of our digital assets. Building relationships would enable the conception of succession or es-
crow arrangements, further remote storage of backed up materials, and ultimately, assuming
the emergence of DAITSS as a widely adopted tool, collaboration in systems development
and format description.
At the system level it was vital that the repository implemented a means for ongoing fixity
checking, either conducted in a random or methodical fashion. Without maintaining assur-
ances about information integrity until the point of dissemination there were implicit risks
that even a well implemented backup strategy might fail to solve, if errors, accidents or
malfeasance were noticed too late, and even backed up content demonstrates the emergent
problem.
Another key point that emerged was that many of the problems being addressed in the
archive’s operations were dealt with on a somewhat ad hoc basis. There was little central
coordination of risk or challenges, or of the operational means to overcome them. By com-
posing its own catalogue of risks the archive could better equip itself to manage resource
effectively to meet all of the challenges, at the points where the greatest threats were being
faced.
On the whole though, the archive demonstrated its status as an effective and well managed
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organisation. Its efforts stood up well to even considerable scrutiny according to the criteria
within the RLG-NARA check-list, and also to those within comparable efforts such as the
German nestor project’s criteria catalogue.
B.7 The Cultural Heritage Archive
Organisational Infrastructure
Mission and Mandate The archive’s primary mission as described by its staff (although
not formally documented in a mission statement) was to provide access to its stored content,
with preservation a notably lower priority. Discussions with repository staff confirmed that
preservation was not a primary objective, and remained more of a by-product, or implicit part
of providing ongoing access. However, agreements with funding organisations suggested
that this view was not completely representative. At the time, and until the dissolution of
the Arts and Humanities Data Servic, AHRC funding was provided with a general condition
that electronic materials generated from funded activities should be deposited to this central
resource for preservation. The archives funding contained a waiver to this deposit request;
part of its justification in seeking this waiver was that alternative arrangements were in place
for long-term preservation, and that the archives databases would “continue to be preserved
and migrated”.
Succession Arrangements Succession or contingency plans were vague if not non-
existent. A perception existed that should the archive fail, the University which provided
the operational context for the archive would assume custodial responsibility for the archival
holdings and ensure their continued and ongoing availability, such was the extent to which
their value was recognised. However notwithstanding this confident attitude, there were
apparently no formal assurances that this would be the case.
Staffing The archive employed four academic staff including a principal archivist, two
full time staff with content responsibilities and a further individual who although retired
continued to contribute. A fifth, and final staff member, employed on what appeared to be
a semi-consultancy basis, was responsible for the repository’s technical infrastructure. This
individual lived a considerable distance from the archive itself, and his presence required a
car journey of several hours consequently he was rarely available on-site to deal with aris-
ing issues. Interviews revealed an internally held perception that there are insufficient staff,
although this was a common contention in many working environments and was unlikely
to definitively prove that numbers fall short of what’s appropriate to support all functions
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and services. Little evidence existed to demonstrate that duties have been formally identi-
fied, described and allocated within the archive; indeed, the suggestion was that all the staff
contribute in a diverse selection of areas towards the archive’s overall goals. There was lit-
tle question of the competence of the archive’s academic staff in terms of the content they
were responsible for maintaining. Their qualifications and considerable expertise were self-
evident. Similarly, the broad competence of the single technical staff member was clear.
There was some suggestion of knowledge shortfalls with respect to some aspects of digi-
tal preservation, described in more detail in the Digital Object Management section below.
Of some concern was the fact that there was little evidence of the availability of ongoing
professional skills development, with the archive favouring an ad-hoc approach to training
that implicitly required staff to learn whatever was needed during the course of business.
Such a strategy may result in further knowledge shortfalls an independent mechanism for
identifying training requirements where they are necessary, based on both internal needs or
expectations and external developments tends to benefit staff and facilitate and legitimise
their efforts.
Designated Community The archive’s designated community remained determinedly
broad; schools, universities, scholars or interested members of the public were identified
as being part of what was a fairly wide and heterogeneous user group. Consequently, a
similarly diverse knowledge base was assumed. Data was generally not annotated within
the database; instead stored in a raw format and presented via the web alongside additional
descriptive information. Few assumptions were made about the user community’s abilities,
service level expectations or available software or systems. End user software requirements
were similarly undemanding; users could access the majority of the archive’s materials using
just a stock web browser. Notwithstanding this, in terms of the audit criteria there were
recognisable shortcomings in the failure to formally document definitions or policies in a
publicly accessible space. Similarly, the apparent absence of mechanisms to review or update
policies over time represented a failure to comply with the strict criteria.
Technical Review and Development Discussions suggested that the archive’s accom-
modating institution demonstrates a commitment to periodic technological review, but in re-
ality this was performed reactively. New developments had been motivated mainly by the
identification of problems, shortcomings, or loss of functionality. A good example was the
introduction of the content management system to assist in the administration of the web
pages that represented the database’s main interface for end user access. This followed a
wider institutional move to better satisfy the requirements of the Disability Discrimination
Act, which cover various accessibility characteristics of web pages. Implementing the re-
quired changes to the previously static web content would have been an onerous undertaking,
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and therefore an alternative technological solution was installed. Despite the lack of formal
prior planning that characterised the archive’s approach to technological developments the
staff remained adamant that this has never resulted in a threat to the integrity or survival of
digital assets within the repository. Changes that have taken place within the system were
not formally documented, although an ad-hoc understanding of the system development had
been maintained. Given the fact that the digital archive’s lifetime has been observed from
conception through each stage of development by the principal archivist it was argued that
sufficient institutional understanding exists.
Stakeholder relationships Feedback from producers was rare, if not non-existent, and
this related to the distant relationship between the archive and the creators of the original
analogue content that was digitised to provide much of the digital archival collection. User
feedback was similarly seldom referred to some eight thousand users had registered to access
the advanced features of the archive, and therefore the archive was aware of their consumers’
identities. However, little use was made of this information, or of further details originating
from this source.
Transparency Undoubtedly the greatest concern with respect to policies and procedures
was the lack of transparency, accountability and documentation that surrounded much of the
archive’s efforts. Notwithstanding the clear indicators of success in terms of funding consis-
tency, user numbers and community reputation, there was little in place to facilitate under-
standing or sustainability, or to enable a newcomer to continue to build on the preceding ef-
forts. In terms of accountability in particular the archive adopts a bullish approach, where the
absence of a charge for their services translated to an apparent sense of non-accountability.
The primary role embraced by staff appeared to be to add value to the materials, with preser-
vation of lesser concern. This view did not appear to conform to terms of funding which
compelled the archive to act as custodian and preserver of digital assets arising from funded
activities; indeed the archive’s own deposit waiver applications offered a commitment to un-
dertake these activities as an alternative to the AHDS. Information integrity measures were
defined, but not formally documented, although it seems that these were exclusively related
to the creation, acquisition and ingest of new content. Once assets become resident within
the database there was little evidence of ongoing integrity checks. No mechanisms existed
to provide on demand measurements of information integrity.
Financial Infrastructure The financial platform upon which the archive was constructed
appeared somewhat fragile. Funding was obtained almost exclusively from short term grants,
awarded as a result of the self motivation, reputation and determination of the archive’s prin-
cipal administrator. Her role was such that she had become an integral part of the archive,
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to the extent that its sustainability seemed to at least some extent dependent on her contin-
ued involvement. The community goodwill generated seemed linked to her, as much as the
archive itself, to the extent that the two were almost indistinguishable. There was a clear
perception that should she walk away it would have been extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible for another individual to replace her. Part of the archive’s funding reflects this - the
principal archivist position was the only one within the archive financed centrally by the
accommodating University; however, this funding was contingent on the individual then in
place continuing to assume the role. No new appointment would be centrally funded. Gen-
erally speaking, the accumulation of funding was conducted in a fairly ad-hoc fashion. The
European Commission, the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the British Academy
were among the archive’s funders. Anecdotal evidence suggested that around 30 per cent of
grants applications had been successful. There had been suggestions that the accommodating
University had considered providing more permanent funding, given the significant resource
that the archive had evolved into, but this remained formally unsubstantiated. Despite the
apparent financial instability, the archive had a degree of security in terms of its physical col-
lection (which accompanied the digital resource), which, it was argued, the University would
preserve indefinitely, although the less tangible digital assets may not enjoy such assurances.
It was suggested a more significant risk was to staff positions, and not the electronic ma-
terials themselves. However, despite this concern, and the fact that employment contracts
were provided on a six-monthly rolling basis, the length of service of staff was considerable,
with three principal employees enjoying twenty, ten and eight years of service respectively.
As described above, the principal archivist’s position would continue even in the event of a
cessation of funding. In such circumstances it was suggested that maintenance and delivery
of the electronic resource would continue, although it would no longer grow.
Business planning Business planning appeared to be undertaken on a very short term
basis in response to circumstances at any given time. The possibility for self-sustainability
through paid-for-services had been explored to a limited extent; one potential revenue stream
was from the provision of researcher-specific databases. The archive made it clear that while
not averse to such developments, insufficient time or opportunities had so far been avail-
able for their realisation. It was argued that such changes would generate a degree of ad-
ministrative workload that would stretch or perhaps exceed the capabilities of the existing
infrastructure.
Risk Management Risk management was not formally documented, but seemingly well
understood throughout the archive’s staff. Rather than formalising risks in a risk-register
or equivalent document, risks were explored and mitigated by planning for broad scenarios.
It was assumed that any threatening technological consequences could be overcome by the
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technological expertise available in-house, and that although depletion or cessation of fund-
ing would inhibit the data archive’s growth, it would not be terminal to the continuation of
delivery services. Sustainability in the event of a combination of both funding lapses and
technological barriers were less well addressed. The consequences of key personnel leaving
the archive were likely to be profound. It was suggested by staff that the technical director
role could be assumed by another, and that the principal archivist role could be continued,
given the momentum already established. However, there was a seriouse shortfall in doc-
umentation within the archive, which could exacerbate the implications of staff loss. The
technological systems were documented from an end user perspective but little documen-
tation was available for prospective developers to inherit and understand the system to the
extent that it could be confidently administered. Similarly, almost every aspect of archival
policies and procedures (although seemingly well established among repository staff, and
reflected at least partially in the system’s imposed workflow) remained undocumented.
Legal Issues The archive faced a number of potentially problematic legal concerns,
which to date had been managed adequately, but, it was considered, may threaten the on-
going viability of the archive. The legal status of much of the material within the database
remained quite unclear. No formal relationship was maintained with information publishers
or producers; instead the archive’s principal researchers operated quite independently, ac-
quiring digital materials from analogue sources based on little more than their availability.
Legal guidance had been sought in the past with regard to the dissemination of copyright
controlled image materials; the suggestion then was that since the chance of rights holders
seeking legal redress was negligible the archive needn’t deviate from its existing practice.
The repository administration offered three main justifications for continuing to distribute
copyrighted materials these were the lack of charge levied by the archive for access to ma-
terials; the excellent track record that the archive had established as an authoratitve source;
and the community interests that were being served it was argued that in the absence of the
archive there would be no way for these demands to be met.
The lack of appropriate contracts or deposit agreements, and the legally questions surround-
ing data gathering procedures were a concern, and almost certainly represented a risk to the
viability of the archive. The restrictions imposed on usage (content was free for personal
and academic usage; copyright notices; digital watermarks and SPIFF technology used to
encode copyright holders name intrinsically to images) would not necessarily satisfy con-
tent creators in the event of their legal objections. Reciprocal agreements were sporadically
in place, enabling the archive to digitise content in exchange for appropriate credit on their
web site and were worthwhile, but could be better formalised in order to limit the risk of
legal liability. Even in those circumstances where producers or publishers directly inter-
acted with the archive no formal written agreements existed. Irrespective of the fact that
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such legal challenges might have been overcome by withdrawing content from the publicly
accessible archive, the impact in terms of wasted staff time could have been considerable.
The archive described only positive feedback from publishers, who according to anecdotal
evidence regarded the archive’s use of their materials as beneficial. Nonetheless, none would
agree to waive copyright, and arrangements would have benefited from being more formally
expressed.
The lack of legal controls was also problematic due to its impact on funding requirements,
notably those imposed by the AHRC. Due to legal circumstances the archive had demon-
strated an understandable reluctance to deposit content; it was thought that such behaviour
might imply ownership. Instead the archive was required to commit to preservation activi-
ties which added to their core objectives to present content, and discussions suggested that
preservation remained a very low priority for the archive, despite the fact that continued
funding was contingent upon it.
Digital Object Management
The actual management of digital content within the archive fell some way short of the best
practice espoused in such standards as ISO 14721 (Reference Model for an Open Archival In-
formation System), but this was expected given that the overarching objective of the archive
was the provision of access, and it was to this end that most resource was committed.
Information Properties Properties of material to be preserved were expressed as database
fields within the archive’s bespoke software. These consisted of a range of relevant kinds of
information, and included descriptive and discovery metadata. There were no compulsory
fields, and therefore no characteristics of the objects regarded as uniformly integral to preser-
vation success. Little or no material was ‘added’ to the content ingested into the database.
In fact, what might be identified as metadata information in almost every case represented
part of the core digital object being preserved and made available to the user community.
Issues surrounding the authenticity of the materials’ source are largely moot, given that they
arrived in physical, analogue form, and were digitised prior to ingest. Some images did ar-
rive at the archive in digital form, mainly from contributing museums, but there was little
evidence of a formally instantiated process for determining their authenticity. Complete-
ness and correctness of accessioned content was to some extent verified within the software
system; controlled terminology lists were imposed, with warnings prompted by the input
of unfamiliar terms, an approval system contributed to the quality assurance process and the
system offered the capability to merge records that were essentially the same. However, there
was little evidence of appropriate policies for determining the extent to which content must
be complete and correct, or what this precisely means within this organisational context.
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Preservation Responsibility Once more, in apparent contrast to their funding require-
ments, archive staff argued that at no point was preservation responsibility accepted for the
contents of materials that are ultimately accepted for archival storage.
Archival Storage There was little evidence of archival storage policies or procedures,
and once more this mainly related to the low priority with which preservation was perceived
within the archive. Notwithstanding this, some aspects of good preservation practice were
in place. For instance MS Windows Globally Unique IDs were generated for each object,
and these were stored within the database as part of the corresponding digital object’s tuple.
However, there were no visible mechanisms in place to ensure the ongoing completeness
and correctness, or integrity of archived content, in addition to those that take place during
the ingest process. For instance, no fixity checks were introduced; although database logs
would reveal any manual or system interventions to stored content they would not record
other changes or data corruptions. Such factors could otherwise have been identified using
checksum data, like MD5 or SHA for instance. The discussions during the audit revealed that
the web server had been compromised, although there was no evidence of database changes.
This assessment of “no harm done” was questioned, especially given the shortfalls in protec-
tion described above. Irrespective, following such a compromise information security best
practice was to rebuild, reverting to trusted back-ups to reassemble content. This was not
done the reason given was that the archive would be imminently moving to a new machine
anyway - and although University computer services were consulted for advice it appeared
that a risky strategy was pursued. Some two hundred thousand records existed at the time
of the assessment within the various databases, but since there was no accession log it was
difficult to resolve to what extent the inventory was complete and correct.
Preservation Strategies Preservation strategies within the archive were undertaken in
a fairly limited, ad-hoc manner, and were motivated or influenced by mainly non-object-
centric factors. For instance, hardware refreshment was undertaken, but based on little more
than resource availability, with new project funding usually provoking new hardware pur-
chases. Insufficient resources were available to ensure the availability of other preservation
or migration strategies. Other changes were introduced to facilitate delivery functionality,
rather than the preservation of content; for instance, when it became clear that the system’s
Ingres database was incapable of accommodating image data the archive updated to a system
with this functionality.
Metadata and Representation Information Representation Information was not for-
mally relied upon, maintained or documented within the archive, although a variety of in-
formation that was associated with the digital materials might have been loosely termed as
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such. For instance, a dictionary of terminology was maintained to assist in the interpretation
of database entries, although neither this nor its entries were explicitly linked to relevant
materials. Similarly, the SPIFF format used as a container format for images throughout
the archive (itself an ISO standard) supported the recording of metadata in the form of a
registrar-assigned ‘license-plates’, enabling various bibliographic and copyright information
to be encapsulated within the images themselves.
The understandability of information content was to some extent measured on an ongoing
basis; academics ran tutorials with students who actively used the database and in that re-
spect acted as guinea-pigs; their insights were used as a gauge to assist in the determination
of emerging expectations. Organisational fluidity had been demonstrated on numerous oc-
casions by the archive, and a flexible approach to expectations had enabled systemic change
on the basis of end user needs.
No minimum metadata requirements were in place within the archive in fact, since the
metadata in almost every circumstance represented part of the content of the digital object,
it varied greatly, and depended on little more than availability. Some records were no more
than an un-captioned image there were no formal review mechanisms if metadata was short
or incomplete and in system terms, no required fields when content was accessioned.
Preservation Validation In terms of preservation success, the archive was confident
that it has lost no content throughout the full extent of its twenty-five year lifetime, despite a
number of system migrations. This claim might be treated with a degree of scepticism given
the lack of documentation about exactly what was expected to be within the collection.
Providing Access Access to the digital collection was provided exclusively via the web,
and via this interface information was offered about the range of delivery options avail-
able. Access was restricted by the user managements system built into the archive’s bespoke
database, and for anonymous access interactions were logged. In the absence of formal
access agreements, access terms were published prominently via the site, and digital water-
marking and the SPIFF license plate represented measures that to some extent ensured users’
adherence.
No formal means are available to demonstrate that the process that generated requested digi-
tal materials was complete (in relation to the request). However, this could have been imple-
mented by reference to fixity information or the raw XML within the database.
All users were afforded read only access, although registration was necessary to access a
comprehensive range of materials. Contribution rights were available by application, to ei-
ther the principal archivist or technical director. The trustworthiness of authorised contribu-
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tors, was beyond the scope of this assessment, although for completeness should be regarded
as part of the repository, and therefore should be subjected to similar scrutiny.
Technologies and Technical Infrastructure
Technology Foundation The archive’s system operated on the Microsoft Windows
Server OS, an industry standard for web delivered materials and Microsoft’s SQL server
database provided the data back-end. The actual bespoke database system that provided
the information environment for storage, was not well documented, but it was argued by the
archive’s technical director that the code, written in Microsoft’s Active Server Pages was self
explanatory, and could be straightforwardly inherited and understood, enabling development
to continue. There were additional sub-systems with more obscure origins a Sun Java pro-
gram for image zooming was available (including source code) and, although this required
maintenance (specifically to introduce support for watermarks), there were few non-trivial
barriers. More troublesome was the Minerva tool that facilitated the processing of SPIFF
files, the container format for images within the archive. This existed only within binary
form, and although it works fine on the current platform would be difficult to replace in the
event of compatibility loss.
Backups and Synchronisation Backups procedures appeared adequate, with an onsite
backup server providing a daily copy, backups to the institutional backup service collected
every second day and off-site tapes recording weekly backups up to six months. Off-site
copies, while not within the same physical building, were nonetheless stored within the Uni-
versity campus. No ‘fire-drill’ recovery had been undertaken, in a full sense, although indi-
vidual files and databases had been successfully retrieved from backup storage. At the time
of the audit there were plans to undertake a full experimental recovery.
Synchronisation was maintained by ensuring that any changes within the system created a
brand new database record, with every tuple that was part of a single revision history sharing
identifiers and associated XML content. Image information remained generally static after
accession, but in the rare circumstances where this was not the case (for instance, if images
were scanned poorly and required re-ingestion) a link to the original image was updated to
point towards the replacement.
Technology Update and Replacement As noted above, hardware and storage media
refreshment was pursued where sufficient money and opportunities were available. It was
suggested that in the event of actual server failure money could be found, although in com-
mon with many aspects of the archive, no formal contingency mechanisms were in place,
and this was not documented anywhere. Decisions during periods of change were generally
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implemented in order to enhance the access platform. An example was the archive’s move
to SQL server, motivated by a high maintenance overhead of twenty separate databases and
the fact that the MS Access database in use at the time was suffering from capacity issues.
Updates to software systems were mainly administered centrally from within the accom-
modating University’s network systems management services, and their testing and imple-
mentation policies were unavailable at the time of the audit. Critical changes to the system
were evaluated using a trial database that ran in parallel with the live system, and could be
undertaken within the live system if successful.
The archive claimed to maintain a security conscious approach had little supporting docu-
mentation. Only archive staff had physical access to the server itself (protected by card based
door security systems), and administrative login rights were available only to the archive’s
technical director and the University network systems management services. General access
was limited by user accounts, within a comprehensive and granular permissions system. Sys-
tem security was further facilitated using SSL to encrypt traffic between users’ browsers and
web servers, strong passwords were enforced, IP address-based authentication was supported
and OS and database logs were consistently monitored.
Disaster planning was not documented at all, and although the archive’s technical director
suggested that the availability of backups guarantees that the worst outcome could be the
loss of a single day’s work, this should have been detailed in a significantly more considered
fashion, outlining the risks, the ways in which they are mitigated and any contingencies in
place.
Conclusions
Assessed according to the strict terms outlined within the audit check-list the approach
adopted by the archive raised questions in a number of areas. However, given the historical
success of the archive, and the esteem that it clearly enjoyed among its target communities
it would be difficult to dismiss its efforts according to just these metrics. The most notable
shortcoming was the lack of formal documentation that characterised much of the business
activities of the archive. There can be little doubt that its current staff were competent in
their positions, and that there was a shared sense of duty, responsibility and role. Simi-
larly, the life cycle of content that was accessioned, archived and disseminated seemed well
understood. Likewise, surrounding procedures were, although not formally communicated
anywhere, well known. Without the discussions undertaken during this assessment there
would have been little scope for forming any kind of organisational assessment. There was
concern that a new staff member would face a similar struggle to understand the organisa-
tion’s mechanisms, policies and scope without recourse to a resource within which they are
formally, objectively and unambiguously expressed.
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Associated with documentary shortcomings were issues concerning the archive’s policy in a
number of key areas. Legal questions abounded, and there seemed to be few formal assur-
ances that the archive had legal authority to maintain much of its digital collections. Where
agreements were in place they were generally informal or bore more similarity to ‘under-
standings’. Relationships with organisations providing content should have been more for-
mally established to provide the archive with the necessary protection to enable it to continue
its business.
A similar problem followed with respect to the user communities closely related to internal
documentation and transparency was the external issue of community trust. Based on its
track record the archive had established a dedicated user base, and although one cannot dis-
miss the success with which this has been preserved for several years, there was a danger that
without better external expression of their policies and procedures this might be threatened.
Preservation policy was perhaps even more of a widespread problem. Frequently described
in this case study was an organisational uncertainty about the role of the archive with re-
spect to preservation, and this ambiguity manifested itself in an approach to digital object
management that fell short of that described in such best-practice benchmarks as OAIS for
instance.
A further issue associated with sustainability that was of concern was the extent to which
the staff, most notably the principal archivist were inextricably associated with the archive.
Given the extent to which the latter’s dedication, self-motivation and wide range of contacts
had offered a degree of fiscal security to the archive during its lifetime there was a notable risk
that her departure would be difficult to overcome. Partly this was an organisational concern
her position existed (and was therefore centrally funded) only for as long as she continued to
occupy it. The other factor was less quantifiable, but nonetheless persuasive, and was based
on her unique personality and knowledge. That the archive had existed so successfully for
over twenty-five years with little evidence of service disruption or data loss appeared to re-
late, to at least some extent, to the fact that the archive had enjoyed tremendous staff stability
throughout its period of existence. Perhaps true sustainability could only be demonstrated,
and this concern addressed, following a rotation of staff, where new individuals are expected
to take over in key archive roles.
Overall the audit exercise identified a series of shortcomings that for the most part would
probably manifest themselves only during a period of organisational disruption or change,
or in the event of one or more unforeseen contingencies. However, it seemed that little was
in place to mitigate such problems should they arise, and within the organisational model
limited resource seemed available to do so. Many of the problems could be traced back to
a lack of documentation and discussions highlighted concerns about the limited extent to
which policies, procedures and legal relationships are formalised. Policies and workflows
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were clearly well-ingrained into the management and archival activities needed to be more
straightforwardly communicable to stakeholders in order to elicit trust.
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